

Third Edition

# The Culture of Critique

An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish  
Involvement in Twentieth-Century  
Intellectual and Political Movements

Kevin MacDonald



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## PREFACE TO THE 2025 EDITION

*The Culture of Critique* (hereafter CofC) was originally published in 1998 by Praeger, an academic publisher. The thesis of the book is a difficult one indeed—difficult not only because it is difficult to establish, but also because it challenges many fundamental assumptions about our contemporary intellectual and political existence.

CofC describes how Jewish intellectuals initiated and advanced a number of important intellectual and political movements during the twentieth century. I argue that these movements are attempts to alter Western societies in a manner that would neutralize or end anti-Semitism and enhance the prospects for Jewish group continuity and upward mobility either in an overt or in a semi-cryptic manner. Several of these Jewish movements (e.g., Jewish activism promoting the shift in immigration policy favoring non-European peoples) have attempted to weaken the power of their perceived competitors—the European peoples who early in the twentieth century had assumed a dominant position not only in their traditional homelands in Europe, but also in the United States and the wider Anglosphere. At a theoretical level, these movements are viewed as the outcome of conflicts of interest between Jews and non-Jews in the construction of culture and in various public policy issues. Ultimately, these movements are viewed as the expression of a group evolutionary strategy by Jews in their competition for social, political, and cultural dominance with non-Jews.

Here I attempt to answer some typical criticisms that have been leveled against CofC.<sup>1</sup> I also discuss issues raised by several books that have appeared since the publication of CofC.

There have been criticisms that I am viewing Judaism as a monolithic entity. This is definitely not the case. Rather, with all the movements that I discuss, my methodology has been as follows:

(1) Find influential movements dominated by Jews, with no implication that all or most Jews are involved in these movements and no restrictions on what the movements are. For example, I touch on Jewish neoconservatism (Ch. 4), which is a departure in some ways from the other movements I discuss. In general, relatively few Jews were involved in most of these movements, and significant numbers of Jews may have been unaware of their existence. Even Jewish leftist radicalism—surely the most widespread and influential Jewish subculture of the twentieth century—may have been a minority movement within Jewish communities in the United States and other Western societies for most periods. As a result, when I criticize these movements, I am not necessarily criticizing most Jews. Nevertheless, these movements were influential, and they were Jewishly motivated.

(2) Determine whether the Jewish participants in these movements both identified as Jews *and* thought of their involvement in the movement as advancing specific Jewish interests. Motivations for involvement may be unconscious or involve self-deception, but for the most part it was quite easy and straightforward to find evidence for both these propositions. If I thought that self-deception was important (as in the case of many Jewish radicals), I provided evidence that in fact they did identify as Jews and were deeply concerned about Jewish issues, despite surface appearances to the contrary.

Thus it does not stand or fall on whether Jews in a particular movement constitute more than their percentage of the population as a whole, whether Jews in general are ethnocentric, the rate of Jewish intermarriage, or whether most Jews were even aware of particular movements—criticisms that have been leveled at CofC by Nathan Cofnas.<sup>2</sup> The focus is on describing the Jewish identities of the main figures of influential movements and their concern with specific Jewish issues, such as combating anti-Semitism, as well as the dynamics of these movements—ethnic networking, centering around charismatic figures, connections with prestigious universities and media, involvement of the organized Jewish community, and non-Jews who participated in the movements and their motivations.

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<sup>1</sup> See also my website: <http://www.kevinmacdonald.net/replies.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> See my article in *Philosophia* (MacDonald, 2022b), which was then retracted and republished in *The Occidental Quarterly* (MacDonald, 2022a) along with a discussion of the retraction.

(3) Attempt to gauge the influence of these movements on gentile society. Keep in mind that the influence of an intellectual or political movement dominated by Jews is independent of the percentage of the Jewish community that is involved in or supports the movement.

(4) Try to show how non-Jews responded to these movements—for example, were they a source of anti-Semitism?

Several of the movements I discuss have been very influential in the social sciences. However, I do not argue that there are no Jews who do good social science, and in fact I provide a list of prominent Jewish social scientists who in my opinion do not meet the conditions outlined under (2) above (see Ch. 2). If there was evidence that these social scientists identified as Jews and had a Jewish agenda in doing social science (definitely not for most of those listed, but possibly true in the case of Richard J. Herrnstein—see below), then they would have been candidates for inclusion in the book. The people I cite as contributing to evolutionary or biological perspectives are indeed ethnically Jewish, but for most of them I have no idea whether they either have a strong Jewish identity or if they have a Jewish agenda in pursuing their research simply because there is no evidence to be found in their work or elsewhere. If there is evidence that a prominent evolutionary biologist identifies as a Jew and views his work in sociobiology or evolutionary psychology as advancing his perception of Jewish interests, then he or she could have been in *CofC* as an example of the phenomenon under study rather than as simply a scientist working in the area of evolutionary studies.

Interestingly, in the case of one of those I mention, Richard J. Herrnstein, Alan Ryan (1994) writes, “Herrnstein essentially wants the world in which clever Jewish kids or their equivalent make their way out of their humble backgrounds and end up running Goldman Sachs or the Harvard physics department.” This is a stance that is typical, I suppose, of neoconservatism, a Jewish intellectual and political movement I discuss in Chapter 4, and it is the sort of thing that, if true, would suggest that Herrnstein did perceive the issues discussed in *The Bell Curve* as affecting Jewish interests in a way that Charles Murray, his co-author, did not. (Ryan contrasts Murray’s and Herrnstein’s worldviews: “Murray wants the Midwest in which he grew up—a world in which the local mechanic didn’t care two cents whether he was or wasn’t brighter than the local math teacher.”) Similarly, twentieth-century theoretical physics does not qualify as a Jewish intellectual movement precisely because there are no signs that Jewish identification and pursuit of Jewish interests were important to the content of the theories or to the conduct of the intellectual movement. Yet Jews have been heavily overrepresented among the ranks of theoretical physicists.

This conclusion remains true even though Albert Einstein, a leading figure among theoretical physicists, was a strongly motivated Zionist (Fölsing,

1993/1997, pp. 494–505), opposed assimilation as a contemptible form of “mimicry” (p. 490), preferred to mix with other Jews whom he referred to as his “tribal companions” (p. 489), embraced the uncritical support for the Bolshevik regime in Russia that was entirely mainstream in the American Jewish community during the 1920s and 1930s, including persistent apology for the Moscow show trials in the 1930s (pp. 644–645), and switched from a high-minded pacifism during World War I to advocating for the development of atomic bombs to defeat Hitler. From his teenage years he disliked the Germans and in later life criticized Jewish colleagues for converting to Christianity and acting like Prussians. He especially disliked Prussians, who were the elite ethnic group in Germany. Reviewing his life at age seventy-three, Einstein declared his ethnic affiliation in no uncertain terms: “My relationship with Jewry had become my strongest human tie once I achieved complete clarity about our precarious position among the nations” (in p. 488). According to Fölsing (p. 488), Einstein had begun developing this clarity from an early age, but did not acknowledge it until much later, a form of self-deception: “As a young man with bourgeois-liberal views and a belief in enlightenment, he had refused to acknowledge [his Jewish identity].”

In other words, the issues of the ethnic identification and even ethnic activism on the part of people like Einstein are entirely separate from the issue of whether such people viewed the content of the theories themselves as furthering Jewish ethnic interests, and, in the case of Einstein, there is no evidence that he did so. The same cannot be said for Jewish movements covered here in which “scientific” theories were fashioned and deployed to advance ethnic group interests. This ideological purpose becomes clear when the unscientific nature of these movements is understood. Much of the discussion in *CofC* documented the intellectual dishonesty, the lack of empirical rigor, the obvious political and ethnic motivation, the expulsion of dissenters, the collusion among co-ethnics to dominate intellectual and academic discourse, and the general lack of scientific spirit that pervaded them. In my view, the scientific weakness of these movements is evidence of their group-strategic function.

Frank Salter’s (2000) review in *Human Ethology Bulletin* discussed some of the controversy surrounding my work, particularly an acrimonious session at the 2000 conference of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society where I was accused of anti-Semitism by several participants. For me the only issue is whether I have been honest in my treatment of sources and whether my conclusions meet the usual standards of scholarly research in the social sciences. Salter notes that I based my research on mainstream sources and that the assertions that have infuriated some colleagues

are not only true but truisms to those acquainted with the diverse literatures involved. Apart from the political sensitivity of the subject, much of the problem facing MacDonald is that his knowledge is often too far ahead of his detractors to allow easy communication; there are not enough shared premises for constructive dialog. Unfortunately the knowledge gap is closing slowly because some of his most hostile critics, including colleagues who make serious ad hominem accusations, have not bothered to read MacDonald's books.

Salter also notes that those, such as John Tooby and Steven Pinker, who have denigrated my competence as a scholar in the media, have failed to provide anything approaching a scholarly critique or refutation of my work.

For twenty years there were no academic critiques of *CofC* despite its being published by an academic publisher. Then, beginning in 2018, Nathan Cofnas published several critiques in academic journals.<sup>3</sup> With the exception of *Philosophia*, an Israeli philosophy journal, those journals did not allow me to reply, but I wrote lengthy responses and posted them on my website. My reply to Cofnas was published by *Philosophia* (MacDonald, 2022b), but as I noted in recounting this episode, this “resulted almost immediately in hostile comments from Jewish academic activists, calls for retraction, and condemnation of the journal’s editor for allowing such a horrifying breach of academic sensibilities to happen” (MacDonald, 2022a). The editor of the journal was eventually replaced and the article retracted after a back-and-forth with three new reviewers.

#### WHY ARE JEWS SO INFLUENTIAL?

Jewish populations have always had enormous effects on the societies in which they reside because of several qualities that are central to the Jewish group evolutionary strategy and likely have been under genetic selection in Ashkenazi Jewish groups. First and foremost, Jews are ethnocentric and able to cooperate in highly organized, cohesive, and effective groups. Also important is high intelligence, including the usefulness of intelligence in attaining wealth, prominence in the media, and eminence in the academic world and the legal profession. I will also discuss two other qualities that have received less attention, psychological intensity and aggressiveness, and finally mention the Jewish guru phenomenon.

The background traits of ethnocentrism, intelligence and wealth, psychological intensity, aggressiveness, and strong charismatic leadership result in

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<sup>3</sup> In the most recent of these critiques, Cofnas (2021) abandons many of the criticisms he previously leveled at my work.

Jews being able to produce formidable, effective groups—groups able to have powerful, transformative effects on the peoples they live among. In the post-Enlightenment world, these traits influence the academic world and the world of popular and elite media, thus amplifying Jewish effectiveness compared with traditional societies. However, even before the Enlightenment Jews have repeatedly become an elite and powerful group in societies in which they reside in sufficient numbers.

It is remarkable that Jews, usually as a tiny minority, have been central to a long list of historical events. Jews were much on the mind of the Church Fathers in the fourth century during the formative years of Christian dominance in the West. Indeed, I have proposed that the powerful anti-Jewish attitudes and legislation of the fourth-century Church must be understood as a defensive reaction against Jewish economic power and enslavement of non-Jews (see *Separation and Its Discontents*, hereafter SAID, MacDonald, 1998/2004a, Ch. 3). Jews who had nominally converted to Christianity but maintained their ethnic ties in marriage and commerce were the focus of the 250-year Inquisition in Spain, Portugal, and the Spanish colonies in the New World. Fundamentally, the Inquisition should be seen as a defensive reaction to the economic and political domination of these “New Christians” (see SAID, Ch. 4).

Nineteenth-century critics of Jews typically complained about Jewish influence in the media and Jewish wealth that often made traditional Western aristocratic elites subservient to them, and, as Richard Wagner famously did, they complained about Jewish influence on culture (MacDonald, 2023c). Jews have also been central to all the important events of the twentieth century. Jews were a necessary component of the Bolshevik revolution that created the Soviet Union and willing participants of horrendous mass murders of its early decades; they remained an elite group in the Soviet Union until well after World War II (Ch. 3). They were a central focus of National Socialism in Germany, in part because of the Jewish role in Bolshevism but also because of their influence in the media and culture in general. Jews have been prime movers of the post-1965 cultural and multicultural/multiethnic revolution in the United States and the West generally, including the encouragement of massive non-White immigration to countries of European origin (see Ch. 8). In the contemporary world, organized American Jewish lobbying groups and deeply committed neoconservative Jews in the George W. Bush administration and the media had a critical role in fomenting wars that benefit Israel (Ch. 4), and neoconservative Jews in the Biden administration have encouraged the all-out support for Ukraine against Russia and for Israel against Hamas. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) is leading the campaign to dilute the First Amendment in order to expunge social media of ideas they don't like, particularly on X (Twitter), and Jewish billionaires are blacklisting students and withholding funds from universities if they don't express enthusiastic support for Israel



(MacDonald, 2023e). Indeed, I would say that we are once again witnessing an incredible display of Jewish power in the United States.

How can such a tiny minority have such huge effects on the history of the West? Part of the story is the individualism of Westerners. In *Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition* (hereafter *Individualism*, MacDonald, 2019a), I develop the view that Europeans are relatively less ethnocentric than other peoples and relatively more prone to individualism, as opposed to the ethnocentric, kinship-based, collectivist social structures which are historically far more characteristic of other human groups, including—relevant to this discussion—Jewish groups (see also Henrich, 2020).

Individualist cultures show relatively little emotional attachment to ingroups. Personal goals are paramount, and socialization emphasizes the importance of self-reliance, independence, individual responsibility, and “finding yourself” (Triandis, 1991, p. 82). Individualists have more positive attitudes toward strangers and outgroup members and are more likely to behave in a pro-social, altruistic manner to strangers. People in individualist cultures are less aware of ingroup-outgroup boundaries and thus are less likely to have negative attitudes toward outgroup members. They often disagree with ingroup policy, show little emotional commitment or loyalty to ingroups, and do not have a sense of common fate with other ingroup members. Opposition to outgroups occurs in individualist societies, but the opposition is more “rational” in the sense that there is less of a tendency to suppose that all of the outgroup members are culpable. Individualists form mild attachments to many groups, while collectivists have an intense attachment to and identification with a few ingroups (Triandis, 1990, p. 61). We tend to see people as individuals, as in the ideology of colorblind meritocracy so common among mainstream conservatives.

Western individualism is unique among the cultures of the world and is largely responsible for the success of the West (Henrich, 2020; *Individualism*). Whereas other cultures are based on extended families and strong kinship relations (e.g., clan-based cultures), Western cultures deemphasize kinship as the basis of society. Rather than one’s status in a kinship group, individual reputation as being honest and trustworthy is paramount. This leads to lower levels of corruption which plague kinship-based cultures where one’s first duty is to help relatives. Individualists are more prone to trust non-relatives based on their reputation, resulting in the high-trust cultures of the West.

But in the contemporary world, individualism’s weaknesses have become apparent. All societies must have something that holds them together, even the individualist culture of the West. The problem is that the social glue of Western societies is membership in a moral community rather than a kinship group. In the traditional West, the moral community was defined by Christian religious authority. In prehistoric Europe, people who rejected the moral

strictures of the community were expelled from the community (a certain death sentence); in historic times, such individuals were ostracized and subjected to other penalties.

However, with the rise of a Jewish elite hostile to traditional Christian authority, the moral community of the West has been fashioned by a media and academic culture that is hostile to the people and culture of the West—with disastrous consequences. People who violate the established norms of political correctness, such as being proud of their White identity and believing that Whites have legitimate interests in opposing their demographic replacement and disempowerment, are shunned by friends and family, and they may well lose their jobs. And, as discussed below, Jewish organizations are leading the campaign to establish legal penalties for speech that contravenes the boundaries of political correctness as defined by these organizations.

### *Background Traits for Jewish Influence*

**Ethnocentrism.** Elsewhere I have argued that Jewish ethnocentrism can be traced back to their Middle Eastern origins (see *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, hereafter PTSDA, MacDonald, 1994/2002b). Traditional Jewish culture has a number of features identifying Jews with the ancestral cultures of the area. The most important of these is that Jews and other Middle Eastern cultures evolved under circumstances that favored large groups dominated by males (Burton et al., 1996). These groups were basically extended families with high levels of endogamy (i.e., marriage within the kinship group) and consanguineous marriage (i.e., marriage to blood relatives), including the uncle-niece marriage sanctioned in the Old Testament. These features are exactly the opposite of Western European tendencies.

Whereas Western societies tend toward individualism, the basic Jewish cultural form is collectivism, in which there is a strong sense of group identity and group boundaries, and moral particularism represented by the phrase “Is it good for the Jews.” In Jewish religious writings, non-Jews had no moral standing and could be exploited at will as long as doing so didn’t harm the entire group. Middle Eastern societies are characterized by anthropologists as “segmentary societies” organized into relatively impermeable, kinship-based groups. Group boundaries are often reinforced through external markers such as hairstyle or clothing, as Jews have often done throughout their history. Different groups settle in different areas where they retain their homogeneity alongside other homogeneous groups, as illustrated by the following account from Carleton Coon (1951, p. 153):

There the ideal was to emphasize not the uniformity of the citizens of a country as a whole but a uniformity within each special segment, and the

greatest possible contrast between segments. The members of each ethnic unit feel the need to identify themselves by some configuration of symbols. If by virtue of their history they possess some racial peculiarity, this they will enhance by special haircuts and the like; in any case they will wear distinctive garments and behave in a distinctive fashion.

Jews are at the extreme of this Middle Eastern tendency toward collectivism and ethnocentrism. I give many examples of Jewish ethnocentrism in my trilogy on Judaism—perhaps most notably the ethnic networking that is so important to CofC—and have argued in several places that Jewish ethnocentrism is biologically based (see MacDonald, 2001; SAID, Ch. 1).

A good start for thinking about Jewish ethnocentrism is the work of Israel Shahak (1994), most notably his co-authored *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel* (Shahak & Mezvinsky, 1999). Present-day fundamentalists attempt to re-create the life of Jewish communities before the Enlightenment (i.e., prior to about 1750). During this period the great majority of Jews believed in the Kabbala—the Jewish mystical tradition. Influential Jewish scholars like Gershom Scholem ignored the obvious racist and exclusivist material in the Kabbalistic literature by using words like “men,” “human beings,” and “cosmic” to suggest the Kabbala has a universalist message. The actual texts say salvation is only for Jews, while non-Jews have “Satanic souls” (Shahak & Mezvinsky, 1999, p. 58).

The ethnocentrism apparent in such statements was not only the norm in traditional Jewish society, but remains a powerful current of contemporary Jewish fundamentalism, with important implications for Israeli politics. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, describing the difference between Jews and non-Jews:

We do not have a case of profound change in which a person is merely on a superior level. Rather we have a case of . . . a totally different species. . . . The body of a Jewish person is of a totally different quality from the body of [members] of all nations of the world. . . . The difference of the inner quality [of the body] . . . is so great that the bodies would be considered as completely different species. This is the reason why the Talmud states that there is an halachic difference in attitude about the bodies of non-Jews [as opposed to the bodies of Jews]: “their bodies are in vain.” . . . An even greater difference exists in regard to the soul. Two contrary types of soul exist, a non-Jewish soul comes from three satanic spheres, while the Jewish soul stems from holiness. (Shahak & Mezvinsky, 1999, pp. 59–60)

These people and secular ethnonationalists, who have basically the same ideas, are firmly in charge in Israel, leading to a long series of protests by liberal Jews in Israel and the U.S. There are many more examples, but in the interest of brevity I'll leave it at that. Even a prominent Israel apologist like

Thomas Friedman (2023) of *The New York Times* wrote that the present government is a “far-right coalition of Jewish supremacists and ultra-Orthodox Jews.” But the Israel Lobby still dominates Congress and the Executive branch, so there won’t be any changes soon. According to Mitchell Plitnick (2023) writing for *Mondoweiss*:

When Rep. Jayapal called Israel a racist state in July, Democrats and Republicans leaped on her in a political feeding frenzy. They fell over each other to cash in on the defense of Israel, a state whose racism is not just obvious but a point of pride for many in its government. They immediately and overwhelmingly passed a resolution stating that “the State of Israel is not a racist or apartheid state.” Jayapal, of course, voted with the majority. The nine who voted against were all progressives who are atop the list of AIPAC’s most hated. It breezed through the Senate by unanimous consent.

Similar overwhelming support for Israel in the Gaza war passed in the House of Representatives and was unanimous in the Senate. Republicans and conservatives generally are especially supportive of Israel.

It’s the same with conservative media. Though I am not entirely sure why this is, it is probably partly because a significant portion of their audiences are Evangelical Protestants who think Israel’s success will inaugurate the Second Coming of Jesus and the end times. It may also be their desire to gain legitimacy in a cultural environment that is completely dominated by the left which accuses anyone to the right of Mitt Romney of being a raving Nazi.

Ethnocentrism is responsive to particular environmental triggers, what evolutionists term “facultative mechanisms,” that is, mechanisms that can be triggered by external circumstances such as perceived threat. The phenomena of a feeling of permanent threat and a siege mentality have been noted by many authors as typical of Jewish culture throughout history (PTSDA, Ch. 7).

A permanent sense of imminent threat appears to be common among Jews. Writing on the clinical profile of Jewish families, E. J. Rosen and Weltman (1982, p. 671) note:

Jews have traditionally believed that they are God’s “chosen people.” In Jewish folklore, this notion of “chosenness” has had a double meaning: Although God may have chosen the Jews, they have undergone great travail; their status means that suffering is a basic part of life. A well-known Yiddish saying, “Shver zu zein a yid” (“It’s tough to be a Jew”), while often accompanied by a resigned sigh, may even reinforce the notion of superiority by virtue of the burden of oppression and suggests that one wears the burden of that suffering with pride.

Zborowski and Herzog (1952, p. 153) note that the homes of wealthy Jews in traditional Eastern European shtetl communities sometimes had secret passages for use in times of anti-Semitic pogroms, and that their existence was “part of the imagery of the children who played around them, just as the half-effaced memory was part of every Jew’s mental equipment.”

A good example is how American Jews reacted to the 1967 war. Silberman (1985, p. 184) notes that around the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, many Jews could identify with the statement of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel that “*I had not known how Jewish I was.*” Silberman comments that “This was the response, not of some newcomer to Judaism or casual devotee but of the man whom many, myself included, consider the greatest Jewish spiritual leader of our time.” Many others made the same surprising discovery about themselves: Arthur Hertzberg (1979, p. 210) wrote:

The immediate reaction of American Jewry to the crisis was far more intense and widespread than anyone could have foreseen. Many Jews would never have believed that grave danger to Israel could dominate their thoughts and emotions to the exclusion of everything else.

The Israel-Hamas war of 2023–present is no exception. As Chana Hughes (2023) reports:

Our lives have changed forever. We have had to change not just the way we think of Israel but how we think of Britain. The past month has exposed an ugly underside. We once thought we lived in a tolerant society. Now we are asking: ‘Can we safely share our Jewishness here?’, and ‘do we belong?’

As Jews we are familiar with tragedy, threat and betrayal. ‘Always make sure you have your passport in date’, my mother used to tell me. Fortunately, today we are still very far from escape. But the recent rise in anti-Semitism makes us feel like we have moved another step closer.

In the darkest times, however, is when the embers of the Jewish spirit burn brightest. Amidst the tragic loss of life and bloodshed, there are revolutions starting. There is a revolution of Jewish identity and unity.

Although security threats are at their highest, the synagogues have never been fuller. ‘We’ve not seen our synagogue this full since the Pittsburgh shooting’, noticed a friend, with a sad laugh. Charities distribute thousands of shabbat candles every Friday, WhatsApp groups encourage psalms to be recited around the clock and hundreds of women gather each week to bake ceremonial *challa* bread and pray. One local barber, for the first time ever, vowed to close his shop on Shabbat as a sign of solidarity. Members of the community vow to support his business in return.

