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Jewish Strategies for Combating Anti-Semitism

Jewish groups have responded to anti-Semitism by adopting a wide range of strategies. A fundamental theoretical feature of this project is the view that humans are “flexible strategizers” in pursuit of evolutionary goals (Alexander 1987; MacDonald 1991; see *PTSDA*, Ch. 1). Within this framework, one expects that strategies for combating anti-Semitism will be highly flexible and able to respond adaptively to novel situations. General-purpose cognitive processes, for example, the skills tapped by the *g* factor of IQ tests, have been utilized to develop a wide array of survival strategies in response to specific situations that could not have been recurrent features of the human environment of evolutionary adaptedness.

These strategies may not succeed in their aims. Rather, unsuccessful strategies are likely to be replaced in a trial-and-error process, and there will be a continual search for new strategies to encounter new, perhaps unforeseen, difficulties. A group strategy that reliably results in hostility is like a widely dispersed fleet of ships attempting to navigate hostile waters: different ships in the fleet encounter different local problems and must develop their own solutions. Moreover, different members of a ship’s crew may advocate different solutions to the same problem, and in the absence of a strong centralized authority, the crew members of one ship may fractionate and pursue their own solutions by in effect constructing their own ships (e.g., Reform, Conservative, Neo-Orthodox, secular, and Zionist solutions to the assimilatory pressures resulting from the Enlightenment). Different sub-groups of Jews may develop different and incompatible strategies for confronting anti-Semitism or attempting to change the wider society to conform to Jewish group interests.

Indeed, one might note that it has often been critically important for Jews to be able to present a divided front to the gentile society, especially in situations where one segment of the Jewish community has adopted policies or attitudes

that provoke anti-Semitism. This has happened repeatedly in the modern world. A particularly common pattern during the period from 1880 to 1940 was for Jewish organizations representing older, more established communities in Western Europe and the United States to oppose the activities and attitudes of more recent immigrants from Eastern Europe (see note 20). The Eastern European immigrants tended to be religiously orthodox, politically radical, and sympathetic to Zionism, and they tended to conceptualize themselves in racial and national terms—all qualities that provoked anti-Semitism. In the United States and England, Jewish organizations (such as the American Jewish Committee [AJCommittee]) attempted to minimize Jewish radicalism and gentile perceptions of the radicalism and Zionism of these immigrants (e.g., Cohen 1972; Alderman 1992, 237ff). Highly publicized opposition to these activities dilutes gentile perceptions of Jewish behavior, even in situations where, as occurred in both England and America, the recent immigrants far outnumbered the established Jewish community.

A low level of anti-Semitism may actually facilitate Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. As discussed in Chapter 1 (see also *PTSDA*, Ch. 7), social identity research indicates that external threat tends to reduce internal divisions and maximize perceptions of common interest among ingroup members and of conflict of interest with outgroups; also, research on individualism/collectivism indicates that in conditions of external threat people tend to be more willing to commit themselves to hierarchical, authoritarian groups in which individual interests are sacrificed to group interests. Anti-Semitism would also increase the costs of defection, since individuals who defect may not be fully accepted by the gentile community because of negative associations with their former group.

Historically, anti-Semitism has been a potent tool in rallying group commitment and in legitimizing the continuity of Judaism. Jewish leaders have been quite conscious of this function of anti-Semitism. For example, in 1929, Dr. Kurt Fleischer, the leader of the Liberals in the Berlin Jewish Community Assembly, stated that “Anti-Semitism is the scourge that God has sent us in order to lead us together and weld us together” (in Niewyk 1980, 84). Jewish religious authorities have also exaggerated or at least strongly emphasized the extent of anti-Semitism in order to reinforce group solidarity (see also *PTSDA*, Ch. 7).

The ADL [Anti-Defamation League], like the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, has built its financial appeal to Jews on its ability to portray the Jewish people as surrounded by enemies who are on the verge of launching threatening anti-Semitic campaigns. It has a professional stake in exaggerating the dangers, and sometimes allows existing racial or political prejudices in the Jewish world to influence how it will portray the potential dangers. (*Tikhun* editor Michael Lerner, in Lerner & West 1995, 135)

Jewish religious consciousness centers to a remarkable extent around the memory of persecution. Persecution is a central theme of the holidays of Passover, Hanukkah, Purim, and Yom Kippur. Lipset and Raab (1995, 108) note that Jews learn about the Middle Ages as a period of persecution in Christian

Europe, culminating in the expulsions and the Inquisitions. The massacres perpetrated by the Crusaders in 1096 in Germany became a central event in Jewish consciousness (Chazan 1996, 24). Detailed lists of martyrs were composed and recited in synagogue ritual for hundreds of years after the event; chronicles of the event were written and a literature on the status of forced converts was developed (Stow 1992, 102). There is also a strong awareness of the persecutions in Eastern Europe, especially the czarist persecutions. Indeed, the historian Sir Louis B. Namier went so far as to say that there was no Jewish history, “only a Jewish martyrology” (in Berlin 1980, 72). When prominent social scientist Michael Walzer (1994, 4), states that “I was taught Jewish history as a long tale of exile and persecution—Holocaust history read backwards,” he is expressing not only the predominant perception of Jews of their own history but also a powerful strand of academic Jewish historiography, the so-called “lachrymose” tradition of Jewish historiography.

Recently, the Holocaust has assumed a preeminent role in this self-conceptualization. A 1991 survey found that 85 percent of American Jews reported that the Holocaust was “very important” to their sense of being Jewish—a figure higher than the percentage who attribute a similar importance to God, the Torah, or the state of Israel (Abrams 1996). Jewish leaders have attempted with great success to use awareness of the Holocaust to intensify Jewish commitment, to the point that the Holocaust rather than religion has become the main focus of modern Jewish identity and the principal legitimator of Israel (Wolffsohn 1993, 77ff; Neusner 1993, 180–181). Within Israel the Holocaust acts as a sort of social glue, which helps to integrate the various social classes, ethnic groups, and generations into a cohesive society. As Holocaust historian Zygmunt Bauman notes, Israel uses the Holocaust “as the certificate of its political legitimacy, as safe-conduct pass for its past and future policies, and, above all, for advance payment for the injustices it might itself commit” (in Stannard 1996, B2).¹

Social identity research shows that people tend to exaggerate characteristics that define the ingroup. Given the centrality of persecution to their own self-image, it is not surprising that American Jews tend to overestimate the actual amount of anti-Semitism. For example, survey results from 1985 indicate that one-third of a sample of affiliated Jews in the San Francisco area stated that a Jew could not be elected to Congress, at a time when three of the four congressional representatives from the area were “well-identified” Jews, as were the two California state senators and the mayor of San Francisco (Lipset & Raab 1995, 75; see also S. M. Cohen 1989). Survey results from 1990 show that eight out of ten American Jews had serious concerns about anti-Semitism, and significant percentages believed anti-Semitism was growing, even though there was no evidence for this, while at the same time 90 percent of gentiles viewed anti-Semitism as residual and vanishing (Hertzberg 1995, 337; see also Smith 1994, 17–18).

The result is a sort of “cognitive dissonance” between actual and perceived anti-Semitism (Shapiro 1992, 13) that strongly suggests self-deception in the

interest of maintaining an illusory self-image as an oppressed outsider, despite actual overrepresentation with respect to all of the markers of social and economic success in American society (see also Chapter 8). Indeed, Jewish organizations have invented new types of anti-Semitism (e.g., relative indifference by gentiles for Jewish concerns) as expressions of traditional types of anti-Semitism have declined, presumably in the effort to bolster a flagging sense of threat to the group. As Shapiro (1992, 47) notes, "If indifference to Jewish concerns was to be the litmus test for anti-Semitism, then by definition virtually the entire world was anti-Semitic."

Complete acceptance by the gentile community may therefore be viewed negatively or at least with ambivalence. One hears quite often of Jewish leaders in the contemporary United States expressing concern about being "loved to death," since complete acceptance may lead to intermarriage and a loss of Jewish identity (see, e.g., Cohen 1992, 141; Lipset & Raab 1995, 75). Hertzberg (1995, 342) suggests that this need for a belief in a powerful external threat accounts for the revival of interest in the Holocaust in the 1970s, at a time of general advancement of Jews in American society. "The parents evoked the one Jewish emotion that had tied their own generation together, the fear of antisemitism. The stark memory of Auschwitz needed to be evoked to make the point that Jews were different." Recently neoconservatives Irving Kristol and Elliott Abrams (1997) have advocated the re-Christianization of America so that Jews, as a marginalized outgroup, would have more cohesion, better resist assimilation, and avoid outmarriage (see Goldberg 1997).

From this perspective, there is no difference between assimilation and Holocaust, and indeed recent Jewish rhetoric has sometimes explicitly stated that, in the words of a recent commentator, "what Hitler attempted in Europe may well come to pass in America without the horror, without the slaughter, without the unspeakable cruelty. *Judenrein*. A disappearance aided and abetted by tolerance and opportunity, by integration and assimilation and intermarriage in the era where everyone had the option of . . . being a Jew by choice" (F. Horowitz 1993). Similar beliefs were also expressed by the 19th-century Zionist Ahad Ha-Am, who argued that the end of anti-Semitism would result in Jews losing their culture and sense of peoplehood (Simon 1960, 104–105). Extinction, whether by physical annihilation or assimilation, continually looms as a psychological threat, and is used to rally commitment to the group. Indeed, the Jewish philosopher and theologian Emil Fackenheim (1972) has promulgated the view that marrying a gentile is tantamount to giving Hitler a posthumous victory. There is perhaps no greater testimony of the intensity with which Judaism involves a group rather than an individual consciousness.

Within this worldview of a beleaguered ingroup surrounded by powerful enemies, the only possible real disaster would be the achievement of all Jewish aspirations: "This assumption that even when Jews achieved as much equality as was likely, just enough antisemitism would remain to enclose them within their own domain is fundamental not only to the addiction to anti-antisemitism but

also even to the theories about the survival of ‘positive Judaism’” (Hertzberg 1995, 344). If anti-Semitism did not exist, it would have to be invented.

In this regard, it is ironic that Jews have at times attributed Jewish separatism and clannishness to gentile anti-Semitism. Thus, during the 19th century in Germany it was common for German liberals to attribute continued Jewish clannishness and separatism in the face of assimilatory pressures to the continued presence of anti-Semitism (e.g., Schorsch 1972, 96). On the other hand, when the surrounding society becomes overly friendly to Judaism, there arises a deep fear among Jews that Judaism will succumb because of too much acceptance. Indeed, the decline in anti-Semitism in the United States has coincided with a major effort by Jewish organizations to encourage programs that stress the importance of preserving Jewish identity (Cohen 1972, 431).

