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## Jewish Involvement in the Psychoanalytic Movement

The familiar caricature of the bearded and monocled Freudian analyst probing his reclining patient for memories of toilet training gone awry and parentally directed lust is now an anachronism, as is the professional practice of that mostly empty and confabulatory art. How such an elaborate theory could have become so widely accepted—on the basis of no systematic evidence or critical experiments, and in the face of chronic failures of therapeutic intervention in all of the major classes of mental illness (schizophrenia, mania and depression)—is something that sociologists of science and popular culture have yet to fully explain. (Paul Churchland 1995, 181)

The thesis of this chapter is that it is impossible to understand psychoanalysis as a “science,” or more properly as a political movement, without taking into account the role of Judaism. Sigmund Freud is a prime example of a Jewish social scientist whose writings were influenced by his Jewish identity and his negative attributions regarding gentile culture as the source of anti-Semitism.

The discussion of Jewish involvement in the psychoanalytic movement was until recently, “as though by tacit agreement, beyond the pale” (Yerushalmi 1991, 98). Nevertheless, the Jewish involvement in psychoanalysis—the “Jewish science”—has been apparent to those inside and outside the movement since its inception:

History made psychoanalysis a “Jewish science.” It continued to be attacked as such. It was destroyed in Germany, Italy, and Austria and exiled to the four winds, as such. It continues even now to be perceived as such by enemies and friends alike. Of course there are by now distinguished analysts who are not Jews. . . . But the vanguard of the movement over the last fifty years has remained predominantly Jewish as it was from the beginning. (Yerushalmi 1991, 98)

In addition to constituting the core of the leadership and the intellectual vanguard of the movement, Jews have also constituted the majority of the

movement's members. In 1906 all 17 members of the movement were Jewish, and they strongly identified as Jews (Klein 1981). In a 1971 study, Henry, Sims and Spray found that 62.1 percent of their sample of American psychoanalysts identified themselves as having a Jewish cultural affinity, compared with only 16.7 percent indicating a Protestant affinity and 2.6 percent a Catholic affinity. An additional 18.6 percent indicated no cultural affinity, a percentage considerably higher than the other categories of mental health professional and suggesting that the percentage of psychoanalysts with a Jewish background was even higher than 62 percent (Henry, Sims & Spray 1971, 27).<sup>1</sup>

We have seen that a common component of Jewish intellectual activity since the Enlightenment has been to criticize gentile culture. Freud's ideas have often been labeled as subversive. Indeed, "[Freud] was convinced that it was in the very nature of psychoanalytic doctrine to appear shocking and subversive. On board ship to America he did not feel that he was bringing that country a new panacea. With his typically dry wit he told his traveling companions, 'We are bringing them the plague' " (Mannoni 1971, 168).

Peter Gay labels Freud's work generally as "subversive" (1987, 140), his sexual ideology in particular as "deeply subversive for his time" (p. 148), and he describes his *Totem and Taboo* as containing "subversive conjectures" (p. 327) in its analysis of culture. "While the implications of Darwin's views were threatening and unsettling, they were not quite so directly abrasive, not quite so unrespectable, as Freud's views on infantile sexuality, the ubiquity of perversions, and the dynamic power of unconscious urges" (Gay 1987, 144).

There was a general perception among many anti-Semites that Jewish intellectuals were subverting German culture in the period prior to 1933 (*SAID*, Ch. 2), and psychoanalysis was one aspect of this concern. A great deal of hostility to psychoanalysis centered around the perceived threat of psychoanalysis to Christian sexual ethics, including the acceptance of masturbation and premarital sex (Kurzweil 1989, 18). Psychoanalysis became a target of gentiles decrying the Jewish subversion of culture—"the decadent influence of Judaism," as one writer termed it (see Klein 1981, 144). In 1928 Carl Christian Clemen, a professor of ethnology at the University of Bonn, reacted strongly to *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud's analysis of religious belief in terms of infantile needs. Clemen decried the psychoanalytic tendency to find sex everywhere, a tendency he attributed to the Jewish composition of the movement: "One could explain this by the particular circles from which its advocates and perhaps, too, the patients it treats, principally hail" (in Gay 1988, 537). Freud's books were burned in the May 1933 book burnings in Germany, and when the Nazis entered Vienna in 1938, they ordered Freud to leave and abolished the *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag*.

In the United States, by the second decade of the twentieth century Freud was firmly associated with the movement for sexual freedom and social reform, and had become the target of social conservatives (Torrey 1992, 16ff).<sup>2</sup> As late as 1956 a psychiatrist writing in the *American Journal of*

*Psychiatry* complained, “Is it possible that we are developing the equivalent of a secular church, supported by government monies, staffed by a genital-level apostolate unwittingly dispensing a broth of existential atheism, hedonism, and other dubious religio-philosophical ingredients?” (Johnson 1956, 40).

Although he rejected religion, Freud himself had a very strong Jewish identity. In a 1931 letter he described himself as “a fanatical Jew,” and on another occasion he wrote that he found “the attraction of Judaism and of Jews so irresistible, many dark emotional powers, all the mightier the less they let themselves be grasped in words, as well as the clear consciousness of inner identity, the secrecy of the same mental construction” (in Gay 1988, 601). On another occasion he wrote of “strange secret longings” related to his Jewish identity (in Gay 1988, 601). At least by 1930 Freud also became strongly sympathetic with Zionism. His son Ernest was also a Zionist, and none of Freud’s children converted to Christianity or married gentiles.

As expected by social identity theory, Freud’s strong sense of Jewish identity involved a deep estrangement from gentiles. Yerushalmi (1991, 39) notes “We find in Freud a sense of otherness vis-à-vis non-Jews which cannot be explained merely as a reaction to anti-Semitism. Though anti-Semitism would periodically reinforce or modify it, this feeling seems to have been primal, inherited from his family and early milieu, and it remained with him throughout his life.”

In a revealing comment, Freud stated “I have often felt as though I inherited all the obstinacy and all the passions of our ancestors when they defended their temple, as though I could throw away my life with joy for a great moment” (in Gay 1988, 604). His identity as a Jew was thus associated with a self-concept in which he selflessly does battle with the enemies of the group, dying in an act of heroic altruism defending group interests—a mirror-image Jewish version of the grand finale of Wagner’s *Nibelungenlied* that was an ingredient in Nazi ideology (see *SAID*, Ch. 5). In terms of social identity theory, Freud thus had a very powerful sense of group membership and a sense of duty to work altruistically for the interests of the group.

Gay (1988, 601) interprets Freud as having the belief that his identity as a Jew was the result of his phylogenetic heritage. As Yerushalmi (1991, 30) notes, his psycho-Lamarckianism was “neither casual nor circumstantial.” Freud grasped what Yerushalmi (1991, 31) terms the “subjective dimension” of Lamarckianism, that is, the feeling of a powerful tie to the Jewish past as shaped by Jewish culture, the feeling that one can not escape being a Jew, and “that often what one feels most deeply and obscurely is a trilling wire in the blood.” In the following passage from *Moses and Monotheism*, the Jews are proposed to have fashioned themselves to become a morally and intellectually superior people:

The preference which through two thousand years the Jews have given to spiritual endeavour has, of course, had its effect; it has helped to build a dike against brutality and the inclination to violence which are usually found where athletic development

becomes the ideal of the people. The harmonious development of spiritual and bodily activity, as achieved by the Greeks, was denied to the Jews. In this conflict their decision was at least made in favour of what is culturally the more important. (Freud 1939, 147)

Freud's sense of Jewish superiority can also be seen in a diary entry by Joseph Wortis based on an interview with Freud in 1935: Freud commented that he viewed gentiles as prone to "ruthless egoism," whereas Jews had a superior family and intellectual life. Wortis then asked Freud if he viewed Jews as a superior people. Freud replied: "I think nowadays they are. . . . When one thinks that 10 or 12 of the Nobel winners are Jews, and when one thinks of their other great achievements in the sciences and in the arts, one has every reason to think them superior" (in Cuddihy 1974, 36).

Further, Freud viewed these differences as unchangeable. In a 1933 letter Freud decried the upsurge in anti-Semitism: "My judgment of human nature, especially the Christian-Aryan variety, has had little reason to change" (in Yerushalmi 1991, 48). Nor, in Freud's opinion, would the Jewish character change. In *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud (1939, 51n), referring to the concern with racial purity apparent in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 2), stated, "It is historically certain that the Jewish type was finally fixed as a result of the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah in the fifth century before Christ." "Freud was thoroughly convinced that once the Jewish character was created in ancient times it had remained constant, immutable, its quintessential qualities indelible" (Yerushalmi 1991, 52).