‘I have never felt my Jewishness the way I do right now’, said a lady, at the kosher butcher, buying chicken soup: ‘Ironically just when we’re under

attack.' Another ex-colleague reached out to me. She had never embraced her Jewish heritage before but now she feels she has to 'pick a side'. She feels the pain of being vilified and misunderstood but feels that it is worth it. . . .

Pressure builds daily as Israel loses global sympathy and the bloody conflict unfolds. Friends in Israel feel supported there and weirdly they feel safer, even when they run into their bomb shelters. Their sense of connection makes them feel alive. The Jewish community's unity now feels even stronger in contrast to the splintered in-fighting about Israel's judicial reform that was rampant prior to the attack. This month, these differences have been put on hold. Faith and togetherness are our community's protection against threat and we have to cling to them with all our might.

There is also an outpouring of Jewish financial support for Israel in response to the war (Silow-Carroll, 2023). While there are still organizations like Jewish Voice for Peace and *Mondoweiss* that have long condemned Israeli policies toward the Palestinians, they definitely do not represent the vast majority of the power and money of the Jewish community in America.

As the examples from Israel's wars show, Jewish ethnocentrism is often manipulated by Jewish authorities attempting to inculcate a stronger sense of group identification—for example, the messages of ever-increasing threat of anti-Semitism promulgated by the ADL—accompanied by highly successful pleas for donations.

Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992, p. 643) note:

[N]ot surprisingly, Siege Mentality is related to Ethnocentrism. The belief that the world has negative intentions towards the group indicates its evil, malice, and aggressiveness. In this context, the group not only feels victimized and self-righteous, but also superior to the out-group.

**Intelligence (and Wealth).** The vast majority of American Jews are Ashkenazi Jews. This is a very intelligent group, with an average IQ of approximately 111 with a particular strength in verbal IQ (Lynn, 2011). Since verbal IQ is the best predictor of occupational success and upward mobility in contemporary societies, it is not surprising that Jews are an elite group in the United States. Intelligence, as well as the other traits discussed here, were likely under genetic selection in traditional Ashkenazi societies because scholars were given marriages to the daughters of wealthy Jews, as well as good business opportunities (PTSDA, Ch. 7). Wealth and reproductive success were strongly linked at least prior to the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless, because of the demographic differences between Jews and White Americans, there are many more White Americans at any level of IQ required for upward mobility and leadership positions in American society

(MacDonald, 2022a). For example, at IQ of 140, there are five times as many White Americans as Jews. Contrary to Cofnas (2021), IQ is *thus an insufficient explanation for Jewish influence*.

Intelligence and ethnic networking are important for academic success, and in Chapter 2 I show that Jews and Jewish organizations led the intellectual effort to deny the importance of racial and ethnic differences in human affairs and to pathologize any sense of White identity or White interests (see also Chs. 5, 8). The Jewish role in creating the intellectual context of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 relied on the success of the Boasian movement in anthropology in shaping academic views on race by dominating the American Anthropological Association since the 1920s. This theoretical perspective subverted the strong sense of race and racial interests that were prominent trends in academia and the mainstream media during that period. Science is the *lingua franca* of the West, so the prestige of the Boasians was critical for their success.

Intelligence is also linked to wealth. Based on past results, Jews are probably around 35 percent of the wealthiest Americans, and in a democracy, that translates into a well-funded infrastructure of Jewish causes—such as neoconservative think tanks, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, and the ADL—and political parties; the Democratic Party is basically funded by wealthy Jews, and the Republican Jewish Coalition probably provides 40 percent of Republican donations aimed at supporting Israel and moving the party to the left on social issues. ADL (2022) assets in 2021 were listed at \$238,000,000, with \$62,000,000 in contributions. The national ADL, like the ACLU, the SPLC, the NAACP, and other so-called civil rights groups, is now merely a tax-exempt cadre of the Democratic Party and is active on behalf of anti-White Critical Race Theory, the transgender revolution, and opposition to any talk about the Great Replacement, claiming that the very idea of a Great Replacement is racist and anti-Semitic (T. Moore, 2021)—while stating that Israel must retain its Jewish majority by controlling immigration and preventing Palestinians on the West Bank from voting.

Intelligence is also evident in Jewish activism. Jewish activism is like a full court press in basketball: intense pressure from every possible angle. But in addition to the intensity, Jewish efforts are very well organized, well-funded, and backed up by sophisticated, scholarly intellectual rationales.

Intelligence and organization are also apparent in Jewish lobbying on behalf of Israel. Over thirty years ago a U.S. Defense Department official, noted that, “On all kinds of foreign policy issues the American people just don’t make their voices heard. Jewish groups are the exceptions. They are prepared, superbly briefed. They have their act together. It is hard for bureaucrats not to respond” (Findley, 1989, p. 164). At the time there was concern that the State Department had remained a bastion of old school WASPs. This is not a problem

any longer, with neoconservative Jews Antony Blinken, Victoria Nuland, and Wendy Sherman firmly in charge of State, during the Biden administration.

**Conscientiousness and Emotional Intensity.** In my 1994 book on Judaism, I highlighted two personality traits of Jews, conscientiousness and emotional intensity (PTSDA, Ch. 7). Both are heritable and quite likely under selection in traditional Jewish communities. Conscientiousness, which involves attention to detail, neatness, orderliness, striving for achievement, persistence toward goals in the face of difficulty, and the ability to focus attention and delay gratification, is, along with IQ, linked to upward mobility. Social conscientiousness appears to be a sort of “don’t let down the group” trait, originally proposed by Darwin (1871) as the basis of group allegiance. Individuals high on this trait would be expected to feel intense guilt for having failed to fulfill their obligations to the group. Moreover, given the importance of conformity to group norms for Judaism, it would be expected that individuals who were low on this trait would be disproportionately inclined to abandon Judaism, while successful Jews who were the pillars of the community and thus epitomized the group ethic of Judaism would be disproportionately likely to be high on group conformity—and also likely to be reproductively successful in traditional societies. The result is that there would be strong selection pressures toward high levels of social conscientiousness within the Jewish community.

Conscientiousness was strongly emphasized in Jewish socialization. Thus, a child reared in a traditional Jewish home would have been socialized to continually monitor his/her behavior to ensure compliance with a vast number of restrictions—the numerous commandments of Ashkenazi religious writing. These are exactly the sorts of environmental influences expected to strengthen the conscientiousness system, what I call “system-specific environmental influences” (MacDonald, 2005a).

Jews also tend to be high on the personality trait of affect intensity; i.e., they are prone to intense emotional experience of both positive and negative emotions (Larsen & Diener, 1992). Individuals high on affect intensity have more complex social networks and more complex lives, including multiple and even conflicting goals. They are prone to fast and frequent mood changes and lead varied and variable emotional lives. Clinically, affect intensity is related to cyclothymia (i.e., alternate periods of elation and depression), bipolar affective disorder (i.e., manic depressive psychosis), neurotic symptoms, and somatic complaints (nervousness, feeling uneasy, shortness of breath).

The common perception of Jewish and non-Jewish psychiatric workers from the late nineteenth century until at least the end of the 1920s was that, compared to gentiles, Ashkenazi Jews (and especially male Jews), had relatively sensitive, highly reactive nervous systems, thus making them more prone to the diagnoses of hysteria, manic depression, neurasthenia (Gershon & Liebowitz, 1975; Gilman, 1993 pp. 92ff), and depression, in men only (Levav et al.,



1997). Gershon and Liebowitz note that 45 percent of 22 patients had bipolar affective disorder—about the same as in an Iraqi population—compared to 19 percent in a study of northern European populations. Within Israel, they cite an Israeli study (in Hebrew) that found that affective disorders were “much more prevalent” among Ashkenazi Jews than Sephardic Jews (Kalman et al., 1970). Additionally, a “preliminary” study found significantly more patients with affective psychoses and fewer with schizophrenia than among non-Jews (Cooklin et al., 1983). A study from 2000 found that in a sample of Israelis with bipolar disorder, the manic phase was “much more common in Israeli bipolar patients” than European and American populations: 55 percent of the patients have illnesses characterized primarily by manias, 28 percent have approximately equal numbers of manias and depressions, and 17 percent suffer predominantly from depressions, but with no difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardic populations (Osher et al., 2000, p. 187).

I emphasize here that affect intensity is also linked to creativity and the manic phase of bipolar affective disorder which seems to be more common among Jews and a more robust component of manic-depressive illness among Jews (D. M. Tucker et al., 1990). During episodes of mania the person has a grandiose self-image (“I am brilliant and can save the world if only people would listen to me”), goal-directed activity such as obsessively working on a project all night, excessive involvement in pleasurable activity like buying sprees and sexual gratification, and racing thoughts which the manic person thinks are brilliant. The depressive part is just the opposite.

Many people may be high on emotionality but not meet the criteria for psychopathology. It's easy to see that people moderately high on positive emotionality—hypomanic or normal but close to the manic range—would be high achievers; they would work persistently toward goals, and they would be very self-confident and have high self-esteem. Such people gravitate to leadership positions in whatever organization they are in, and it's easy to see that they might become gurus, establishing a devoted following, like charismatic rabbis in traditional Jewish communities—Jewish gurus like Freud, Boas, Trotsky, et al. discussed in the following chapters.

For example, Albert Lindemann (1997, p. 448) notes that many of Trotsky's personality traits are stereotypically Jewish:

If one accepts that anti-Semitism was most potently driven by anxiety and fear, as distinguished from contempt, then the extent to which Trotsky became a source of preoccupation for anti-Semites is significant. Here, too, [Paul] Johnson's words are suggestive: He writes of Trotsky's “demonic power” [in *A History of the Jews*, 1987]—the same term, revealingly, used repeatedly by others in referring to Zinoviev's oratory or Uritsky's ruthlessness [Zinoviev and Uritsky were two other prominent early

Bolsheviks]. Trotsky's boundless self-confidence, his notorious arrogance, and sense of superiority were other traits often associated with Jews. Fantasies there were about Trotsky and other Bolsheviks, but there were also realities around which the fantasies grew.

This emotional intensity extends to Jewish academics writing about Jewish history. Lindemann (1997, p. 12) writes:

[E]specially in popular history, a strong tendency exists to favor an emotionally laden description and narrative, especially of colorful, dramatic, or violent episodes, over explanation that employs calm analysis or a searching attention to historical context. Pogroms, famous anti-Semitic affairs, and the description of the ideas of anti-Semitic authors and agitators are described with moral fervor, rhetorical flair, and considerable attention to the details of murder, arson, and rape. Background, context, and motives are often slighted or dealt with in a remarkably thin and tendentious fashion.

Lindemann comments on the impassioned, moralistic rhetoric and simplistic analyses to be found in Robert Wistrich's *Anti-Semitism: The Longest Hatred* and in the writings of Holocaust historians Lucy Dawidowicz and Daniel J. Goldhagen. "In order to write 'genuine' German history, [Dawidowicz] seems to think, hatred and resentment rather than sympathy or love constitute the appropriate state of mind. She makes precious little effort to understand the motivations of nineteenth-century nationalistic Germans. They are simply contemptible 'other people.'" He describes Howard Morley Sachar's chapter on Romanian anti-Semitism as "a tirade, without the slightest effort at balance" (Lindemann, 1997, p. 509).

Affect intensity influences the tone and intensity of Jewish activism. Among Jews there is a critical mass that is intensely committed to Jewish causes—a sort of 24/7, "pull out all the stops" commitment that produces instant, massive responses on Jewish issues. Jewish activism has a relentless, never-say-die quality. This intensity goes hand in hand with the "slippery slope" style of arguing: Jewish activism is an intense response because even the most trivial manifestation of anti-Jewish attitudes or behavior is seen as inevitably leading to mass murder of Jews if allowed to continue.

**Ashkenazi Jews Are Aggressive.** Much of the previous is also about Jewish aggressiveness. Jews have always behaved aggressively toward those they have lived among, and they have been perceived as aggressive by their critics. Aggressive behavior by Jews can be found in the ancient world. Bachrach suggests that the Jews were so wealthy, powerful, and aggressive that until around the middle of the fifth century the Roman government viewed a strong anti-

Jewish policy as not politically viable, even though it was continually being pressured in this direction by the Church (Bachrach, 1985). The rather limited anti-Jewish actions of the government during the 150 years following the Edict of Toleration of 313 are interpreted “as attempts to protect Christians from a vigorous, powerful, and often aggressive Jewish gens” (p. 408). The Jews themselves were perceived by the emperors, the government, and the Church fathers as “an aggressive, well-organized, wealthy, and powerful minority” (p. 408). Particularly revealing are the suggestion that the solvency of the municipalities depended on Jews paying their taxes and the fear that offending the Jews could set off widespread and costly revolts, such as the one led by Patricius in 351.

E. Horowitz (1998, p. 5) recounts the historiography surrounding Jewish violence and aggressiveness, noting, for example, what a nineteenth-century British historian Rev. George Williams had written:

[The Jews] had followed the Persians from Galilee, to gratify their vengeance by the massacre of the believers, and the demolition of their most sacred churches. They were amply gutted with blood. In a few days 90,000 Christians of both sexes, and of all ages and conditions, fell victims to their indiscriminating hatred.

Commenting on this assertion, E. Horowitz (1998, p. 5–6) notes:

As we shall see, Jewish contemporaries of Williams described the events of 614 rather similarly. A century later, however, in the years following the Holocaust, memories of Jews gratifying their vengeance and giving vent to their “indiscriminating hatred” began to fade, being displaced increasingly by the Sartrean Jew, “passionately hostile to violence” [a reference Jean Paul Sartre’s philo-Semitic *Anti-Semite and Jew*]. This was especially true in works dealing with the Holocaust itself. In *The Informed Heart* (1960), Bruno Bettelheim wondered aloud whether the Nazi notion “that millions of Jews . . . would submit to extermination did not also result from seeing how much degradation they would accept without fighting back.” . . . [Historians] present a monolithic view of a mythic Jewish past in which abhorrence of violence was deeply ingrained in the Jewish self-image. . . . Yet a reexamination of the record of Jewish religious violence against Christians and the external manifestations of their religion during the millennium after the Christianization of the Roman empire under Constantine . . . would reveal patterns of behavior very much at variance with the alleged historic self-image of the Jews “as a people abhorring violence in any form.”

Being aggressive and “pushy” is part of the stereotype of Jews in Western societies, and the behavior of Israeli West Bank settlers—who routinely attack Palestinians with impunity (Bergman & Mazzetti, 2024)—and Israel itself in ethnically cleansing and murdering at least 60,000 Palestinians in Gaza in the war that began on October 7th, 2023 and expanding their territory in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime also fits the stereotype.

In early twentieth-century America, the sociologist Edward A. Ross (1914) commented on a greater tendency among Jewish immigrants to maximize their advantage in all transactions, ranging from Jewish students badgering teachers for higher grades to poor Jews attempting to get more than the usual charitable allotment. For Ross (p. 144–145), while not involving physical violence, “No other immigrants are so noisy, pushing and disdainful of the rights of others as the Hebrews,” and:

The authorities complain that the East European Hebrews feel no reverence for law as such and are willing to break any ordinance they find in their way. . . . The insurance companies scan a Jewish fire risk more closely than any other. [During this period, arson aimed at collecting insurance payouts was often termed “Jewish lightening.”] Credit men say the Jewish merchant is often “slippery” and will “fail” in order to get rid of his debts. For lying the immigrant has a very bad reputation. In the North End of Boston “the readiness of the Jews to commit perjury has passed into a proverb.”

Ross (1914, p. 150) also reported:

[Immigration officials had] become very sore over the incessant fire of false accusations to which they are subjected by the Jewish press and societies. United States senators complain that during the close of the struggle over the immigration bill they were overwhelmed with a torrent of crooked statistics and misrepresentations by the Hebrews fighting the literacy test.

Jews were unique as an American immigrant group in their hostility toward American Christian culture and in their energetic, aggressive efforts to change that culture. From the perspective of Henry Ford’s *The International Jew*, the United States had imported around 3.5 million mainly Yiddish-speaking, intensely ethnocentric Jewish immigrants over the previous forty years. In that very short period and long prior to achieving anything like the power they obtained after World War II and the 1960s counter-cultural revolution, Jews had had enormous effects on American society, particularly in their attempts to remove expressions of Christianity from public life beginning with an attempt in 1899–1900 to remove the word “Christian” from the Virginia Bill

of Rights. Ford (1920) stated in his outlet, *The Dearborn Independent*: “The Jews’ determination to wipe out of public life every sign of the predominant Christian character of the US is the only active form of religious intolerance in the country today.”

However, the epitome of Jewish aggression is their long crusade as a tiny minority to alter the ethnic balance of the U.S. in order to prevent the sort of mass movement that occurred in Germany in the 1930s (see Ch. 8).

Charges of anti-Semitism and guilt over the Holocaust are not the only instruments of Jewish aggressiveness. Jewish groups intimidate their enemies by a variety of means. People who oppose policies on Israel advocated by Jewish activist organizations have been fired and blacklisted from their jobs, harassed with letters, subjected to intrusive surveillance, and threatened with death. Although there is a great deal of self-censorship in the media on Israel as a result of the major role of Jews in the ownership and production of the media, gaps in this armor are aggressively closed. Paul Findley (1989, p. 296) noted over thirty years ago that there are “threats to editors and advertising departments, orchestrated boycotts, slanders, campaigns of character assassination, and personal vendettas”—a phenomenon that, as noted above, is ongoing.

Incidentally, not all Jewish groups have behaved as aggressively toward the surrounding society as have the Ashkenazi groups that make up the great bulk of American Jewry. For example, a community of Syrian Jews called the SY (pronounced “ess-why”) arrived in New York around the same time as the huge influx of Ostjuden (Eastern European Jews). The SY have become wealthy, but they haven’t entered into the power centers of American society. They eschew higher education and have no role in the elite media. They are not involved in the legal profession, politics, or academic departments of the social sciences or humanities. Although they tend to be hawkish on matters related to Israel, they have not been involved in creating the edifice that is the Israel Lobby. One gets the impression that they want to make money and stay under the radar by not making waves—the antithesis of the aggressive posture of the Ostjuden.

This is probably how they survived for centuries in the Middle East. In fact, Jews in traditional societies often hid their wealth and controlled the behavior of other Jews so as not to arouse hostility from the surrounding peoples (SAID, Ch. 6). In other words, unlike the Ashkenazim, they have not developed an adversarial, competitive stance toward the people and culture of America. One can’t imagine them developing a lobby that would harness the power of the United States on behalf of a foreign government, nor can one imagine them becoming a hostile elite, as Ashkenazi Jews became in the Soviet Union (MacDonald, 2005b). They have shown no tendencies toward developing a culture of critique that subjected Western culture to what John Murray Cuddihy (1974, p. 68) termed “punitive objectivity” and “the vindictive objectivity of the

marginal nonmember.” Unlike their Ashkenazi brethren, they had no impact on Western societies in the twentieth century. In this regard, they are much more like the Overseas Chinese than their Jewish brothers from Eastern Europe.

To understand the origins and the power of the Israel Lobby, one has to understand the Ostjuden—the *fons et origo* of the two most potent and aggressive twentieth-century Jewish movements: political radicalism and Zionism. It is not that the Ostjuden are particularly ethnocentric compared to other Jews. They are, if anything, less ethnocentric than the SYs with their hyperxenophobia and obsession with blood purity (Chafets, 2007). Indeed, it is obvious that the Ostjuden could never have been so successful in creating the Israel Lobby or in altering the culture and demography of the West had they remained as a hermetically sealed community, shut off from the power centers of the society.

Finally, I have proposed that the most radical, most ethnocentric Jews tend to provide the direction for the entire Jewish community in the long run (MacDonald, 2003b). This has happened once again in contemporary Israel and is supported enthusiastically by the mainstream Jewish community in the U.S. as epitomized by the ADL, the American Israel Public Affairs Council, etc. For example, “With its overwhelming victory in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Israel more than doubled the amount of land it controlled, seizing new territory in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.” Israel could have used this land to bargain for a future Palestinian state, but “the acquisition of the territories animated a religious political movement—Gush Emunim, or ‘Bloc of the Faithful’—that was determined to settle the newly conquered lands” (Bergman & Mazzetti, 2024).

Settling newly conquered land reflects the attitudes of many prominent Zionists and Israelis. Theodor Herzl (1960, p. 711), the founder of Zionism, maintained that the area of the Jewish state stretches: “From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates.” This reflects God’s covenant with Abraham in Genesis 15: 18–20 and Joshua 1: 3–4: “To your descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates, the land of the Kenites, the Kenizzites, the Kadmonites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Rephaim, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Girgashites, and the Jebusites.”

The flexibility of the ultimate aims of Zionism can also be seen in this 1956 comment by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister:

The acceptance of partition [of the Palestinian Mandate] does not commit us to renounce Transjordan [i.e., the modern state of Jordan]; one does not demand from anybody to give up his vision. We shall accept a state in the boundaries fixed today. But the boundaries of Zionist aspirations are the concern of the Jewish people and no external factor will be able to limit them. (in Chomsky, 1999, p. 161)

Ben-Gurion's vision of "the boundaries of Zionist aspirations" included southern Lebanon, southern Syria, all of Jordan, and the Sinai, much of which has already been achieved (in Chomsky, 1999, p. 161). Or consider Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's statement that the borders of Israel "are where Jews live, not where there is a line on the map" (p. 50).

These views are common among the more extreme Zionists today—especially the fundamentalists and the settler movement, and notably Gush Emunim—who now set the tone in Israel. Indeed, in the opinion of Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky (1999, p. 73), "It is not unreasonable to assume that Gush Emunim, if it possessed the power and control, would use nuclear weapons in warfare to attempt to achieve its purpose."

**Conclusion.** The current situation in the United States is the result of an awesome deployment of Jewish power and influence. One must contemplate the fact that American Jews have managed to maintain unquestioned support for Israel since the 1967 war despite Israel's seizing land and engaging in a brutal occupation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories—an apartheid occupation that will most likely end with expulsion or complete subjugation and degradation of the Palestinians. During this same period Jewish organizations in America have been a principal force—in my view the main force—for erecting a state dedicated to suppressing ethnic identification among European-derived peoples, for encouraging massive multi-ethnic immigration into the U.S., and for erecting a legal system and cultural ideology that is obsessively sensitive to the complaints and interests of ethnic minorities (the culture of the Holocaust). All this is done without a whisper of double standards in the aboveground media.

The American Jewish community is well organized and lavishly funded. It has achieved a great deal of power, and it has been successful in achieving its interests. One of the great myths often promulgated by Jewish apologists is that Jews have no consensus and therefore cannot wield any real power. Yet there is in fact a great deal of consensus on broad Jewish issues, particularly in the areas of Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, and abortion rights.

Nevertheless, while civil liberties were championed by Jewish organizations during the anti-communist wave of the 1950s—when sympathy with communism was mainstream within the American Jewish community at a time when many Jewish communists were being hauled before Congressional committees and universities sometimes required loyalty oaths (MacDonald, 2019b)—Jewish organizations like the ADL are now prominently involved in censoring speech, especially on social media. Jewish consensus changes depending on Jewish interests. As always, interests trump principles.

Massive changes in public policy on these issues, beginning with the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s, coincide with the period of increasing

Jewish power and influence in the United States. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any significant area where public policy conflicts with the attitudes of mainstream Jewish organizations.

WERE NON-JEWISH THEORISTS CRITICAL TO THE  
SUCCESS OF THE MOVEMENTS DESCRIBED IN COFC?