Nevertheless, in historical perspective the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism has ensured that concerns about the potentially disastrous consequences of anti-Semitism have been far more prevalent than concerns that a decline in anti-Semitism would actually destroy Judaism. In the following I will discuss various Jewish strategies designed to counteract anti-Semitism.

JEWISH STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING ANTI-SEMITISM

Phenotypic Resemblance: Crypsis

We decree that Jews who have become Christians in appearance only, but secretly keep the Sabbath and observe other Jewish customs, shall not be permitted to join in communion or prayer or even to enter the church, but let them openly be Hebrews according to their religion. Their children shall not be baptized nor shall they purchase or possess a slave. (Canon 8 of the Council of Nicaea II [A.D. 787]; in Gilchrist 1969, 157)

And what will it profit our lord and king to pour holy water on the Jews, calling them by our names, Pedro or Pablo, while they keep their faith like Akiba or Tarfon? . . . Know, Sire, that Judaism is one of the incurable diseases. (Comments of a fictional Spanish-Jewish refugee after being forcibly baptized in Portugal in 1497, from Solomon Ibn Verga *Sefer Shevet Yehudah*, in Yerushalmi 1991, 32)

The data summarized in *PTSDA* (Ch. 4) indicate that there has been a powerful trend for Jews in traditional societies to maximize phenotypic differences between themselves and host populations, by a variety of segregative practices. Nevertheless, there are many instances in which Jews themselves have minimized these differences.

A particularly interesting example is crypsis. When threatened by severe sanctions, Jews have “converted” to other religions, practicing Judaism in secret and ultimately becoming overtly Jewish again when the threat had passed. Crypsis is “as old as the Jew himself” (Prinz 1973, 1). Indeed, there is a long tradition within Judaism that highly prizes the tradition of crypto-Judaism. In his

preface to the 1932 edition of his work *History of the Marranos*, Sir Cecil Roth (1974, xxiii–xxiv) wrote of the “incredible romance” of the history of the Marranos, “the submerged life which blossomed out at intervals into such exotic flowers; the unique devotion which could transmit the ancestral ideals unsullied, from generation to generation, despite the Inquisition and its horrors.”

Indeed, there is some indication that the ideological basis of crypto-Judaism can be found in standard interpretations of the Book of Esther, in which Esther marries King Ahasuerus but secretly retains her Jewish identity and ultimately saves her people.² The phrase, “Esther had not made known her people nor her kindred” (Est. 2:10) was especially valued by the crypto-Jews during the period of the Inquisition (Beinart 1971b, 472). The tradition of crypto-Judaism also sometimes appears as part of contemporary Jewish education, as described by Freedland (1978): Jewish schoolchildren reenact the experience of practicing Jewish rituals in secret (admitted to this exercise only after providing a password), saying prayers under their breath.

The first instance given by Roth (1974) occurred during the 5th-century B.C. Zoroastrian persecution in Persia, and the phenomenon occurred as recently as World War II (Begley 1991). Jewish crypsis occurred under Byzantine rule (Avi-Yonah 1984, 254–255) and in medieval Germany, England, and France (Chazan 1987, 101; Roth 1978, 83; Baron 1973, 111). Crypto-Jews have existed for centuries in several areas of the Muslim world (e.g., the Daggatun of the Sahara, the Donmeh of Salonica, and the Jedidim of Persia). In at least one instance, the government simply gave up the effort at forcible assimilation. Lewis (1984, 152) describes cryptic Jews in Muslim Persia during the 18th century following a forced conversion. These individuals were eventually allowed to return to Judaism. In the words of a French traveler, “They [the Muslim authorities] found that what external professions so ever they made of Mahometanism, they still practised Judaism; so that there was a necessity of suffering them to be again bad Jews, since they could not make good Muslims out of them.”

Jews have also adopted crypsis in order to take advantage of economic opportunities. There are many examples of temporary deception, such as Jewish traders posing as gentiles in order to avoid taxes levied on Jews in Arab countries (Stillman 1979), Poland (Weinryb 1972; Hundert 1986), and the Roman Empire (Grant 1973, 225). Reflecting these practices, in the early 5th century the Theodosian Code (CTh 16.8.23) prohibited conversions of convenience by Jews attempting to avoid prosecution for crimes and for avoiding compulsory public services, and in 787 the Council of Nicaea II prohibited such individuals from owning Christian slaves (in Gilchrist 1969, 157). Marrano traders posed as Christians when in Christian countries but revealed their Judaism when in the Ottoman Empire (Pullan 1983, 193). Individuals from the same extended family would represent themselves as sincere New Christians in Portugal, as Christian Portuguese in France, and as Jews in Holland, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire (Yerushalmi 1971, 17). There have also been examples of lifelong deception, in which an individual, typically a powerful person, “converts” but continues to

associate with Jews and furthers their causes. Fischel (1937) gives the example of Ya'qub ben Killis in the medieval Islamic period who underwent a conversion of convenience, continued to associate with Jews, and appointed Jews to responsible posts in his administration.

In Europe prior to emancipation, "conversion" to Christianity was often perceived, in Heinrich Heine's words, as the "entrance ticket to European civilization," the baptized person becoming in effect a crypto-Jew. "Most Jews who now converted to Christianity did so simply as a mode of qualifying for social and professional positions in society, with little interest in Christianity *per se* and, as often as not, without really relinquishing their family and social ties with the Jewish community" (Carlebach 1978, 32). Meyer (1989, 36) notes that Jews who converted to Christianity "often associated almost exclusively with fellow converts. In Germany they were referred to as *Taufjuden*, baptized Jews. They had not really become Christians but had taken on a borderline identity in which they still feared the verdict of the Gentile." Ruppin (1934, 331) also notes a similarly motivated pattern in which Jewish parents would baptize their children in infancy while retaining their own religious status.

The conversions of several famous people were apparently conversions of convenience. For example, Heinrich Heine's baptism does not seem to have been accompanied by any religious feelings, and a year later he complained that he regretted it, because it had not held any benefits for him. Within a few years his writing exhibited very negative attitudes toward Christianity. Christianity was "a gloomy, sanguinary religion for criminals" (in Sammons 1979, 148), a religion that repressed the healthy sensuality of antiquity. Heine developed a strong Jewish consciousness toward the end of his life, as indicated by his late work *Romanzero* and his statement that "I make no secret of my Judaism, to which I have not returned, because I have not left it" (in Rose 1990, 167). As a rule, Jewish identification has typically been most intense during periods of anti-Semitism, and, "whenever Jews were threatened—whether in Hamburg during the Hep-Hep riots [of 1819] or in Damascus at the time of the ritual murder accusation [1840]—Heine at once felt solidarity with his people" (Praver 1983, 762). In his later years Heine referred to himself as a Jew and developed a biological conception of Judaism (See Chapter 5).

Such individuals often retained a "residual solidarity, if not with the community of origin, at any rate with fellow 'marranos'" (Mosse 1989, 335). Lichten (1986) describes the case of an individual who converted at age fifteen and benefited from the lack of economic restrictions on Christians but remained an advocate of Jewish causes and stated in his will that "I was my whole life a Jew, and I die as a Jew" (p. 113). Mosse notes that baptized Jews maintained informal social and business networks that resulted in marriages with other baptized Jews and Jewish families who had not changed their surface religion. While baptized Jews of the *haute bourgeoisie* were viewed as acceptable marriage partners by the Jewish *haute bourgeoisie*, gentiles of the *haute bourgeoisie* were not. Thus genetic ancestry rather than social class or surface religion made a

difference in marriage decisions. Indeed, Mosse states his impression that the “earlier sharp distinctions between unbaptized and baptized Jews appear with time to have become somewhat blurred” (p. 133), suggesting that the baptized individuals were eventually re-absorbed into the Jewish community rather than into the gentile community. Carlebach notes that these “converts” were subjected to a great deal of ridicule and contempt by gentiles, presumably because they were perceived as deceivers. The suggestion is that this type of conversion increased anti-Semitism.

However, the most important historical examples of Jewish crypsis come from Spain and Portugal (Beinart 1971a,b, 1981; Contreras 1991, 1992; Lea 1906–1907; Roth 1937, 1974). Crypsis occurred under the Christian Visigoths in the 7th century, under the Muslim Almohades during 12th and 13th centuries, and reached its greatest heights after the forced conversions of 1391 in Christian Spain. In both of the cases involving Christian authorities, crypto-Judaism occurred after a period of mass forced conversion, a rapid ascendancy of crypto-Jews to the highest ranks of society (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 5), and, as a direct consequence, the development of political institutions intended to expose crypto-Judaism when gentiles realized that attempts to assimilate the Jews forcibly had not succeeded.

The Inquisition, established in 1481, was “the result of conditions which arose in Spain following the forced conversion movement. . . . All the methods that had been employed in the 15th century to prise the converts away from their Jewish education and surroundings—whether by ousting the Jews from the mixed [Jewish-New Christian] neighborhoods or by their expulsion from the country—had failed. The Conversos were, and remained, Jews at heart, and their Judaism was expressed in their way of life and their outlook” (Beinart 1981, 23). The New Christians were “Jews in all but name, and Christians in nothing but form” (Roth 1937, 27; see also Baron 1969, 3ff; 1973, 161ff; Johnson 1988, 225–228).

Beinart (1981; see also Hordes 1991; Lazar 1991b; Roth 1995, 70) provides evidence for elaborate deceptions used by the New Christians in order to continue to observe many of the 613 commandments that constituted the *Mitzvoth* during this period, including circumcision, observance of the Sabbath, marriage customs (including having Jews witness the marriage), and burial rites. Children were told of their special status around the age of puberty, and intermarriage with other New Christians was practiced. For its part, the Inquisition developed a long list of practices by which crypto-Jews could be recognized, including the performance of Jewish *Mitzvot* and perfunctory participation in Christian rites. Baron (1973, 162) shows that Jews from Holland and France traveled surreptitiously to Spain and Portugal during the late 17th century to instruct the New Christians in Jewish ritual and encourage them to emigrate to safer regions.³

Moreover, many wealthy New Christians and their descendants openly practiced Judaism after leaving the Peninsula (e.g., Boyajian 1983; Yerushalmi 1971). Groups of New Christians immediately established openly Jewish communities in Amsterdam, Hamburg, Bordeaux, Italy, and many other areas after

leaving the Peninsula, and New Christians in Brazil immediately emerged as Jews after the Dutch conquest. These families had extensive kinship and mercantile ties with Sephardic mercantile families around the world, and some had preserved their Jewish names after many generations and re-adopted them after they left.