The obvious racialism and the clear statement of Jewish ethical, spiritual, and intellectual superiority contained in Freud's last work, *Moses and Monotheism*, must be seen not as an aberration of Freud's thinking but as central to his attitudes, if not his published work, dating from a much earlier period. In *SAID* (Ch. 5) I noted that prior to the rise of Nazism an important set of Jewish intellectuals had a strong racial sense of Jewish peoplehood and felt racial estrangement from gentiles; they also made statements that can only be interpreted as indicating a sense of Jewish racial superiority. The psychoanalytic movement was an important example of these tendencies. It was characterized by ideas of Jewish intellectual superiority, racial consciousness, national pride, and Jewish solidarity (see Klein 1981, 143). Freud and his colleagues felt a sense of "racial kinship" with their Jewish colleagues and a "racial strangeness" to others (Klein 1981, 142; see also Gilman 1993, 12ff). Commenting on Ernest Jones, one of his disciples, Freud wrote "The racial mixture in our band is very interesting to me. He [Jones] is a Celt and hence not quite accessible to us, the Teuton [C. G. Jung] and the Mediterranean man [himself as a Jew]" (in Gay 1988, 186).

Freud and other early psychoanalysts frequently distinguished themselves as Jews on the basis of race and referred to non-Jews as Aryans, instead of as Germans or Christians (Klein 1981, 142). He wrote to C. G. Jung that Ernest Jones gave him a feeling of "racial strangeness" (Klein 1981, 142). During the 1920s Jones was viewed as a gentile outsider even by the other members of

the secret Committee of Freud's loyalists and even though he had married a Jewish woman. "In the eyes of all of [the Jewish members of the committee], Jones was a Gentile. . . . [T]he others always seized every opportunity to make him aware that he could never belong. His fantasy of penetrating the inner circle by creating the Committee was an illusion, because he would forever be an unattractive little man with his ferret face pressed imploringly against the glass" (Grosskurth 1991, 137).

Early in their relationship Freud also had suspicions about Jung, the result of "worries about Jung's inherited Christian and even anti-Jewish biases, indeed his very ability as a non-Jew to fully understand and accept psychoanalysis itself" (Yerushalmi 1991, 42). Before their rupture, Freud described Jung as a "strong independent personality, as a Teuton" (in Gay 1988, 201). After Jung was made head of the International Psychoanalytic Association, a colleague of Freud's was concerned because "taken as a race," Jung and his gentile colleagues were "completely different from us Viennese" (in Gay 1988, 219). In 1908 Freud wrote a letter to the psychoanalyst Karl Abraham in which Abraham is described as keen while Jung is described as having a great deal of *élan*—a description that, as Yerushalmi (1991, 43) notes, indicates a tendency to stereotype individuals on the basis of group membership (the intellectually sharp Jew and the energetic Aryan). Whereas Jung was inherently suspect because of his genetic background, Abraham, was not. Freud, after delicately inquiring about whether Abraham was a Jew, wrote that it was easier for Abraham to understand psychoanalysis because he had a racial kinship [*Rassenverwandschaft*] to Freud (Yerushalmi 1991, 42).

Freud's powerful racial sense of ingroup-outgroup barriers between Jews and gentiles may also be seen in the personal dynamics of the psychoanalytic movement. We have seen that Jews were numerically dominant within psychoanalysis, especially in the early stages when all the members were Jews. "The fact that these were Jews was certainly not accidental. I also think that in a profound though unacknowledged sense Freud wanted it that way" (Yerushalmi 1991, 41). As in other forms of Judaism, there was a sense of being an ingroup within a specifically Jewish milieu. "Whatever the reasons—historical, sociological—group bonds did provide a warm shelter from the outside world. In social relations with other Jews, informality and familiarity formed a kind of inner security, a 'we-feeling,' illustrated even by the selection of jokes and stories recounted within the group" (Grollman 1965, 41). Also adding to the Jewish milieu of the movement was the fact that Freud was idolized by Jews generally. Freud himself noted in his letters that "from all sides and places, the Jews have enthusiastically seized me for themselves." "He was embarrassed by the way they treated him as if he were 'a God-fearing Chief Rabbi,' or 'a national hero,' " and by the way they viewed his work as "genuinely Jewish" (in Klein 1981, 85; see also Gay 1988, 599).

As in the case of several Jewish movements and political activities reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 (see also *SAID*, Ch. 6), Freud took great pains to ensure that a gentile, Jung, would be the head of his psychoanalytic move-

ment—a move that infuriated his Jewish colleagues in Vienna, but one that was clearly intended to deemphasize the very large overrepresentation of Jews in the movement during this period. To persuade his Jewish colleagues of the need for Jung to head the society, he argued, “Most of you are Jews, and therefore you are incompetent to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. It is absolutely essential that I should form ties in the world of science” (in Gay 1988, 218). As Yerushalmi (1991, 41) notes, “To put it very crudely, Freud needed a goy, and not just any goy but one of genuine intellectual stature and influence.” Later, when the movement was reconstituted after World War I, another gentile, the sycophantic and submissive Ernest Jones, became president of the International Psychoanalytic Association.

Interestingly, although recent scholarship is unanimous that Freud had an intense Jewish identity, Freud took pains to conceal this identity from others because of a concern that his psychoanalytic movement would be viewed as a specifically Jewish movement and thus be the focus of anti-Semitism. Whereas his private correspondence is filled with a strong sense of Jewish ethnic identity, his public statements and writings exhibited a “generally guarded, distanced tone” (Yerushalmi 1991, 42), indicating an effort at deception. Freud also attempted to downplay in public the extent to which Judaism pervaded his family environment while growing up, his religious education, and his knowledge of Hebrew, Yiddish, and Jewish religious traditions (Goodnick 1993; Rice 1990; Yerushalmi 1991, 61ff).<sup>3</sup>

Deception is also indicated by the evidence that Freud felt that one reason psychoanalysis needed highly visible gentiles was because he viewed psychoanalysis as subverting gentile culture. After publishing *Little Hans* in 1908, he wrote to Karl Abraham that the book would create an uproar: “German ideals threatened again! Our Aryan comrades are really completely indispensable to us, otherwise psychoanalysis would succumb to anti-Semitism” (in Yerushalmi 1991, 43).

Social identity theory emphasizes the importance of positive attributions regarding the ingroup and negative attributions regarding the outgroup. Freud’s strong sense of Jewish identity was accompanied by feelings of intellectual superiority to gentiles (Klein 1981, 61). In an early letter to his future wife, Freud stated “In the future, for the remainder of my apprenticeship in the hospital, I think I shall try to live more like the gentiles—modestly, learning and practicing the usual things and not striving after discoveries or delving too deep” (in Yerushalmi 1991, 39). Freud used the word *goyim* to refer to gentiles in this passage, and Yerushalmi comments, “The hand is the hand of Sigmund; the voice is the voice of Jakob [Freud’s religiously observant father]” (p. 39). It is the voice of separation and estrangement.

An attitude of Jewish superiority to gentiles not only characterized Freud but pervaded the entire movement. Ernest Jones (1959, 211) mentioned “the Jewish belief, which they often impose on other people too, concerning the superiority of their intellectual powers.” As in the case of radical intellectual

circles dominated by Jews (see Ch. 3), “The feeling of Jewish superiority alienated many non-Jews within the movement and encouraged many outside the movement to dismiss as hypocritical the humanitarian claims of the psychoanalysts” (Klein 1981, 143)—a comment suggesting self-deception among psychoanalysts regarding their motives.

Freud’s estrangement from gentiles also involved positive views of Judaism and negative views of gentile culture, the latter viewed as something to be conquered in the interest of leading humanity to a higher moral level and ending anti-Semitism. Freud had a sense of “Jewish moral superiority to the injustices of an intolerant, inhumane—indeed, anti-Semitic—society” (Klein 1981, 86). Freud “supported those in the Jewish society [B’nai B’rith] who urged Jews to regard themselves as mankind’s champions of democratic and fraternal ideals” (Klein 1981, 86). He wrote of his messianic hope to achieve the “integration of Jews and anti-Semites on the soil of [psychoanalysis]” (in Gay 1988, 231), a quote clearly indicating that psychoanalysis was viewed by its founder as a mechanism for ending anti-Semitism.

[Freud] was proud of his enemies—the persecuting Roman Catholic Church, the hypocritical bourgeoisie, the obtuse psychiatric establishment, the materialistic Americans—so proud, indeed, that they grew in his mind into potent specters far more malevolent and far less divided than they were in reality. He likened himself to Hannibal, to Ahasuerus, to Joseph, to Moses, all men with historic missions, potent adversaries, and difficult fates. (Gay 1988, 604)

This comment is an excellent example of the consequences of a strong sense of social identity: Freud’s powerful sense of Jewish group identity resulted in negative stereotypical thinking regarding the gentile outgroup. Gentile society, and particularly the most salient institutions of gentile culture, were viewed stereotypically as evil. These institutions were not only viewed negatively, but the accentuation effect (see *SAID*, Ch. 1) came into play and resulted in a general attribution of homogeneity to the outgroup, so that these institutions are seen as much less divided than they actually were.

Consider also Sulloway’s (1979b) description of the genesis of Freud’s self-concept as a hero dating from his childhood and inculcated by his family. Attesting to the intensity of Freud’s Jewish identification and his self-concept as a Jewish hero, all of Freud’s childhood heroes were related to Judaism: Hannibal, the Semitic combatant against Rome; Cromwell, who allowed the Jews to enter England; and Napoleon, who gave Jews civil rights. Early on he described himself as a “conquistador” rather than as a man of science.