Anti-biologism is now pervasive in the social sciences and a common thread in the intellectual movements discussed here—e.g., race is interpreted as nothing more than a social construct, so that racial differences in mental ability are completely explained by environmental influences, especially White racism; anti-Semitism is explained by envy or irrational hatred untethered from any consideration of Jewish behavior. An important contemporary example is that biological explanations are completely ruled out in mainstream feminist theory, so that college graduates, especially those with gender studies degrees, emerge as radical environmentalists. For example, Judith Butler, a strongly identified Jewish lesbian whose work has been seen as subversive of traditional sexual norms (J. Bennett, 2024; Butler, 2017), has been highly influential in gender studies for her theory that sexual behavior is “performative”—that people enact their sexual behavior as a choice dictated by cultural norms and constrained by various punishments if one deviates from those norms. As Butler (1988, p. 520) states, “What is called gender identity is a performative accomplishment compelled by social sanction and taboo.” Genetic and hormonal influences on gender are thus completely ignored. Butler’s (p. 531) theory is self-consciously subversive of traditional gender norms:

Gender is not passively scripted on the body, and neither is it determined by nature, language, the symbolic, or the overwhelming history of patriarchy. Gender is what is put on, invariably, under constraint, daily and incessantly, with anxiety and pleasure, but if this continuous act is mistaken for a natural or linguistic given, power is relinquished to expand the cultural field bodily through subversive performances of various kinds.

Thus for example, one could become transgender by intentionally overcoming the constraints on gender imposed by culture (thus rejecting any biological constraints) and become a different gender.

Butler’s argument is not based on any of the theories discussed in later chapters of this book, but on those of French philosophers, particularly Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, and Michel Foucault. For example: “In Merleau-Ponty’s reflections in *The Phenomenology of Perception* on ‘the body in its sexual being,’ he takes issue with [naturalistic] accounts of bodily



experience and claims that the body is ‘an historical idea’ rather than a ‘natural species’” (Butler, 1988, p. 520).

There is no claim here that the Jewish intellectual movements reviewed in *CofC* are the only influential anti-biological or non-biological movements for understanding human behavior. For example, behaviorism is an offshoot of the British empiricist tradition in philosophy and was highly influential in psychology, eventually being subsumed within cognitive theories, neither of which owes anything to the movements reviewed here. Far more important for the movements reviewed here were Marxism (Ch. 3) and other perspectives essentially developed in service of specific Jewish interests, such as combating anti-Semitism and opposing the racist theories based on Darwinism (Ch. 2) that were mainstream in the 1920s and in which the success of Western societies was explained at least partly in racial terms.

It was only after the ascent of Jews in American universities (see below) and the decisive influence of the Jewish movements discussed here that French philosophy had a significant impact on Anglosphere intellectuals. However, the movements discussed here are the movements that fundamentally transformed the intellectual landscape in the United States, other Anglosphere countries, and much of the West. Prior to around 1970, philosophy departments emphasized the British empiricist tradition, with almost no coverage of continental philosophy after Kant; in my experience as a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin in the 1960s, one could easily obtain a Ph.D. in philosophy without even a passing acquaintance with continental philosophy. And psychology was still mired in behaviorism. Indeed, one could perhaps argue that it was only the leftward shift resulting from the ascent of the Jewish left that intellectuals looking for anti-biological perspectives discovered the utility of these continental movements in their attacks on the Western tradition.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: THE DECLINE OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS  
AMONG EUROPEAN-DERIVED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES AND  
THE CONTINUITY OF ETHNOCENTRISM AMONG JEWS

Fundamental to this transformation was the decline of ethnic consciousness among European peoples. It is fascinating to contrast the immigration debates of the 1920s with those of the 1950s and 1960s. The immigration restrictionists of the 1920s unabashedly asserted the right of European-derived peoples to the land they had conquered and settled. There were many assertions of ethnic interest—that the people who colonized and created the political and economic culture of the country had a right to maintain it as their possession.

By the 1940s and certainly by the 1960s it was impossible to make such assertions without being deemed not only a racist but also an intellectual Neanderthal. Indeed, Bendersky (2000) shows that such rhetoric was increasingly taboo in the 1930s. One can see the shift in the career of racial theorist Lothrop Stoddard, author of books such as *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy* and numerous articles for the popular media, such as *Collier's*, *Forum*, and *The Saturday Evening Post*. Stoddard viewed Jews as highly intelligent and as racially different from Europeans. He also believed that Jews were critical to the success of Bolshevism. However, he stopped referring to Jews completely in his lectures to the U.S. Army War College in the late 1930s. The Boasian revolution in anthropology had triumphed, and theorists who believed that race was important for explaining human behavior became fringe figures. Stoddard himself went from being a popular and influential writer to being viewed as a security risk as the Roosevelt administration prepared the country for war with National Socialist Germany.

Another marker of the change in attitude toward Jews was the response to Charles Lindbergh's remarks in Des Moines, Iowa, on the eve of U.S. entry into World War II. Lindbergh's advocacy of non-intervention was shaped not only by his horror at the destructiveness of modern warfare—what he viewed as the suicide of European culture—but also by his belief that a second European war would be suicidal for the White race. In an article published in 1939 in *Reader's Digest*, a popular magazine, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, he stated:

[It was a war] among a dominant people for power—blind, insatiable, suicidal. Western nations are again at war, a war likely to be more prostrating than any in the past, a war in which the White race is bound to lose, and the others bound to gain, a war which may easily lead our civilization through more Dark Ages if it survives at all. (Lindbergh, 1939, p. 65)

In order for Whites to maintain their dominance over other races, Lindbergh believed that they should join together to fend off the teeming legions of non-Whites who were the real long-term threat.

Lindbergh was not a Nordicist. He took a long-term view that Russia would be a White bulwark against the Chinese in the East. He advocated a racial alliance among Whites based “on a Western Wall of race and arms which can hold back either a Genghis Khan or the infiltration of inferior blood; on an English fleet, a German air force, a French army, [and] an American nation” (Lindbergh, 1939, p. 66). However, he believed the Soviet Union under communism was abhorrent:

I tell you that I would a hundred times rather see my country ally herself with England, or even with Germany with all of her faults, than with the cruelty, the godlessness, and the barbarism that exist in Soviet Russia. An alliance between the United States and Russia should be opposed by every American, by every Christian, and by every humanitarian in this country. (in Berg, 1998/1999, p. 422)

Writing in 1939, Lindbergh clearly viewed the atrocities perpetrated by the Soviet Union to be far worse than anything perpetrated by National Socialist Germany.

In his famous speech on September 11th, 1941, Lindbergh stated that Jews were one of the principal forces attempting to lead the United States into the war, along with the Roosevelt administration and the British. Lindbergh noted that Jewish opposition to Germany was understandable given persecution “sufficient to make bitter enemies of any race.” He stated that the Jews’ “greatest danger to this country lies in their large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, our radio, and our Government.” And, most controversially, he stated, “I am saying that the leaders of both the British and Jewish races, for reasons which are understandable from their viewpoint as they are inadvisable from ours, for reasons which are not American, wish to involve us in the war” (in Berg, 1998/1999, p. 427).

Lindbergh’s speech was greeted with a torrent of abuse and hatred unparalleled for a mainstream public figure in American history. Overnight Lindbergh went from cultural hero to moral pariah. Jewish influence in the media and government would be difficult to measure then as it is now, but it was certainly considerable and a common concern of anti-Jewish sentiment of the time. In a booklet published in 1936, the editors of *Fortune* magazine concluded that the main sources of Jewish influence on the media were their control of the two major radio networks and the Hollywood movie studios. They suggested that “at the very most, half the opinion-making and taste-influencing paraphernalia in America is in Jewish hands” (Editors of *Fortune*, 1936, p. 62)—a rather remarkable figure considering that Jews constituted approximately 2–3 percent of the population and that most of the Jewish population were first- or second-generation immigrants.<sup>4</sup> A short list of Jewish ownership or management of the media during this period would include *The New York Times* (the most influential newspaper, owned by the Sulzberger family), the *New York Post* (George Backer), *The Washington Post* (Eugene Meyer), *The Philadelphia*

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<sup>4</sup> A 1945 report on anti-Semitism by the American Jewish Committee included a section from the 1936 report by the editors of *Fortune* where Jewish media influence is phrased somewhat differently: “Approximately half of opinion-making in the United States is Jewish. Jewish influence in radio, theatre, and motion pictures is considerable while it is less marked in journalism and advertising” (American Jewish Committee, 1945, p. 21).

*Inquirer* (M. L. Annenberg), *The Philadelphia Record* and the *Camden Courier-Post* (J. David Stern), the *Newark Star-Ledger* (S. I. Newhouse), the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* (Paul Block), CBS (the dominant radio network, owned by William Paley), NBC (headed by David Sarnoff), all of the major Hollywood movie studios, Random House (the most important book publisher, owned by Bennett Cerf), and a dominant position in popular music.<sup>5</sup> Walter Winchell, who had an audience of tens of millions and was tied with Bob Hope for the highest-rated program on radio, believed that Lindbergh's opposition to intervention "was unconscionable, a form of treason" (Gabler, 1994/1995, p. 294). Winchell, "the standard bearer for interventionism," was Jewish. He had close ties during this period to the ADL, which provided him with information on the activities of isolationists and Nazi sympathizers which he used in his broadcasts and newspaper columns (pp. 294-298).

There is no question that the movie industry did indeed propagandize against Germany and in favor of intervention. In May 1940, the Warner Bros. studio wired Roosevelt that "personally we would like to do all in our power within the motion picture industry and by use of the talking screen to show the American people the worthiness of the cause for which the free peoples of Europe are making such tremendous sacrifices" (in Gabler, 1988, p. 343). Later in 1940 Joseph P. Kennedy lectured the Hollywood movie elite that they should stop promoting war and stop making anti-German movies or risk a rise in anti-Semitism. Immediately prior to Lindbergh's Des Moines speech, Senator Gerald Nye asserted that foreign-born owners of the Hollywood studios had "violent animosities toward certain causes abroad" (pp. 344-345). Representatives of the movie industry, realizing that they had the support of the Roosevelt administration, aggressively defended making "America conscious of the national peril."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This listing is based on several sources: Editors of *Fortune*, 1936; Philadelphia Anti-Defamation Council & The American Jewish Committee, 1941; Gabler, 1988; Kantor, 1982.

<sup>6</sup> Ben Hecht, who was a prominent Hollywood screenwriter and staunch Zionist, included pro-interventionist ideas in movies at this time (Liukkonen, 2008). For example, in *Angels Over Broadway* (1940), Hecht has the Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. character ask, "What happened to the Poles, the Finns, the Dutch? They're little guys. They didn't win. . . ." Rita Hayworth replies, "They will, some day." Hecht also made some uncredited additions to Alfred Hitchcock's *Foreign Correspondent* (1940). When Hitchcock was asked about the anti-Nazi and pro-Britain message of the film, he said that it was all the doing of Walter Wanger and Ben Hecht. (Wanger was also Jewish; his birth name was Walter Feuchtwanger.) In the film a character says, "Keep those lights burning, cover them with steel, build them in with guns, build a canopy of battle-ships and bombing planes around them and, hello, America, hang on to your lights, they're the only lights in the world." Hecht's strong Jewish consciousness, including his support for the Jewish terrorist group Irgun, which combated the British in the lead-up to Israel becoming a state, can be seen in the following: "In April 1941, [Hecht] wrote a piece titled 'My Tribe Is Called Israel' in his column for P.M., the liberal New York newspaper, defending his efforts to 'increase generally the Jew consciousness of the world,' and castigated 'Americanized Jews' for failing to join him out of fear that they would appear to value Jewish lives more than American ones. It

Harvard historian William Langer stated in a lecture to the U.S. Army War College that the rising dislike of Nazi Germany in the United States was due to “Jewish influence” in the media:

You have to face the fact that some of our most important American newspapers are Jewish-controlled, and I suppose if I were a Jew I would feel about Nazi Germany as most Jews feel and it would be most inevitable that the coloring of the news takes on that tinge. As I read the *New York Times*, for example, it is perfectly clear that every little upset that occurs (and after all, many upsets occur in a country of 70 million people) is given a great deal of prominence. The other part of it is soft-pedaled or put off with a sneer. So that in a rather subtle way, the picture you get is that there is no good in the Germans whatever. (in Bendersky, 2000, p. 273)

It is also interesting that the *Chicago Tribune* was “circumspect on the Jewish question” despite the personal sentiments of Robert McCormick, the *Tribune*’s non-Jewish publisher, that Jews were an important reason behind America’s anti-German policy (Bendersky, 2000, p. 284). This suggests that concern with Jewish power—quite possibly concern about negative influences on advertising revenue (see Editors of *Fortune*, 1936, p. 57)—was an issue for McCormick. On balance, it would seem reasonable to agree with Lindbergh that Jewish influence in the media was significant during this period. Of course, this is not to say that Jews dominated the media at this time, or that no other influences were important.

It is also noteworthy that U.S. military officers often worried that Roosevelt was influenced to be anti-German by his Jewish advisors, Samuel I. Rosenman, Felix Frankfurter, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (Bendersky, 2000, p. 274), and they worried that Jewish interests and the British would push the United States into a war with Germany. Both Frankfurter and Morgenthau were strongly identified Jews and effective advocates for Jewish interests. Morgenthau actively promoted Zionism and the welfare of Jewish refugees (e.g., pp. 333ff, 354ff). Both supported U.S. involvement in the war against Germany, and Morgenthau became well known as an advocate of the Morgenthau Plan entailing extremely harsh treatment of the Germans during and after World War II.

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was lucid and strident invective that teetered on the vituperative—a typical Hecht opinion piece—and it caught the attention of the so-called Bergson Group, a small network within the U.S. who sought to advance the agenda of Irgun, a paramilitary organization fighting to establish a free Jewish state across the entirety of the historical land of Israel. The group was led by Peter Bergson (born Hillel Kook), a charismatic twenty-five-year-old Palestinian who sensed in Hecht a potential ally. Bergson reached out and arranged a meeting at the Twenty One Club, Hecht’s favorite Manhattan hangout” (E. White, 2017).

Moreover, there is no question that Jews were able to exert a great deal of influence on specific issues during this period. For example, Zionist organizations exerted enormous pressure on the government (e.g., Bendersky, 2000, p. 325). During World War II they engaged in “loud diplomacy” (p. 326) with thousands of rallies, dinners with celebrity speakers, letter campaigns, meetings, lobbying, threats to newspapers for publishing unfavorable items, insertion of propaganda as news items in newspapers, and giving money to non-Jewish politicians and celebrities like Will Rogers in return for their support. (Because Jews are a small minority, this “loud diplomacy” included prominent roles for sympathetic non-Jews—a common theme for Jewish movements aiming to influence non-Jews, as noted in several chapters here.) By 1944, “thousands of non-Jewish associations would pass pro-Zionist resolutions” (p. 326). In 1944 both Republican and Democratic platforms included strong pro-Zionist planks even though the creation of a Jewish state was strongly opposed by the Department of State and the Department of War (p. 328).

Nevertheless, whatever the level of Jewish influence on the media during this period, commentators generally focused on denouncing the seeming implication in Lindbergh’s speech that Jewish interests were “not American.” I suppose that Lindbergh’s statement could have been amended by a public relations-minded editor without distorting Lindbergh’s intentions to read something like “Jewish interests are not the same as the interests of other Americans” or “Jewish interests are not the same as those of the country as a whole.” However, I rather doubt that this alteration would have assuaged the outpouring of hatred that ensued. The simple facts that the vast majority of U.S. Jews were indeed in favor of intervention and that Jews did have a significant effect on public attitudes and public policy had become irrelevant. As Lindbergh himself said, the choice was “whether or not you are going to let your country go into a completely disastrous war for lack of courage to name the groups leading that country to war—at the risk of being called ‘anti-Semitic’ simply by *naming them*” (as paraphrased by Anne Morrow Lindbergh, 1980, p. 224; emphasis in original). America had entered into an era when it had become morally unacceptable to discuss Jewish interests at all. We are still in that era.

An exception that proves the rule was Pat Buchanan’s 1990 column that referred to Israel’s “amen corner” in the United States advocating war with Iraq—indeed, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee had been lobbying Congress behind the scenes to declare war on Iraq (Sobran, 1999). Writing in *The Wall Street Journal*, Norman Podhoretz, former editor of *Commentary*, promptly labeled Buchanan an “anti-Semite” without feeling the need to address the question of whether or not American Jews were indeed pressing for war with Iraq in order to benefit Israel. As in the case of Lindbergh’s remarks a half century earlier, truth was irrelevant. While this incident has not altered the taboo on discussing Jewish interests in the same way that it is common to

discuss the interests of other ethnic groups, it has resulted in a long-term problem for Buchanan's political career. When Buchanan ran for president in 2000, a hostile columnist writing in a prominent Jewish publication stated, "Out of the slime of the sewers and into the filth of the gutter a desperate Patrick J. Buchanan, the neo-Nazi, has crawled into the political arena using anti-Semitism as his principal device to secure a future for himself" (H. L. Adelson, 1999). The columnist went on to claim that Buchanan "always was a neo-Nazi" and that he "reveals the shallow quality of his tortured, sick, defective mind." Not to be outdone, Alan Dershowitz (1999) wrote, "Let there be no mistake about it. Pat Buchanan is a classic anti-Semite with fascist leanings who hates Israel and loves Nazi war criminals." The example illustrates that Jews continue to exert immense pressure, including smear tactics, to keep Jewish interests off-limits in American political discussion. As with Lindbergh in an earlier generation, Buchanan's experience is a grim reminder to politicians who dare raise the issue of Jewish interests in public debate. Buchanan became completely marginalized within the Republican Party and eventually left it for an unsuccessful run as the Reform Party presidential candidate in 2000.

It is instructive to review in some detail the "Niagara of invective" experienced by Lindbergh (Berg, 1998/1999, p. 428). He was denounced by virtually all the leading media, by Democrats and Republicans, Protestants and Catholics, and, of course, Jewish groups. Many accused him of being a Nazi, including President Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, who labeled Lindbergh "the No. 1 United States Nazi fellow traveler" (p. 428). Reinhold Niebuhr, the prominent Protestant leader (see below), called on Lindbergh's organization, the America First Committee, to "divorce itself from the stand taken by Lindbergh and clean its ranks of those who would incite to racial and religious strife in this country" (p. 428). The committee released a statement saying that neither Lindbergh nor the organization were anti-Semitic.

The reaction of Lindbergh's wife, Anne Morrow Lindbergh, is particularly interesting because it illustrates both the power of moral revulsion combined with hypocrisy that had enveloped any public discussion of Jewish interests, and the power of moral communities as a phenomenon unique to the individualist, non-kinship-oriented cultures of the West (see above). Women, even more than men, are especially prone to avoid being ostracized from a group for violating the moral basis of the community (see below). From Anne Morrow Lindbergh (1980, pp. 220-230, emphasis in original):

September 11, 1941: Then [he gave] his speech—throwing me into black gloom. He names the "war agitators"—chiefly the British, the Jews, and the Administration. He does it truthfully, moderately, and with no bitterness or rancor—but I hate to have him touch the Jews at all. For I dread the reaction on him. No one else mentions this subject out loud (though many

seethe bitterly and intolerantly underneath). C. [Charles], as usual, must bear the brunt of being frank and open. What he is saying in public is not intolerant or inciting or bitter and it is just what he says in private, while the other soft-spoken cautious people who say terrible things in private would never dare be as frank in public as he. They do not want to pay the price. And the price will be terrible. Headlines will flame "Lindbergh attacks Jews." He will be branded anti-Semitic, Nazi, Führer-seeking, etc. *I can hardly bear it. For he is a moderate. . . .*

September 13, 1941: He is attacked on all sides—Administration, pressure groups, and Jews, as now openly a Nazi, following Nazi doctrine.

September 14, 1941: I cannot explain my revulsion of feeling by logic. Is it my lack of courage to face the problem? Is it my lack of vision and seeing the thing through? Or is my intuition founded on something profound and valid?

I do not know and am only very disturbed, which is upsetting for him. I have the greatest faith in him as a person—in his integrity, his courage, and his essential *goodness*, fairness, and kindness—his nobility really. . . . How then explain my profound feeling of grief about what he is doing? If what he said is the truth (and I am inclined to think it is), why was it wrong to state it? He was naming the groups that were pro-war. No one minds his naming the British or the Administration. But to name "Jew" is un-American—even if it is done without hate or even criticism. Why?

Because it is segregating them as a group, setting the ground for anti-Semitism. . . .

I say that I would prefer to see this country at war than shaken by violent anti-Semitism. (Because it seems to me that the kind of person the human being is turned into when the instinct of Jew-baiting is let loose is worse than the kind of person he becomes on the battlefield.)

September 15, 1941: The storm is beginning to blow up hard. America First is in a turmoil. . . . He is universally condemned by all moderates. . . . The Jews demand a retraction. . . . I sense that this is the beginning of a fight and consequent loneliness and isolation that we have not known before. . . . For I am really much more attached to the worldly things than he is, mind more giving up friends, popularity, etc., mind much more criticism and coldness and loneliness.

September 18, 1941: Will I be able to shop in New York at all now? I am always stared at—but now to be stared at with hate, to walk through aisles of hate!<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Further, in a conversation with his wife on November 24th, 1941, Charles Lindbergh was pessimistic about establishing a Jewish state: "C. and I get into an argument *à propos* of an article in the paper, a speech of a rabbi at a Jewish conference in which he said that the first thing that would have to be done at the peace table after the war was that a large indemnity would have to be paid to the Jews for their sufferings. Also speaks about having a piece of land of their own—which I am sympathetic with. . . . [C.] says it isn't as simple as all that. Whose land



Several issues stand out in these comments. Anne Morrow Lindbergh is horrified at having to walk through “aisles of hate,” horrified at having to give up her friends, horrified at being a pariah where once she was idolized as the wife of the most popular man in the country. While she accepts the truth of what her husband said and its good intentions, she thinks it better left unsaid and does not dwell on the unfairness of the charges against her husband, in particular the charge that he is a Nazi. Truth is no defense if it leads to what are regarded as morally unacceptable actions, and slander and smear tactics are warranted and understandable if the goals are morally praiseworthy. She supposes that even a disastrous war that might kill hundreds of thousands of Americans (and, as her husband believed, might result in the destruction of European culture and the White race) is preferable to the possibility of an outbreak of violent anti-Semitism. The moral demeanor of Americans is more important than their survival as a nation or people. And all of this because Lindbergh simply stated that Jews had interests as a group that differed from those of other Americans. Their lesson learned, American politicians presumably realized that even rational, intelligent, and humane discussions of Jewish interests were beyond the boundaries of acceptable discussion. Jews had no interests as Jews that could be said to conflict with the interests of any other group of Americans.

Her reaction fits well with a major point of my 2019 book, *Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition: Evolutionary Origins, History, and Prospects for the Future*, that the social glue of the unique individualist cultures of the West is based on moral communities rather than on kinship as is true for the other cultures of the world. Individualists, and especially women (because of evolved sex differences in personality—see *Individualism*, Ch. 8), are loath to violate the moral norms of their communities for fear of being ostracized or worse. As noted above, in the contemporary age, the moral norms of Western societies are established by elites in the media and academia, both of which have a strong Jewish presence and influence (see below for a discussion of Jewish influence in the media and academia). Anne Morrow Lindbergh was clearly horrified to realize that her husband’s speech had resulted in both of them becoming moral pariahs: “I . . . mind more [than Charles] giving up friends, popularity, etc., mind much more criticism and coldness and loneliness.”

By the time of Lindbergh’s speech, Jews not only had a prominent position in the U.S. media, but had also seized the intellectual and moral high ground via their control of the intellectual and political movements discussed in *CofC*. Not only were Jewish interests beyond the bounds of civilized political

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are you going to take? . . . He is very pessimistic of its being solved without great suffering” (A. M. Lindbergh, 1980, p. 239).

discussion, but assertions of European ethnic interests became impermissible as well. Such assertions conflicted with the Boasian dogma that genetic differences between peoples were trivial and in any case irrelevant. They conflicted with the Marxist belief in the equality of all peoples and the Marxist belief that nationalism and assertions of ethnic interests were reactionary. Such assertions were deemed a sure sign of psychopathology within the frameworks of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School, and they would be regarded as the babblings of country bumpkins by the New York Intellectuals and by the neo-conservatives who spouted variants of all of these ideologies from the most prestigious academic and media institutions in the society. There may indeed have been other forces that relegated a nativist mindset to the political and intellectual fringe—Gottfried (2000) points a finger at liberal Protestantism and the rise of the managerial state—but it is impossible to understand the effectiveness of either of these influences in ending mainstream assertions of the ethnic interests of Europeans in the absence of the Jewish movements I describe.