In addition, some of those who escaped the Inquisition lived as crypto-Jews in France beginning in the 15th century, and also in Germany, the Netherlands, and England in the 16th century at a time when Judaism was officially proscribed. Some crypto-Jews remained in France even after the edict of expulsion of 1615; Portuguese Marranos living in France changed their pose of Christianity only at the turn of the 18th century, although in the 17th century there had been complaints that Jews were trading among the French “with no distinguishing marks” (in Baron 1973, 110). Some returned to England in the latter part of the 16th century posing as Calvinist refugees. The crypto-Jews, who were said by a contemporary to be attending mass and receiving the Eucharist (Baron 1973, 139), were expelled from England in 1609 after an internal quarrel alerted the authorities to their existence, but they gradually returned, this time posing as Catholics, removing their disguise only after official negotiations under Cromwell. Crypto-Jews who were refugees from the Iberian Peninsula were also targets of inquisitions in Italy if they failed to adopt a Jewish identity on arriving (Pullan 1983).

The New Christians were perceived by the Iberians not as an atomistic set of individuals but as a cohesive national/ethnic group; Yerushalmi (1971, 21), after emphasizing the ethnic character of the Jewish nation living in exile in the Peninsula, notes that the fundamental difficulty addressed by the Inquisition was “the continuing existence in the Peninsula of a *metamorphosed Jewish ‘nation’* which was basic to the very possibility of a *metamorphosed ‘Judaism,’* in whatever form that might assume” (italics in text).

The “groupness” of the New Christians was obvious to all:

Yet while the convert abandoned his people, his peoplehood did not abandon him. It was reflected in many of his characteristics, the product of numerous factors—ethnic, social, environmental and educational—that had influenced Jewish life for centuries. These were essentially *Jewish* characteristics; and although assimilation had somewhat dimmed them, they could still be discerned in the Jewish convert even decades after his conversion. . . . [W]hen masses of Jews were converted at the same time, each of them saw himself within his people and by no means as one who had forsaken it. In Spain, where these converts or their great majority lived for many years in boroughs of their own, this feeling of communion was kept alive as long as the process of assimilation had not destroyed, or seriously affected, the collective fabric. Also many characteristics of the Jew and his life-style, which even isolated converts retained for many years, were guarded for much larger periods in the converso communities. As a result, the converso could still be recognized—even several generations after his ancestors’ conversion—by his Jewish appearance, his habits and mannerisms, his attitudes and reactions, as well as his views on a variety of issues. In consequence, in the middle of the 15th century (and no doubt in many cases even later) the great majority of the New Christians in Spain had

not yet shaken off the shadow of their past; and the result of this fact was the consciousness of their “otherness” that determined the attitude of their neighbors. (Netanyahu 1995, 993–994; italics in text)

There was undoubtedly a wide variation among the New Christians in their religious beliefs and the extent to which they retained Jewish religious observances—a fact that has resulted in continuing controversy and a large mass of both contemporary and modern apologetic literature (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the central fact about the Inquisition is that the New Christians continued to exist as visible groups within Iberian society. They were organized as a set of endogamous, interlocking family clans characterized by high levels of within-group cooperation and patronage in pursuit of economic and political goals (Contreras 1991, 1992; Hordes 1991; Yerushalmi 1971, 18). Indeed, as has been common throughout Jewish history, especially in traditional societies (see also *PTSDA*, Chs. 5 and 6), the spectacular economic success of the New Christians was conditioned ultimately on the “organic solidity of the kinship ties” (Contreras 1991, 140) and (at least prior to the onset of the Inquisition) on their being patronized by a gentile ruling elite, who utilized them as an intermediary between themselves and a subject population (see Chapter 2).

In Spain, the Inquisition ultimately had the intended effect. The New Christians were persecuted, and the unconverted Jews were expelled in 1492. Nevertheless, even at the beginning of the 17th century, well over a century after the beginning of the Inquisition, Jews and gentile Spaniards were still fighting for supremacy: “The remnants of the Jewish caste were attacked by the Inquisition through the New Christians of Jewish ancestry, while the real Spanish Jews helped to worsen the international situation of Christian Spain from Turkey, Holland, and, later, from England” (Castro 1971, 244; see also Contreras 1991, 132). Indeed, persecutions for Judaizing actually increased in the first decades of the 18th century; in the period from 1721 to 1727 there were sixty-four *autos de fé* involving 820 individuals accused of Judaizing (Haliczer 1990, 233). Vestiges of crypto-Judaism can still be found in the Iberian Peninsula (Haliczer 1987), and crypto-Jews never disappeared entirely from Spanish America (Baron 1973, 372).⁴

Abandoning Phenotypic Characteristics that Provoke Gentile Hostility

A less extreme form of crypsis de-emphasizes or discontinues traditional phenotypic traits that provoke hostility while at the same time retaining the essential genetic and cultural separatism central to traditional Judaism. In *PTSDA* (Ch. 4) it was noted that a powerful trend since the Enlightenment has been to minimize phenotypic features such as special Jewish languages, modes of dress, styles of hair, and ways of gesturing that have sharply distinguished Jews from gentiles in traditional societies. There is a “dynamic—albeit contradictory—process in modern Jewish life between efforts to decrease visibility in order to reduce hostility to the group and the need for public perpetuation and legitimization of the Jewish religion and community. . . . Much of the content of American

Jewish culture can be seen as an outcome of different strategies of image management” (Zenner 1991, 141).

I propose that this attempt to maintain separatism while nevertheless making the barriers less visible is the crux of the problem for post-Enlightenment Judaism. A good example is the Reform Judaism movement. While never abandoning the ideology of genetic separatism, the Reform movement, beginning in the 19th century, has de-emphasized the appearance of differences between Judaism and other religions in order to alter negative images of Jews held by gentiles (Endelman 1991, 195).

Reform Judaism in contemporary societies may thus be viewed as a “semi-cryptic” Jewish strategy, which like other religious forms of Judaism acts as a “protective coloring” (Elazar 1980, 9) adopted because “it is a legitimate way to maintain differences when organic ways [i.e., assertions of ethnic peoplehood] are suspect” (Elazar 1980, 23). As Katz (1986, 32) notes, “The definition of the Jewish community as a purely religious unit was, of course, a sham from the time of its conception.” While Judaism in other parts of the world was and remains openly ethnic, Reform Judaism in the West developed a religious veneer because of its usefulness in facilitating perceptions of surface similarity with other, non-ethnic religions, while in Israel the Reform movement is virtually non-existent because the need for protective coloring is not present.

Reform Jews hoped to retain traditional genetic and cultural separatism but “as to outward appearances, [they would] differ from any Christian church to no greater degree than did the various Christian denominations among themselves” (Patai 1971, 37–38).⁵ As the Reform Rabbi Isaac M. Wise (1819–1900) stated, “Whatever makes us ridiculous before the world as it now is, may safely be and should be abolished” (in Patai 1971, 38).⁶ Religious services and weddings became more solemn and dignified in order to make them more similar to many Christian services (Meyer 1988, 35–36, 169–170). One disaffected French Jew complained that “what his co-religionists desired above all was for Gentile visitors at their service to exclaim with satisfaction: ‘Why it’s like our own!’” (in Meyer 1988, 171).⁷

Jews have sometimes avowed religious belief in order to escape the charges of Jewish nationalism—another example of the role of religion as a “protective coloring” for Jewish ethnic/national interests. In the World War I era in Germany, “liberal laymen . . . were in the mass irreversibly secularized Jews, who called themselves religious principally to escape suspicion that their Judaism might be national” (Meyer 1988, 212). Similarly, during the negotiations on the peace treaty ending World War I, the anti-Zionist Henry Morgenthau pressed President Wilson on wording of the treaty: “Any clause in the peace treaty which denoted or connoted the Jews as anything other than a religious sect was anathema to him” (Frommer 1978, 157). This conflicted with the views of the American Jewish Congress (AJCongress) and Eastern European Jews, who favored granting Jews political and cultural autonomy as a separate nation within Eastern European societies. As one Eastern European delegate said,

“Jews are a nation, not a religious sect and we wish the world to know it” (in Frommer 1978, 147).⁸

A more extreme form of this tendency is to deny the reality of the Jewish group entirely. For example, a highly influential essay written in 1893, at the height of an outbreak of anti-Semitism in Germany, not only emphasized the exclusively religious nature of Judaism but portrayed Jewish group ties as completely analogous to those among Catholics and Protestants. Jews were portrayed as engaging in political action solely as individuals and as subject to moral judgment only as individuals (see Schorsch 1972, 108; see also Chapter 8).

Interestingly, the attempt to emphasize phenotypic similarity in the context of continued separatism was not always successful, presumably because it was perceived as little more than deception. The proto-Zionist Moses Hess wrote in 1840 that “it is not the old-type of pious Jew that is most despised but the modern Jew . . . who denies his nationality while the hand of fate presses heavily on his own people. The beautiful phrases about humanity and enlightenment which he employs as a cloak for his treason . . . will ultimately not protect him from public opinion (in Frankel 1981, 12). Writing of the upsurge in anti-Semitism in Germany in the late 19th century, Meyer (1988, 202) notes that anti-Semites focused their hatred most on the non-Orthodox Jews, “since they were the least conspicuously Jewish, yet persisted in maintaining a purposeful religious differentiation.” Indeed, there is some indication that the German public ceased thinking of Jews in religious terms at all in the latter part of the 19th century (Mosse 1989, 224).