This type of messianic thought was common in *fin de siècle* Vienna among Jewish intellectuals who were attempting to bring about a “supranational, supraethnic world” (Klein 1981, 29), a characterization that, as seen in Chapter 3, would also apply to Jewish involvement in radical political movements. These intellectuals “frequently expressed their humanitarianism in terms of their renewed Jewish self-conception. . . . [They had] a shared belief that Jews were responsible for the fate of humanity in the twentieth century” (p. 31).

Many early proponents viewed psychoanalysis as a redemptive messianic movement that would end anti-Semitism by freeing the world of neuroses produced by sexually repressive Western civilization. Klein shows that some of Freud's closest associates had a very clearly articulated conception of psychoanalysis as a Jewish mission to the gentiles—what one might view as a uniquely modern version of the ancient “light of the nations” theme of Jewish religious thought very common among intellectual apologists of Reform Judaism during the same period.

Thus for Otto Rank, who developed a close father-son relationship with Freud, Jews were uniquely qualified to cure neurosis and act as the healers of humanity (Klein 1981, 129). Developing a variant of the perspective Freud used in *Totem and Taboo* and *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Rank argued that whereas other human cultures had repressed their primitive sexuality in the ascent to civilization, “Jews possessed special creative powers since they had been able to maintain a direct relation to ‘nature,’ to primitive sexuality” (Klein 1981, 129).<sup>4</sup> Within this perspective, anti-Semitism results from the denial of sexuality, and the role of the Jewish mission of psychoanalysis was to end anti-Semitism by freeing humanity of its sexual repressions. A theoretical basis for this perspective was provided by Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, in which aggression was linked with the frustration of drives.

Klein shows that this conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a redemptive “light of the nations” was common among other Jewish intimates of Freud. Thus Fritz Wittels advocated complete freedom of sexual expression and wrote “Some of us believed that psychoanalysis would change the surface of the earth . . . [and introduce] a golden age in which there would be no room for neuroses any more. We felt like great men. . . . Some people have a mission in life” (in Klein 1981, 138–139). Jews were viewed as having the responsibility to lead the gentiles toward truth and nobility of behavior. “The tendency to place the Jew and the non-Jew in a relationship of fundamental opposition imbued even the expressions of redemption with an adversary quality” (Klein 1981, 142). Gentile culture was something to be conquered in battle by the morally superior, redemptive Jew: “The spirit of the Jews will conquer the world” (Wittels; in Klein 1981, 142). Coincident with Wittels's belief in the mission of psychoanalysis was a positive Jewish self-identity; he described the convert Jew as characterized by the “psychological disability of hypocrisy” (Klein 1981, 139).

The cure for the aggression characteristic of anti-Semitism was therefore believed to lie in freeing gentiles from their sexual repressions. Although Freud himself eventually developed the idea of a death instinct to explain aggression, a consistent theme of the Freudian critique of Western culture, as exemplified for example by Norman O. Brown, Herbert Marcuse, and Wilhelm Reich, has been that the liberation of sexual repressions would lead to lowered aggression and usher in an era of universal love.

It is therefore of interest that when Jung and Alfred Adler were expelled from the movement for heresy, the issue that appears to have been most important to Freud was their rejection of the interrelated ideas of the sexual etiology of neurosis, the Oedipal complex, and childhood sexuality.<sup>5</sup> Sexual repression in Western societies during this period was highly salient and undeniable. Freud's theory may thus be viewed as an invention whose utility in the assault on Western culture derived from the intuitive plausibility of supposing that the suppression of sexual urges would result in major changes in behavior that could possibly have psychotherapeutic effects. Moreover, the Oedipal complex idea proved to be critical to Freud's thesis for the centrality of sexual repression in *Totem and Taboo*—what Gay (1988, 329) terms some of Freud's "most subversive conjectures" and discussed in more detail below.

This belief in the curative powers of sexual freedom coincided with a leftist political agenda common to the vast majority of Jewish intellectuals of the period and reviewed throughout this book. This leftist political agenda proved to be a recurrent theme throughout the history of psychoanalysis. Support of radical and Marxist ideals was common among Freud's early followers, and leftist attitudes were common in later years among psychoanalysts (Hale 1995, 31; Kurzweil 1989, 36, 46–47, 284; Torrey 1992, 33, 93ff, 122–123), as well as in Freudian inspired offshoots such as Erich Fromm, Wilhelm Reich (see below) and Alfred Adler. (Kurzweil [1989, 287] terms Adler the leader of "far left" psychoanalysis, noting that Adler wanted to immediately politicize teachers as radicals rather than wait for the perfection of psychoanalysis to do so.) The apex of the association between Marxism and psychoanalysis came in the 1920s in the Soviet Union, where all the top psychoanalysts were Bolsheviks, Trotsky supporters, and among the most powerful political figures in the country (see Chamberlain 1995). (Trotsky himself was an ardent enthusiast of psychoanalysis.) This group organized a government-sponsored State Psychoanalytical Institute and developed a program of "pedology" aimed at producing the "new Soviet man" on the basis of psychoanalytic principles applied to the education of children. The program, which encouraged sexual precocity in children, was put into practice in state-run schools.

There is also evidence that Freud conceptualized himself as a leader in a war on gentile culture. We have seen that Freud had a great deal of hostility to Western culture, especially the Catholic Church and its ally, the Austrian Habsburg monarchy (Gay 1988; McGrath 1974; Rothman & Isenberg 1974a).<sup>6</sup> In a remarkable passage from the *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud, in attempting to understand why he has been unable to set foot in Rome, proposes that he has been retracing the footsteps of Hannibal, the Semitic leader of Carthage against Rome during the Punic wars.

Hannibal . . . had been the favourite hero of my later school days. . . . And when in the higher classes I began to understand for the first time what it meant to belong to an alien race . . . the figure of the semitic general rose still higher in my esteem. To my youthful mind Hannibal and Rome symbolized the conflict between the tenacity of

Jewry and the organisation of the Catholic Church. (Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams*; in Rothman & Isenberg 1974a, 64)

The passage clearly indicates that Freud was self-identified as a member of “an alien race” at war with Rome and its daughter institution, the Catholic Church, a central institution of Western culture. Gay (1988, 132) states, “A charged and ambivalent symbol, Rome stood for Freud’s most potent concealed erotic, and only slightly less concealed aggressive wishes.”<sup>7</sup> Rome was “a supreme prize and incomprehensible menace” (Gay 1988, 132). Freud himself described this “Hannibal fantasy” as “one of the driving forces of [my] mental life” (in McGrath 1974, 35).

A strong connection exists between anti-Semitism and Freud’s hostility to Rome. Freud’s conscious identification with Hannibal occurred following an anti-Semitic incident involving his father in which his father behaved passively. Freud’s response to the incident was to visualize “the scene in which Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear before the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Ever since that time Hannibal had . . . a place in my phantasies” (in McGrath 1974, 35). “Rome was the center of Christian civilization. To conquer Rome would certainly be to avenge his father and his people” (Rothman & Isenberg 1974a, 62). Cuddihy (1974, 54) makes the same point: “Like Hamilcar’s son Hannibal, he will storm Rome seeking vengeance. He will control his anger, as his father had done, but he will use it to probe relentlessly beneath the beautiful surface of the diaspora to the murderous rage and lust coiled beneath its so-called civilities.”

Rothman and Isenberg (1974) convincingly argue that Freud actually viewed the *Interpretation of Dreams* as a victory against the Catholic Church and that he viewed *Totem and Taboo* as a successful attempt to analyze the Christian religion in terms of defense mechanisms and primitive drives. Regarding *Totem and Taboo*, Freud told a colleague that it would “serve to make a sharp division between us and all Aryan religiosity” (in Rothman & Isenberg 1974, 63; see also Gay 1988, 326). They also suggest that Freud consciously attempted to conceal his subversive motivation: A central aspect of Freud’s theory of dreams is that rebellion against a powerful authority must often be carried on with deception: “According to the strength . . . of the censorship, [the authority-defying individual] finds himself compelled . . . to speak in allusions . . . or he must conceal his objection beneath some apparently innocent disguise” (Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams*; in Rothman & Isenberg 1974a, 64).

The bizarre argument of Freud’s (1939) *Moses and Monotheism* is quite clearly an attempt to show the moral superiority of Judaism compared to Christianity. Freud’s hostility to the Catholic Church is apparent in this work: “The Catholic Church, which so far has been the implacable enemy of all freedom of thought and has resolutely opposed any idea of this world being governed by advance towards the recognition of truth!” (p. 67). Freud also

reiterates his conviction that religion is nothing more than neurotic symptomatology—a view first developed in his *Totem and Taboo* (1912).

All religions may be symptoms of neurosis, but Freud clearly believed that Judaism is an ethically and intellectually superior form of neurosis: According to Freud, the Jewish religion “formed their [the Jews’] character for good through the disdain of magic and mysticism and encouraging them to progress in spirituality and sublimations. The people, happy in their conviction of possessing the truth, overcome by the consciousness of being the chosen, came to value highly all intellectual and ethical achievements” (Freud 1939, 109). In contrast, “The Christian religion did not keep to the lofty heights of spirituality to which the Jewish religion had soared” (Freud 1939, 112). Freud argues that in Judaism the repressed memory of killing the Mosaic father figure lifts Judaism to a very high ethical level, whereas in Christianity the unrepressed memory of killing a father figure eventually results in a reversion to Egyptian paganism. Indeed, Freud’s formulation of Judaism might even be termed reactionary, since it retains the traditional idea of Jews as a chosen people (Yerushalmi 1991, 34).