The rise of a de-ethnicized non-Jewish managerial elite that rejects traditional cultural institutions—as exemplified by President Bill and Hillary Clinton as well as most Democrats and Republicans—and is interwoven with a critical mass of ethnically conscious Jews and other ethnic minorities is an enormously important fact of our current political life. My claim that Jewish intellectual and political activities were a necessary condition for the rise of such an elite, while obviously difficult to verify conclusively (as any other causal hypothesis would be), is also compatible with the work of others, most notably David A. Hollinger's (1996) *Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth-Century American Intellectual History* and Carl Degler's (1991) *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought*.

The rise of such a de-ethnicized elite of White Americans is hardly an inevitable consequence of modernization or any other force of which I am aware. Such de-ethnicized managerial elites are unique to Western European and Western European-derived societies (see *Individualism*). Such elites are not found elsewhere in the world, either in highly developed nations, such as Japan and Israel, or in the undeveloped nations of Africa and elsewhere. Moreover, the cultural shifts under consideration have also occurred in traditionally Catholic countries like France and Italy, where Protestantism has not been a factor. France in particular has been very open to non-European immigration, and its intellectual life has been deeply influenced by the movements discussed in *CofC* as well as the movements of the left cited above with respect to Judith Butler's work. Conversely, there are many examples where Protestantism has peacefully coexisted with or even rationalized nationalism and ethnocentrism.

## HOW AMERICANS SAW THEMSELVES UP THROUGH THE 1920S

Developing theories of why Western cultures have provided such fertile ground for the movements and theories discussed in *CofC* is an important area for research that I have explored in *Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition*. In this context, it is instructive to look at the way Europeans in the United States saw themselves a century ago.<sup>8</sup> Americans of European descent thought of themselves as part of an ethnic and cultural heritage extending backward in time to the founding of the country. The Anglo-Saxon heritage of the British Isles was at the center of this self-conception, but Americans of German and Scandinavian descent also viewed themselves as part of this ethnic and cultural heritage. They had a great deal of pride in their accomplishments. They had conquered a vast territory and had achieved a high degree of economic progress. They saw themselves as having created a civilization with a strong moral fabric—a country of farmers and small businessmen that had become a world economic power. They believed that their civilization was a product of their own unique ingenuity and skills, and they believed that it would not survive if other peoples were allowed to play too large a role in it. They saw themselves as exhibiting positive personality traits such as courage in the face of adversity, self-reliance, inventiveness, originality, and fair play—the very virtues that allowed them to conquer the wilderness and turn it into an advanced civilization.

Americans at the dawn of the twentieth century looked out on the world and saw their own society as superior to others. They saw themselves and other European societies as reaping the rewards of political and economic freedom while the rest of the world suffered as it had from time immemorial—the despotism of Asia, the barbarity and primitivism of Africa, and the economic and political backwardness of Russia and Eastern Europe.

They saw themselves as Christian, and they thought of Christianity as an essential part of the social fabric and their way of life. Christianity was seen as basic to the moral foundations of the society, and any threat to Christianity was seen as a threat to the society as a whole. When these people looked back on their own childhood, they saw “a simple, secure world of commonly accepted values and behavior” (Bendersky, 2000, p. 6)—a world of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. They had a strong sense of family pride and regional identification, having deep roots in the areas in which they grew up. They did not think of the United States as a Marxist hell of war between the social classes. Instead, they thought of it as a world of harmony between the social classes in

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<sup>8</sup> The following is based on Bendersky's (2000, pp. 2–46) study of U.S. military officers but is representative of commonly held attitudes in the early twentieth century.

which people at the top of society earned their positions but felt a certain sense of social obligation to the lower social classes.

The early part of the twentieth century was also the high-water mark of Darwinism in the social sciences. It was common at that time to think that there were important differences between the races—that races differed in intelligence and in moral qualities. Not only did races differ, but they were in competition with each other for supremacy. As I described in SAID Chapter 5, such ideas were part of the furniture of intellectual life—commonplace among Jews as well as non-Jews.

That world has vanished. The rise of Jewish power and the disestablishment of the specifically European nature of the United States—a war fought on several fronts—are the real topics of *CofC*. The main thrusts of Jewish activism against European ethnic and cultural hegemony have focused on three critical power centers in the United States: (1) the academic world of information in the social sciences and humanities and its influence on the lower levels of the educational system; (2) the political world where public policy on immigration and other ethnic issues are decided; and (3) the mass media where “ways of seeing” are presented to the public.

At the academic level, Jewish intellectuals led the battle against the ideas that races even exist and that there are differences in intelligence or cultural level between the races that are rooted in biology (Ch. 2). At the level of politics, Jewish organizations spearheaded the drive to open up immigration to all of the peoples of the world. Jewish organizations, media companies, and media personalities also played a key role in furthering the interests of other racial and ethnic minorities, and they led the legal and legislative effort to remove Christianity from the public square (Ch. 8).

#### THE RISE OF THE JEWS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES

Concurrent with the rise of Jewish influence in the media was the Jewish rise in elite academic institutions and especially the Ivy League universities. The transformation of the faculty in the social sciences and humanities was well underway in the 1950s, and by the late 1960s it was largely complete. The new elite was very different from the old elite it displaced. The difference was that the old Protestant elite was not at war with the country it dominated. The old Protestant elite was wealthier and better educated than the public at large, but they approached life on basically the same terms. They saw themselves as Christians and as Europeans, and they didn’t see the need for radically changing the society.

Things are very different now. Since the 1960s a hostile, adversarial elite has emerged to dominate intellectual and political discourse. It is an elite that

almost instinctively loathes the traditional institutions of European-American culture: its religion, its customs, its manners, and its sexual attitudes. In the words of one commentator, “today’s elite loathes the nation it rules” (Gelernter, 1997).

This “hostile elite” is fundamentally a Jewish-dominated elite whose origins and main lines of influence are described in *CofC*. (By “Jewish-dominated elite,” I mean that policies disfavored by the mainstream Jewish community—e.g., policies regarding Israel or multicultural immigration—are highly unlikely to become official policy even if supported by most Americans.) The emergence of this hostile elite is an aspect of ethnic competition between Jews and non-Jews, and its effect will be a long-term decline in the hegemony of European peoples in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

Academia is an important locus of power. As Gross and Fosse (2012, p. 128) point out, the occupation of being a professor is of great sociological significance:

[Professors] play pivotal social roles producing new knowledge and technology; teaching and credentialing growing numbers of students; advising government, industry, and non-governmental organizations; and shaping social narratives in . . . the “civil sphere.” Politics do not bear directly on all work professors do, but higher education institutions as loci of knowledge production and dissemination may be influenced in important ways by their political views.

At least since the nineteenth century, the way we see ourselves has been vitally shaped by the academic community. Contemporary views on issues like race, gender, immigration, and a host of vital issues are manufactured in the academy (especially elite universities), disseminated throughout the media and the lower levels of the educational system, and ultimately consumed by the educated and not-so-educated public. Newspaper articles and television programs on these issues routinely include quotes from academic experts—especially professors from elite institutions.

Hollinger (1996, p. 4) notes “the transformation of the ethnoreligious demography of American academic life by Jews” in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, as well as the Jewish influence on trends toward the secularization of American society and in advancing an ideal of cosmopolitanism (p. 11). As early as the early 1940s, this transformation resulted in “a secular, increasingly Jewish, decidedly left-of-center intelligentsia based largely but not exclusively in the disciplinary communities of philosophy and the social sciences” (p. 160). By 1968, Jews constituted 20 percent of the faculty of elite American colleges and universities and 30 percent of the “most liberal” faculty. At this time, Jews, representing less than 3 percent of the population, constituted 25 percent of

the social sciences faculty at elite universities and 40 percent of liberal faculty who published most (see Rothman & Lichter, 1982/1996, p. 103). Jewish academics were also far more likely to support “progressive” or communist parties from the 1930s to the 1950s. In 1948 30 percent of Jewish faculty voted for the Progressive Party, compared to less than 5 percent of gentile faculty (p. 101).

Using survey data of 60,000 academics from 1969, Lipset and Ladd (1971) show that the 1960s were a critical period for the rise of a Jewish academic culture well to the left of non-Jewish professors. Jews represented around 12 percent of faculty in general, but around 25 percent of the younger faculty (less than age fifty) at Ivy League universities—percentages that were much higher than in previous decades. Jews were heavily represented on the faculties of other elite public and private universities as well, particularly in the politically relevant fields of the law and the social sciences.

Moreover, Jewish faculty were more heavily published than non-Jewish faculty, indicating greater influence. This is important because the academic world is a top-down system: those at the top train the next generation of scholars and police the recruitment of new faculty. For example, a professor at Harvard places his Ph.D. students at the flagship state universities, such as the University of Wisconsin, the University of Michigan, or the University of California-Berkeley, and they in turn place their students at lower-tier colleges and universities—the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, etc. They therefore have more influence on the future of the field than less-published scholars. As indicated below, liberal faculty are perfectly willing to discriminate on the basis of political views, and I think it’s quite likely that this also occurred in the 1960s.

Importantly, Lipset and Ladd also found that Jewish faculty were well to the left of non-Jewish faculty. Thus, a considerably larger percentage of Jewish faculty rated themselves as liberal or left (74.5 percent) compared to less than 40 percent of non-Jewish faculty. In the social sciences, 84.9 percent of Jewish faculty compared to 76 percent of Protestants and 65.2 percent of Catholics described themselves as liberal or left. Among the Jewish faculty, 59.1 percent approved of 1960s student radical activism, compared to around 40 percent for non-Jewish faculty. Jewish faculty were also more likely to approve relaxing standards in order to recruit more minority faculty and students.

Within the Jewish segment, the least religious Jews were the most liberal. This is important because, as documented in *CofC*, in general liberal-left Jews were not religious but were strongly identified as Jews and saw their politics as advancing specifically Jewish interests. The leftist politics of the new academic elite was thus closely related to Jewish identification, and it was broadly reflective of the political views of the mainstream Jewish community.

In a work published in 1977, Harriet Zuckerman also found high levels of Jewish overrepresentation among elite, high-achieving academics, as indicated in Table 1 below.

Faculty	Percent Jews	Achievement Quotient
Law	36	13.3
Sociology	34	12.6
Economics	28	10.4
Physics	26	9.6
Political Science	24	8.9
History	22	8.1
Philosophy	20	7.4
Mathematics	20	7.4

**Table 1:** Jewish Percentage of Faculty at Elite Universities by Department. Achievement Quotient is the percentage of Jewish faculty divided by the percentage of Jews in the population, set at 2.7 percent. (Zuckerman, 1977/1996)

These findings regarding Jewish overrepresentation replicate similar findings based on surveys cited elsewhere in this volume. In the 1970s, Charles Kadushin's 1974 sample of authors who were published in the top twenty academic journals in America indicated that Jews accounted for 56 percent of social scientists and 61 percent of humanity scholars.

The leftward bias of the social sciences continues today. Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2011) conducted an informal survey at a convention of social psychologists (reputedly the most left-leaning academic area of psychology), finding that only 3 in a crowd of 1,000 (0.3 percent) were willing to publicly label themselves as “conservative” compared to around 40 percent of the American public. Haidt sees social psychology as a “tribal moral community” that shuns and ostracizes political conservatives, with the result that research conflicting with core political attitudes is either not performed or is likely to be excluded from peer-reviewed journals because such research faces much more daunting scrutiny and higher methodological standards in the peer review process.

Sociology is another hotbed of leftist academics. Emil Kierkegaard (2024) concluded that “Surveys of sociologists from the 1950s to 2020s show that it is an extremely left-wing field even by comparison with other academic social science fields.”

As noted by Zuckerman (1977; see above) and in Chapter 2, Jews are highly overrepresented in sociology. In examining why this might be, Gross and Fosse (2012) found that the most powerful variable was simply having a graduate degree—results they argue are not due to IQ. That is, college professors are liberals because they went to graduate school, and they did so not because they

were smarter, but for some other reason. The second strongest predictor was “intellectualism”—the extent of tolerance for controversial ideas. (Based on my experience in contemporary academia, such tolerance would seem to be entirely in the self-conceptions of the professors.) The next most powerful predictor was religious affiliation or lack thereof: people with no religious affiliation, or Jewish affiliation, or non-conservative Protestant affiliation were more likely to be liberal (in that order). Since it’s likely that a considerable percentage of professors who declare themselves as having no religious affiliation are Jews, this doubtless underrepresents the importance of Jewishness in accounting for professorial liberalism. (In general, the study would have been far better if race and Jewish ethnic background—not simply religious affiliation—were included as variables.)

Gross and Fosse (2012, p. 154) acknowledge that their data can be interpreted in a number of ways. However, they argue that “the liberalism of professors . . . is a function . . . of the systematic sorting of young adults who are already liberally—or conservatively—inclined into and out of the academic profession, respectively.” Just as a profession like nursing becomes typecast as appropriate for women, becoming a professor is seen as appropriate for liberals: “We argue that the professoriate, along with a number of other knowledge work fields, has been ‘politically typed’ as appropriate for and welcoming of people with broadly liberal political sensibilities, and as inappropriate for conservatives” (p. 155).

A study completed after Gross and Fosse’s paper indicated that liberal faculty members acknowledge being willing to discriminate against conservative job candidates, and that this tendency became stronger among the most liberal faculty (Inbar & Lammers, 2012). Such discrimination is a powerful reinforcement for self-sorting processes—effectively ensuring that the next generation of faculty will be liberal as well.

Gross and Fosse have some ideas on how academia became dominated by the left. Disciplines construct images of the ideal person in their respective fields, and these images are ultimately the result of conflict among competing images. When it comes to understanding the history of how the academy became a bastion of the left, they emphasize the 1960s and the conservative reaction against it. It was during this period that the image of the radical leftist professor replaced the image of the ivory tower professor—the unworldly person of letters and sophistication, at home with his books, his pipe, and his tweed jacket, and totally immersed in discussions of Renaissance poetry or the art of classical antiquity.

Universities were relatively liberal before the 1960s—at least since the decline of Darwinism in the social sciences by 1930. As I have argued, the decline of Darwinian social science (perhaps “eradication” is a better word) resulted in an intellectual gap that was quickly filled by several Jewish-dominated



intellectual movements of the left (MacDonald, 2015). Nevertheless, there was a major shift in the 1960s that resulted in the activist left becoming dominant at American universities.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this shift was that before the 1960s liberalism was identified with supporting labor unions and other institutions aimed at improving the lot of the (predominantly White) working class. The intellectual movements that came to dominate the left—perhaps most notably the Frankfurt School, whose members were clearly influenced by their Jewish identities and sense of Jewish interests (Ch. 6)—abandoned the working class because it was insufficiently radical and had succumbed to fascism in Germany and Italy during the 1930s. This caused the Frankfurt School intellectuals and many other leftist intellectuals to reject orthodox Marxism, replacing it by advocating multiracial immigration and multiculturalism, as well as recruiting those who had complaints against the traditional culture of America, particularly feminists and racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities—what is now often called the grievance industry. As discussed below, complaints against the current system are a critical motivating feature of successful intellectual movements. The groups recruited into the coalition of the left then formed the core of the “tribal moral community” described by Haidt (2011)—the community that has come to define the academic culture of the left that now dominates universities, particularly in the social sciences, the humanities, and the law).

As Gross and Fosse (2012, pp. 158–159) note, it was during the 1960s when the universities became strongly associated with the political left in the eyes of friends and foes alike—enough to result in self-selection processes in which conservatives would feel unwelcome in the university:

Higher education was a crucial micromobilization context for a number of left social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, which further enhanced the institution’s liberal reputation; with concerted cultural efforts by American conservatives, especially from the 1950s on, to build a collective identity for their movement around differentiation from various categories of “liberal elites,” not least liberal professors; with restricted opportunities for Americans on the far left to enter other institutional spheres; and with self-reinforcing processes by which self-selection into the academic profession by liberals resulted in a more liberal professoriate whose reputation for liberalism was thereby maintained or enhanced.

Further, because departments at elite universities attempt to best represent the *zeitgeist* of their particular academic fields, Gross and Fosse point out they will offer positions to scholars they see as exemplary, and political attitudes are a major part of being exemplary. Imagine the extreme improbability

of being hired in a gender studies department as an openly declared conservative heterosexual male—especially at an elite institution (MacDonald, 2008c).

I would also add that not only are liberal attitudes a key component of being seen as a viable job candidate at an elite institution, but also group membership is critical. Being non-White or a member of a sexual minority definitely gives one an advantage in the hiring process, as well as promotion and the prospect of becoming an administrator.

Since the contemporary *zeitgeist* celebrates the multicultural left (as opposed to the pro-White working-class left of the pre-1960s), hiring is biased toward those who espouse the most liberal attitudes, and especially those from aggrieved groups as imagined by the multicultural left. And, as Gross and Fosse point out, this in turn leads to elite institutions being to the left of lesser institutions. In the academic food chain, the result is that graduate students coming from elite institutions are most representative of the leftist academic culture, either because of their socialization in the academic environment or simply because of their perceived self-interest as a victimized group championed by the left. This becomes progressively diluted as one goes to the second- and third-tier schools and eventually down to K-12 education.

This creates a liberal social environment at all levels of the academic pecking order. Public opinion surveys carried out since the 1960s show that going to college results in attitude change in a liberal direction compared to parents. If education level remained the same, there was little change in attitudes (Kaufmann, 2004, p. 191).

Thus, for all its supposed openness to new ideas and espousal of egalitarianism, the academic world is a top-down system in which the highest levels are rigorously policed to ensure ideological conformity, not only for the reasons suggested by Gross and Fosse, but also because any leak in the system would mean that dissidents would benefit from institutional prestige. Thus John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (2007) caused a panic in the ranks of the Israel Lobby with their work on the lobby and its effects on U.S. foreign policy. Mearsheimer and Walt weren't just two easy-to-ignore professors from a third-tier university, nor were they members of an easily marginalized group, such as Arabs. They were well-known and academically productive professors at prestigious institutions—the University of Chicago and Harvard respectively.

This resulted in a full-fledged smear campaign emphasizing “shoddy scholarship”—improbable given their long history of publishing their research in major academic journals (MacDonald, 2007a). This charge was typically made by Jewish activist organizations or others without the slightest experience in scholarship. Mearsheimer and Walt were also charged with the thought crime of anti-Semitism, and their work was likened to *The Protocols of*

the *Elders of Zion*—also improbable given that they are political liberals who have bent over backwards not to offend Jews (MacDonald, 2007b).

Nevertheless, despite their lack of credibility, these efforts have been at least somewhat successful. At the time of this writing in 2024, politicians are loath to cite Mearsheimer and Walt, and it is unthinkable that they could attain positions in the government where they could directly influence U.S. foreign policy. This shows that even elite academics can be marginalized if they come up against powerful interests. But the energy expended by the Jewish activist community against Mearsheimer and Walt shows the danger that elite academics pose to those who disagree with the implications of their ideas. Other examples are E. O. Wilson, the Harvard biologist (see Ch. 2), and Nobel Laureate James Watson, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA.

#### IS GROSS AND FOSSE'S THEORY COMPATIBLE WITH COFC?

The major question for me is whether the theory of Gross and Fosse (2012) is compatible with my proposal in *CofC* that Jewish intellectual movements were a critical force in producing the leftist political culture in the academic world and beyond. I think the answer is a resounding “yes.”

Gross and Fosse propose a conflict theory of successful intellectual movements. In particular, they cite sociological research indicating that successful intellectual movements have three key ingredients: (1) they originate with people with high-status positions having complaints against the current environment, resulting in conflict with the status quo; (2) these intellectuals form cohesive and cooperative networks; and (3) this network has access to prestigious institutions and publication outlets (Frickel & Gross, 2005).

This is precisely the perspective developed in *CofC*. In the following, I provide evidence that Jewish-dominated intellectual movements were a critical factor (necessary condition) for the triumph of the intellectual left in late twentieth-century Western societies, with a focus on the creation of an academic culture of the left. But before embarking on that, it is noteworthy that Gross and Fosse are at least somewhat cognizant of the importance of Jewish influence. They deem it relevant to point out that Jews entered the academic world in large numbers after World War II and became overrepresented among professors, especially in elite academic departments in the social sciences—that is, in the decade immediately prior to the triumph of the multicultural left in the academic world. They cite survey data indicating that 25 percent of the faculty at research universities are Jewish compared to 10 percent overall; these percentages are even higher in departments of social science at research universities (Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006). Correspondingly, conservative Protestants are underrepresented, especially among faculty at elite research

universities. Further, and importantly, as noted above, the most liberal professors work at the most elite institutions. These findings also fit well with the views of other social scientists noted above (Hollinger, 1996; Rothman & Lichter, 1982/1996) and regarding sociology as discussed in Chapter 2.

### WHY ARE JEWS LIBERAL?

Gross and Fosse also correctly point out that Jews in general are politically liberal. Indeed, Norman Podhoretz (2009, Ch. 31) in his *Why Are Jews Liberals?* noted that over 80 percent of Jews voted for Barack Obama—far higher than any other religious or ethnic group, except Blacks. In the 2024 election, while religious Jews voted around 40 percent for Trump, non-religious Jews (the vast majority of American Jews) voted around 25 percent for Trump (A. Rosen, 2024), in line with previous patterns despite increasing criticism of Israel on the left, especially after the Gaza war of 2023–present. Moreover, the Jewish voting profile in terms of income and occupation is completely different from other liberal voters—reflected in the old saw that Jews “earn like Episcopalians and vote like Puerto Ricans.” Whereas the views of Jewish professors are quite in line with the views of the wider Jewish community, the views of non-Jewish White professors are quite out of step with the wider White community.

Thus the liberalism of Jewish professors is entirely in line with the attitudes of other Jews, and it is at least doubtful that the reasons why Jewish professors are liberal are any different from why most Jews are liberal—that is, the liberal proclivities of Jews are a fundamental facet of Jewish identity in the diaspora in twentieth-century Western societies. This means that the deeper motivation for the liberalism of a very significant percentage of faculty at elite universities, especially in departments of social sciences and humanities, is not really addressed in Gross and Fosse’s study.

The following, therefore, assumes that Jewish professors are motivated by the same forces that motivate liberalism and radicalism as Jewish ideologies in the Western diaspora—thus the same as the motivations of the principal figures in the Jewish intellectual movements covered in other chapters of this volume.

**(1) Jewish intellectuals have a complaint.** Gross and Fosse propose that successful intellectual movements begin with a complaint, and there can be little doubt that Jews in general have a complaint, or rather, two related complaints: the long history of anti-Semitism, and the predominance of White Christian culture.

Podhoretz’s book is typical of a very large literature that points to the lachrymose view of Jewish history as influencing how Jews see themselves politically in diaspora societies in the West. This view of Jewish history proposes

that, beginning with an unfortunate theological belief (that Jews killed God), Jews in Western societies have repeatedly been passive, innocent victims of marauding non-Jews. As I noted in SAID (p. 215):

Jewish religious consciousness centers to a remarkable extent around the memory of persecution. Persecution is a central theme of the holidays of Passover, Hanukkah, Purim, and Yom Kippur. . . . Jews learn about the Middle Ages as a period of persecution in Christian Europe, culminating in the expulsions and the Inquisitions. The violence perpetrated by the Crusaders in 1096 in Germany became a central event in Jewish consciousness. . . . Detailed lists of martyrs were composed and recited in synagogue ritual for hundreds of years after the event; chronicles of the event were written and a literature on the status of forced converts was developed. . . . There is also a strong awareness of the nineteenth-century pogroms in Eastern Europe, especially in Russia. Indeed, the historian Sir Louis B. Namier went so far as to say that there was no Jewish history, “only a Jewish martyrology” (in Berlin 1980, 72). . . . [And] when prominent social scientist Michael Walzer (1994, 4) states that “I was taught Jewish history as a long tale of exile and persecution—Holocaust history read backwards,” he is expressing not only the predominant perception of Jews of their own history but also a powerful strand of academic Jewish historiography, the so-called “lachrymose” tradition of Jewish historiography.