A particularly interesting example of the flexibility of Jewish identity is the shift by the Jewish leadership away from the traditional ideology of Judaism as a nation in exile, to an ideology that Judaism is nothing more than a community of religious faith as a common response to the Enlightenment, then to a resurgence of an ideology of Judaism as an ethnic group and advocacy of cultural pluralism in the period following World War II in America and other Western societies. Harup (1972) notes that the return to an ideology of ethnic peoplehood was at least partly a result of declining anti-Semitism, and this makes excellent theoretical sense. We have seen that a common Jewish strategy during periods of anti-Semitism is to adopt varying forms of crypsis, but the converse is also true. During periods of minimal anti-Semitism, Jews benefit from an ideology that Judaism constitutes an ethnic group, because such an ideology is ideal for rationalizing and openly advocating an interest in Jewish group commitment and genetic non-assimilation. Indeed, I would suppose that in the absence of anti-Semitism there would be a resurgence of traditional Judaism, complete with separate languages, different types of clothing, etc., which would very clearly mark off the Jewish ingroup from the surrounding society. Such a strategy would be ideal for maintaining group cohesion and solidarity, but it would also render Judaism thoroughly visible to gentiles and thus tend to increase anti-Semitism. The best strategy for Judaism is to maximize the ethnic, particularistic aspects of Judaism within the limits necessary to prevent these aspects from

resulting in anti-Semitism. But at least in Western societies, such a strategy involves walking a very fine line and being very flexibly responsive to changes in external contingencies (see Chapter 9).

Political Strategies for Minimizing Anti-Semitism

In a statement that would apply to Jewish responses to anti-Semitism throughout history, Lindemann (1991, 279) portrays Jews “individually and collectively, as active agents, as modern, responsible, and flawed human beings, not merely as passive martyrs or as uncomprehending objects of impersonal forces.” In general, Jews have been flexible strategizers in the political arena. The effectiveness of Jewish strategizing has been facilitated by the fact that Judaism is a high-investment group evolutionary strategy, and particularly by the fact that the IQ of Ashkenazi Jews is at least one standard deviation above the Caucasian mean (*PTSDA*, Ch. 7). For example, Jewish influence on United States immigration policy was facilitated by Jewish wealth, education, and social status (Neuringer 1971, 87). The main Jewish activist organization influencing immigration policy, the AJCommittee, was characterized by “strong leadership, internal cohesion, well-funded programs, sophisticated lobbying techniques, well-chosen non-Jewish allies, and good timing” (Goldstein 1990, 333). In all historical eras, Jews as a group have been highly organized, highly intelligent, and politically astute, and they have been able to command a high level of financial, political, and intellectual resources in pursuing their group goals.

A very wide array of political strategies have been pursued with varying success. Jews in traditional Poland responded to anti-Semitism with such strategies as physical defense, attempts to fill indispensable functions for the king, cultivation of friendly personal relationships with the powerful, and payment of bribes and protection money. This led to the perception among Polish writers that Jews controlled the nobility and the political process (Goldberg 1986, 49–51; Weinryb 1972).⁹

Jews engaged in a very wide range of activities to combat anti-Semitism in Germany in the period from 1870 to 1914, including the formation of self-defense committees (e.g., the *Zentralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens* whose name—Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith—was meant to suggest that Jews constitute a community of religious faith), lobbying the government, utilizing and influencing the legal system (e.g., taking advantage of libel and slander laws to force anti-Jewish organizations into bankruptcy), writing apologies and tracts for distribution to the masses of gentile Germans, and funding organizations opposed to anti-Semitism that were not overtly Jewish (Ragins 1980, 23ff).

A major consequence of these activities was to make anti-Semitism a disreputable, unsavory enterprise. The *Zentralverein* successfully pursued legal actions against every major anti-Jewish leader, with the result that not only were there severe financial repercussions for the anti-Semitic movement, but, more impor-

tantly, because of the high prestige of the legal system among Wilhelminian Germans, convicted individuals lost their status among large segments of the public and even within the anti-Semitic movement itself (Levy 1975, 158–159). Similarly the Zentralverein commissioned writings in opposition to “scientific anti-Semitism,” as exemplified by academically respectable publications that portrayed Judaism in negative terms. The Zentralverein monitored academic works for such material and sometimes succeeded in banning offending books and getting publishers to alter offensive passages. The result was to render such ideas academically and intellectually disreputable.

Similar examples are provided in Chapter 2 where it was mentioned that a theme of anti-Semitism has been that Jewish organizations have used their power to make the discussion of Jewish interests off limits, and that individuals who had made remarks critical of Jews were forced to make public apologies and suffered professional difficulties as a result. In recent cases illustrating this theme, the ADL successfully pressured St. Martin’s Press to rescind publication of David Irving’s biography of Goebbels (*Washington Post*, April 4, 1996) after an article by editorial columnist Frank Rich condemning the book appeared in the *New York Times* (April 3, 1996).¹⁰ The ADL also pressured the American Psychological Association to defer presenting a lifetime achievement award to Dr. Raymond B. Cattell because of Cattell’s alleged “commitment to racial supremacy theories” (*New York Times*, August 15, 1997).¹¹

The AJCommittee has also engaged in a wide range of activities to minimize anti-Semitism and pursue Jewish interests, including writing and distributing articles on the situation in czarist Russia, the fraudulent nature of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and the benefits of immigration. Position papers were prepared on Jewish life in Eastern Europe prior to requesting intervention by the American government. Scholarly treatises were prepared in an effort to emphasize Jewish contributions to civilization and rebut the anti-Semitism of such intellectuals as Houston Stewart Chamberlain (Cohen 1972, 34).

In recent times Jewish strategy has often included attempts to mold personal beliefs via the mass media. The Dreyfus Affair in *fin de siècle* France “saw the emergence, for the first time, of a distinct class of intellectuals . . . as a major power in European society and among whom emancipated Jews were an important, sometimes a dominant, element. A new issue was raised, not just for France: Who controls our culture?” (Johnson 1988, 387). “The young Jewish intellectuals, and their growing band of radical allies, began by asking for justice and ended by seeking total victory and revenge. In doing so, they gave their enemies an awesome demonstration of Jewish and philosemitic intellectual power” (Johnson 1988, 388). While at the beginning of the affair the media was controlled by the anti-Semites, by the end of it, fully 90 percent of the literature on the subject was pro-Dreyfus. This campaign involved newspapers, photography, and cinema, and gradually it tilted public opinion in favor of Dreyfus.¹²

Sachar (1992) provides several examples of the use of the mass media to promote Jewish causes, some of which were originally perceived as being opposed to majority interests. In the campaign against czarist Jewish policy in

the 1890s, Oscar Straus and Jacob Schiff were able to secure highly sympathetic treatments in the *New York Times*, owned by their friend Adolph Ochs, also a Jew. The AJCommittee's Louis Marshall also persuaded Ochs to provide press coverage favorable to Leo Frank (Ivers 1995, 41). (Frank, the manager of a pencil factory, was convicted in the murder of a 14-year-old female employee in 1913). This attempt backfired; Southerners reacted negatively to attempts by a northern, Jewish-owned newspaper to influence events in the South. (It is also interesting that Marshall insisted that Ochs not mention that Frank was Jewish or that anti-Semitism was involved in the prosecution—another instance in which Jewish interests were perceived as best served by crypsis.)

Another example of media manipulation was the effort expended to abrogate the Russian trade agreement of 1832. Over a period of three years (1908–1911), the AJCommittee overcame complete apathy among the public and also widespread official concern about American commercial and foreign policy interests to achieve a complete victory (Cohen 1972, 54ff). Although the purpose of the campaign was to change Russian policy toward its Jews, the pretext was Russia's denial of visas to four American Jews and the inability of twenty-eight American Jews living in Russia to travel freely. Thousands of copies of speeches by the Jewish activist Louis Marshall (who never mentioned the plight of Russian Jewry) and Herbert Parsons (a non-Jewish congressman from New York) were distributed to national and state politicians, newspapers, magazines, judges and lawyers, clergy, educators, and fraternal organizations. The AJCommittee provided material for articles in the popular media and distributed rebuttals when opposing positions appeared in the media. Political bodies ranging from Congress to state legislatures were intensely lobbied to pass pro-abrogation resolutions. Rallies with prominent gentile speakers were held, including one in New York whose participants included Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey (who later, as president, endorsed the Balfour Declaration supporting a Jewish homeland in Palestine) and Speaker Champ Clark of the U. S. House of Representatives (who also served Jewish interests in the Congressional immigration battles of the period [Neuringer 1971]).

The results were successful: "Leading newspapers throughout the United States editorialized against the treaty. Magazine articles inveighed against it. Clergymen and Rotary Club, Lion, and other service organizations added their own resolutions of condemnation" (Sachar 1992, 233). By the time of passage by a 301–1 vote, "most members [of Congress] could not wait to express their horror of Russian barbaric practices, their eulogies of the Jewish people and of American Jews in particular, and their insistence upon the inviolability of the rights of American citizens" (Cohen 1972, 77).¹³ Later, during World War I, the AJCommittee attempted to prevent Americans from being sympathetic to the Russian war effort at a time when American officials viewed an alliance with Russia as an important aspect of American foreign policy (Goldstein 1975).

More important was the successful Zionist public relations campaign to change American public opinion on the advisability of a Jewish homeland. Although other factors were involved, Sachar (1992, 595) gives partial credit to

the Zionist public relations campaign for the ultimate success of the thirty-year effort on behalf of a Jewish homeland. In the final stages, the pressure on President Harry Truman was intense. After Truman reluctantly agreed to vote for the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine measure supporting the creation of a Jewish state, he was strongly urged to exert pressure on other countries to approve the measure. "Again, the White House was inundated by mail, besieged by Democratic congressmen and party officials. As Truman himself said, 'I do not think I ever had so much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance,'" (in Sachar 1992, 599–600).¹⁴

Another Jewish media interest has been to promote positive portrayals of Jews and combat negative images. Gabler (1988, 300ff) describes a traditional concern among Jewish organizations regarding the portrayal of Jews by the Jewish-controlled Hollywood studios. Major Jewish organizations, such as the AJCommittee, the ADL, and the AJCongress, developed a formal liaison with the studios by which depictions of Jews would be subjected to censorship. One such group stated in 1947 that "Jewish organizations have a clear and rightful interest in making sure that Hollywood films do not present Jews in such a way as to arouse prejudice. . . . In some cases, such pictures should be taken out of production entirely. In other cases, scripts should be edited carefully to eliminate questionable passages. Everything should be done to eliminate unfortunate stereotypes of the Jews" (p. 303). Gabler describes several instances where scripts were altered to provide more positive portrayals of Jews. The activities of this group were not publicized, out of fear that it could result in "the charge that [a] Jewish group is trying to censor the industry," which, as Gabler notes, "was exactly what it was trying to do" (p. 304).¹⁵ The period following World War II marked the beginning of anti-anti-Semitic movies such as *Gentleman's Agreement*, which won an Oscar for Best Picture (Gabler 1988, 349ff).¹⁶

The Uses of Universalism

Jews attempting to appeal to gentiles have often framed their interests in universalist terms or recruited prominent gentiles to back the cause publicly. From an evolutionary perspective the intent is to make the Jewish cause appear to be in the interests of others as well. When goals are cast in ethnic or national terms, they are not likely to appeal to those outside the group. Indeed, such obviously self-interested goals would be likely to alert outsiders to conflicts of interest between ingroup and outgroup. On the other hand, a standard finding in social psychology is that people are more likely to respond positively when goals are advocated by similar others, or when the goal is cast as being in the interests of all rather than in the interests of an outgroup, as predicted by social identity theory and genetic similarity theory (see Chapter 1).