Freud’s psychoanalytic reinterpretation may be viewed as an attempt to reinterpret Judaism in a “scientific” manner: the creation of a secular, “scientific” Jewish theology. The only substantial difference from the traditional account is that Moses replaces God as the central figure of Jewish history. In this regard, it is interesting that from an early period Freud strongly identified with Moses (Klein 1981, 94; Rice 1990, 123ff), suggesting an identification in which he viewed himself as a leader who would guide his people through a dangerous time. Given Freud’s intense identification with Moses, the following passage from *Moses and Monotheism*, ostensibly referring to the ancient prophets who followed Moses, may be taken to apply to Freud himself: “Monotheism had failed to take root in Egypt. The same thing might have happened in Israel after the people had thrown off the inconvenient and pretentious religion imposed on them. From the mass of the Jewish people, however, there arose again and again men who lent new colour to the fading tradition, renewed the admonishments and demands of Moses, and did not rest until the lost cause was once more regained” (pp. 141–142). *Moses and Monotheism* also links monotheism with the superiority of Jewish ethics, but nowhere does Freud make clear how an ideology of monotheism could possibly result in a higher sense of ethics. As indicated in *PTSDA* (Chapter 3), Jewish monotheism is closely linked to ethnocentrism and fear of exogamy. Also, as indicated in *PTSDA* (Ch. 6), Jewish ethics is fundamentally a tribalistic ethics in which there are major differences in how individuals are treated depending on whether or not they are Jews.

As I have noted, perceived anti-Semitism would be expected to exacerbate the tendency to subject gentile culture to radical criticism. There is excellent evidence that Freud was intensely concerned with anti-Semitism, perhaps dating from the anti-Semitic incident involving his father (e.g., Rice 1990; Rothman & Isenberg 1974a,b; Yerushalmi 1991). Indeed, as expected on the

basis of social identity theory, Gay (1987, 138) notes that Freud's Jewish identity was most intense "when times were hardest for Jews."

Freud's theory of anti-Semitism in *Moses and Monotheism* (Freud 1939, 114-117) contains several assertions that anti-Semitism is fundamentally a pathological gentile reaction to Jewish ethical superiority. Freud dismisses several surface causes of anti-Semitism, although he gives some credence to the view that anti-Semitism is caused by Jewish defiance of oppression (obviously a cause in which Judaism is portrayed in a positive light).

But *Moses and Monotheism* traces the deeper causes of anti-Semitism to the unconscious: "The jealousy which the Jews evoked in other peoples by maintaining that they were the first-born, favourite child of God the Father has not yet been overcome by those others, just as if the latter had given credence to the assumption" (p. 116). Further, the Jewish ceremony of circumcision is said to remind gentiles of "the dreaded castration idea and of things in their primeval past which they would fain forget" (p. 116). And finally, anti-Semitism is said to result from the fact that many Christians have become Christians only recently as the result of forced conversion from even more barbarically polytheistic folk religions than Christianity itself is. Because of the violence of their forced conversions, these barbarians "have not yet overcome their grudge against the new religion which was forced upon them, and they have projected it on to the source from which Christianity came to them [i.e., the Jews]" (p. 117).

A more self-serving, far-fetched theory of anti-Semitism is difficult to imagine.<sup>8</sup> The general scholarly community has tended to regard *Moses and Monotheism* as "recklessly fanciful" (McGrath 1991, 27), but this is certainly not the case for Freud's other works. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Freud's highly influential (and equally speculative) *Totem and Taboo* and *Civilization and Its Discontents* present the view that the repression of sex, so apparent as an aspect of Western culture during Freud's life, is the source of art, love, and even civilization itself. However, neurosis and unhappiness are the price to be paid for these traits because neurosis and unhappiness are the inevitable result of repressing sexual urges.

As Herbert Marcuse (1974, 17) writes concerning this aspect of Freud's thought: "The notion that a non-repressive civilization is impossible is a cornerstone of Freudian theory. However, his theory contains elements that break through this rationalization; they shatter the predominant tradition of Western thought and even suggest its reversal. His work is characterized by an uncompromising insistence on showing the repressive content of the highest values and achievements of culture."

Western culture has been placed on the couch, and the role of psychoanalysis is to help the patient adjust somewhat to a sick, psychopathology-inducing society: "While psychoanalytic theory recognizes that the sickness of the individual is ultimately caused and sustained by the sickness of his civilization, psychoanalytic therapy aims at curing the individual so that he can

continue to function as part of a sick civilization without surrendering to it altogether” (Marcuse 1974, 245).

As was the case with some of Freud’s close associates described above, Freud viewed himself as a sexual reformer against this most Western of cultural practices, the suppression of sexuality. Freud wrote in 1915: “Sexual morality—as society, in its extreme form, the American, defines it—seems to me very contemptible. I advocate an incomparably freer sexual life” (in Gay 1988, 143). As Gay (1988, 149) notes, it was an ideology which “was deeply subversive for his time.”

### THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

He [Nathan of Gaza] was an outstanding example of a highly imaginative and dangerous Jewish archetype which was to become of world importance when the Jewish intellect became secularized.<sup>9</sup> He could construct a system of explanations and predictions of phenomena which was both highly plausible and at the same time sufficiently imprecise and flexible to accommodate new—and often highly inconvenient—events when they occurred. And he had the gift of presenting his protean-type theory . . . with tremendous conviction and aplomb. Marx and Freud were to exploit a similar capacity. (*A History of the Jews*, Paul Johnson 1988, 267–268)

There is a long history of well-argued claims that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Even ignoring the long-standing objections of experimentally inclined researchers in mainstream psychology, there is a distinguished pedigree of highly critical accounts of psychoanalysis that began appearing in the 1970s by scholars such as Henri Ellenberger (1970), Frank Sulloway (1979a), Adolph Grünbaum (1984), Frank Cioffi (1969, 1970, 1972), Hans Eysenck (1990), Malcolm Macmillan (1991), E. Fuller Torrey (1992), and perhaps most famously, Frederick Crews (1993; Crews et al. 1995). The following passages sums up this tradition of scholarship:

Should we therefore conclude that psychoanalysis is a science? My evaluation shows that at none of the different stages through which it evolved was Freud’s theory one from which adequate explanations could be generated. From the beginning, much of what passed as theory was found to be description, and poor description at that. . . . In every one of the later key developmental theses, Freud assumed what had to be explained. . . .

None of his followers, including his revisionist critics who are themselves psychoanalysts, have probed any deeper than did Freud into the assumptions underlying their practise, particularly the assumptions underlying “the basic method”—free association. None question whether those assumptions hold in the therapeutic situation; none has attempted to break out of the circle. (Macmillan 1991, 610–612)

What passes today for Freud bashing is simply the long-postponed exposure of Freudian ideas to the same standards of noncontradiction, clarity, testability, cogency, and parsimonious explanatory power that prevail in empirical discourse at large. Step by

step, we are learning that Freud has been the most overrated figure in the entire history of science and medicine—one who wrought immense harm through the propagation of false etiologies, mistaken diagnoses, and fruitless lines of inquiry. Still the legend dies hard, and those who challenge it continue to be greeted like rabid dogs. (Crews et al. 1995, 298–299)

Even those within the psychoanalytic camp have often noted the lack of scientific rigor of the early psychoanalysts, and indeed, lack of scientific rigor is a continuing concern even in psychoanalytic circles (e.g., Cooper 1990; Michaels 1988; Orgel 1990; Reiser 1989). Gay (1988, 235), who clearly regards psychoanalysis as a science, states of the first-generation psychoanalysts that they “fearlessly interpreted one another’s dreams; fell on the others’ slips of the tongue or pen; freely, much too freely, employed diagnostic terms like ‘paranoid’ and ‘homosexual’ to characterize their associates and indeed themselves. They all practiced in their circle the kind of wild analysis they decried in outsiders as tactless, unscientific, and counterproductive.”

Gay (1988, 543) calls *Civilization and Its Discontents* “one of [Freud’s] most influential writings.” It now seems apparent that the theory Freud developed in *Civilization and Its Discontents* and his earlier work, *Totem and Taboo*, rests on a number of extremely naive, prescientific conceptualizations of human sexual behavior and its relation to culture. It is noteworthy that in arriving at his views Freud was forced to summarily reject Edward Westermarck’s theory of incest, which is the basis of modern scientific theories of incest (see MacDonald 1986).

However, by means of these speculative leaps, Freud managed to diagnose Western culture as essentially neurotic while apparently, on the basis of the argument in *Moses and Monotheism*, holding the view that Judaism represents the epitome of mental health and moral and intellectual superiority. Freud appears to have been well aware that his highly subversive conjectures in *Totem and Taboo* were entirely speculative. When the book was called a “just so” story by a British anthropologist in 1920, Freud was “amused” and stated only that his critic “was deficient in phantasy” (Gay 1988, 327), apparently a concession that the work was fanciful. Freud stated, “It would be nonsensical to strive for exactitude with this material, as it would be unreasonable to demand certainty” (in Gay 1988, 330). Similarly, Freud described *Civilization and Its Discontents* as “an essentially dilettantish foundation” on which “rises a thinly tapered analytic investigation” (in Gay 1988, 543).