The lesson that Jews learned from the Middle Ages carries down to today, as Podhoretz (2009, p. 29) notes:

[The Jews] emerged from the Middle Ages knowing for a certainty that—individual exceptions duly noted—the worst enemy they had in the world was Christianity: the churches in which it was embodied—whether Roman Catholic or Russian Orthodox or Protestant—and the people who prayed in and were shaped by them. It was a knowledge that Jewish experience in the ages to come would do very little, if indeed anything at all, to help future generations to forget.

It is common, therefore, for Jews to hate all manifestations of Christianity. But the decline of Christianity as the central intellectual paradigm didn’t improve things for Jews. During the Enlightenment, anti-Jewish ideologies smoothly morphed into non-theological views in which Judaism was a superstitious relic that prevented Jews from shedding their attachment to their people—“giving up their sense of themselves as a people whose members were bound together across national boundaries and wherever they might live” (Podhoretz, 2009, p. 43).

The Enlightenment critique of Judaism implied that Jews should give up their tribal allegiances and economic and political networks and that they should accept the atomized individualism implied by the modern nation-state. As Count Clermont-Tonnerre expressed it when addressing the French National Assembly in 1789, “The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals. . . . The existence of a nation within a nation is unacceptable to our country” (in Podhoretz, 2009, p. 51).

In the nineteenth century, Jews began to be seen by their enemies as an economically successful alien race intent on subverting national cultures wherever they lived. Podhoretz (2009, p. 111) points to “the new racist rationale [that] manifested itself in the portrayal of a war between Aryans and Semites as the central drama of history.” For example, Ivan Aksakov, a leader of the Slavophiles in Russia, viewed Jews as a mortal enemy intent on destroying Christianity: “The Western European Christian world will be faced in the future, in one form or another, with a life-and-death struggle with Jewry, which is striving to replace the universal Christian ideal by another, Semitic ideal, also universal, but negative and anti-Christian” (in p. 108).

Even in the United States—the “golden land” as seen by Jewish immigrants—there was exclusion and antipathy from “the upper echelons of the Wasp patriciate” (Podhoretz, 2009, p. 90), and quotas on Jews were established at elite universities. In America, Jews were excluded by WASP elites, and Christian forms of anti-Semitism (e.g., Father Charles Coughlin) remained strong through the 1930s. As discussed above, isolationists such as Charles Lindbergh also tended to see Jews as an interest group aiming at getting America involved in war with Germany.

Jews concluded, as they had ever since the political left and right came to be defined, that their enemies were on the right. But the main lesson Podhoretz and a legion of other Jewish intellectuals have drawn is that over the centuries Western intellectuals have produced a variety of Christian and non-Christian anti-Jewish ideologies, each with the same result: irrational hatred toward Jews. So it’s not just Christianity, but European civilization itself that is the problem for Jews.

And, although Podhoretz doesn’t explicitly make this move, it’s a very short jump from blaming the culture created and sustained by Europeans to the idea that Europeans as a people or group of peoples are the problem—the ultimate conclusion of the Frankfurt School (see Ch. 6). This explicit or implicit sense that Europeans themselves are the problem is the crux of the Jewish complaint.

This Jewish complaint has resonated powerfully among Jewish intellectuals who rose to the heights of the academic world. As John Murray Cuddihy (1974, p. 68) notes, Jewish intellectuals were generally estranged from and hostile toward Western culture and institutions:

From Solomon Maimon to Norman Podhoretz, from Rahel Varnhagen to Cynthia Ozick, from Marx and Lassalle to Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, from Herzl and Freud to Harold Laski and Lionel Trilling, from Moses Mendelssohn to J. Robert Oppenheimer and Ayn Rand, Gertrude Stein, and Reich I and II (Wilhelm and Charles), one dominating structure of an identical predicament and a shared fate imposes itself upon the consciousness and behavior of the Jewish intellectual in *Galut* [exile]: with the advent of Jewish Emancipation, when ghetto walls crumble and the *shtetlach* [small Jewish towns] begin to dissolve, Jewry—like some wide-eyed anthropologist—enters upon a strange world, to explore a strange people observing a strange *halakah* (law code). They examine this world in dismay, with wonder, anger, and punitive objectivity. This wonder, this anger, and the vindictive objectivity of the marginal nonmember are recidivist; they continue unabated into our own time because Jewish Emancipation continues into our own time.

The various chapters of *CofC* show that hostility to the people and culture of the West was characteristic of all the Jewish intellectual and political movements of the left that came to be ensconced in the academic world of the United States and other Western societies. For example, Franz Boas's cultural relativism, which implied that Western societies were in no way more advanced or superior to other societies, came to dominate academic anthropology at a time when Western societies were far more scientifically and technologically advanced and dominated the world politically and militarily. Boas had a strong sense that anti-Semitism pervaded non-Jewish society, leading him to despise non-Jewish culture, particularly the culture of the Prussian aristocracy in his native Germany (see Ch. 2; Degler, 1991, p. 200; Stocking, 1968, p. 150).

Charles S. Liebman's (1973, pp. 153ff) theory of Jewish involvement in the left emphasizes the idea that leftist universalist ideology allows Jews to subvert traditional social categorizations in which Jews are viewed in negative terms. The adoption of such ideologies by Jews is an attempt to overcome Jewish feelings of alienation "from the roots and the traditions of [non-Jewish] society" (p. 153).

Many neoconservatives, particularly those centered around Senator Henry Jackson (e.g., Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz), were also motivated by perceived anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union (see Ch. 4). Estrangement from and hostility toward non-Jews and their culture were typical of Freud and other prominent Jewish psychoanalysts—motivated at least partly by their perception of anti-Semitism (see Ch. 5). Given the complaint that so many of Freud's followers had about Western society, it is not surprising that psychoanalysis was used to produce theories in which anti-Semitism is attributed to intrapsychic conflict, sexual repression, or troubled parent-child

relationships, while also denying the importance of cultural separatism and the reality of group-based competition for resources; the Frankfurt School's theory is an outstanding example of this (see Ch. 6). The New York Intellectuals were also motivated by the complaints of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union (see Ch. 7), and similarly, Jewish involvement in shaping U.S. immigration policy, in the direction of lessening the power of Whites via non-White immigration and multiculturalism, was also motivated by two different complaints about non-Jewish society: the familiar complaint of anti-Semitism, but also the complaint that models of the United States as a homogeneous White, Christian civilization excluded Jews and were dangerous for Jews in the long run given what happened in Germany in the 1930s (see Ch. 8).

In summary, there is good evidence that Jewish intellectuals involved in important intellectual movements of the left that came to dominate academic discourse were motivated by complaints—mainly complaints of anti-Semitism but also complaints of cultural exclusion from White, Christian society.

Finally, it should also be noted that Gross and Fosse point out that studies of professorial politics show that, while professors do have more liberal economic attitudes than other Americans, it is their social attitudes—their views of gender, homosexuality, abortion, etc.—that make them truly distinctive.

This is also the case with Jews generally. For example, the difference between the largely Jewish Hollywood elite and both traditional American elites and the general public is clearest on “expressive individualism”—a dimension tapping ideas of sexual liberation (including approval of homosexuality), moral relativism, and a disdain for religious institutions (Powers et al., 1996). The Hollywood elite is also more tolerant of unusual or deviant lifestyles as well as ethnic and religious minorities. Survey data repeatedly show that the Jewish community in general has more liberal attitudes on issues related to sexuality and church-state separation (S. M. Cohen & C. S. Liebman, 1997).

**(2) Jewish intellectuals formed cohesive, effective networks.** The following is a passage from Chapter 7 summarizing the cohesion of Jewish intellectual networks apparent through the book:

An important thread apparent in the discussions of psychoanalysis, Boasian anthropology, the Frankfurt School, and radical intellectual and political circles has been that Jewish intellectuals have formed highly cohesive groups whose influence derives to great extent from the solidarity and cohesiveness of the group. . . . Intellectual activity is like any other human endeavor: cohesive groups outcompete individualist strategies. Indeed, the fundamental truth of this axiom has been central to the success of Judaism throughout its history.



Among this self-described alienated and marginalized group there was also an atmosphere of social support that undoubtedly functioned as had traditional Jewish ingroup solidarity arrayed against an outside world seen as morally and intellectually inferior. They perceived themselves as people with a complaint who must cling together against the forces of evil—"rebel intellectuals defending a minority position and upholding the best traditions of radicalism" (Cooney, 1986, p. 265). *Partisan Review*, the flagship journal of the New York Intellectuals (discussed in Ch. 7), provided "a haven and support" and a sense of social identity; it "served to assure many of its members that they were not alone in the world, that sympathetic intellectuals existed in sufficient number to provide them with social and professional moorings" (p. 249). There was thus a great deal of continuity to this "coherent, distinguishable group" of intellectuals "who mainly began their careers as revolutionary communists in the 1930s [to] become an institutionalized and even hegemonic component of American culture during the conservative 1950s while maintaining a high degree of collective continuity" (Wald, 1987, p. 12, 10). The cohesiveness of academic Jews is also indicated by their citation patterns, as mentioned in Chapter 7, citing Greenwald and Schuh (1994).

Finally, contributing to cohesion has been the tendency to center around charismatic leaders—e.g., Boas (Ch. 2), Freud (Ch. 5), Max Horkheimer (Ch. 6), Leo Strauss (Ch. 4), and Trotsky (Ch. 3)—with a powerful moral, intellectual, and social vision. The followers of these leaders had an intense devotion toward them, often mimicking their idiosyncrasies and promoting them as intellectual gods to their students and colleagues.

The strong ingroup biases and high cohesiveness of these Jewish intellectual movements doubtless account for the success of some of the more egregious, politically inspired social science of the last decades. For example, historian John Higham (1984, p. 154) pointed out that the incredible success of *The Authoritarian Personality* studies (i.e., the studies that claimed the group allegiances of non-Jews were the result of psychiatric disorder) was facilitated by the "extraordinary ascent" of Jews concerned with anti-Semitism in academic social science departments in the post-World War II era.

**(3) Jewish intellectuals had access to the most prestigious academic institutions.** The Jewish-dominated movements that transformed the academic world became ensconced in the most prestigious academic institutions. The New York Intellectuals, for example, developed ties with elite universities, particularly Harvard, Columbia, the University of Chicago, and the University of California–Berkeley, while psychoanalysis and Boasian anthropology became well entrenched throughout academia. The Frankfurt School intellectuals were associated with Columbia and the University of California–Berkeley, and their intellectual descendants are dispersed through the academic world. The neoconservatives are mainly associated with the University of Chicago and

Johns Hopkins University, and they were able to get their material published by the academic presses at these universities as well as Cornell University.

The moral and intellectual elite established by these movements dominated intellectual discourse during a critical period after World War II and through the transformations of the 1960s. College students during this period were powerfully socialized to adopt liberal-radical cultural and political beliefs.

As Eric P. Kaufmann (2004, p. 247) points out in his account of the decline of WASP America, once the new value set was institutionalized, it became the focus of status competition within the boundaries set by these movements. Kaufmann's account is also useful because, in basic agreement with Gross and Fosse, he cites sociologist Mario Diani (1997) who emphasizes that social movements tend to succeed to the extent that leaders of a movement possess "social capital" in the form of social ties to the mass media, corporate cultural intermediaries, and the state intelligentsia—where dominant interpretations of reality are generated. The same applies to understanding the creation of dominant moral communities that are so critical for understanding how popular attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism are influenced by the elite media and the educational system (see *Individualism*).

The cosmopolitan revolution was not confined to academia. It came to dominate all the high ground in American society, including the mass media, the lower levels of the educational system, and the rhetoric and voting behavior of politicians, the latter influenced by the newly established boundaries of the moral community created by this new elite and via donations to political candidates who lean liberal or left on social issues (see, e.g., Weiss, 2016). In the case of the mass media, there is excellent evidence for a very strong Jewish influence (see below) and for the idea that the mass media provided very positive portrayals of the leftist worldview. Indeed, a major theme of CofC is that Jewish influence in the popular media was an important source of favorable coverage of Jewish intellectual movements, particularly psychoanalysis and 1960s political radicalism.

Moreover, as implied by Gross and Fosse, once an organization becomes dominated by a particular intellectual perspective, there is enormous inertia created by the fact that the informal networks dominating elite universities serve as gatekeepers for the next generation of scholars. Aspiring academics are subjected to a high level of indoctrination at the undergraduate and graduate levels; there is tremendous psychological pressure to adopt the fundamental intellectual assumptions that lie at the center of the power hierarchy of the discipline. Once such a movement attains intellectual predominance, it is not surprising that people would be attracted to these movements because of the prestige associated with them. And, as Gross and Fosse argue,

conservatives who do not subscribe to these ideas simply self-select to go into a different career.

#### THE FINAL STEP IN THE RADICALIZATION OF THE UNIVERSITY

The final step in the transformation of the university into a stronghold of the anti-White multicultural left was the establishment of academic departments staffed by the various aggrieved parties championed by the multicultural left after it abandoned the White working class. The 1970s saw the emergence of departments of ethnic studies and women's and gender studies. My former university (California State University–Long Beach) is typical of academia generally in having departments or programs in American Indian Studies, Africana Studies (formerly Black Studies), American Studies (whose subject matter emphasizes “How do diverse groups within the Americas imagine their identities and their relation to the United States?”), Asian and Asian-American Studies, Chicano and Latino Studies, Jewish Studies, and Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies.

All of these departments and programs exemplify the leftist academic culture. All are politically committed to advancing the interests and worldviews of their special grievances against Whites and their culture. Often they are avowedly and explicitly on the left.

A critical force in establishing such departments was the Jewish left that came to influence the academic world after World War II, reaching a commanding position by the late 1960s. As noted above, these Jewish intellectual movements, particularly the Frankfurt School and the New York Intellectuals, had developed an explicit ideology that promoting the interests of the working class was a poor strategy given that the working class in Europe had not risen up in communist revolution but had joined fascist movements instead. Moreover, as noted above for the New York Intellectuals, they were well aware that race rather than social class was a far more powerful variable for explaining the deeply embedded attitudes of rural America, particularly in the South—attitudes they regarded as abhorrent, at least partly because anti-Jewish attitudes were common among these groups. Finally, along with the entire Jewish community, they had adopted a cultural and ethnic pluralist model for America in which America would cease to be defined as either White or Christian (see Ch. 8). White Christians were the problem.

As a result, the next step was to broaden the basis of the left and consolidate their power by promoting other groups that had grievances against White, Christian America. Because of the history of European conquest and colonialism, the multiracial immigrants of the post-1960s have been highly susceptible to anti-White attitudes, and thus, like the Jews, prone to having

grievances against White America—views that are common among professors of ethnic and gender studies. Although it is difficult to specify the exact linkages here, it is certainly the case that the triumph of the Jewish-dominated intellectual movements in the academic world was followed in short order by the establishment of these other pillars of the cultural left within the university.

Indeed, as noted throughout this volume, a common pattern for Jewish intellectual and political movements has been to reach out and make alliances with non-Jews, many of whom often attain highly visible positions in the movement. This is necessary because Jews are a relatively small percentage of the population, and it is in their interest, whether in influencing academic discourse or the political process, to ally themselves with other groups with grievances against Whites. The culture of the left became solidified within the university when it was able to recruit people who, like so many Jewish intellectuals, perceived themselves to be sexual, racial, and ethnic victims. These people are a large and committed portion of the leftist culture of the university, and in the currently dominant culture of the left, they are highly incentivized to claim victim status as a route to professional success.

Since women have been framed by the regnant cultural left as victims of the previously dominant patriarchy, it's not surprising that women are a large part of the post-1960s grievance coalition in academia. Noah Carl (2021) notes that women are granted around 60 percent of Ph.D. degrees and around 80 percent of bachelor's degrees in departments of ethnic, gender, and cultural studies. These departments are often made up of leftist activists. Moreover, a study of the voting behavior of academics showed that 10 percent of men voted Republican, while only 4 percent of women did (Langbert et al., 2016). In departments of sociology, 81 percent of women agreed with the statement that sociology "should be both a scientific and moral enterprise" compared to 58 percent of men; in anthropology 49 percent of women agreed that "traditional indigenous knowledge is not less 'true,'" compared to 19 percent of men; 36 percent of women agreed that "science is just one way of knowing," compared to 12 percent of men (M. Horowitz et al., 2018). Overall, compared to men, women are more in favor of the leftist programs to end free speech and censor speech they disagree with. They are more inclined toward activism, and less inclined toward dispassionate inquiry; they are more likely to agree that hate speech is violence, that it's acceptable to shout down a speaker, that controversial scientific findings should be censored, and that it should be illegal to say offensive things about minorities.

These sex differences are likely due ultimately to women's greater tendencies toward empathy for putative victims, harm avoidance, and conformity. As I noted in *Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition* (Ch. 8), there are

strong sex differences in the empathy and fear systems, with women being more prone to empathic concern for others and to fear:

Being high on fear leads to conformity because in the contemporary West there is much to fear if one fails to conform to the attitudes of the mainstream moral community—loss of job, loss of friends and family, and general ostracism. It's much safer to remain within the confines of the moral community.

Within the evolutionary/biological perspective, such differences are importantly influenced by different selection pressures on males and females, as influenced by hormonal differences; for example, greater average muscle mass among men is influenced by testosterone prenatally and during adolescence.

Further, the Jewish movements that came to dominate the academy are not at all different from the wider Jewish community in making alliances with ethnic and sexual minorities. The organized Jewish community has made alliances with non-White ethnic groups and has championed the cause of public visibility for sexual minorities (MacDonald, 2006, 2009a). Charles E. Silberman (1985, p. 350) notes:

American Jews are committed to cultural tolerance because of their belief—one firmly rooted in history—that Jews are safe only in a society acceptant of a wide range of attitudes and behaviors, as well as a diversity of religious and ethnic groups. It is this belief, for example, not approval of homosexuality, that leads an overwhelming majority of U.S. Jews to endorse 'gay rights' and to take a liberal stance on most other so-called "social" issues.

This concern for Jewish safety in the more or less homogeneous pre-1965 White society is also at the root of Jewish promotion for multiracial immigration and in particular the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Ch. 8).

Conspicuously missing from the list of Jewish allies are lower- and middle-class Whites. These are the groups that were most vilified by the New York Intellectuals and the Frankfurt School, and they have suffered the most from the multicultural revolution. These people are being pushed out economically and politically. They are the enraged participants in the Tea Party movement and the supporters of Donald Trump that have been so visible in recent years. They can't move to gated communities or send their children to all-White private schools. Their unions have been destroyed and their jobs either shipped overseas or performed by recent immigrants, legal and illegal. Their fortunes will continue to decline as millions more non-Whites crowd our shores.

The result of this revolution is the American university as we see it now. Conservatives need not apply, and heterosexual White males should be prepared to exhibit effusive demonstrations of guilt and sympathy with their oppressed co-workers—and expect to be passed over for high-profile, high-paying administrative positions in favor of the many aggrieved ethnic and sexual minorities who now dominate the university.

#### JEWISH OVERREPRESENTATION AT ELITE UNIVERSITIES

Beginning in the early twentieth century, there has been an ethnic war between Jews and WASPs over admission to Ivy League universities, ranging from quotas against Jews in the 1920s (e.g., Harvard's Jewish enrollment dropped from 30 percent to 15 percent between 1925 and 1926) to the ultimate victory of Jewish activist groups after World War II. The result is that, when controlling for their academic qualifications, Jews have been greatly overrepresented at elite universities for several decades (Unz, 2018c 2012, 2024b). Because elite universities are a critical pipeline into the American elite, admission policies of Ivy League universities are of vital importance. The following is based on figures supplied by Hillel, the campus Jewish organization:

Jewish students were roughly 1,000% more likely to be enrolled at Harvard and the rest of the Ivy League than white Gentiles of similar ability. This was an absolutely astonishing result given that under-representation in the range of 20% or 30% is often treated by courts as powerful *prima facie* evidence of racial discrimination. (Unz, 2018c)

[Sociologist Jerome] Karabel [2005] opens the final chapter of his book [*The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton*] by . . . noting the extreme irony that the WASP demographic group which had once so completely dominated America's elite universities and "virtually all the major institutions of American life" had by 2000 become "a small and beleaguered minority at Harvard," being actually fewer in number than the Jews whose presence they had once sought to restrict. Very similar results seem to apply all across the Ivy League, with the disproportion often being even greater than the particular example emphasized by Karabel. (Unz, 2012)

Unz (2024b) also notes that Claudine Gay, a Black woman, resigned after only six months **on the job** due to accusations of plagiarism and anti-Semitism, and that the four previous presidents of Harvard dating to 1991 were either Jewish or married to a Jewish spouse (with three in the former category); the interim replacement for Gay is also Jewish. Further, from Unz (2024b):

[S]ix of the eight Ivy League university presidents are currently Jewish, including Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Cornell, Brown, and Dartmouth, as are those of other elite colleges such as Caltech and MIT. This ethnic ratio of top academic leadership has remained roughly unchanged for several decades.

Any sign that the enrollment of Jews at elite universities is less than about 20 percent is seen as indicative of anti-Semitism. A 2009 article in *The Daily Princetonian* cited data from Hillel indicating that, with the exception of Princeton and Dartmouth, on average Jews made up 24 percent of Ivy League undergraduates. Princeton had only 13 percent Jews, leading to much anxiety and a drive to recruit more Jewish students. The rabbi leading the campaign said she “would love 20 percent”—an increase from over six times the Jewish percentage in the population to around ten times (Martins, 2009).

The result was extensive national coverage, including articles in *The New York Times* and *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. According to Unz (2012):

These articles included denunciations of Princeton’s long historical legacy of anti-Semitism and quickly led to official apologies, followed by an immediate 30 percent rebound in Jewish numbers. During these same years, non-Jewish white enrollment across the entire Ivy League had dropped by roughly 50 percent, reducing those numbers to far below parity, but this was met with media silence or even occasional congratulations on the further “multicultural” progress of America’s elite education system.

Unz (2023a) also cites data indicating a very large drop in Jewish academic performance based on National Merit Scholarship data and competition for academic prizes:

Harvard’s white enrollment dropped by nearly 10 percentage points, steadily falling from 45.1% in 2012 to just 35.4% in 2021. And if, as seems likely, ethnically Jewish students are in the approximate range of 25%, the unavoidable conclusion is that although white Gentiles are nearly 60% of the American population and probably at least 60% of our highest-performing students, they are now approaching a single digit presence at our most elite college.

#### JEWISH INFLUENCE ON OTHER RELIGIONS IN THE U.S.

**Influencing U.S. Protestantism.** Given the general rise in Jewish influence after World War II, it is not surprising to find evidence for Jewish involvement in the dramatic changes in Protestant sensibilities in a pro-Jewish direction at

that time. John Murray Cuddihy's (1978) book, *No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste*, focuses on the elevation of Judaism to the status of one of the "big three" U.S. religions, to the point that a rabbi officiates at the presidential inauguration even though Jews constitute approximately 2–3 percent of the population. Cuddihy argues that this religious surface served as a protective coloring and led to a sort of crypto-Judaism in which Jewish ethnic identities were submerged in order to make them appear civilized to non-Jews. As part of this contract, the prominent Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr acknowledged "the stubborn will of the Jews to live as a peculiar people"—meaning that the Jews could remain a people with a thin veneer of religion.

Both sides gave up something in this bargain. The Jews' posturing as a religion left them open to large-scale defection via intermarriage to the extent that they took seriously the idea that Judaism was akin to Protestantism, and in fact this did occur, but without noticeably affecting the power of the organized Jewish community.