The attempt to cast particularistic interests in universalist terms has appeared periodically in Jewish intellectual history and has had a very central role in Judaism since the Enlightenment. Thus a major aspect of Reform ideology, especially during the 19th century, was to recast the traditional messianic hope of Judaism into universalist terms and to de-emphasize the ethnic/national character of Judaism while nevertheless maintaining traditional Jewish cultural

separatism. The traditional hopes for the restoration of Jewish political power were replaced by the hope of a world of peace and justice for all of humanity.

Moreover, a major theme of *The Culture of Critique* is that Jewish intellectual movements have advocated universalist ideologies for the entire society (e.g., Marxism) in which the importance of the Jew/gentile social category is reduced in salience and is of no theoretical importance. A consistent finding in research on intergroup contact is that making the social categories which define groups less salient would lessen intergroup differentiation and facilitate positive social interactions between members from different groups (Brewer & Miller 1984; Doise & Sinclair 1973; Miller et al. 1985). At the extreme, the acceptance of a universalist ideology by gentiles would result in their not perceiving Jews as in a different social category at all, while nevertheless Jews would be able to maintain a strong personal identity as Jews.

Jewish organizations have often included statements that explicitly advocate universalist aims for human rights and de-emphasize the ethnic character of Judaism:

While it is clear that [the plea for universal human rights] of these . . . organizations is merely subsidiary or supplementary, its inclusion in the general statement of aims serves the important purpose of precluding the reproach of Jewish clannishness or ethnocentrism: one way of striving for the betterment of the Jewish position in America is to demonstrate, on an organizational level, the Jewish interest in the general American welfare. (Patai 1971, 53)

Jewish organizations in Germany in the period 1870–1914 argued that anti-Semitism was a threat to all of Germany because it was fundamentally “un-German”: “It followed that those Jews who now banded together to oppose anti-Semitism did so out of concern for their nation and in order to make a contribution to the welfare of their fatherland. In their dedication to defense, Jewish citizens gave proof of their patriotism and deep devotion to the national interests of Germany” (Ragins 1980, 55). The strategy may have sometimes backfired:

Jewish interests were firmly entrenched on the side of the Manchester school of *laissez-faire*. As a group the Jews had nothing to gain from state interference in private enterprise and they stood to lose a good deal by the fall of liberals from political power. So they fought back mainly through the press [1848–1874]. Their power was not exactly measurable but recognizable. What made their power appear sinister to their enemies was the fact that the Jews were anxious to hide it for fear of arousing yet greater hostility. Thereby they increased the impression of all sharing in a conspiracy particularly as they defended their interests in the name of lofty principles not as Jews but as Germans. (Schmidt 1959, 46)

Another use of universalism has been to recruit gentile leaders to endorse Jewish causes. Theoretically, this technique takes advantage of the importance of similarity and ingroup membership for inducing positive attitudes (see Ch. 1). People are more likely to agree with, and have positive attitudes toward, similar others and fellow ingroup members than dissimilar others or outgroup members.

This type of activity can involve deception, as occurred in the ancient world, where an entire apologetic literature was written by Jews masquerading as gentiles (Schürer 1986, 617ff). By adopting a gentile pseudonym the author hoped to make gentiles more sympathetic to Jewish ideas, particularly the superiority of Jewish religious beliefs (e.g., ethics and monotheism), as well as to defend Jewish honor against gentile criticisms. For example, the famous Letter of Aristeas defends the Jewish law of purity and “tends to glorify the Jewish people with its excellent institutions and its sumptuous prosperity” (Schürer 1986, 678). In Chapter 4 I also suggested that in the late Roman Empire prominent gentile Judaizers were courted by the Jewish community in order to lessen anti-Semitism.

The first cases I am aware of where gentiles were recruited to support Jewish causes occurred during the New Christian turmoil in 15th-century Spain. Lope de Barrientos, an Old Christian and the Bishop of Cuenca, was recruited by the prominent New Christian Fernán Díaz to write a tract supporting the orthodoxy of most New Christians and condemning their enemies (Netanyahu 1995, 612). (The tract was a revision of Díaz’s apologetic tract *Instrucción del Relator*, and Díaz even suggested that the entire tract be published in the bishop’s name.) Another Old Christian apologist for the New Christians, the jurist Alonso Díaz de Montalvo, was also closely associated with Fernán Díaz and discussed his apologetic tract with Díaz and another prominent New Christian apologist, Alonso de Cartagena, prior to publication.

Jewish organizations opposed to anti-Semitism had an active role in establishing and maintaining gentile-dominated organizations opposed to anti-Semitism in Germany in the period from 1870 to 1933 (Niewyk 1980, 88; Ragins 1980, 53–54; Schorsch 1972, 79ff), leading to accusations among anti-Semites that such organizations were “no more than a front for ‘moneyed Jewry’” (Levy 1975, 147). Much earlier, Moses Mendelsohn had obtained the services of Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, a prominent gentile historian and diplomat, to argue the cause of emancipation of the Alsatian Jews (Schorsch 1972, 79).

One reason why gentiles were attractive spokesmen for Judaism was that for Jews to openly fight against anti-Semitism was in effect “a repudiation of concealment as the price for equality” (Schorsch 1972, 12)—a comment that shows the importance of adopting a semi-cryptic profile during this period, in which emancipation was viewed as a *quid pro quo* for assimilation. A desire not to appear Jewish was present in the 1840s when proto-Zionist Moses Hess, editor of a journal “determined to subject German attitudes and institutions, political and religious, to an unrelenting barrage of radical criticism,” refused to admit his Jewish friend Ludwig Braunfels to the editorial board out of concern that the paper would be perceived as dominated by Jews (Frankel 1981, 14).

In England during the 1930s Jewish organizations developed a technique “used periodically ever since” of supplying materials to be used by groups that advocate Jewish causes, such as supporting anti-fascist candidates, without referring in any way to the Jewish origins of the materials (Alderman 1983,

122). The result was a gap between the actions of the official Jewish community and its public proclamations during a period when Jews were being advised by these same organizations to adopt a low profile to avoid fanning the flames of anti-Semitism: “Publicly, therefore the Board denied the existence of a Jewish vote, but surreptitiously it did its best to foster an anti-fascist vote” (Alderman 1983, 122). Indeed, the Board of Deputies did its best during the period simultaneously to “tighten its hold” (p. 123) on the behavior of British Jews while at the same time promulgating the fictions that Jews were merely a religious community (despite a strong strand of Zionism within the community) and that Jews tended not to vote in any particular way (despite their antipathy to Conservative candidates, at least partly because of the Conservative Party’s opposition to Zionism).

This type of strategy appears also to have been common in 20th-century America. In 1903 during an attempt to influence czarist policy toward Jews, a fund-raising and protest committee formed by Jewish activist Jacob Schiff and his colleagues was headed by a gentile and included former president Grover Cleveland and prominent Christian clergymen as speakers. In 1911 the attempt to abrogate the Russian trade agreement included the formation of “the first of a series of non-Jewish ‘front’ committees at which Jews would prove exceptionally adept in future years” (Sachar 1992, 233), including, as we have seen, the participation of Woodrow Wilson and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Jewish spokesmen favored formulations in which the problem was couched as an *American* problem rather than as a problem for American Jews (even though the difficulties for American Jews were only a pretext for a campaign that was actually directed at changing the status of Russian Jews). It was in this form that the measure passed Congress (Cohen 1972, 72). In comments to AJCommittee officials, President W. H. Taft was quite aware of the deceptive nature of the AJCommittee rhetoric, stating that he viewed “the AJC’s anti-Russian campaign as an attempt to destroy the Pale [of Settlement]—thinly disguised by the AJC’s public rhetoric that spoke only of treaty obligations and religious equality in the United States” (Goldstein 1990, 150). In the period following World War II, Jews were active in funding gentile-dominated organizations opposed to anti-Semitism: “Jews offered to provide the professional staffs and most of the financing if prominent Gentiles would grace the organizational letterheads” (Dinnerstein 1994, 147).

Beginning in the late 19th century, Jews were far more unanimous in their support of liberal immigration policies than any other American ethnic group, and their arguments were typically couched in terms of universalist humanitarian ideals rather than narrow ethnic interests. Jewish organizations, such as the AJCommittee, organized, funded, and performed most of the work of a variety of umbrella organizations aimed at combating restrictions on immigration (e.g., the National Liberal Immigration League; the Citizens Committee for Displaced Persons; the National Commission on Immigration and Citizenship; the American Immigration Conference; see *The Culture of Critique*). Most of the members of these groups were from other ethnic or religious groups.

This type of strategy is also apparent in Jewish attempts to secularize American culture. Ginsberg (1993, 101) notes that the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) insisted that the plaintiffs and the lead lawyer be gentiles in a case challenging the constitutionality of a non-denominational prayer in the New York public schools. This meant that the only gentile lawyer on the NYCLU staff was chosen to argue the case.¹⁷

Jews dominated the Socialist Party of America but “they tended to avoid the very top leadership positions, however, lest attempts to develop a broader base be weakened. Their role in the American Communist Party [CPUSA] would soon follow the same pattern” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 99). CPUSA leaders were greatly concerned that the party image was too Jewish, with the result that Jewish members were encouraged to adopt non-Jewish-sounding names, and there were active (largely unsuccessful) efforts to recruit gentile members (Klehr 1978, 41; Liebman 1979, 501). This attempt at Jewish invisibility often coincided with a strong sense of Jewish ethnic identification (see *The Culture of Critique*). As a result of these efforts, gentiles were able to rise in the party at a substantially faster rate than Jews; despite often representing around 40 percent of the Central Committee in the period from 1921–1961, only one Jew ever held the top position in the CPUSA (Klehr 1978, 47, 52).¹⁸ Similarly in Germany, Jews avoided the top positions in the German Social Democratic Party despite “a large Jewish presence in leadership positions of the second rank” (Lindemann 1997, 172).