Peter Gay terms Freud’s proposal of the Lamarckian inheritance of guilt, which runs through these works, as “sheer extravagance, piled upon the earlier extravagance of the claim that the primal murder had been an historic event.” However, even this assessment fails to get at the incredible rejection of the scientific spirit apparent in these writings. It was more than extravagance. Freud was accepting a genetic theory, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, which had, at least by the time *Civilization and Its Discontents* reaffirmed the doctrine, been completely rejected by the scientific community. This was a self-consciously speculative theory, but Freud’s speculations clearly had an

agenda. Rather than provide speculations that reaffirmed the moral and intellectual basis of the culture of his day, his speculations were an integral part of his war on gentile culture—so much so that he viewed *Totem and Taboo* as a victory over Rome and the Catholic Church.

Similarly, Freud's *Future of an Illusion* is a strong attack on religion in the name of science. Freud himself acknowledged that the scientific content was weak, stating, "the analytic content of the work is very thin" (in Gay 1988, 524). Gay (1988, 537) finds that it "fell short of his self-imposed standards," which, as we have already seen, were hardly averse to speculation in the service of a political agenda. Again, however, Freud engages in scientific speculation in the service of an agenda of subverting the institutions of gentile society. This type of posturing was typical of Freud. For example, Crews (1993, 57) notes that Freud advanced his theory that Dostoevsky was not an epileptic but a hysteric suffering from having witnessed a primal scene "with a typically guileful show of tentativeness; but then, just as typically, he goes on to treat it as firmly settled." Dostoevsky was in fact an epileptic.

The theory of the Oedipal complex, childhood sexuality, and the sexual etiology of the neuroses—the three central doctrines that underlie Freud's radical critique of gentile culture—play absolutely no role in contemporary mainstream developmental psychology. From the standpoint of evolutionary theory, the idea that children would have a specifically sexual attraction to their opposite sex parent is highly implausible, since such an incestuous relationship would result in inbreeding depression and be more likely to result in disorders caused by recessive genes (see MacDonald 1986). The proposal that boys desire to kill their fathers conflicts with the general importance of paternal provisioning of resources in understanding the evolution of the family (MacDonald 1988a; 1992): Boys who had succeeded in killing their fathers and having sex with their mothers would not only be left with genetically inferior offspring, but also be deprived of paternal support and protection. Modern developmental studies indicate that many fathers and sons have very close, reciprocated affectional relationships beginning in infancy, and the normative pattern is for mothers and sons to have very intimate and affectionate, but decidedly nonsexual, relationships.

The continued life of these concepts in psychoanalytic circles is testimony to the continuing unscientific nature of the entire enterprise. Indeed, Kurzweil (1989, 89) notes "In the beginning, the Freudians tried to 'prove' the universality of the Oedipus complex; later on, they took it for granted. Ultimately, they no longer spelled out the reasons for the pervasiveness of childhood sexuality and its consequences in the cultural monographs: they all accepted it."<sup>10</sup> What started out as a speculation in need of empirical support ended up as a fundamental *a priori* assumption.

Research inspired by these basic Freudian tenets ceased long ago and in a sense never started: Fundamentally, psychoanalysis has not inspired any significant research on these three basic Freudian constructs. Interestingly, there is evidence that Freud fraudulently portrayed the data underlying these

concepts. Esterson (1992, 25ff; see also Crews 1994) convincingly argues that Freud's patients did not volunteer any information on seduction or primal scenes at all. The seduction stories that provide the empirical basis of the Oedipal complex were a construction by Freud, who then interpreted his patients' distress on hearing his constructions as proof of the theory. Freud then engaged in deception to obscure the fact that his patients' stories were reconstructions and interpretations based on an *a priori* theory. Freud also retroactively changed the identity of the fancied seducers from nonfamily members (such as servants) because the Oedipal story required fathers. Esterson provides numerous other examples of deception (and self-deception) and notes that they were typically couched in Freud's brilliant and highly convincing rhetorical style. Both Esterson (1992) and Lakoff and Coyne (1993, 83–86) show that Freud's famous analysis of the teenage Dora (in which her rejection of the pedophilic sexual advances of an older married man is attributed to hysteria and sexual repression) was based entirely on preconceived ideas and circular reasoning in which the patient's negative emotional response to the psychoanalytic hypothesis is construed as evidence for the hypothesis. Freud engaged in similar deceptive reconstructions in an earlier phase of his theory construction when he believed that seductions had actually occurred (Powell & Boer 1994). It was a methodology that could produce any desired result.

A particularly egregious tendency is to interpret patient resistance and distress as an indication of the truth of psychoanalytic claims. Of course, patients were not the only ones who resisted psychoanalysis, and all other forms of resistance were similarly an indication of the truth of psychoanalysis. As Freud himself noted, "I am met with hostility and live in such isolation that one must suppose I had discovered the greatest truths" (in Bonaparte, Freud & Kris 1957, 163). As we shall see, resistance to psychoanalytic "truth" on the part of patients, deviating psychoanalysts, and even entire cultures was viewed as a sure sign of the truth of psychoanalysis and the pathology of those who resisted.

Because of this reconstructive, interpretive manner of theory construction, the authority of the psychoanalyst became the only criterion of the truth of psychoanalytic claims—a situation that leads quite naturally to the expectation that the movement, in order to be successful, would *necessarily* be highly authoritarian. As indicated below, the movement was authoritarian from the beginning and has remained so throughout its history.

Notice that the interpretive, hermeneutic basis of theory construction in psychoanalysis is formally identical to the procedures of Talmudic and Midrashic commentaries on scripture (Hartung 1995; see *PTSDA*, Ch. 7). Psychoanalysts have tended to suppose that consistency with observable facts is an adequate criterion for a scientifically acceptable causal explanation. Psychoanalysts "inhabit a kind of scientific preschool in which no one divulges the grown-up secret that successful causal explanation must be *differential*, establishing the *superiority* of a given hypothesis to all of its extant

rivals” (Crews 1994, 40; italics in text). As indicated in Chapter 6, the development of consensual theories consistent with observable reality but without any scientific content is a hallmark of twentieth-century Jewish intellectual movements.

Any theorist on the contemporary scientific scene who proposed that children are normally sexually attracted to their opposite sex parent would be ostracized for providing a psychological basis for supposing that children would seek such contact. A glaring mistake that persists throughout Freud’s writings is the systematic conflation of sexual desire and love (see MacDonald 1986): “From the very first, in psychoanalysis, it has seemed better to speak of these love impulses as sexual impulses” (in Wittels 1924, 141)—a comment that suggests the self-conscious nature of this conflation as well as indicates the casual manner in which psychoanalysts have framed their hypotheses. Indeed, Freud conflated all types of pleasure as fundamentally different manifestations of an underlying and unitary but infinitely transformable sexual pleasure, including the oral gratification resulting from breast feeding, anal gratification resulting from defecation, sexual gratification, and love. Contemporary researchers have often proposed that affectional ties between parents and children are developmentally important and that children actively seek these ties. However, modern theory and data, and certainly an evolutionary approach, provide absolutely no support for identifying affectional ties with sexual desire or with supposing that affectional ties are sublimated or redirected sexual desire. Modern approaches support instead a discrete systems perspective in which sexual desire and affection (and other sources of pleasure) involve quite separate, independent systems. From an evolutionary perspective, the powerful affectional (love) relationships between spouses and between parents and children function as a source of social cohesiveness whose ultimate purpose is to provide a high level of support for children (see MacDonald 1992).

This conflation between sexual desire and love is also apparent in many of Freud’s psychoanalytic successors, including Norman O. Brown, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse, whose works are reviewed below. The common thread of these writings is that if society could somehow rid itself of sexual repressions, human relations could be based on love and affection. This is an extremely naive and socially destructive viewpoint, given the current research in the field. Psychoanalytic assertions to the contrary were never any more than speculations in the service of waging a war on gentile culture.

In his insightful ruminations on Freud, Cuddihy (1974, 71) traces Freud’s views in this matter to the fact that for Jews, marriage was completely utilitarian (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 7). A disciple of Freud, Theodore Reik stated that the older generation of Jews held the conviction that “love is to be found only in novels and plays.” “Love or romance had no place in the Judengasse [Jewish quarter].” Love was therefore viewed by Freud as an invention of the alien gentile culture and thus morally suspect. Its true hypocritical nature as a veneer for and really only a sublimation of the sexual instinct would be

unmasked by psychoanalysis. As described more fully below, it was a devastating analysis—an analysis with important consequences for the social fabric of Western societies in the late twentieth century.