What the Protestants gave up was far more important because it has been a contributing factor to the more or less irreversible ethnic changes (barring a cataclysm) in the United States and elsewhere in the Western world. Judaism became unconditionally accepted as a modern religion co-equal with other dominant U.S. religions even while retaining a commitment to its ethnic core. It conformed outwardly to the religious norms of the United States, but it also continued to energetically pursue its ethnic interests, especially with regard to issues where there is a substantial consensus among Jews: support for Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, and abortion rights (J. J. Goldberg, 1996, p. 5).<sup>9</sup> What is remarkable is that a wealthy, powerful, and highly talented ethnic group was able to pursue its interests without those interests ever being the subject of open political discussion by mainstream political figures, for over eighty years—at least since Lindbergh's ill-fated Des Moines speech of 1941.

I suppose that Niebuhr thought that he was only giving up the prospect of converting Jews to Christianity, but the implicit downgrading of the ethnic character of Judaism provided an invaluable tool in furthering Jewish ethnic aims in the United States, essentially allowing Jews to win the ethnic war without anyone even being able to acknowledge that it was an ethnic war. For example, during the immigration debates of the 1940s–1960s Jews were described by themselves and others as "people of the Jewish faith." They were simply practicing another religion in an officially pluralistic religious society, and part of Jewish posturing was a claim to a unique, universalistic, moral-

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<sup>9</sup> J. J. Goldberg also included civil liberties as a common Jewish interest, but, as indicated below, Jewish organizations have led the charge to severely limit free speech related to racial and ethnic interests.



religious vision that could only be achieved by enacting legislation that in fact furthered their particularistic ethnic aims. The universalistic, moral-religious vision promoted by Jewish activists really amounted to taking the Protestants at their own word—by insisting that every last shred of ethnic identity among Protestants be given up while Jews were implicitly allowed to keep theirs, if only they would frame their actions within religious context and behave civilly.

The evidence provided by Cuddihy suggests that Niebuhr was socialized by the Jewish milieu of New York into taking the positions that he did—that his position as a major Protestant spokesperson was facilitated by alliances he formed with Jews and because his writings fit well within the Jewish milieu of New York intellectual circles. Niebuhr's behavior is therefore as much an indication of Jewish power and the ability of Jews to recruit gentiles sympathetic to their causes as it is an indication of Protestant self-destruction. One cannot underestimate the importance of Jewish power in intellectual circles in New York at the time of Niebuhr's pronouncements—most notably the *New York Intellectuals* (Ch. 7). For example, Leslie Fiedler (1948, p. 873) noted that “the writer drawn to New York from the provinces feels . . . the Rube, attempts to conform; and the almost parody of Jewishness achieved by the gentile writer in New York is a strange and crucial testimony of our time.”

**Influencing Christian Zionism.** Christian Zionism is a very powerful force for philo-Semitism and pro-Israel attitudes in the United States. There is a fascinating history that suggests that Jewish activist Samuel Untermyer, a committed Zionist, was important in promoting and publicizing the work of C. I. Scofield, whose annotated Bible, first published by Oxford University Press in 1909, is the basis of Christian Zionism. Scofield had a “criminal history, a deserted wife, a wrecked family, and a penchant for self-serving lies.” Untermyer also likely provided Scofield with money necessary for his “lavish life-style.” Footnotes to the Scofield Bible were added in 1967 that placed even greater emphasis on Zionist aims, and some of Scofield's less Zionist footnotes were removed (Carlson, 2002).

For example, the following were added: “For a nation to commit the sin of anti-Semitism brings inevitable judgment”; “God made an unconditional promise of blessing through Abram's seed to the nation of Israel to inherit a specific territory forever;” and “It has invariably fared ill with the people who have persecuted the Jew, well with those who have protected him. The future will still more remarkably prove this principle” (in Carlson, 2002).

Jews have actively supported the Christian Zionist movement. Beginning in 1978, the Likud Party in Israel has taken the lead in organizing this force for Israel, and they have been joined by the neoconservatives. For example, in 2002 the Israeli embassy organized a prayer breakfast with the major Christian Zionists. Jews have founded or funded organizations aimed at Christians, such as Christians United for Israel (founded by John Hagee), which has ten million

members and is closely associated with the Zionist Organization of America and the Israeli government (Joyce, 2014).

**Influencing Catholicism.** Jewish pressure for altering traditional Roman Catholic attitudes on Jewish responsibility for deicide are recounted in Lacouture (1995, pp. 440–458) and Roddy (1966). Pope John XXIII deleted the “perfidious Jews” reference from the Holy Week liturgy (Lacouture, p. 448). He then solicited the opinions of the world’s 2,594 bishops on the Church’s relations with the Jews. Virtually all of the respondents wished to maintain the status quo. The Pope was “bitterly disappointed by the response of the episcopate” (p. 449).

Converted Jews were instrumental in creating the Vatican II document *Nostra Aetate* (1965) which changed the historic position of the Catholic Church toward Jews (MacDonald, 2012a). The technique was to find passages of Scripture that conformed to their ethnic interests in raising the status of Judaism while remaining within the intellectual confines of Catholicism:

*Nostra Aetate* confirmed that Christ, his mother and the apostles were Jews, and that the church had its origin in the Old Testament. It denied that the Jews may be held collectively responsible for Jesus Christ’s death, and decried all forms of hatred, including anti-Semitism. Citing the Letter of St. Paul to the Romans, *Nostra Aetate* called the Jews “most beloved” by God. These words . . . staged a revolution in Catholic teaching. (Connelly, 2012)

From the Jewish point of view, a revolution was highly desirable. For example, the comments on Judaism in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* from 1910—during the papacy of Pius X, who is highly regarded by traditionalist Catholics—are instructive. Jews in the time of Jesus are described as a “race” that rejected the call of Jesus for repentance, showing no sorrow for sin, unfit for salvation, and rejecting the true kingdom of God in favor of earthly power: “Jesus justly treated as vain the hopes of His Jewish contemporaries that they should become masters of the world in the event of a conflict with Rome” (Gigot, 1910). These views, including the view that Jews are a race, can be traced back to Christian intellectuals such as Eusebius in the fourth century (SAID, Ch. 3).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *The Occidental Observer* and *The Occidental Quarterly* have posted several articles on Jewish influence on the Catholic Church: George F. Held’s (2013) translations of Léon de Poncins: *The Problem with the Jews at the Council* in four parts; Jimmy Moglia’s (2018) “Quo Vadis Vatican? Jewish involvement in the radical changes of the Second Vatican Council”; and my (MacDonald, 2012a) “The role of Jewish converts to Catholicism in changing traditional Catholic teachings on Jews.” Andrew Joyce’s (2019b) “Jews, White Guilt, and the Death of the Church of England” shows how some of these same figures (e.g., Jules Isaac) have influenced the Church of England.

In the post-World War II lead-up to Vatican II, the most influential activist was Jules Isaac, who started several organizations dedicated to furthering Jewish interests within the Church (Held, 2013). Andrew Joyce (2019b) also discusses Isaac's role in changing the attitudes of the Church of England vis-à-vis the Jews, citing a statement by the Church of England Faith and Order Commission (2019, pp. 14–15):

Jules Isaac, who wrote on Jewish-Christian relations in the aftermath of the Second World War, saw a profound link between historic Christian anti-Judaism and the eruption of antisemitism in the twentieth century. If the first premise of antisemitism is the perception that “there is something inherently wrong with the Jews as a people,” then traditional Christian teaching that the Jewish people are collectively responsible throughout time for the death of the divine Christ, and therefore guilty together of deicide, imbues it with a terrible power. Isaac coined the phrase “the teaching of contempt” (*enseignement du mépris*) to describe what he saw as key features of Christianity's sustained hostility to Judaism from earliest times.

#### FROM THE CULTURE OF CRITIQUE TO THE CULTURE OF THE HOLOCAUST

While CofC describes the “culture of critique” dominated by Jewish intellectual and political movements, perhaps insufficient attention was given to the critical elements of the new culture that have replaced the traditional European cultural forms that dominated a century ago. Central to the new culture is the elevation of Jewish experiences of suffering during World War II, collectively referred to as “the Holocaust,” to the level of a pivotal historical-cultural icon in Western societies. Here I discuss two books focused on the political and cultural functions of the Holocaust in contemporary life—Peter Novick's *The Holocaust in American Life* (1999), and Norman Finkelstein's *The Holocaust Industry* (2000, 2001). Novick's book, the more scholarly of the two, notes that the Holocaust has assumed a preeminent status as a symbol of the consequences of ethnic conflict. He argues that the importance of the Holocaust is not a spontaneous phenomenon but stems from highly focused, well-funded efforts of Jewish organizations and individual Jews with access to the major media:

We are not just “the people of the book,” but the people of the Hollywood film and the television miniseries, of the magazine article and the newspaper column, of the comic book and the academic symposium. When a high level of concern with the Holocaust became widespread in American Jewry, it was, given the important role that Jews play in American media

and opinion-making elites, not only natural, but virtually inevitable that it would spread throughout the culture at large. (Novick, 1999, p. 12)

The Holocaust was originally promoted to rally support for Israel following the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars:

Jewish organizations . . . [portrayed] Israel's difficulties as stemming from the world's having forgotten the Holocaust. The Holocaust framework allowed one to put aside as irrelevant any legitimate ground for criticizing Israel, to avoid even considering the possibility that the rights and wrongs were complex. (Novick, 1999, p. 155)

As the threat to Israel subsided, the Holocaust was promoted as the main source of Jewish identity and in the effort to combat assimilation and inter-marriage among Jews. During this period, the Holocaust was also promoted among gentiles as an antidote to anti-Semitism. In recent years this has involved a large-scale educational effort (including mandated courses in the public schools of many U.S. states) spearheaded by Jewish organizations and staffed by thousands of Holocaust professionals aimed at conveying the lesson that "tolerance and diversity [are] good; hate [is] bad, the overall rubric [being] 'man's inhumanity to man'" (Novick, 1999, pp. 258–259). The Holocaust has thus become an instrument of Jewish ethnic interests, not only as a symbol intended to create moral revulsion at violence directed at minority ethnic groups—prototypically the Jews—but also as an instrument to silence opponents of multiethnic immigration into Western societies. As described in Chapter 8, promoting high levels of multiethnic immigration has been a goal of Jewish groups since the late nineteenth century.

Jewish Holocaust activists insisted on the "incomprehensibility and inexplicability of the Holocaust" (Novick, 1999, p. 178)—an attempt to remove all rational discussion of its causes and to prevent comparisons to numerous other examples of ethnic violence.

Even many observant Jews are often willing to discuss the founding myths of Judaism naturalistically—subject them to rational, scholarly analysis. But they're unwilling to adopt this mode of thought when it comes to the "inexplicable mystery" of the Holocaust, where rational analysis is seen as inappropriate or sacrilegious [and hence precludes any serious investigations of what actually happened]. (Novick, 1999, p. 200)

Holocaust activist Elie Wiesel "sees the Holocaust as 'equal to the revelation at Sinai' in its religious significance; attempts to 'desanctify' or 'demystify' the Holocaust are, he says, a subtle form of anti-Semitism" (Novick, 1999, p.

201). Because the Holocaust is regarded as a unique, inexplicable event, Jewish organizations and Israeli diplomats cooperated to block the U.S. Congress from commemorating the Armenian genocide. "Since Jews recognized the Holocaust's uniqueness—that it was 'incomparable,' beyond any analogy—they had no occasion to compete with others; there could be no contest over the incontestable" (p. 195). Abraham Foxman, head of the ADL, claimed that the Holocaust is "not simply one example of genocide but a near successful attempt on the life of God's chosen children and, thus, on God himself" (p. 199)—a comment that illustrates well the intimate connection between Holocaust promotion and the more extreme forms of Jewish ethnocentrism.

A result was that American Jews were able to define themselves "as the quintessential victim community" (Novick, 1999, p. 194). As an expression of this tendency, Holocaust activist Simon Wiesenthal compiled a calendar showing when, where, and by whom Jews were persecuted on every day of the year. Holocaust consciousness was the ultimate expression of a victim mentality. The Holocaust came to symbolize the natural and inevitable terminus of anti-Semitism.

There could be no such thing as overreaction to an anti-Semitic incident, no such thing as exaggerating the omnipresent danger. Anyone who scoffed at the idea that there were dangerous portents in American society hadn't learned "the lesson of the Holocaust." (Novick, 1999, p. 178).

While Jews are portrayed as the quintessential victim in Holocaust iconography, the vast majority of non-Jews are portrayed as potential or actual anti-Semites. "Righteous Gentiles" are acknowledged, but the criteria are strict. They must have risked their lives, and often the lives of the members of their families as well, to save a Jew. "Righteous Gentiles" must have displayed "self-sacrificing heroism of the highest and rarest order" (Novick, 1999, pp. 179–180). Such people are extremely rare, and any Jew who discusses "Righteous Gentiles" for any other reason comes under heavy criticism. The point is to shore up the fortress mentality of Jews—"promoting a wary suspicion of gentiles" (p. 180). A prominent Jewish feminist exemplifies this attitude: "Every conscious Jew longs to ask her or his non-Jewish friends, 'Would you hide me?'—and suppresses the question for fear of hearing the sounds of silence" (p. 181).

Consciousness of the Holocaust is very high among Jews. A 1998 survey found that "remembrance of the Holocaust" was listed as "extremely important" or "very important" to Jewish identity—far more often than anything else, such as synagogue attendance or travel to Israel (Novick, 1999, p. 202). Indeed, Jewish identity is far more important than American identity for many American Jews: "In recent years it has become not just permissible but, in some

circles, laudable for American Jews to assert the primacy of Jewish over American loyalty" (p. 34).

Consciousness of the Holocaust is not confined to Jews but has become institutionalized as an American cultural icon. Besides the many Holocaust memorial museums that dot the country and the mushrooming of mandated courses about the Holocaust in public schools, a growing number of colleges and universities now have endowed chairs in Holocaust studies. "Considering all the Holocaust institutions of one kind or another in the United States, there are by now thousands of full-time Holocaust professionals dedicated to keeping its memory alive" (Novick, 1999, p. 277).

This effort has been very successful. In a 1990 survey, a substantial majority agreed that the Holocaust "was the worst tragedy in history" (Novick, 1999, p. 232; emphasis original). Recently, the main thrust of the Holocaust as cultural icon is the ratification of multiculturalism. Between 80 and 90 percent of those surveyed agreed that the need to protect the rights of minorities, and not "going along with everybody else" were lessons to be drawn from the Holocaust. Respondents agreed in similar proportions that "it is important that people keep hearing about the Holocaust so that it will not happen again."

The effort has perhaps been even more effective in Germany:

[C]ritical discussion of Jews in Germany today is virtually impossible. Whether conservative or liberal, a contemporary German intellectual who says anything outside a narrowly defined spectrum of codified pieties about Jews, the Holocaust, and its postwar effects on German society runs the risk of professional and social suicide. (M. M. Anderson, 2001)

Discussions of the work of Jewish intellectuals have come to dominate German intellectual life to the almost complete exclusion of non-Jewish Germans. Many of these intellectuals are discussed in *CofC*, including Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Sigmund Freud.

"Shoah business" has become a staple of contemporary German cultural and political life. Germans thrive on debates about the Holocaust and their ongoing responsibility to preserve its memory, campaigning to erect a gigantic memorial to the Jewish dead in the historic center of Berlin or flocking to hear the American scholar Daniel Goldhagen's crude and un-historical diatribes against the German national character. (M. M. Anderson, 2001)

Scholars have lost all sense of normal standards of intellectual criticism and have come to identify more or less completely with the Jewish victims of National Socialism.

For example, Holocaust poet Paul Celan has become a central cultural figure, surpassing all other twentieth-century poets. His works are now beyond rational criticism, to the point that they have become enveloped in a sort of stultifying mysticism: “Frankly, I find troubling the sacred, untouchable aura that surrounds Celan’s name in Germany; troubling also the way in which his name functions like a trump card in intellectual discussions, closing off debate and excluding other subjects” (M. M. Anderson, 2001). Jewish writers like Kafka are seen as intellectual giants who are above criticism; discussions of Kafka’s work focus on his Jewish identity and are imbued by consciousness of the Holocaust despite the fact that he died in 1924.

Like Novick, Finkelstein (2000) takes a functionalist view of the “Holocaust industry,” arguing that it serves as a vehicle for extorting money for Jewish organizations from European governments and corporations, and for justifying the policies of Israel and U.S. support for Israeli policy (pp. 7–8). Finkelstein also argues that embracing the Holocaust allows the wealthiest and most powerful group in the United States to claim victim status—a status that is wearing thin and is now often seen as hypocritical because of the Israeli genocide of Palestinians in Gaza beginning in 2023.

The ideology of the Holocaust states that it is unique and inexplicable—as noted by Novick as well—but Finkelstein also emphasizes how the Holocaust industry promotes the idea that anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior stem completely from irrational loathing by non-Jews and have nothing to do with conflicts of interest. For example, Elie Wiesel states, “For two thousand years . . . we were always threatened. . . . For what? For no reason” (in Finkelstein, 2000, p. 53). (By contrast, the basic premise of my book SAID is precisely that anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior throughout history are firmly rooted in conflicts of interest, certainly including the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.) Finkelstein approvingly quotes Boas Evron, an Israeli writer: “Holocaust awareness [is] an official, propagandistic indoctrination, a churning out of slogans and a false view of the world, the real aim of which is not at all an understanding of the past, but a manipulation of the present” (in Finkelstein, 2000, p. 41).

Finkelstein (2000, p. 8) notes the role of the media in supporting the Holocaust industry, quoting Elie Wiesel: “When I want to feel better, I turn to the Israeli items in *The New York Times*.” *The New York Times*, which is owned by the Sulzberger family (see below),

serves as the main promotional vehicle of the Holocaust industry. It is primarily responsible for advancing the careers of Jerzy Kosinski, Daniel Goldhagen, and Elie Wiesel. For frequency of coverage, the Holocaust places a close second to the daily weather report. Typically, *The New York*

*Times Index* 1999 listed fully 273 entries for the Holocaust. By comparison, the whole of Africa rated 32 entries. (Finkelstein, 2001)

Besides a receptive media, the Holocaust industry takes advantage of its power over the U.S. government to apply pressure to foreign governments, particularly the governments of Eastern Europe (Finkelstein, 2000, pp. 133ff).

In a poignant allusion to the pervasive double standard of contemporary Jewish ethical attitudes (and reflecting a similar ethical double standard that pervades Jewish religious writing throughout history), Finkelstein describes a January 2000 Holocaust education conference attended by representatives of fifty countries, including Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel. The conference declared that the international community had a “solemn responsibility” to oppose genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, and xenophobia. A reporter afterward asked Barak about the Palestinian refugees: “On principle, Barak replied, he was against even one refugee coming to Israel: ‘We cannot accept moral, legal, or other responsibility for refugees’” (Finkelstein, 2000, p. 137).

#### JEWS AND THE MEDIA: SHAPING “WAYS OF SEEING”

**The Psychology of Media Influence.** Psychological research indicates two types of cognitive processing: implicit and explicit. These modes of processing may be contrasted on a number of dimensions (see, e.g., Geary, 2005; MacDonald, 2008a; Stanovich, 1999, 2004). Implicit processing is automatic, effortless, relatively fast, and involves parallel processing (i.e., processing going on independently in different parts of the brain) of large amounts of information; it characterizes the modules described by evolutionary psychologists designed by natural selection to perform specific functions. Explicit processing is the opposite of implicit processing: conscious, controllable, effortful, relatively slow, and involves serial processing of relatively small amounts of information in a sequential manner (e.g., performing the steps of solving a math problem). Explicit processing is involved in the operation of the mechanisms of general intelligence (Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005) as well as controlling emotional states and action tendencies, such as anger or frustration tending to lead to aggression (MacDonald, 2008a).

The conscious, explicitly processing parts of the brain are thus able to control the lower parts of the brain that utilize implicit processing, for example, emotional states and action tendencies resulting from evolved modules like those underlying ethnocentrism. These work via automatic, implicit processing, but they are controllable by higher brain centers located in the cortex (MacDonald, 2010a, 2009b). Hence the evolved mechanisms underlying



ethnocentrism can be controlled by the higher brain centers processing the information they obtain via the media.

Being able to control impulses of any kind taps into the personality system of conscientiousness, often labelled “*effortful control*” because it involves explicit, conscious effort to control impulses. Simply put, conscientious people are relatively better able to regulate the more evolutionarily ancient parts of our brain that are responsible for many of our passions and desires. The critical point is that cultural information is of vital importance for motivating people to inhibit their ethnocentric tendencies—e.g., being aware that explicit assertions critical of Jews would result in ostracism or other penalties. This cultural information relies on explicit processing and provides the basis for prefrontal, top-down inhibitory control of ethnocentrism, so that the control of ethnocentrism and other evolved tendencies (e.g., lust, jealousy, love) is a direct consequence of the control of cultural information. For example, the rise of a new, substantially Jewish elite meant that explicit messages about race (e.g., “there’s no such thing as race”) and ethnocentrism (e.g., “White ethnocentrism is a sure sign of psychopathology and disturbed parent-child relationships”) were being disseminated by the mass media and throughout the educational system. Especially since World War II, these messages have been consistently hostile to White ethnocentrism and the very idea that race exists, and that in turn has meant that Whites have been encouraged to inhibit their natural ethnocentrism.

Moreover, since White people tend to be more individualistic than other peoples, they are less likely than other peoples to make invidious distinctions between ingroups and outgroups and are more likely to be open to strangers and people who don’t look like them. They are relatively unlikely to assume, say, that all or most Jews are dishonest because of a particular example of a dishonest Jew. And because Whites are relatively low in ethnocentrism and relatively high in conscientiousness, controlling ethnocentrism is easier for them on average. Their subcortical mechanisms responsible for ethnocentrism are weaker to start with and hence easier to control. They are thus more susceptible to media messages.

Finally, as emphasized throughout my *Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition*, moral communities are the social glue of Western societies, whereas kinship relationships are the social glue of the other culture areas of the world. Moral communities based on a reputation as capable, honest, trustworthy, and fair are a fundamental aspect of Western individualism and have been a big reason for the historical trajectory that led to Western dominance of the planet. Since the rise of a substantially Jewish elite with major influence in the media, reputation has typically been influenced by the media environment, resulting in conformity to the messages emanating from the media in

order to maintain or enhance reputation as a morally upright, trustworthy person.

In the environments that Western peoples evolved in, if individuals acted in defiance of the moral strictures of the community, they would be ostracized. Whereas in the contemporary West, people can survive such ostracism by finding a new niche of like-minded friends, in prehistoric Europe ostracism would have certainly resulted in death. Thus, to a considerable extent, the ability to control media messages facilitates control over Western peoples by penalizing non-conformists and rewarding conformists. This is a major source of Jewish power and influence.

**Jewish Ownership of American Media.** I noted above that the Jewish attack on European domination of the United States focused on three critical areas of power: (1) the academic world of information in the social sciences and humanities; (2) the political world where public policy on immigration and other ethnic issues, such as policy toward the Middle East, are decided; and (3) the mass media where “ways of seeing” (see W. Kerr, 1968) are presented to the public. The first edition of *CofC* focused on the first two of these areas of power, but little attention was given to the mass media, except where it served to promote Jewish intellectual or political movements, as in the case of psychoanalysis. This lack of attention to the cultural influence of the mass media is a major gap.

It has often been noted that Jews have long been dominant in the Hollywood entertainment industry since its inception. At present it plays a major role in American culture and politics, as it has been “long known as the ‘ATM of the Democratic Party’” (Perman et al., 2024). By all accounts, ethnic Jews have a powerful influence in the American media—far larger than any other identifiable group. The extent of Jewish ownership and influence on the popular media in the United States is remarkable given the relatively small proportion of the population that is Jewish.<sup>11</sup> In a survey performed in the 1980s, 60 percent of a representative sample of the movie elite were of Jewish background (Powers et al., 1996, p. 79n13). Michael Medved (1996, p. 37) notes:

[I]t makes no sense at all to try to deny the reality of Jewish power and prominence in popular culture. Any list of the most influential production executives at each of the major movie studios will produce a heavy majority of recognizably Jewish names. This prominent Jewish role is obvious to anyone who follows news reports from Tinsel Town or even bothers to read the credits on major movies or television shows.