Strategies for Combating Anti-Semitism Focusing on Controlling Behavior within the Jewish Community

Jews have often taken actions within their own community designed to limit anti-Semitism. Such measures are theoretically important, because a successful group strategy must be protected from invasion by deceivers, freeloaders, and those who endanger the community. The data reported in this section offer corroboration for the social identity theory presented in Chapter 1 as the basis of gentile anti-Semitism: The negative behavior of a few outgroup members tends to be generalized uncritically to all of the outgroup. As a result, a strategizing group, especially a minority group surrounded by a potentially hostile majority, is well advised to have mechanisms that control the behavior of individual Jews.

One of the most important roles of the old *Kehilla* organization among the Jews was to regulate the personal behavior of Jews so as not to offend gentile sensibilities (see also *PTSDA*, Ch. 4). In 15th-century Spain there were laws that prohibited extravagant dress and entertainment, the purpose of which was partly “to prevent householders . . . from arousing Christian envy and hatred ‘on account of which new edicts are enacted against us’ ” (Baer 1961, II, 269). During this period there were attempts to control the behavior of the wealthy Jewish courtier class, because their activities, such as moneylending and tax farming, were potent sources of anti-Semitism (Baer 1961, I, 257ff). Similarly, a regulation of the Synod of Frankfort of 1603 stated that “no member of our community whether young or old, shall be permitted to lie to Gentiles or deceive them, whether in regard to what Jews buy from them or in regard to what the

Jews sell them. Those who deceive Gentiles profane the name of the Lord among the Gentiles” (from Finkelstein 1924, 280). Resolutions also prohibited large groups of Jews from congregating in public. “In general, any action that might arouse the notice, the envy, or the anger of the Gentile population was deprecated” (Finkelstein 1924, 88).

Despite the decline of the Kehilla system, there have been continuing attempts to restrain other Jews in the interests of lowering anti-Semitism. In the period from 1870 to 1914, liberal German Jews actively dissociated themselves from Jews, especially Orthodox Jews, who refused to adopt the outward appearances of assimilation and thus justified the charge that Jews were foreigners (Ragins 1980, 49). Attempts were made to get other Jews to abandon typically Jewish gestures and social behavior because it was offensive to Germans: “One was required to be ever watchful and take great care to avoid all provocative behavior” (Ragins 1980, 88). Indeed, “as late as 1890 [Jews] were still consciously suppressing every conspicuous and distinctive Jewish trait” (Schorsch 1972, 66).¹⁹ Similarly, in the United States as late as 1931, the ADL contained a Bureau of Jewish Department that “taught Jews to avoid offensive behavior that might arouse anti-Semitism” (Goldberg 1996, 129), including advice not to wear furs in Florida during the summer.²⁰

Attempts have also been made at defusing gentile perceptions of Jewish racial exclusivity. One of the questions submitted by Napoleon to the Jewish community in 1807 was on Jewish attitudes regarding intermarriage. The response of the Jewish Sanhedrin was that intermarriage could not be religiously sanctioned although the marriage was civilly valid—a response interpreted by Levenson (1989, 322) as an attempt to deceive Napoleon into thinking that their response was a qualified “yes” to intermarriage when in fact it was a qualified “no.” Leopold Auerbach, an influential 19th-century Jewish apologist, argued that Jews should actively seek converts and relax requirements for conversion to counter the perception among Germans that Jews were racially exclusive (Schorsch 1972, 110). Isolated Jewish spokesmen repeatedly advocated intermarriage with or without conversion of the Christian partner, but even liberal Jewish organizations such as the Zentralverein developed very aggressive campaigns against apostasy and condemned the government for encouraging Jewish conversion to Christianity (Schorsch 1972, 110, 141).²¹

There have also been many attempts to alter Jewish economic behavior vis-à-vis gentiles. In the 19th century, the *Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus* (League to Combat Anti-Semitism), a gentile organization opposing anti-Semitism, made efforts to supervise the practices of Jewish clothing peddlers and cattle traders that provoked gentile hostility (Schorsch 1972, 84). These activities won the support of Jewish leaders, many of whom perceived their coreligionists as “vocationally and morally defective.” For example, Ludwig Stern, responding to Wilhelm Marr’s anti-Semitic writings, blamed anti-Semitism on the activities of a few rich Jews and accepted Jewish involvement in stock market frauds as an important cause of anti-Semitism rooted in actual Jewish behavior (Zimmerman 1986, 80). Stern urged Jews to abandon money-

lending and not to flaunt their wealth, because it aroused jealousy. Later the Zentralverein attempted to reduce the “objective” causes of anti-Semitism by apologizing for the “maturing” nature of the Jewish community and especially for the large number of “alien and uncultured Semites living in Germany” (Schorsch 1972, 136).²²

In the 1930s in England, Neville Laski, President of the Board of Deputies (the major organization of British Jews), set up a subcommittee to “to deal with such social conditions as sweatshops, bad employers, landlords and price-cutting in the East End.” The committee attempted to raise the public image of Jews by making Jews more aware of the effect their “individual malpractices” had on fomenting anti-Semitism and pressuring them to change their behavior.

I submit that the time has passed for us . . . to ignore the fact that not a day goes by without anti-Semitism being created by Jews themselves . . . a new generation of unethical Jewish traders are by bankruptcy, due to complete irresponsibility and lack of principle, causing hardship over a wide field and manufacturing anti-Semitism at high pressure. (M. G. Liverman, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Board of Deputies, November 1938, in Alderman 1992, 294)

During the 19th century there were attempts to end the economic and social class disparities between Jews and Germans because of the clear effect these disparities had in exacerbating anti-Semitism (Ragins 1980, 68, 71). Although largely unsuccessful, these programs were motivated by the fact that a consistent theme of anti-Semitism of the period was the lack of Jewish participation in primary production and their concentration in high-prestige, high-income occupations. This Jewish response was therefore an attempt to alter the perception that Jews as a group engage in resource competition and economic exploitation of gentiles, a common theme of anti-Semitic writings (see Chapter 2). Thus an advocate of the program stated that

if the Jews do not post a contingent in *all* types of occupations, if there are not soon more waiters and letter-carriers, miners and factory workers in the lower classes, court clerks and minor officials of every sort in the middle classes and artisans and farmers in greater numbers among the German Jews, then we cannot complain about the hostile reproach that we constitute a *Volk* within the *Volk* and do not assimilate ourselves sufficiently. (In Ragins 1980, 68; italics in text).

Jewish organizations have also attempted to control Jewish criminal behavior. The “extraordinarily large representation of Jews among traffickers and their victims” (Niewyk 1980, 118) in international prostitution from 1870 to 1939 was a major source of negative stereotypes by gentiles (see Bristow 1983), and in early 20th-century America Jews were active in attempts to eradicate Jewish prostitution, control of prostitution, street crime, and gangster activities (see Sachar 1992). In New York in 1912, the Bureau of Social Morals was established by Jewish philanthropists to provide information to the district attorney regarding Jewish criminal activities.

Jews also made active attempts to control the behavior of other Jews likely to lead to charges of disloyalty.²³ Meyer (1988, 339) notes that a major goal of the Reform movement in post-World War I Germany was to suppress Zionism because of its perceived effect on fanning the flames of anti-Semitism due to charges of Jewish disloyalty.²⁴ Two prominent German reform rabbis in the early 20th century declared that a Zionist newspaper was a “calamity” to German Jews: “As long as the Zionists wrote in Hebrew, they were not dangerous, now that they write in German it is necessary to oppose them” (in Meyer 1988, 209). In other words, a low-profile Zionism was harmless, but there was danger if gentiles became aware of strident assertions of Jewish nationalism. In 1913 the Zentralverein accused the Zionist movement of being dominated by people who denied any allegiance to Germany (Schorsch 1972, 200), and it voted to expel any Zionist “who denies any feeling of German nationality, who feels himself a guest among a host people and nationally only a Jew” (in Schorsch 1972, 181; see also Magill 1979, 211–212). (In 1914 at the outbreak of World War I, the German Zionist Federation [the main German Zionist organization] resolved that Jews had no roots whatever in Germany.) To an organization intent on depicting Jews as loyal to Germany, there was clearly a concern that Germans would over-attribute the lack of loyalty of these Zionists to all Jews—another example of the tendency to assume the worst about outgroups as an important contributor to historical anti-Semitism (see discussion of Type II errors in Chapter 1).

On the other hand, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, a prominent Zionist and leader of the AJCongress, characterized Western European Jews as engaging in deception by pretending to be patriotic citizens while really being Jewish nationalists: “They wore the mask of the ruling nationality as of old in Spain—the mask of the ruling religion” (in Frommer 1978, 118). Wise had a well-developed sense of dual loyalty, stating on one occasion “I am not an American citizen of Jewish faith. I am a Jew. I am an American. I have been an American 63/64ths of my life, but I have been a Jew for 4000 years” (in Lilienthal 1953, 165). Similar conflicts between Zionists and anti-Zionists, framed in much the same way, occurred in America (Frommer 1978)²⁵ and England (Alderman 1983).²⁶

Fears of charges of disloyalty also emerged when the World Jewish Congress was established as an outgrowth of the AJCongress in the 1930s. Cyrus Adler, president of the AJCommittee, described the attempt to create such an international body as “a sensational blunder,” warning that “the enemies of Jews in every country and especially in Germany would seize upon the Congress as an alleged justification of their charges. The question is not whether such a result should occur, but whether it is likely to occur. The Jews of Europe, and especially of Germany, want no such Congress” (in Frommer 1978, 467).²⁷ United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, though an ardent Zionist, also strongly disapproved of a World Jewish Congress because it would “lend color to the arguments based on the *Protocols [of the Elders of Zion]*” (in Frommer 1978, 484).²⁸

Also related to charges of disloyalty, there was great concern within the Jewish community from the 1920s through the Cold War period, that the very large overrepresentation of ethnic Jews within the American Communist Party (CPUSA) would lead to anti-Semitism; “The fight against the stereotype of Communist-Jew became a virtual obsession with Jewish leaders and opinion makers throughout America” (Liebman 1979, 515),²⁹ and indeed, the association of Jews with the CPUSA was a focus of anti-Semitic literature at this time (e.g., Beaty 1951). As a result, the AJCommittee engaged in intensive efforts to change opinion within the Jewish community by showing that Jewish interests were more compatible with advocating American democracy than Soviet communism (e.g., emphasizing Soviet anti-Semitism and support of nations opposed to Israel in the period after World War II) (Cohen 1972, 347ff).³⁰

Particularly worrisome to American Jewish leaders was the arrest and conviction of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for spying. Leftist supporters of the Rosenbergs, many of whom were Jewish, attempted to portray the event as an instance of anti-Semitism and actively sought to enlist mainstream Jewish opinion on the side of this interpretation (Dawidowicz 1952). However, in doing so they made the Jewish identities of these individuals and the connection between Judaism and communism even more salient; the official Jewish community went to great lengths to alter the public stereotype of Jewish subversion and disloyalty. The AJCommittee obtained a prominent role for Jews in the prosecution of the Rosenbergs and was active in promoting public support for the guilty verdicts (Ginsberg 1993, 121; Navasky 1980, 114ff).