Finally, another general mistake, and one that illustrates the political nature of Freud's entire agenda, is that sexual urges are viewed as having a powerful biological basis (the id), while traits such as responsibility, dependability, orderliness, guilt, and delay of gratification (i.e., the conscientiousness system of personality theory) are imposed by a repressive, pathology-inducing society. In a comment indicating the usefulness of these psychoanalytic notions in the war on gentile culture, James Q. Wilson (1993a, 104) correctly states that the belief that conscience "is the result of repression is a useful thing to believe if you would like to free yourself of the constraints of conscience—conscience becomes a 'hang-up' that prevents you from 'realizing yourself.'" It fact, conscientiousness is a critical biological system which has been under intensive eugenic selection within the Jewish community (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 7). An evolutionary perspective implies, rather, that both systems have a powerful biological basis and both serve critical adaptive functions (MacDonald 1995a, 1998c). No animal and certainly no human has ever been able to be devoted entirely to self-gratification, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that our biology would solely be directed toward obtaining immediate gratification and pleasure. In the real world, achieving evolutionary goals demands that attention be paid to details, careful plans be made, and gratification be deferred.

The continued life of these notions within the psychoanalytic community testifies to the vitality of psychoanalysis as a political movement. The continued self-imposed separation of psychoanalysis from the mainstream science of developmental psychology, as indicated by separate organizations, separate journals, and a largely nonoverlapping membership, is a further indication that the fundamental structure of psychoanalysis as a closed intellectual movement continues into the present era. Indeed, the self-segregation of psychoanalysis conforms well to the traditional structure of Judaism vis-à-vis gentile society: There is the development of parallel universes of discourse on human psychology—two incompatible worldviews quite analogous to the differences in religious discourse that have separated Jews from their gentile neighbors over the ages.

## **PSYCHOANALYSIS AS A POLITICAL MOVEMENT**

While Darwin was satisfied with revising his work after further reflection and absorbing palpable hits by rational critics, while he trusted the passage of time and the weight of his argumentation, Freud orchestrated his wooing of the public mind through a loyal cadre of adherents, founded periodicals and wrote popularizations that would spread the authorized word, dominated international congresses of analysis until he felt too frail to attend them and after that through surrogates like his daughter Anna. (Gay 1987, 145)

Scholars have recognized that this self-consciously oppositional, subversive stance characteristic of psychoanalysis was maintained by methods that are completely contrary to the scientific spirit. The really incredible thing about the history of psychoanalysis is that Freud should be the object of such intense adulatory emotions 60 years after his death and 100 years after the birth of psychoanalysis—another indication that the entire subject must carry us well beyond science into the realm of politics and religion. What Grosskurth (1991, 219) says about herself is the only important scientific question: “I am fascinated by the fact that thousands of people continue to idealize and defend [Freud] without really knowing anything about him as a person.” It is the continuation of this movement and the veneration of its founder, not the pseudoscientific content of the theory, that are of interest.

I have already noted the self-consciously speculative nature of these subversive doctrines, but another important aspect of this phenomenon is the structure of the movement and the manner in which dissent was handled within the movement. Psychoanalysis “conducted itself less like a scientific-medical enterprise than like a politburo bent on snuffing out deviationism” (Crews 1994, 38). It is not surprising, therefore, that observers such as Sulloway (1979b) have described the “cultlike” aura of religion that has permeated psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has often been compared to a religion by outsiders as well as by insiders. Gay (1988, 175) notes the “persistent charge that Freud had founded a secular religion.” Although Gay disputes the charge, he also uses words such as “movement” (p. 180 and passim), “conversion” (p. 184), and “the Cause” (p. 201) in describing psychoanalysis; and he uses “strayed disciple” (p. 485) to describe a defector (Otto Rank) and “recruit” (p. 540) to describe Princess Marie Bonaparte. Similarly, Yerushalmi (1991, 41) speaks of Freud as bestowing on Jung “the mantle of apostolic succession.” And I can’t help noting that the staunch Freud disciple Fritz Wittels (1924, 138) reports that during the period when Freud and Jung were close, Freud often said of Jung, “This is my beloved son in whom I am well pleased.”

Wittels (1924) also decried the “suppression of free criticism within the Society. . . . Freud is treated as a demigod, or even as a god. No criticism of his utterances is permitted.” Wittels tells us that Freud’s *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* is “the psychoanalyst’s Bible. This is no mere figure of speech. The faithful disciples regard one another’s books as of no account. They recognize no authority but Freud’s; they rarely read or quote one another. When they quote it is from the Master, that they may give the pure milk of the word” (pp. 142–143). Freud “had little desire that [his] associates should be persons of strong individuality, and that they should be critical and ambitious collaborators. The realm of psychoanalysis was his idea and his will, and he welcomed anyone who accepted his views” (p. 134).

The authoritarianism of the movement repelled some. The influential Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler left the movement in 1911, telling Freud that “this ‘who is not for us is against us,’ this ‘all or nothing,’ is necessary for religious

communities and useful for political parties. I can therefore understand the principle as such, but for science I consider it harmful" (in Gay 1987, 144–145).

Other independent thinkers were simply expelled. There were emotionally charged, highly politicized scenes when Adler and Jung were expelled from the movement. As indicated above, both individuals had developed perspectives that clashed with those aspects of psychoanalytic orthodoxy that were crucial to developing a radical critique of Western culture, and the result was a bitter schism. In the case of Adler, some members in the movement and Adler himself made attempts to minimize the differences with Freudian orthodoxy by, for example, viewing Adler's ideas as extensions of Freud rather than as contradictions, "But Freud was not interested in such forced compromises" (Gay 1988, 222). Indeed, Jung stated in 1925 that Freud's attitude toward him was "the bitterness of the person who is entirely misunderstood, and his manners always seemed to say: 'If they do not understand, they must be stamped into hell' " (in Ellenberger 1970, 462). After Jung's schism with Freud, Jung stated: "I criticize in Freudian psychology a certain narrowness and bias and, in 'Freudians,' a certain unfree, sectarian spirit of intolerance and fanaticism" (in Gay 1988, 238).

The defections-expulsions of Jung and Adler were an early indication of the inability to tolerate any form of dissent from fundamental doctrines. Otto Rank defected in the mid-1920s, and again the problem was disagreement with the importance of a fundamental Freudian doctrine, the Oedipal complex. This defection was accompanied by a great deal of character assassination, often consisting of attempts to show that Rank's behavior was an indication of psychopathology.

Most recently Jeffrey Masson has been expelled from the movement because he questioned the Freudian doctrine that patients' reports of sexual abuse were fantasies. As with the other dissenters, such a view entails a radical critique of Freud, since it entails the rejection of the Oedipal complex. As with Talmudic discussions, one could question Freud, but the questioning had to be done "within a certain framework and within the guild. Stepping outside of the framework, being willing to question the very foundations of psychoanalysis, is unthinkable for most analysts" (Masson 1990, 211). Masson's expulsion was characterized not by scientific debate about the accuracy of his claims but by a Stalinist show trial complete with character assassination.

In the history of psychoanalysis, character assassination typically involves analyzing scientific disagreement as an indication of neurosis. Freud himself "never tired of repeating the now notorious contention that the opposition to psychoanalysis stemmed from 'resistances' " arising from emotional sources (Esterson 1992, 216). For example, Freud attributed Jung's defection to "strong neurotic and egotistic motives" (in Gay 1988, 481).<sup>11</sup> Gay (1988, 481) comments, "These ventures into character assassination are instances of the kind of aggressive analysis that psychoanalysts, Freud in the vanguard, at once deplored and practiced. This . . . was the way that analysts thought about

others, and about themselves.” The practice was “endemic among analysts, a common professional deformation” (Gay 1988, 481). One might also note the similarity of these phenomena to the Soviet practice of committing dissenters to mental hospitals. This tradition lives on. Frederick Crews’s (1993, 293) recent critique of psychoanalysis has been portrayed by psychoanalysts as “composed in a state of bitter anger by a malcontent with a vicious disposition.” Crews’s behavior was explained in terms of botched transferences and Oedipal complexes gone awry.

Perhaps the most astonishing case is Otto Rank’s letter of 1924 in which he attributes his heretical actions to his own neurotic unconscious conflicts, promises to see things “more objectively after the removal of my affective resistance,” and notes that Freud “found my explanations satisfactory and has forgiven me personally” (Grosskurth 1991, 166). In this matter “Freud seems to have acted as the Grand Inquisitor, and Rank’s groveling ‘confession’ could have served as a model for the Russian show trials of the 1930s” (Grosskurth 1991, 167). Freud viewed the entire episode as a success; Rank had been cured of his neurosis “just as if he had gone through a proper analysis” (in Grosskurth 1991, 168). Clearly, we are dealing with no ordinary science here, but rather with a religious-political movement in which psychoanalysis is a form of thought control and an instrument of domination and interpersonal aggression.