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<sup>11</sup> Discussions of Jewish ownership of the media include: Ginsberg, 1993, p. 1; Kotkin, 1993, p. 61; Silberman, 1985, p. 147.

As of this writing (February 2024), Comcast, controlled by the Roberts family (Jewish), is the largest telecommunications and multimedia conglomerate. It owns assets in television broadcasting (e.g., NBC, Telemundo), cable television (e.g., MSNBC, CNBC, USA Network, E!), Xfinity (cable television, broadband internet, and home telephone service), a film studio (e.g., Universal Pictures), the video-on-demand network Peacock, animation studios (e.g., DreamWorks Animation, Universal Animation Studios), and theme parks. It also owns the Sky Group, Europe's largest media and cable network, which operates in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy ("Sky Group," 2024).

David Zaslav is the head of Warner Bros. Discovery, which owns an array of streaming networks (e.g., HBO, Cinemax), cable television networks (e.g., CNN, CNN International, Discovery+), film studios (e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, New Line Cinema), and video game publishers ("List of assets owned by Warner Bros. Discovery," 2024).

Another dominant media company is the Walt Disney Company, headed by Bob Iger. Disney has a vast array of holdings, mainly in movies (e.g., Walt Disney Pictures, Pixar, Marvel Studios), network and streaming television (e.g., ABC Signature, ESPN, FX), music recording and publishing (e.g., Hollywood Records, which includes country music label DMG Nashville), and theme parks dotted around the world ("List of assets owned by the Walt Disney Company," 2024).

National Amusements is a media empire whose president, Shari Redstone, is the daughter of Sumner Redstone (born Rothstein). National Amusements owns 1,500 screens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Latin America. It has a controlling interest in Paramount Global, which owns Paramount Pictures film and television studio, CBS television, and a variety of cable television networks (e.g., Black Entertainment Television, MTV, Nickelodeon, Comedy Central, Showtime). Its international division manages international versions of its pay TV networks, as well as region-specific assets, including television channels in Argentina, Chile, India, and the United Kingdom ("Paramount Global," 2024).

Other major television companies owned by Jews include DreamWorks SKG (founded in 1994 by film director Steven Spielberg, former Disney Pictures chairman Jeffrey Katzenberg, and recording industry mogul David Geffen). DreamWorks has gone through several distribution deals, most recently with Universal Pictures, and the animation studio was spun off in 2004 into NBCUniversal ("DreamWorks Pictures," 2024). Spielberg remains chairman and is also a Jewish ethnic activist. After making the Holocaust film *Schindler's List*, Spielberg established the Survivors of the Shoah Foundation with the aid of a grant from the U.S. Congress. He also helped fund Professor Deborah Lipstadt's

defense against a libel suit brought by British World War II historian and Holocaust revisionist David Irving.

In the world of print media, Advance Publications, owned by the descendants of founder Samuel Irving Newhouse, Sr. (born Solomon Isadore Neuhaus), owns twenty-six newspapers (e.g., the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* and *Newark Star-Ledger*) and mass media company Condé Nast, which publishes *Vogue*, *The New Yorker*, and *Vanity Fair*. Advance Publications also has substantial stakes in Warner Bros. Discovery, Charter Communications, and the social news site Reddit, which went public on March 27, 2024.

The newsmagazine *U.S. News & World Report*, which has a weekly circulation of 2.3 million, has been owned and published by Mortimer B. Zuckerman since 1984. Zuckerman has also owned New York's liberal-oriented tabloid newspaper, the *Daily News*, the sixth-largest newspaper in the country, and *The Atlantic Monthly*. Zuckerman is a Jewish ethnic activist. He was head of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (2001–2003), an umbrella organization for major Jewish organizations in the United States (*The Forward*, April 27th, 2001, pp. 1, 9). Zuckerman uses his column in *U.S. News & World Report* to promote Israel and is considered to be a media member of the Israel Lobby by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (2007), authors of *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

Another Jewish activist who had a prominent position in the U.S. media is Martin Peretz, owner of *The New Republic* (TNR) since 1974; he ended his role as editor and regular blogger in 2010. Throughout his career Peretz has been devoted to Jewish causes, particularly Israel. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, he told Henry Kissinger that his “dovishness stopped at the delicatessen door,” and many among his staff feared that all issues would be decided on the basis of what was “good for the Jews” (Alterman, 1992, pp. 185, 186). Indeed, a staffer stated, “Aside from Israel, he has no meaningful policy views at all” (Wallace-Wells, 2010). One editor was instructed to obtain material from the Israeli embassy for use in TNR editorials.

It is not enough to say that TNR's owner is merely obsessed with Israel; he says so himself. But more importantly, Peretz is obsessed with Israel's critics, Israel's would-be critics, and people who never heard of Israel, but might one day know someone who might someday become a critic. (Alterman, 1992, p. 195).

The Sulzberger family owns The New York Times Company which, after selling its radio and television stations, mainly in 2007, has focused on print media, including *The New York Times* (the largest-circulation newspaper in the United States), *The New York Times International Edition*, and thirteen regional newspapers located mainly in the South.

Jewish ownership of *The New York Times* is particularly interesting because it has been the most influential newspaper in the United States since the start of the twentieth century. As noted in a book on the Sulzberger family (Tift & Jones, 1999), even at that time, there were several Jewish-owned newspapers, including the *New York World* (controlled by Joseph Pulitzer), the *Chicago Times-Herald* and the *Chicago Evening Post* (controlled by H. H. Kohlsaat), and the *New York Post* (controlled by the family of Jacob Schiff). In 1896 Adolph Ochs purchased *The New York Times* with the critical backing of several Jewish businessmen, including Isidor Straus (co-owner of Macy's department stores) and Jacob Schiff (a successful investment banker who was also a pro-Bolshevik Jewish ethnic activist). "Schiff and other prominent Jews like . . . Straus had made it clear they wanted Adolph to succeed because they believed he 'could be of great service to the Jews generally'" (Tift & Jones, pp. 37–38). Ochs's father-in-law was the influential Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, and the founder of Reform Judaism in the United States.

There are some exceptions to this pattern of media ownership, but even in such cases ethnic Jews often have a major managerial role.<sup>12</sup> For example, Rupert Murdoch controls dozens of media companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, including television networks, newspapers, film studios, and book publishing. In the United States the Murdoch empire has positioned itself as a gatekeeper for mainstream conservative viewpoints via the Fox News Channel (the most watched cable news network), *The Wall Street Journal* (the largest print circulation newspaper, second largest overall when counting digital subscriptions), and the tabloid conservative-oriented *New York Post* (fourth largest print circulation newspaper). Murdoch is a philo-Semite. He was the publisher of *The Weekly Standard*, the premier neoconservative magazine edited by neoconservative Jewish ethnic activist William Kristol (see Ch. 4).

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<sup>12</sup> A partial exception is the Washington Post Company. Until her death in 2001, *The Washington Post* was run by Katharine Meyer Graham, daughter of Eugene Meyer, who purchased the paper in the 1930s. Ms. Graham had a Jewish father and a Christian mother and was raised as an Episcopalian. Katharine's husband, the former publisher of the *Post*, Phil Graham, was not Jewish. The *Post*'s publisher, since 1991, is Donald Graham, the son of Katharine and Phil Graham. This influential publishing group is thus less ethnically Jewish than the others mentioned here. The Washington Post Company has a number of other media holdings in newspapers (The Gazette Newspapers, including eleven military publications), television stations, and magazines, most notably the nation's number-two weekly newsmagazine, *Newsweek*. The Washington Post Company's various television ventures reach a total of about 7 million homes, and its cable TV service, Cable One, has 635,000 subscribers. In a joint venture with *The New York Times*, the *Post* publishes the *International Herald Tribune*, the most widely distributed English-language daily in the world.

[M]ost of Murdoch's closest friends and business advisers were wealthy, influential New York Jews intensely active in pro-Israel causes. And he himself still retained a strong independent sympathy for Israel, a personal identification with the Jewish state that went back to his Oxford days. (Kiernan, 1986, p. 261)

So it's not surprising that Fox News is strongly pro-Israel.

**Media and the Creation of Culture.** As many academics have pointed out, the media have become more and more important in creating culture (e.g., Powers et al., 1996, p. 2). Before the twentieth century, the main creators of culture were religious, military, and business institutions. In the course of the twentieth century these institutions became less important while the media have increased in importance (for an account of this transformation in the military, see Bendersky, 2000). And there is little doubt that the media attempt to shape the attitudes and opinions of the audience (Powers et al., pp. 2–3). Part of the continuing culture of critique is that the media elite tend to be very critical of Western culture and civilization, portraying it as failing, dying, and, at worst, sick and evil compared to other cultures (p. 211). These views were common in Hollywood long before the cultural revolution of the 1960s, but they were not often expressed in the media because of the influence of non-Jewish cultural conservatives—e.g., the National Catholic Legion of Decency (1934–1980) and the Hays Commission's Motion Picture Production Code (1934–1968).

Perhaps the most important issue Jews and Jewish organizations have championed is cultural pluralism—the idea that the United States ought not to be ethnically and culturally homogeneous. As described in *CofC*, Jewish organizations and Jewish intellectual movements have championed cultural pluralism in many ways, especially as powerful and effective advocates of an open immigration policy. The media have supported this perspective by portraying cultural pluralism almost exclusively in positive terms—that cultural pluralism is easily achieved, beneficial to everyone, and is morally superior to a homogeneous Christian culture made up mainly of White non-Jews. People who oppose cultural pluralism are portrayed as stupid and bigoted (Lichter et al., 1994, p. 251), the classic being the Archie Bunker character in Norman Lear's *All in the Family* television series. Departures from racial and ethnic harmony are portrayed as entirely the result of White racism (Powers et al., 1996, p. 173).

Since Jews have a decisive influence on television and movies, it is not surprising that Jews are portrayed positively in the movies. There have been a great many explicitly Jewish movies and television shows with recognizable Jewish themes. Hollywood has an important role in promoting the “Holocaust industry,” with movies like Spielberg's *Schindler's List* (1993) and the four-part television miniseries *Holocaust* (1978), written by Gerald Green, directed by

Marvin Chomsky, and produced by Herbert Brodtkin and Robert Berger. Both of these ventures were lavishly promoted by Jewish groups. The promotion for *Holocaust* in 1978 was remarkable (Novick, 1999, p. 210). The ADL distributed ten million copies of its sixteen-page tabloid *The Record* for this purpose. Jewish organizations pressured major newspapers to serialize a novel based on the script and to publish special inserts on the Holocaust. *The Chicago Sun-Times* distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of its insert to local schools. The American Jewish Committee, in cooperation with NBC, distributed millions of copies of a study guide for viewers; teachers' magazines carried other teaching material tied to the program so that teachers could easily discuss the miniseries in class. Jewish organizations worked with the National Council of Churches to prepare other promotional and educational materials, and they organized advance viewings for religious leaders. The day the series began was designated "Holocaust Sunday," and various activities were scheduled in cities across the country; the National Conference of Christians and Jews distributed yellow stars to be worn on that day. Study guides for Jewish children depicted the Holocaust as the result of Christian anti-Semitism. The material given to Jewish children also condemned Jews who did not have a strong Jewish identity.

This massive promotion succeeded in many of its goals. These included the introduction of Holocaust education programs in many states and municipalities, beginning the process that led to the National Holocaust Memorial Museum and a major upsurge of support for Israel.

In general, television portrays Jewish issues "with respect, relative depth, affection and good intentions, and the Jewish characters who appear in these shows have, without any doubt, been Jewish—often depicted as deeply involved in their Judaism" (Pearl & Pearl, 1999, p. 5). For example, *All in the Family* (and its sequel, *Archie Bunker's Place*) not only portrayed working-class Whites as stupid and bigoted, but it also portrayed Jewish themes very positively. By the end of its twelve-year run, the Archie Bunker character had raised a Jewish child in his home, befriended a Black Jew (implication: Judaism has no ethnic connotations), gone into business with a Jewish partner, enrolled as a member of a synagogue, praised his close friend at a Jewish funeral, hosted a Sabbath dinner, participated in a *bat mitzvah* ceremony, and joined a group to fight synagogue vandalism. These shows, produced by Jewish liberal political activist Norman Lear, thus exemplify the general trend for television to portray non-Jews as participating in Jewish ritual and "respecting, enjoying, and learning from it. Their frequent presence and active involvement underscore the message that these things are a normal part of American life" (p. 16). Jewish rituals are portrayed as "pleasant and ennobling, and they bestow strength, harmony, fulfillment, and sense of identity upon those who observe them" (p. 62).

Television presents images of Jewish issues that conform to the views of mainstream Jewish organizations, and it “invariably depicts anti-Semitism as an ugly, abhorrent trait that must be fought at every turn” (Pearl & Pearl, 1999, p. 103). There is never any rational explanation for anti-Semitism; anti-Semitism is portrayed as an absolute and incomprehensible evil. Positive, well-liked, non-Jewish characters, such as Mary Tyler Moore, are often recruited to lead the fight against anti-Semitism—a pattern reminiscent of that noted in later chapters in which non-Jews become high-profile spokespersons for Jewish-dominated movements. There is also the implication that anti-Semitism is a proper concern of the entire community. Regarding Israel:

[O]n the whole, popular TV has conveyed the fact that Israel is the Jewish homeland with a strong emotional pull upon Diaspora Jews, that it lives in perpetual danger surrounded by foes, and that as a result of the constant and vital fight for its survival, it often takes extraordinary (sometimes rogue) measures in the fields of security and intelligence. (Pearl & Pearl, 1999, p. 173)

Non-Jews are portrayed as having deep admiration and respect for Israel, its heroism, and achievements. Israel is seen as a haven for Holocaust survivors, and Christians are sometimes portrayed as having an obligation to Israel because of the Holocaust.

In the movies, a common theme is Jews coming to the rescue of non-Jews, as in *Independence Day* (1996), where Jeff Goldblum plays a “brainy Jew” who rescues the world, and in *Ordinary People* (1980), where Judd Hirsch plays a Jewish psychiatrist who rescues an uptight WASP family (Bernheimer, 1998, pp. 125–126). The movie *Addams Family Values* (1993), discussed in Chapter 1 (footnote 26), is another example of this genre. Bernheimer (p. 162) notes that “in many films, the Jew is the moral exemplar who uplifts and edifies a gentile, serving as a humanizing influence by embodying culturally ingrained values.” This “Jews to the Rescue” theme also characterizes Jewish leftist radicalism (Ch. 3) and psychoanalysis (Ch. 5): radical Jews save the world from the evils of capitalism, and promoters of psychoanalysis save non-Jews from their neuroses.

On the other hand, Christianity is often portrayed as evil and Christians as psychopaths. Michael Medved (1992, p. 50) describes Hollywood’s cumulative attacks in recent years on the traditional family, patriotism, and traditional sexual mores—the Hollywood version of the culture of critique—but the most obvious focus of attack is on the Christian religion:

In the ongoing war on traditional values, the assault on organized faith represents the front to which the entertainment industry has most clearly



committed itself. On no other issue do the perspectives of the show business elites and those of the public at large differ more dramatically. Time and again, the producers have gone out of their way to affront the religious sensibilities of ordinary Americans.<sup>13</sup>

Medved fails to find even one film made since the mid-1970s where Christianity is portrayed positively, apart from a few films where it is portrayed as an historical relic—a museum piece. Examples where Christianity is portrayed negatively abound. For example, in the film *Monsignor* (1982), a Catholic priest commits every imaginable sin, including the seduction of a glamorous nun and then is involved in her death. In *Agnes of God* (1985), a disturbed young nun gives birth in a convent, murders her baby, and then flushes the tiny, bloody corpse down the toilet. There are also many subtle anti-Christian scenes in Hollywood films, such as when the director Rob Reiner repeatedly focuses on the tiny gold crosses worn by Kathy Bates, the sadistic villain in *Misery* (1990).

Another media tendency is to portray small towns as filled with bigots and anti-Semites. Media commentator Ben Stein (1976, p. 22) records the hostility of the media toward rural America:

The typical Hollywood writer . . . is of an ethnic background from a large Eastern city—usually from Brooklyn [i.e., they have a Jewish background]. He grew up being taught that people in small towns hated him, were different from him, and were out to get him [i.e., small town people are anti-Semites]. As a result, when he gets the chance, he attacks the small town on television or the movies. . . .

The television shows and movies are not telling it “like it is”; instead they are giving us the point of view of a small and extremely powerful section of the American intellectual community—those who write for the mass visual media. . . . What is happening, as a consequence, is something unusual and remarkable. A national culture is making war upon a way of life that is still powerfully attractive and widely practiced in the same country. . . . Feelings of affection for small towns run deep in America, and small-town life is treasured by millions of people. But in the mass culture of the country, a hatred for the small town is spewed out on television screens and movie screens every day. . . . Television and the movies are

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<sup>13</sup> Cones (1997) provides a similar analysis: “This analysis of Hollywood films with religious themes or characters reveals that in the last four decades Hollywood has portrayed Christians as sexually rigid, devil-worshipping cultists, talking to God, disturbed, hypocritical, fanatical, psychotic, dishonest, murder suspects, Bible-quoting Nazis, slick hucksters, fake spiritualists, Bible pushers, deranged preachers, obsessed, Catholic schoolboys running amok, Adam and Eve as pawns in a game between God and Satan, an unbalanced nun accused of killing her newborn infant, dumb, manipulative, phony, outlaws, neurotic, mentally unbalanced, unscrupulous, destructive, foul-mouthed, fraudulent and as miracle fabricators. Few, if any, positive portrayals of Christians were found in Hollywood films released in the last four decades.”

America's folk culture, and they have nothing but contempt for the way of life of a very large part of the folk. . . . People are told that their culture is, at its root, sick, violent, and depraved, and this message gives them little confidence in the future of that culture. It also leads them to feel ashamed of their country and to believe that if their society is in decline, it deserves to be.

This is a good example of social identity processes so important in both Jewish attitudes toward non-Jews and non-Jewish attitudes toward Jews: out-groups are portrayed negatively and ingroups are portrayed positively (see *CofC*, *passim*, and SAID, Ch. 1).

Jewish influence on the media undoubtedly has a major effect on how Israel is portrayed—a major theme of Finkelstein's (2000) *The Holocaust Industry*. Ari Shavit (1996), an Israeli columnist, described his feelings on the killings of a hundred civilians in a military skirmish in southern Lebanon in 1996: "We killed them out of a certain naive hubris. Believing with absolute certitude that now, with the White House, the Senate, and much of the American media in our hands, the lives of others do not count as much as our own." (Much the same could be said about the Israel-Hamas war of 2023–present, except that the toll of civilian casualties is orders of magnitude higher.)

Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel (2001–2006), provides another study in contrast. There was a huge difference in the media reaction to Sharon and the response to the situation in Austria in 2000 when Jörg Haider's Freedom Party won enough seats in parliament to have a role in the Austrian government. Several countries, including Israel, recalled their ambassadors in response to the election of Haider. Politicians around the world condemned Austria and announced that they would not tolerate Haider's participation in any Austrian government. Trade embargoes against Austria were threatened. The cause of these actions was that Haider had said that there had been many decent people fighting on the German side during World War II, including some in the SS. He had also said that some of Hitler's economic policies in the 1930s had made good sense, and he had called for a cutoff of immigration into Austria. Haider apologized for these statements, but the electoral success of his party still resulted in the ostracism of Austria and a continuous barrage of alarmist media attacks against him personally.

Contrast this with the treatment of Ariel Sharon's election as prime minister of Israel in 2001. As Israel's Minister of Defense in September 1982, Sharon was in command during the slaughter of 700–2,000 Palestinians, including women and children, in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps just outside Beirut, Lebanon. *New York Times* journalist Thomas Friedman saw "groups of young men in their twenties and thirties who had been lined up against walls, tied by their hands and feet, and then mowed down gangland style" (Ron, 2001).

Radio communications among Israeli military commanders were monitored in which they talked about carrying out “purging operations” in the refugee camps. While the actual killing was done by Lebanese Christians supported by Israel, the Israeli army kept the camps sealed for two days while the slaughter went on. The Kahan Commission, an Israeli commission formed to investigate the incident, concluded that Sharon was indirectly responsible for the massacre, and it went on to say that Sharon bore personal responsibility.<sup>14</sup>

The reaction to the election of Sharon in the U.S. media was subdued to say the least. No trade embargoes were threatened; no ambassadors were recalled. The *Los Angeles Times* dutifully printed a column by a Jewish writer in which Sharon was portrayed as having “learned from his mistakes” (Klein Halevi, 2001). In June 2001, Sharon was indicted as a war criminal in Belgium on the basis of affidavits provided by survivors of the slaughter. It is also noteworthy that Rehavam Zeevi, a close associate of Sharon and Israel’s Minister of Tourism as well as a member of the powerful Security Cabinet until his assassination in October 2001, described Palestinians as “lice” and advocated the expulsion of Palestinians from Israeli-controlled areas. Zeevi said Palestinians were living illegally in Israel and “We should get rid of the ones who are not Israeli citizens the same way you get rid of lice. We have to stop this cancer from spreading within us” (Associated Press, 2001).

This has continued into the present (Bergman & Mazzetti, 2024). Israeli settlers have not only continued to build settlements on the West Bank but have repeatedly attacked and intimidated Palestinians, with little or no consequences. And because of the fertility of the religious and ethnonationalist Jews, they have been able to take over the government. The Gaza war beginning in 2023 has led to widespread charges of genocide against the Israelis (e.g., Amnesty International), and Benjamin Netanyahu has been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court.

As noted above, the most radical, most ethnocentric Jews tend to provide the direction for the entire Jewish community in the long run (MacDonald, 2003b). In contemporary Israel the ethnonationalist right is politically dominant and is supported enthusiastically by the mainstream Jewish community in the United States, as epitomized by the ADL, AIPAC, etc. Indeed, the Gaza

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<sup>14</sup> From the Kahan Commission (1983, p. 73) Report: “We shall remark here that it is ostensibly puzzling that the Defense Minister [Ariel Sharon] did not in any way make the Prime Minister [Menachem Begin] privy to the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps. It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the refugee camps, and having failed to take this danger into account when he decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps. In addition, responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for not ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists’ entry into the camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.”

war has seen an upsurge in Jewish identification, synagogue attendance, and donations to Jewish causes.

With its overwhelming victory in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Israel more than doubled the amount of land it controlled, seizing new territory in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Now it faced a choice: Would the new land become part of Israel or be bargained away as part of a future Palestinian state? To a cadre of young Israelis imbued with messianic zeal, the answer was obvious. The acquisition of the territories animated a religious political movement—Gush Emunim, or “Bloc of the Faithful”—that was determined to settle the newly conquered lands. (Bergman & Mazzetti, 2024)

The psychological intensity apparent in this effort is also characteristic of the activist Jewish community in the United States in pursuing its interests, whether directed toward supporting Israel or promoting Third World immigration and multiculturalism in the United States (see MacDonal, 2023d, an updated version of MacDonal, 2003a).<sup>15</sup>

#### JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, CANCEL CULTURE, AND CENSORSHIP OF THE INTERNET

Too often Whites neglect the activism of Jews in the sphere of speech legislation until it is too late, and Jews have been instrumental throughout the West in orchestrating legal restrictions on speech.<sup>16</sup> In my 2002 Preface I wrote, “One may expect that as ethnic conflict continues to escalate in the United States, increasingly desperate attempts will be made to prop up the ideology of multiculturalism . . . with the erection of police state controls on nonconforming thought and behavior.” As noted above, there has been a shift from “the culture of critique” to what one might term “the culture of the Holocaust” as Jews have moved from being outsiders to the consummate insiders in American life. Whereas in the 1950s Jewish organizations championed free speech at a time when many Jewish communists were being brought up before

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<sup>15</sup> At the extreme of ethnocentrism is altruistic self-sacrifice, several examples of which are discussed in *The New York Times Magazine* article cited above. I discuss Jewish martyrdom as an example of extreme Jewish ethnocentrism briefly in MacDonal, 2001. An example is Baruch Goldstein, who in 1994 murdered twenty-nine Palestinians and was beaten to death by the Palestinian survivors. Of course, in many Israeli cases of altruistic self-sacrifice, the perpetrator was not killed and knew that he had a lot of support in the government and would have his sentence shortened to basically a slap on the wrist.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, the cases of Australia (Sanderson, 2014), Canada (Fraser, 2022), and Britain (Joyce, 2009). I note also a recent journal article on the origin of speech laws in Norway (Ben David, 2024) in which the earliest drafts of the legislation were discovered in the head-quarters of a Jewish group (Yeats, 2024).