Communists were also hounded out of mainstream Jewish organizations where they had previously been welcome. Particularly salient was the 50,000-member Jewish Peoples Fraternal Order, an affiliate of the AJCongress listed as a subversive organization by the U. S. Attorney General. The JPFO was the financial and organizational “bulwark” of the CPUSA after World War II and also funded the *Daily Worker* and the *Morning Freiheit* (Svonkin 1997, 166). Although the AJCongress severed its ties with the JPFO and stated that communism was a threat, it was “at best a reluctant and unenthusiastic participant” (Svonkin 1997, 132) in the Jewish effort to develop a public image of anti-communism—a position reflecting the sympathies of many among its predominantly second- and third-generation Eastern European immigrant membership.

Finally, the right of Jews to dissent from Israeli policy has sometimes been a lively issue within the Jewish community. During the mid-1970s, American Jewish leaders were recruited by Israel to condemn the activities of Breira, a group that aimed to influence American Jewish attitudes toward Israeli policy. American members of Breira received “tongue-lashings” by ranking Israeli diplomats, and American Jewish intellectuals who had signed advertisements opposing settlements in the occupied territories were, in the words of Irving Howe recounting his own experience, “subjected to unseemly pressures in their communities and organizations”—what Howe termed “*heimishe* [homelike] witch hunting” (Goldberg 1996, 206).

NOTES

1. According to Stannard (1996), the effort among some scholars to elevate the Holocaust to “religio-mythic” status as a unique historical event derives from these political objectives. He notes that Israel has endorsed Turkey’s denial of the Armenian genocide in order to solidify its claim of the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust, while in a cynical *quid pro quo*, Turkey has publicly agreed to the uniqueness of the Holocaust.

2. Pakter (1992, 719) notes that there is a tradition of oblique criticism of the Book of Esther because of the marriage of Esther to Ahasuerus. Even a marriage to a foreigner that resulted in Jewish deliverance was viewed negatively.

3. Other interesting tidbits: Roth (1995, 235) describes examples of monks born of Converso parents who made up fantastic stories to explain why they appeared to have been circumcised. The Converso historian Palencia states that prior to the anti-Converso riots of 1473 in Cordova, the Conversos, believing that they were protected by a large army, openly disparaged Christianity and performed Jewish rituals (Netanyahu 1995, 800). When Byzantium fell to the Turks in 1453, many Conversos believed that the Messiah had come and that they could soon resume their overt identities as Jews (Baer 1961, II, 292). During this period, the Conversos openly acknowledged their ancestry and commonly asserted that it was superior to that of gentiles (Contreras 1991, 134). Converso writers living outside the Peninsula developed apologia for crypto-Judaism; the Converso Bachelor Alfonso de la Torre (d. 1485) wrote a book containing instructions for Jewish practice, camouflaged as a Christian catechism (Faur 1992, 30). When the book was republished in Amsterdam in 1623 the Christian material was omitted.

4. The Portuguese New Christians were also very tenacious. The great majority of them descended from Spanish Jews who had been expelled from Spain after refusing to become New Christians at the time of the expulsion of 1492, suggesting that many in this group were very resolute in their commitment to Judaism (Yerushalmi 1971, 5). Although the Portuguese Inquisition was largely successful in suppressing crypto-Judaism both in the Peninsula and the New World (Lea 1906–1907; Roth 1974), the last regular synagogue was discovered in 1706 in Lisbon, and crypto-Jews were discovered periodically in the 18th century. Several communities of crypto-Jews came to light in Portugal in the 20th century; Hordes (1991, 213) describes a group of “Hispanic Catholics” in contemporary New Mexico who continue to marry among themselves and preserve several remnants of Jewish religious practices.

5. Although many Jews in post-emancipation Germany attempted to suppress Jewish expressions and patterns of intonation, they were not entirely successful. One component of anti-Semitic writings, particularly those of Wagner, was the charge that Jews could not speak any European language without betraying their group identity. Katz (1985, 98) states the charge of continued linguistic peculiarity “had some basis in reality,” and he also suggests that Jews made attempts to suppress their linguistic peculiarities much more when talking to gentiles, while continuing to retain Jewish overtones to their speech in the company of other Jews. Such a situation suggests deception, since the suppression of linguistic peculiarity would appear to be in the service of de-emphasizing Jewish identification in the presence of gentiles, while within-group linguistic peculiarity continued its age-old function as a badge of group membership.

6. These trends are not restricted to recent times. Rabinowitz (1938, 243) notes that the Jews of medieval France abandoned several traditional practices out of concern not to appear ridiculous to Christians.

7. Other examples: Physical rituals were minimized, especially ones that were raucous and “primitive” (such as flagellation on the day before Yom Kippur). The traditional goal of resuming animal sacrifices in the restored Temple was abandoned. Vernacular languages were increasingly used, and the organ was widely introduced to religious services in imitation of the Christian practice. The effort to blend in sometimes coincided with continued expressions of separatism. For example, the synagogues built in Germany during the period of liturgical reform from 1850 to 1880 tended toward Moorish style, “in effect declaring that political and cultural integration did not require abdication of origins; the synagogue did not have to resemble the Church” (Meyer 1988, 183).

8. Similarly, in 1920 Jewish leaders attempting to oppose restrictions on Jewish immigration argued that Jews should be classified not as a race but as a religion. This ideology of Judaism was designed to make Jewish immigration more appealing to gentiles, but in making this assertion they had to contend with the fact that many Jews at the time, especially Zionists, viewed Judaism as a racial group (Panitz 1969, 56).

9. Similarly, Jews pursued an array of strategies to avoid or mitigate the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions, including armed resistance, assassinations, personal relationships with the powerful, political efforts (particularly the effort to obtain Portuguese independence from Spain), bribes and gifts, and manipulating the attitudes of the powerful (“propaganda”) (Roth 1974, 69; see also Beinart 1981; Lea 1906–1907).

10. Jewish academics were also successful in getting the American Historical Association (AHA) to condemn the idea that the Holocaust never happened or has been greatly exaggerated, and recently the AHA rejected the thesis that Jews were disproportionately involved in the Atlantic slave trade or as exploiters of slaves, as maintained by the book *The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews*, published by the Nation of Islam (*Los Angeles Times*, B12, February 18, 1995).

11. Noam Chomsky, the famous MIT linguist, describes his experience with the ADL:

In the United States a rather effective system of intimidation has been developed to silence critique. . . . Take the Anti-Defamation League. . . . It’s actually an organization devoted to trying to defame and intimidate and silence people who criticize current Israeli policies, whatever they may be. For example, I myself, through a leak in the new England office of the Anti-Defamation League, was able to obtain a copy of my file there. It’s 150 pages, just like an FBI file, [consisting of] interoffice memos warning that I’m going to show up here and there, surveillance of talks that I give, comments and alleged transcripts of talks . . . [T]his material has been circulated [and] . . . would be sent to some local group which would use it to extract defamatory material which would then be circulated, usually in unsigned pamphlets outside the place where I’d be speaking. . . . If there’s any comment in the press which they regard as insufficiently subservient to the party line, there’ll be a flood of letters, delegations, protests, threats to withdraw advertising, etc. The politicians of course are directly subjected to this, and they are also subjected to substantial financial penalties if they don’t go along. . . . This totally one-sided pressure and this, by now, very effective system of vilification, lying, defamation, and judicious use of funds in the political system . . . has created a highly biased approach to the whole matter. (Chomsky 1988, 642–3)

12. In the 1890s Julius Langbehn's work on Rembrandt became enormously popular and received many positive reviews in the media. However, later editions offended Jews and liberals, and the tone of the reviews changed. Langbehn stated that "the mendacity of the . . . reviewers in the daily press is clearly demonstrated by the fact that they praised the author of the Rembrandt book to the skies until he uttered one word against the Jews; from that day on, he was continually maligned" (in Stern 1961, 156n).

13. The results did not live up to Jewish expectations:

[The pact had resulted in] a bitter unfriendly Russia, a decline in trade, anti-Semitic and anti-American reprisals in Russia. Foreign countries did not follow America's action but sought rather to reap the benefits of her rift with Russia. In the United States abrogation brought adverse reaction for American Jews in some quarters [including widespread negative attitudes in the State Department]. A year after abrogation Taft laughed privately at the joke on the Jews; from their pulpits rabbis were declaiming that the United States had scored a victory against bigotry and intolerance, but America and the Jews, not Russia, had lost out. (Cohen 1972, 78–79)

14. Another Jewish media strategy has been to encourage a "dynamic silence" on certain topics. The AJCommittee persuaded the media to withhold coverage of the activities of anti-Semite Gerald L. K. Smith (Cohen 1972, 375; Ginsberg 1993, 124), and most Jewish writers in England chose to ignore Chamberlain's *Foundations* (Field 1981, 465). Perhaps it is significant that review copies of *PTSDA* were sent to over forty Jewish publications but, to my knowledge, the book was not reviewed in any of them.

15. On the other hand, the idea that Hollywood portrays other ethnic groups negatively has been a component of remarks deemed anti-Semitic. See Chapter 2, note 40.