The apex of this authoritarian aspect of the movement was the creation of “a tight, small organization of loyalists” whose main task was to prevent departures from orthodoxy (Gay 1988, 229–230). Freud accepted the idea with enthusiasm. “What took hold of my imagination immediately, is your [Ernest Jones’s] idea of a secret council composed of the best and most trustworthy among our men to take care of the further development of [psychoanalysis] and defend the cause against personalities and accidents when I am no more. . . . [The committee would] make living and dying easier for me. . . . [T]his committee had to be *strictly secret*” (Freud, in Gay 1988, 230; italics in text).<sup>12</sup>

The workings of the Committee have been extensively documented by Grosskurth (1991, 15; italics in text) who notes that “By insisting the Committee must be *absolutely secret*, Freud enshrined the principle of confidentiality. The various psychoanalytic societies that emerged from the Committee were like Communist cells, in which the members vowed eternal obedience to their leader. Psychoanalysis became institutionalized by the founding of journals and the training of candidates; in short an extraordinarily effective political entity.”

There were repeated admonitions for the Committee to present a “united front” against all opposition, for “maintaining control over the whole organization,” for “keeping the troops in line,” and for “reporting to the commander” (Grosskurth 1991, 97). This is not the workings of a scientific organization, but rather of an authoritarian religious-political and quasi-military move-

ment—something resembling the Spanish Inquisition or Stalinism far more than anything resembling what we usually think of as science.

The authoritarian nature of the psychoanalytic movement is exemplified by the personalities of the members of the Committee, all of whom appear to have had extremely submissive personalities and absolute devotion to Freud. Indeed, the members appear to have self-consciously viewed themselves as loyal sons to Freud the father figure (complete with sibling rivalry as the “brothers” jockeyed for position as the “father’s” favorite), while Freud viewed his close followers as his children, with power to interfere in their personal lives (Grosskurth 1991, 123; Hale 1995, 29). To the loyalists, the truth of psychoanalysis was far less important than their psychological need to be appreciated by Freud (Deutsch 1940).

These relationships went far beyond mere loyalty, however. “[Ernest] Jones had grasped the fact that to be a friend of Freud’s meant being a sycophant. It meant opening oneself completely to him, to be willing to pour out all one’s confidences to him” (Grosskurth 1991, 48). “Jones believed that to disagree with Freud (the father) was tantamount to patricide (father murder),” so that when Sandor Ferenczi disagreed with Freud on the reality of childhood sexual abuse, Jones called him a “homicidal maniac” (Masson 1990, 152).

Regarding Ferenczi, Grosskurth (1991) notes, “The thought of a disagreement with Freud was unbearable” (p. 141), “There were occasions when he [Ferenczi] rebelled against his dependency, but always he returned repentant and submissive” (pp. 54–55). The situation was similar for Kurt Eissler, the closest confidant of Anna Freud’s inner circle in the 1960s: “What he felt for Freud seemed to border on worship” (Masson 1990, 121). “He held one thing sacred, and hence beyond criticism: Freud” (Masson 1990, 122). It was common among the disciples to imitate Freud’s personal mannerisms, and even among analysts who did not know Freud personally there were “intense feelings, fantasies, transferences, identifications” (Hale 1995, 30).

This authoritarian aspect of the movement continued long after the dissolution of the secret Committee and long after Freud’s death. Anna Freud received a ring from her father and kept a “special group” around her whose existence was not public knowledge (Masson 1990, 113). “Psychoanalysis always was, from the moment Freud found disciples, a semisecret society. This secrecy has never disappeared” (Masson 1990, 209).

The tendency to stifle dissent has continued in psychoanalysis long after the well-documented tendencies of the founding father and his disciples (Orgel 1990). “Psychoanalysis demanded loyalty that could not be questioned, the blind acceptance of unexamined ‘wisdom.’” “Success as a psychoanalyst meant being a team player and not questioning the work of other analysts on one’s team” (Masson 1990, 209, 70). Intellectual dissent was stifled with statements by superiors that doubters had a further need for analysis or simply by removing dissenters from training programs.

Further evidence for the essentially political character of psychoanalysis is the unique role of disciples able to trace themselves back to Freud in a direct

line of descent. “The idea of being a chosen disciple, privileged to have direct contact with the master, has survived and is continued in the procedures of many of the training programs of the institutes” (Arlow & Brenner 1988, 5; see also Masson 1990, 55, 123). “The intensely filial relationships to Freud of the first generation were gradually replaced by highly emotional relationships to a fantasied Freud, still the primal founder, but also to organizations, to peers, to superiors in the institute hierarchy—above all—to the training analyst, the training analyst’s analyst, and, if possible, back to Freud and his circle became a determinant of psychoanalytic prestige” (Hale 1995, 32).

Unlike in a real science, in psychoanalysis there is a continuing role for what one might term the sacred texts of the movement, Freud’s writings, both in teaching and in the current psychoanalytic literature. *Studies of Hysteria* and *The Interpretation of Dreams* are almost 100 years old but remain standard texts in psychoanalytic training programs. There is a “recurrent appearance in the analytic literature of articles redoing, extending, deepening, and modifying Freud’s early case histories” (Arlow & Brenner 1988, 5). Indeed, it is remarkable to simply scan psychoanalytic journal articles and find that a large number of references are to Freud’s work performed well over 60 years ago. The 1997 volume of *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* had 77 references to Freud in 24 articles. Only five articles had no references to Freud, and of these, one had no references at all. (In keeping with psychoanalytic tradition, there were no empirical studies.) There thus appears to be a continuing tendency noted by Wittels (1924, 143) long ago: “The faithful disciples regard one another’s books as of no account. They recognize no authority but Freud’s; they rarely read or quote one another. When they quote it is from the Master, that they may give the pure milk of the word.”

The continued use of Freud’s texts in instruction and the continuing references to Freud’s work are simply not conceivable in a real science. In this regard, although Darwin is venerated for his scientific work as the founder of the modern science of evolutionary biology, studies in evolutionary biology only infrequently refer to Darwin’s writings because the field has moved so far beyond his work. *On the Origin of Species* and Darwin’s other works are important texts in the history of science, but they are not used for current instruction. Moreover, central features of Darwin’s account, such as his views on inheritance, have been completely rejected by modern workers. With Freud, however, there is continuing fealty to the master, at least within an important subset of the movement.

One rationalization for the authoritarian character of the movement was that it was necessary because of the irrational hostility psychoanalysis aroused in the scientific and lay communities (e.g., Gay 1987). However, Sulloway (1979a, 448; see also Ellenberger 1970, 418–420; Esterson 1992, 172–173; Kiell 1988) finds the supposedly hostile reception of Freud’s theories to be “one of the most well-entrenched legends” of psychoanalytic history. Moreover, one might note that Darwin’s theory also provoked intense hostility during Darwin’s life, and recently there has been a great deal of public hostil-

ity directed at recent elaborations of Darwin's theory as it pertains to human behavior. Nevertheless, these theoretical perspectives have not developed the authoritarian, separatist traits of psychoanalysis. Indeed, evolutionists and behavioral geneticists have attempted to influence mainstream research in anthropology, psychology, sociology, and other fields by publishing data in mainstream journals and often by using mainstream methodologies. Controversy and hostility by itself need not lead to orthodoxy or to separation from the university. In the world of science, controversy leads to experimentation and rational argumentation. In the world of psychoanalysis, it leads to expulsion of the nonorthodox and to splendid isolation from scientific psychology.

Indeed, in works such as Grosskurth's (1991) *The Secret Ring* and Peter Gay's biography of Freud, much comment is made on the authoritarian nature of the movement, but discussions of the need for authoritarianism as resulting from external pressures on psychoanalysis are extremely vague and almost completely absent. Instead, the drive for orthodoxy comes from within the movement as the direct result of the personalities of a small group of loyalists and their absolute commitment to their master's cause.

Reflecting the utility of psychoanalysis as an instrument of psychological domination and thought control, Freud himself refused to be analyzed. Freud's refusal resulted in difficulties with Jung (Jung 1961) and, much later, with Ferenczi, who commented that the refusal was an example of Freud's arrogance (Grosskurth 1991, 210-211). In contrast, Freud used psychoanalysis to sexually humiliate two of his most fervent disciples, Ferenczi and Jones. Freud's analysis of the women involved in relationships with Ferenczi and Jones resulted in the women leaving the men but remaining on friendly terms with Freud (see Grosskurth 1991, 65). Grosskurth suggests that Freud's actions were a test of his disciples' loyalty, and the fact that Jones continued in the movement after this humiliation indicates the extent to which Freud's followers showed unquestioned obedience to their master.

An ethologist observing these events would conclude that Freud had behaved like the quintessential dominant male, which Freud mythologized in *Totem and Taboo*, but only symbolically, since Freud did not apparently have a sexual relationship with the women (although he was "captivated" by Jones's gentile female friend [Grosskurth 1991, 65]). To have refrained from killing the father under these circumstances was to have successfully passed through the Oedipal situation—an acknowledgment of fealty to Freud the father figure.