Congressional committees on charges of subversion (MacDonald, 2019b), coinciding with their status as an established elite, Jewish organizations are now in the forefront of movements to censor free speech and thought crimes.

The internet has been a major gap in Jewish influence over the major media, but Jewish organizations have taken the lead in attempting to censor the internet. Jewish organizations have also been strong advocates of “hate crime” legislation in all European and European-derived countries. For example, in 1997 the ADL published *Hate Crimes: ADL Blueprint for Action*, which provides recommendations on prevention and response strategies to crimes of ethnic violence, such as penalty enhancement laws, training for law enforcement and the military, security for community institutions, and community anti-bias awareness initiatives. In June 2001 the ADL announced a program designed to assist law enforcement in the battle against “extremists and hate groups.” A major component of the Law Enforcement Initiative is the development of specialized hate crime, extremism, and anti-bias curricula for training programs designed for law enforcement personnel.

This has continued. In 2023 the Biden administration unveiled “The U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism,” which although emphasizing violence (which is already illegal) includes provisions to combat online statements:

DHS [Department of Homeland Security] will conduct a series of regional and online workshops on countering antisemitism, Islamophobia, and related forms of hate-motivated violence, such as online misogyny and gender-based violence, and violence against LGBTQI+, AANHPI [Asian-American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander], or Black communities. These workshops will provide direct assistance and help DHS identify additional ways to assist the Jewish community and other communities that have been targeted with violence. (ADL, n.d.)

Further, the Countering Antisemitism Act of 2024, as developed by the ADL, contained a provision requiring “the National Coordinator to conduct an annual analysis of online antisemitic content, including Holocaust denial and distortion, and prepare recommendations for Congress on how to counter the spread of antisemitism online” (ADL, 2024)—the beginning of an attempt to bar all criticism of Jews from the internet. As passed by the House (Antisemitism Awareness Act, 2023), a similar bill provides that penalties would apply to “programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance” and could thus include defunding universities that allow protests against Israel and its support by the Jewish community, since criticism of or opposition to Israel has been

conflated with anti-Semitism.<sup>17</sup> This version of the bill includes a provision that the U.S. government define anti-Semitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (n.d.)—a definition that the American Civil Liberties Union opposes because it would likely infringe on the First Amendment by precluding criticism of Israel (Foran et al., 2024). For example, “[h]olding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel” would presumably make illegal any claim that, despite the existence of relatively powerless anti-Israel Jews, the Israel Lobby and its power in American politics is a project of the mainstream Jewish community with the support of all of the major American Jewish organizations. The Jewish community thus bears considerable responsibility for the actions of Israel given its influence on U.S. diplomatic and military support for Israel—and U.S. power in international politics. It would also make illegal “[d]rawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis”—when at least some such comparisons are eminently rational (Cook, 2016).

Moreover, the above section on Jewish influence in the media (or the Israel Lobby) could also run afoul of the provision that would proscribe “[m]aking mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collective—such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.” And it would appear to claim that no Jews could ever be reasonably claimed to be more loyal to Israel than to the country they reside in: “Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations” (for likely examples, see MacDonald, 2009d). Finally, two members of the House of Representatives claimed it would infringe on some Christian beliefs, such as the view that Jews were responsible for killing Christ (Kilgore, 2024).

These efforts to end public criticism of Jews or Israel have ramped up since the Israel-Hamas war of 2023–present. University presidents have been removed because they defended the free speech of protesters, and peaceful protesters have been removed by police, blackballed in the job market, penalized by their universities, and physically attacked by pro-Israel groups, without consequences for the attackers—a huge contrast with the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020 and the antiwar protests of the 1960s that were enthusiastically backed by Jewish groups (see Ch. 3; Unz, 2024a). It should be becoming clear to most Americans just who runs their country.

These censorship efforts are thus far more pervasive and effective than when I wrote about this topic in the 2002 preface—at a time when the internet

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<sup>17</sup> The Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations also “commend[ed] the passage of the bill”: <https://tinyurl.com/2ew9j76f>.

was nowhere near as developed as it is in 2025. As noted in the 2002 preface, both the Simon Wiesenthal Center and the ADL had already attempted to pressure internet service providers such as AOL and popular websites such as Yahoo! into restricting access to disapproved websites. Yahoo! banned thirty-nine internet clubs originally labeled as “hate sites” by the Simon Wiesenthal Center, and internet auction sites were subjected to protests for selling National Socialist memorabilia.<sup>18</sup> Amazon and Barnes and Noble banned my books *CofC*, *SAID*, and a 2008 compilation of my essays titled *Cultural Insurrections*. These online retailers also came under fire for selling Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, a book that is certainly of historical importance. The ADL also published a report, *Poisoning the Web: Hatred Online*, and urged the U.S. Congress to initiate a comprehensive study of “hate speech” on the internet (Kessler, 1999).

This censorship is much more pervasive because the internet—particularly social media—is now a much more pervasive part of people’s lives. When I was growing up, there was no social media, and Jews had more or less pervasive influence on the public conversation via ownership of the three national television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), influential newspapers, and the Hollywood studios. However, the rise of social media has allowed ordinary citizens to broadcast their opinions to a wide audience—which Jewish organizations clearly perceive as a danger to Jewish interests. In my case, I was shadow-banned on Twitter (now X) for several years after getting around 33,000 followers; then, after Elon Musk took over in late October 2022, my followers increased dramatically to around 43,000 before I was banned permanently in the spring of 2023 without any explanation of which tweets violated their terms of service. My research, including my research in personality and child development, has been banned by ResearchGate (researchgate.net), the main website for academics to present their research to a wide audience (before being banned, I ranked in the top ten percent in citations by other academics). Another website, *The Occidental Observer* (theoccidentalobserver.net), and the journal I edit, *The Occidental Quarterly* (toqonline.com), have been prevented from processing credit card payments, making recurrent donations and subscriptions difficult. And beginning in 2018, Nathan Cofnas, an academic philosopher, began publishing critiques of my work in academic journals—critiques that I was not allowed to reply to in those journals, resulting in me being forced to reply on my personal website, *The Occidental Observer*, and *The Occidental Quarterly*. As noted above, the exception was that *Philosophia*, a peer-reviewed Israeli journal of philosophy, allowed me to reply, publishing it online on January 1, 2022. However, my reply caused a firestorm and was quickly retracted by Springer Nature, a major academic publisher. The editor was fired and the

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<sup>18</sup> See their press releases from July 15th, 1999, November 29th, 1999, and January 26th, 2001.

paper sent out for three new reviews, which were uniformly negative.<sup>19</sup> Of course, I am far from the only person who has been treated in this manner. Virtually anyone who stands up for the interests of White people (e.g., Jared Taylor and James Edwards) have been treated similarly.

An important marker of this campaign for censorship has been the conflict between Elon Musk and the ADL beginning after Musk bought Twitter in October 2022. Musk is a self-described “free speech absolutist” (despite the above-mentioned censorship of accounts like mine after he bought Twitter), and the ADL engaged in a campaign to pressure advertisers to boycott X because of an alleged increase in “hate speech” on the platform. Musk denied that there had been an increase in “hate speech” and claimed that the boycott campaign had resulted in a 60 percent decline in advertising revenue, later reduced to 10 percent; Musk then threatened to sue the ADL for 10 percent of the value of X.

Musk went on the offensive:

A tweet posted by @breakingbaht . . . read: “Jewish communities [sic] have been pushing the exact kind of dialectical hatred against whites that they claim to want people to stop using against them.”

The billionaire owner and CTO of X, formerly Twitter, responded the same evening: “You have said the actual truth.” In another reply, he wrote: “I am deeply offended by ADL’s messaging and any other groups who push de facto anti-white racism or anti-Asian racism or racism of any kind.” Musk has feuded with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) before, threatening to sue over its accounting of hate speech on his social media network.

Musk continued on the same tear about the white race. He approved of a tweet reading: “Everyone is allowed to be proud of their race, except for white people, because we’ve been brainwashed into believing that our history was somehow ‘worse’ than other races. This false narrative must die.”

Musk wrote: “Yeah, this is super messed up. Time for this nonsense to end and shame ANYONE who perpetuates these lies!” (Montgomery, 2023)

Musk took pains to avoid being called an anti-Semite, claiming that he had visited Israel twice and that “I don’t know if I am genetically Jewish . . . but I am aspirationally Jewish” and “pro-Semitic.” After this tweet, he visited Israel again, met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the Israel-Hamas war broke out on October 7, 2023, and later visited Auschwitz-Birkenau. It

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<sup>19</sup> See MacDonald, 2022a (includes a discussion of the retraction, etc.)



should also be noted that Musk has had many Jewish business associates over the years (Isaacson, 2023).

Social media companies based in the United States are also under pressure from foreign governments, including France, Germany, Austria, and Canada, where anti-free speech laws are common and there are no constitutional guarantees of free speech.

In my 2002 preface, I wrote:

Government-imposed censorship is effective in countries like France and Germany, but is not likely to succeed in the United States with its strong tradition of constitutionally protected free speech. As a result, the major focus of the Jewish effort to censor the Internet in the United States has been to pressure private companies like AOL and Yahoo! to use software that blocks access to sites that are disapproved by Jewish organizations. The ADL developed voluntary filter software (ADL HateFilter) that allows users to screen out certain websites. However, while AOL—the largest ISP [internet service provider] by far—has proved to be compliant in setting standards in line with ADL guidelines, the ADL notes that other ISPs, such as Earthlink, have not cooperated with the ADL, and independent web hosting sites have sprung up to serve websites rejected by AOL.<sup>20</sup>

The ADL and the SWC have an uphill road because the Internet has long been touted as a haven for free speech by the high-tech community. . . . Clearly Jewish organizations are making every effort to censor anti-Jewish content on the Internet. They are far from reaching their goal of removing anti-Jewish material from the Internet, but in the long run the very high political stakes involved mean that great effort will be expended.

However, since that time, leftist authoritarianism has replaced the libertarian culture of the early years of the internet, and most American technology companies have entirely gone along with the censorship advocated by the ADL. American corporations in general have also gotten in line with leftist positions, often controversially over issues such as: endorsing Black Lives Matter protests; Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion initiatives; endorsing LGBTQ+ issues; and producing “woke” media content. For example, the Walt Disney Company has been labeled “Woke Disney” by conservatives (Jiménez & Barnes, 2023), and Florida governor Ron DeSantis has fought with the company over a bill opposing teaching LGBTQ+ issues in kindergarten through the third grade. Corporations have been pressured by large-asset management firms that invest in public companies to adopt Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) policies to promote diversity and other policies advocated by the left. The most

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<sup>20</sup> The article previously linked has disappeared. However, this material has been updated, see Foxman & Wolf, 2013.

well-known of the companies promoting ESG has been BlackRock Inc., headed by Larry Fink, a Jew. However, after a period of growth in 2020 and 2021, the funds dedicated to ESG investing began to close down due to poor performance and opposition by conservatives, and BlackRock has retreated from the ESG label (Brewster, 2023). There has been wide publicity of the huge costs to brands like Bud Light that used a transgender activist as a spokesperson. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the great majority of American corporations remain on the left as seen in their pattern of political donations (Amoros, 2018).

Finally, the generally liberal culture of another pillar of American elite culture, the universities with their traditional support for academic freedom, has been replaced by an authoritarian censorship regime dominated by the left. Mainstream conservatives invited to speak have been greeted with rioting or threats of rioting, often with the support of the university administration. As a result, it's rare to find any universities where there is any significant conservative voice.

Musk's position on free speech is thus out of step with the other elite institutions of American culture and has therefore stirred a hornet's nest of hostility. This is likely one reason why he switched from being a Democrat to supporting Donald Trump in the 2024 election.

#### THE QUESTION OF BIAS

I have several times been called an "anti-Semite" for the tone of some of my writings, both in CofC, on various internet discussion lists, and featured in one of Nathan Cofnas's (2023) critiques. To be perfectly frank, I did not have a general animus for organized Jewry when I got into this project. I was a former New Leftist turned moderate Republican fan of George Will, but I did not advocate for racial interests, nor did I have anything but a cursory knowledge of Judaism and certainly no hostility toward Jews. Before even looking at Judaism, I had applied the same evolutionary group strategy perspective to the ancient Spartans (MacDonald, 1988a). There are quite a few statements in my books that attempt to soften the tone and deflect charges of anti-Jewish bias. My first book on Judaism, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone* (PTSDA, 1994/2002b), has a statement on the first page stating that the traits I ascribe to Judaism (self-interest, ethnocentrism, and competition for resources and reproductive success) are by no means exclusive to Jews. I also write about the extraordinarily high Jewish IQ and about Jewish accomplishments (e.g., Nobel prizes) in that book. In the second book, *Separation and Its Discontents* (SAID, 1998/2004a), I discuss the tendency for anti-Semites to exaggerate their complaints, to develop fantastic and unverifiable theories of Jewish behavior, to exaggerate the

extent of Jewish cohesion and unanimity, to claim that all Jews share stereotypically Jewish traits or attitudes, especially in cases where in fact Jews are overrepresented among people having certain attitudes (e.g., political radicalism during most of the twentieth century). And I describe the tendency of some anti-Semites to develop grand conspiracy theories in which all historical events of major or imagined importance, from the French Revolution to the Trilateral Commission, are linked together in one grand plot and blamed on the Jews. All of this is hardly surprising on the basis of what we know about the psychology of ethnic conflict. But that doesn't detract in the least from supposing that real conflicts of interest are at the heart of all of the important historical examples of anti-Semitism. Most of this is in the first chapter of SAID—front and center as it were, just as my other disclaimers are in the first chapter of PTSDA.

It must be kept in mind that group evolutionary strategies are not benign, at least in general and especially in the case of Judaism, which has often been very powerful and has had such extraordinary effects on the history of the West. I think there is a noticeable shift in my tone from the first book to the last simply because I knew a lot more and had read a lot more. People often say after reading the first book that they think I really admire Jews, but they are unlikely to say that about the last two and especially about *CofC*. That is because by the time I wrote *CofC* I had changed greatly from the person who wrote the first book. The first book is really only a documentation of theoretically interesting aspects of Judaism (how Jews solved the free-rider problem that plagued theories of group selection, how they managed to erect and enforce barriers between themselves and other peoples, the genetic cohesion of Judaism, how some groups of Jews came to have such high IQs, how Judaism developed in antiquity). Resource competition and other conflicts of interest with other groups are more or less an afterthought, but these issues move to the foreground in SAID, and in *CofC* I look exclusively at the twentieth century in the West. Jews have indeed made important contributions to Western culture in the last two hundred years. But whatever one might think are the unique and irreplaceable Jewish contributions to the post-Enlightenment world, it is naive to suppose that Jewish activism in Western societies has been intended to benefit Europeans in general; and in any case, I am hard-pressed to think of any area of science and technology that would not have developed without Jewish input, although in some cases perhaps not quite as quickly. In general, positive impacts of Jews have been quantitative rather than qualitative. They have accelerated some developments, for example in finance and some areas of science, rather than made them possible.

On the other hand, I am persuaded that Jews have had some important negative influences. I am morally certain that Jewish involvement in the radical left in the early to middle part of the last century was a necessary but not

sufficient condition for many of the horrific events in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. (About this, of course, one can disagree. I am simply saying that I find the evidence compelling.) But the main point is that I came to see Jewish groups as competitors with the European majority of the United States and as powerful facilitators of the enormous changes that have been unleashed in this country, particularly via the successful advocacy of massive non-European immigration into the United States. I found that I was being transformed in this process from a mainstream conservative who had little or no identification with his own people into an ethnically conscious actor—exactly as predicted by the theory of social identity processes that forms the basis of my theory of anti-Semitism (see SAID). In fact, if one wants to date when I dared cross the line into what some see as proof that I am an “anti-Semite,” the best guess would probably be when I started reading on the involvement of all the powerful Jewish organizations in advocating massive non-European immigration. My awareness began with my reading a short section in a standard history of American Jews well after the first book was published. Some of the other influences that I attributed to Jewish activism had become more or less irrelevant (e.g., psychoanalysis) or reversible—even radical leftism—so they didn’t much bother me. I could perhaps even ignore the towering hypocrisy of Jewish ethnocentrism coinciding as it does with Jewish activism against the ethnocentrism of non-Jewish Europeans. But immigration and its effects on diluting White voting power are essentially irreversible, barring an enormous cataclysm.

I started to realize that my interests are quite different from prototypical Jewish interests—as emphasized in Chapter 8, Jews see non-White immigration as preventing an essentially homogeneous White society from turning on the Jews as happened in 1930s’ Germany. We need ways of talking about people who oppose policies recommended by the various Jewish establishments without simply being tarred as “anti-Semites.” Immigration is only one example where there are profound conflicts of interest. Writing in November 2001, I noted in my 2002 preface, “we are bogged down in a war with no realizable endgame largely because of influence of the Jewish community over one area of our foreign policy and because of how effectively any mention of the role of Israel and the Israel Lobby in creating friction between the United States, the Arab world, and Iran is muzzled simply by the cry of anti-Semitism.” As noted above, such ideas have been greatly elaborated in Mearsheimer and Walt’s (2007) *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

At home we have entered into an incalculably dangerous experiment in creating a multiethnic, multicultural society in which the intellectual elite has developed the idea that the formerly dominant European majority has a moral obligation to allow itself to be eclipsed demographically and culturally—the result, at least at its inception and to a considerable degree thereafter, of the

influence of Jewish interest groups on immigration policy and the influence of Jewish intellectual movements on our intellectual and cultural life generally, including the media with its very large Jewish influence. As noted above, the rise of Jewish power and the disestablishment of the specifically European nature of the United States are the real topics of *CofC*.

I agree that there is bias in the social sciences and I certainly don't exempt myself from this tendency. It is perhaps true that by the time I finished *CofC* I should have stated my attitudes in the first chapter. Instead, they are placed in the last chapter—rather forthrightly, I think. In a sense, stating them at the end was appropriate because my attitudes about Jewish issues marked a cumulative, gradual change from a very different worldview.

It is annoying that such disclaimers never appear in writing by strongly identified Jews, even when they see their work as advancing Jewish interests. A major theme of *CofC* is that Jewish social scientists with a strong Jewish identity have seen their work as advancing Jewish interests. It is always amazing to me that media figures like the Kristols and Podhoretzes and foreign policy experts like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Ben Shapiro, and Mark Levin do not feel an obligation to precede their remarks on issues affected by their solicitude for Israel by saying, "You should be wary of what I say because I have a vested ethnic interest in advancing the interests of Israel." But the same thing goes for vast areas of anthropology (the Boasian school's role in essentially eradicating racial differences research), history (e.g., blatantly apologetic accounts of the history and causes of anti-Semitism, or the role of Jews in the early decades of the Soviet Union), psychology (the Frankfurt School, psychoanalysis), and contemporary issues (immigration, church-state relations). The point of *CofC* that really galls people is the idea that we should simply acknowledge this bias in (some) Jewish researchers as we do in non-Jewish researchers. There are a great many books on how Darwin and Galton were influenced by the general atmosphere of Victorian England, but writing of a Jewish bias immediately results in charges of "anti-Semitism."

The deeper point is that, whatever my motivations and biases, I would like to suppose that my work on Judaism at least meets the criteria of good social science, even if I have come to the point of seeing my subjects in a less than flattering light. Isn't the only question whether I am right? But the real question that concerns my critics is, of course, "Is it good for the Jews?"

## CONCLUSION

*CofC* is really an attempt to understand the twentieth century as what Yuri Slezkine (2004) has termed a "Jewish century"—a century in which Jews and Jewish organizations were deeply involved in all the pivotal events. From the

Jewish viewpoint it has been a period of great progress. In the late nineteenth century, the great bulk of the Jewish population lived in Eastern Europe, with many Jews mired in poverty and all surrounded by hostile populations and unsympathetic governments. A century later, Israel is firmly established in the Middle East, Jews have become a hugely powerful group in the United States (the most powerful country in the world) and have achieved elite status throughout the West. The critical Jewish role in murderous communist regimes has been sanitized, while Jewish victimization during World War II has achieved the status of a moral touchstone and is a prime weapon in the push for large-scale non-White immigration, multiculturalism, and the promotion of other Jewish causes. Opponents have been relegated to the fringe of intellectual and political discourse, and there are powerful movements afoot that would silence them entirely.

None of this should be surprising. Jewish populations have always had enormously outsized effects on the societies where they reside because of several qualities that are central to Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, as noted above: high intelligence (including the usefulness of intelligence in attaining wealth); the ability to cooperate in highly organized, cohesive groups; and personality traits like affect intensity and aggressiveness. This has led repeatedly to Jews becoming an elite and powerful group in societies where they reside in sufficient numbers—as much in the twentieth-century United States and the Soviet Union as in fifteenth-century Spain or ancient Alexandria. History often repeats itself after all. This has particularly been the case in the post-Enlightenment individualistic societies of the West where Jews had unfettered access to the most prestigious media, academic, and political institutions of these societies.

Indeed, recent data indicate that Jewish per capita income is almost double that of non-Jews, a bigger difference than the White-Black income gap. Although Jews make up less than 3 percent of the population, they constitute 11 percent of the richest twenty-five Americans<sup>21</sup> and more than a quarter of the richest four hundred Americans according to the *Forbes* 400 list (LaFranco & Peterson-Withorn, 2023). A remarkable 87 percent of college-age Jews are currently enrolled in institutions of higher education, as compared with 40 percent for the population as a whole (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997). Jews are indeed an elite group in American society (see also Ch. 9).

My perception is that the Jewish community in the United States is moving aggressively ahead, ignoring the huge disruptions Jewish organizations have caused in the West (now mainly via successful advocacy of massive non-European immigration) and in the Islamic world (via the treatment of

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<sup>21</sup> This includes non-Jew Kenneth C. Griffin who is at least very sympathetic to Jewish causes (see Haidar & Kettles, 2024).

Palestinians by Israel). Whatever the justification for such beliefs, U.S. support for Israel is by all accounts an emotionally compelling issue in Iran and the Arab world. A true test of Jewish power in the United States will be whether support for Israel is maintained even in the face of the enormous costs that have already been paid by the United States in terms of: loss of life; economic disruption; hatred and distrust throughout the Muslim world; loss of civil liberties at home; and now the shame of giving virtually unconditional support to Israel's genocidal policies against the Palestinians, when Jewish organizations are a main support for immigration, multiculturalism, and propaganda promoting inter-ethnic harmony in the West.

In the 2002 preface I noted, "As of this writing, while Jewish organizations are bracing for a backlash against Jews in the United States and while there is considerable concern among Jews about the Bush administration's pressure on Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians in order to placate the Muslim world (e.g., Rosenblatt, 2001), all signs point to no basic changes in the political culture of the United States vis-à-vis Israel as a result of the events of September 11, 2001." The same will likely be said about the current Gaza war and the Iran-Israel confrontations of 2024 and 2025, despite the worldwide pressure on Israel to curb its slaughter of Palestinian civilians. Indeed, under the Trump administration the Israel Lobby achieved its long-term goal of dragging the United States into a war with Iran.