16. A recent media tactic has been to label as anti-Semitic any negatively toned difference between Jews and gentiles. Hertzberg (1993a, 52) cites widely publicized ADL data from 1992 indicating that approximately half of Americans believe that "Jews stick together more than other Americans," and that "Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews." While the ADL labels such views anti-Semitic, Hertzberg (1993a, 52) questions whether these attitudes are prejudicial, suggesting that they simply reflect reality: "One of the main tasks of the organized Jewish community is to maintain Jewish identity in the American melting pot; and members of Jewish organizations take special pride in the claim that Jews value continuity more highly than other ethnic groups do. Among Jews, moreover, it is clearly a virtue to feel closer to other Jews than to anyone else. Why is it an index of anti-Semitism if other Americans are aware that many Jews feel this way?" Indeed, during the 1950s the AJCommittee, while advocating exclusively Jewish associations related to "specific religious or ethnic purposes," had deplored the fact that Jews preferred to associate and socialize exclusively with exclusively or predominantly Jewish groups (Cohen 1972, 411–412.) Weiss (1996) finds it ironic that the AJCommittee views a statement like "Jews stick together" as anti-Semitic while at the same time it classifies a Jew only half of whose friends are Jewish as lacking in Jewish identification. One might also note that negative gentile attitudes regarding intermarriage with Jews continue to be viewed as expressions of anti-Semitism by Jewish organizations (see, e.g., Smith 1994), while at the same time the organized Jewish community continues to aggressively combat intermarriage between Jews and gentiles (see Ch. 9).

17. In Chapter 2 it was noted that Jews controlled all of the major motion picture companies and that this has been a recurrent aspect of anti-Semitism in the United States.

It is interesting that the industry has often used gentiles as spokespersons in its dealings with investigative bodies, which themselves have often had anti-Semitic overtones. Two gentiles, Will H. Hays and Joseph I Breen, were appointed in 1922 and 1934 respectively to head movie industry bodies intended to prevent censorship campaigns directed at Hollywood movies (Ceplair & Englund 1980, 304n), and more recently Jack Valenti has filled this role. Wendell Wilkie, a Republican internationalist and former presidential candidate was recruited as spokesman for the Hollywood studies during investigations of its role in promoting intervention in World War II. During the anticommunist hearings of 1940, the studios recruited a gentile from Georgia, Y. Frank Freeman, to represent it before HUAC (Gabler 1988, 346, 354). During the HUAC Hollywood hearings of 1953 there was an attempt to develop a “kosher HUAC” that would coordinate policies related to screening employees, etc. “All of the names that were floated (from [Judge Learned] Hand to [former president Harry] Truman) had only one thing in common—not one of them was Jewish. They had difficulty coming up with an acceptable sponsor, perhaps because their criteria of selection—an establishment organization with impeccable credentials—precluded their finding any acceptable takers” (Navasky 1980, 127).

18. The attempt to defuse perceptions of Jewishness was also behind efforts of the German-Jewish economic elite in the early 20th century to appoint a significant number of gentiles to boards of directors of their companies (Mosse 1987, 294). Whereas the gentile board members of these companies tended to be isolated and heterogeneous, the Jewish board members formed a highly compact, interlocking elite group with a strong presence throughout the “Jewish sector” of the economy.

19. Nevertheless, Jewish behavior continued to draw comment from Jews. Walther Rathenau, a prominent Jewish industrialist and political figure who strongly advocated assimilation, described the Jews as “a separated alien tribe in the midst of German life, effervescent and vulgarly decorated, with hot-blooded, animated gesticulations. An Asiatic horde on Brandenburg sand. . . . In narrow cohesion among themselves, in strict seclusion outwards: thus they live in a semi-voluntary, invisible ghetto; not a living member of the *Volk*, but rather an alien organism in its body” (in Ragins 1980, 77).

20. Concerns about the potential for anti-Semitism resulting from perceptions of foreignness were also behind the attempts by the more established German-American Jews to decrease immigration of their Eastern European coreligionists. Thus in the 1880s a Jewish spokesman tried to prevent European Jewish philanthropies from sending Eastern European Jews to America, by noting that “the Jewish position in America was not yet secure. . . . American Jews could not ‘afford to incur the ill will of their compatriots’ ” (Sachar 1992, 124; see also Neuringer 1971, 15ff). A Jewish publication warned about the “uncouth Asiatics” from Russia, and there were concerns that the new immigrants would ultimately lower the social class of the established Jewish community. These concerns regarding the outlandish behavior of new immigrants continue regarding recent Jewish immigrants into America. Sachar (1992) describes the extreme separatism of the Hasidic Jews who immigrated to the United States after World War II. The Hasidic Jews are so separatist that they are given to viewing rabbis of other sects as “heterodox,” a trend Sachar perceives as ominous: “Even in tolerant America, hairshirt tribalism was a provocative stance for a community ranked among the smallest, and still among the most suspect and vulnerable, of the nation’s ethno-religious minorities” (p. 700).

21. Similar activities are apparent in the contemporary world. Children of the group of Falasha Jews who were evacuated from Ethiopia to Israel have made tours of schools in the United States with the avowed purpose of demonstrating that not all Jews are white (*Los Angeles Times*, February 16, 1995). These activities may well be directed at opposing the logic of the United Nations resolution (since repealed) equating Zionism with racism and at ameliorating African-American anti-Semitism.

22. Similarly, in the Weimar period, the National League of Frontline Veterans emphasized Jewish “self-discipline” as a means of defusing anti-Semitism: “Out of the inns of gluttony! Away from the mad pursuit of pleasure! Down with vain baubles! *Back to simplicity and serious living!*” (in Niewyk 1980, 92; italics in text). During this period the Zentralverein was also active in urging Jewish businessmen to treat customers and employees fairly, in response to the complaints of anti-Semites.

23. The official Jewish community also cooperated with the British government’s lack of aggressive concern about European Jews during World War II out of concerns that

the loyalty of British Jews to their co-religionists in other lands was greater than their loyalty to their fellow citizens in Britain. . . . The spectre of the cosmopolitan Jew, loyal to international Jewry but to nothing else, haunted Jewish communal leaders (and many of those whom they led) as much as it haunted purveyors of anti-Jewish prejudice, of whom there was a growing number in the 1930s. (Alderman 1992, 281)

24. Walter Rathenau (see note 19) was a prominent critic of Jewish behavior during this period. Rathenau stated that the charge of internationalism would continue to be made against Jews so long as they were related by marriage to “all the foreign Cohns and Levys” (in Ragins 1980, 77), a comment which illustrates the saliency of the ethnic nature of Judaism for anti-Semitic attitudes of the period. Rathenau also criticized Jews for remaining foreigners and failing to win the trust of Germans (Niewyk 1980, 96–97). Reflecting this concern, a major goal of the National League of Jewish Frontline Veterans was to rebut charges that Jews had been underrepresented as frontline soldiers in World War I and had suffered disproportionately few casualties (see Niewyk 1980, 90).

25. There was a conflict between the established German-American Jews represented by the AJCommittee and the Eastern European Jews who founded the AJCongress (Frommer 1978). The latter were far more likely to be Zionists (as well as political radicals) with a well-developed view of Jewry as a nation and as a race with strong ties to foreign Jews. The following are quotations from *The American Hebrew*, a periodical that reflected the views of the older Jewish establishment represented by the AJCommittee:

[The vast majority of American Jews] feel that they cannot participate in an undertaking predicated on what, in effect, would be an acknowledgment that they are a people apart from the rest of the population of the countries of which they are citizens and to which they owe their allegiance. (*American Hebrew*, June 15, 1923, p. 93)

Reports from the Zionist Convention at Baltimore indicate at this writing that the Organization continues heedless of the fact that its nationalist policy is the chief stumbling block in the way of the speedy upbuilding of Palestine. It was, indeed, with great assurance that the convention “keynote” orator declared that the Jew is the alien par excellence; that even “assimilationists,” i.e., anti-nationalist Jews, are now again conscious that the flag which they thought theirs during the war is not their flag, that those who fought for their nation fought, in effect, not for their nation but in the Foreign Legion. Can folly go further? . . . [O]ne who knows himself to be an American in nationality will not alienate himself from the land of his birth or adoption, however cordially he may desire the upbuilding of Palestine. (*American Hebrew*, June 22, 1923, p. 113)

26. In England there were conflicts between recent immigrants from Eastern European and the established Jewish community represented by the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association. In 1916 an establishment leader stated that cooperation with the Zionists could not take place “on an overt or official assumption of the existence of a Jewish nationality for the Jews all over the world” (in Alderman 1983, 100).

27. Although the leaders of the AJCongress were largely Zionist and conceptualized Jews as a nation rather than a religion, they recruited “outstanding American clergymen individually to endorse our movement” (in Frommer 1978, 488)—another example of the usefulness of conceptualizing Judaism as a religion rather than an ethnic group, and presumably involving some deception or self-deception. The official statement of the function of the World Jewish Congress was framed in terms of peoplehood: “To symbolize and make a reality of the common resolution of the Jewish people to unite in defence of its rights; and to secure the cooperation of the various branches of this dispersed people in all matters of common interest” (in Frommer 1978, 492).

28. Attempts to control Jewish behavior related to Zionism continued after the establishment of Israel. Early on, David Ben-Gurion was prevailed upon to resign his office as chairman of a Zionist organization because it “might instantly lead to charges of dual loyalty” (Sachar 1992, 717). Concerns about accusations of dual loyalty have figured prominently in the wake of the Jonathan Pollard spying case. American Jews “pressed urgently for assurances that the Israeli government never again would expose them to this discomfiture. How would their own government ever entrust Jews to positions of security and responsibility?” (Sachar 1992, 896). American Jews were extensively investigated when applying for positions related to national security after this incident (Ginsberg 1993, 217–218). Nevertheless, the Israeli intelligence service has often recruited diaspora Jews to assist in intelligence operations (Ostrovsky & Hoy 1990).

29. In the 1920s, the fact that Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe were viewed as “infected with Bolshevism . . . unpatriotic, alien, unassimilable,” contributed to restrictive immigration legislation (Neuringer 1971, 165). Jewish publications warned that the leftism of Jewish immigrants would lead to anti-Semitism. The official Jewish community engaged in “a near-desperation . . . effort to portray the Jew as one hundred per cent American” by organizing highly visible patriotic pageants on national holidays and urging the immigrants to learn English (Neuringer 1971, 167). Nevertheless, Jewish radicalism continued to be a problem. In 1937 the AJCommittee commissioned a report from a sympathetic gentile, Alvin Johnson, who recommended that Jews develop programs aimed at countering political radicalism and Zionism among Jewish youth and that Jews become less conspicuous (Cohen 1972, 203).

30. Similarly in England in 1887 the Federation of Minor Synagogues was created by established British Jews to moderate the radicalism of newly arrived immigrants from Eastern Europe. This organization also engaged in deception, by deliberately distorting the extent to which the immigrants had radical political attitudes (Alderman 1983, 60).