Besides controlling his male underlings, Freud used psychoanalysis to pathologize female resistance to male sexual advances. This is apparent in the famous analysis of the teenage Dora, who rejected the advances of an older married man. Dora's father sent her to Freud because he wanted her to accede to the man's advances as an appeasement gesture because the father was having an affair with the man's wife. Freud obligingly attributed Dora's rejection to repressing amorous desires toward the man. The message is that 14-year-old girls who reject the sexual advances of older married men are

behaving hysterically. An evolutionist would interpret her behavior as an understandable (and adaptive) consequence of her evolved psychology. Reflecting the generally positive accounts of Freud in the popular media of the 1950s, Donald Kaplan (1967), a lay analyst writing in *Harper's*, wrote that Freud had "exercised his finest ingenuity" in the case of Dora: "Three months with Freud may have been the only experience with unimpeachable integrity in her long, unhappy life." Lakoff and Coyne (1993) conclude their discussion of Dora by arguing that in general psychoanalysis was characterized by thought control, manipulation, and debasement of the analysand. Crews (1993, 56) also describes a "scarcely believable" case in which Freud manipulated Horace Frink, president of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, into a disastrous divorce and remarriage to an heiress, the latter event to be accompanied by a sizable financial contribution to the psychoanalytic movement. Frink's second wife later divorced him. Both divorces were accompanied by episodes of manic depression.

An important corollary of these findings is that psychoanalysis has many features in common with brainwashing (Bailey 1960, 1965; Salter 1998).<sup>13</sup> During training sessions, any objection by the future psychoanalyst is viewed as a resistance to be overcome (Sulloway 1979b). Many contemporary analysts feel that their analysts behaved aggressively toward them, turning them into devoted and passive followers of their highly idealized analyst, a role facilitated by the "unquestioned authority" of the analyst (Orgel 1990, 14). Masson (1990, 86) describes his training analysis as "like growing up with a despotic parent," since the qualities it requires in the prospective analysts are meekness and abject obedience.

I suggest that the inculcation of passive and devoted followers via the aggression and thought control represented by psychoanalysis has always been an important aspect of the entire project. At a deep level, the fundamentally pseudoscientific structure of psychoanalysis implies that disputes cannot be resolved in a scientific manner, with the result that, as Kerr (1992) notes, the only means of resolving disputes involves the exercise of personal power. The result was that the movement was doomed to develop into a mainstream orthodoxy punctuated by numerous sectarian deviations originated by individuals who were expelled from the movement. These offshoots then replicated the fundamental structure of all psychoanalysis-inspired movements: "Each major disagreement over theory or therapy seemed to require a new validating social group, a psychoanalytic tradition that recent splits within Freudian institutes seem only to confirm" (Hale 1995, 26). Whereas real science is individualistic at its core, psychoanalysis in all its manifestations is fundamentally a set of cohesive, authoritarian groups centered around a charismatic leader.

Despite the complete lack of support by a body of scientific research and the authoritarian, highly politicized atmosphere of the movement, psychoanalysis has at least until recently "maintained a considerable place of honor within residency and medical student curricula and teaching." The American

Psychiatric Association (APA) “over many years has been led primarily by medical psychoanalysts, both as medical director in the person of Dr. Melvin Sabshin and through a succession of psychoanalyst presidents” (Cooper 1990, 182). The APA has supported the American Psychoanalytic Society in many ways directly and indirectly. The intellectual credibility of psychoanalysis within the wider psychiatric community and a considerable portion of its financial resources have therefore been achieved not by developing a body of scientific research or even being open to alternative perspectives, but by political influence within the APA.

Another source of financial support for psychoanalysis derived from its acceptance within the Jewish community. Jews have been vastly overrepresented as patients seeking psychoanalytic treatments, accounting for 60 percent of the applicants to psychoanalytic clinics in the 1960s (Kadushin 1969). Indeed, Glazer and Moynihan (1963, 163) describe a Jewish subculture in New York in mid-twentieth-century America in which psychoanalysis was a central cultural institution that filled some of the same functions as traditional religious affiliation: “Psychoanalysis in America is a peculiarly Jewish product. . . . [Psychoanalysis] was a scientific form of soul-rebuilding to make them whole and hardy, and it was divorced, at least on the surface, from mysticism, will, religion, and all those other romantic and obscure trends that their rational minds rejected” (p. 175). Patients and analysts alike were participating in a secular movement that retained the critical psychological features of traditional Judaism as a separatist, authoritarian, and collectivist cultlike movement.

Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that Freud’s real analysand was gentile culture, and that psychoanalysis was fundamentally an act of aggression toward that culture. The methodology and institutional structure of psychoanalysis may be viewed as attempts to brainwash gentile culture into passively accepting the radical criticism of gentile culture entailed by the fundamental postulates of psychoanalysis. Draped in scientific jargon, the authority of the analyst depended ultimately on a highly authoritarian movement in which dissent resulted in expulsion and elaborate rationalizations in which such behavior was pathologized.

Indeed, the following passage, written to Karl Abraham, shows that Freud thought that in order to accept psychoanalysis, gentiles had to overcome “inner resistances” resulting from their racial origins. Comparing Abraham to Jung, Freud wrote, “You are closer to my intellectual constitution because of racial kinship [*Rassenverwandschaft*], while he as a Christian and a pastor’s son finds his way to me only against great inner resistances” (in Yerushalmi 1991, 42).

Gentiles’ acceptance of psychoanalysis would thus, in a sense, represent the Jews’ conquering the “innate” tendencies of the Christians—the victory of the Semitic general against his hated adversary, gentile culture. Indeed, Kurzweil (1989) shows that the tendency to pathologize disagreement not only occurred within the movement and in reference to defectors but also was often applied

to whole countries where psychoanalysis failed to take root. Thus the early lack of a positive reception for psychoanalysis in France was ascribed to “irrational defenses” (p. 30), and a similar situation in Austria was attributed to a “general resistance” to psychoanalysis (p. 245), where “resistance” is used with psychoanalytic connotations.

### **PSYCHOANALYSIS AS A TOOL IN THE RADICAL CRITICISM OF WESTERN CULTURE: THE WIDER CULTURAL INFLUENCE OF FREUD’S THEORY**

Because Freud’s ideology was self-consciously subversive and, in particular, because it tended to undermine Western institutions surrounding sex and marriage, it is of some interest to consider the effects of these practices from an evolutionary perspective. Western marriage has long been monogamous and exogamous, and these features contrast strongly with features of other stratified societies, especially societies from the Near East, such as ancient Israel (MacDonald 1995b,c; *PTSDA*, Ch. 8).

Freud’s views in *Totem and Taboo* and *Civilization and Its Discontents* represent a failure to grasp the uniqueness of Roman and later Christian institutions of marriage and the role of Christian religious practices in producing the uniquely egalitarian mating systems characteristic of Western Europe.<sup>14</sup> In Western Europe the repression of sexual behavior has fundamentally served to support socially imposed monogamy, a mating system in which differences in male wealth are much less associated with access to females and reproductive success than in traditional non-Western civilizations where polygyny has been the norm. As elaborated also in *PTSDA* (Ch. 8), polygyny implies sexual competition among males, with wealthy males having access to vastly disproportionate numbers of women and lower-status men often being unable to mate at all. This type of marriage system is very common among the traditional stratified human societies of the world, such as classical China, India, the Muslim societies, and ancient Israel (Betzig 1986; Dickemann 1979). While poor males cannot find a mate in such a system, women are reduced to chattel and are typically purchased as concubines by wealthy males. Socially imposed monogamy thus represents a relatively egalitarian mating system for men.

Moreover, because of higher levels of sexual competition among males, the status of women in non-Western societies is immeasurably lower than in Western societies where monogamy has developed (MacDonald 1988a, 227–228; J. Q. Wilson 1993a). It is no accident that the recent movement toward women’s rights developed in Western societies rather than in the other stratified societies of the world. The massive confusion characteristic of psychoanalysis is also apparent in Freud’s close colleague, Fritz Wittels. Wittels expected an era of liberation and sexual freedom to be ushered in by a group of Jewish psychoanalytic messianists, but his expectation was based on a profound misunderstanding of sex and human psychology. Wittels condemned

“our contemporary goddamned culture” for forcing women into “the cage of monogamy” (in Gay 1988, 512), a comment that completely misunderstands the effects of inter-male sexual competition as represented by polygyny.

There are sound reasons for supposing that monogamy was a necessary condition for the peculiarly European “low-pressure” demographic profile described by Wrigley and Schofield (1981). This demographic profile results from late marriage and celibacy of large percentages of females during times of economic scarcity. The theoretical connection with monogamy is that monogamous marriage results in a situation where the poor of both sexes are unable to mate, whereas in polygynous systems an excess of poor females merely lowers the price of concubines for wealthy males. Thus, for example, at the end of the seventeenth century approximately 23 percent of individuals of both sexes remained unmarried between ages 40 to 44, but, as a result of altered economic opportunities, this percentage dropped at the beginning of the eighteenth century to 9 percent, and there was a corresponding decline in age of marriage (Wrigley & Schofield 1981). Like monogamy, this pattern was unique among the stratified societies of Eurasia (Hajnal 1965, 1983; MacFarlane 1986; R. Wall 1983; Wrigley & Schofield, 1981).

In turn, the low pressure demographic profile appears to have had economic consequences. Not only was marriage rate the main damper on population growth, but, especially in England, this response had a tendency to lag well behind favorable economic changes so that there was a tendency for capital accumulation during good times rather than a constant pressure of population on food supply:

The fact that the rolling adjustment between economic and demographic fluctuations took place in such a leisurely fashion, tending to produce large if gradual swings in real wages, represented an opportunity to break clear from the low-level income trap which is sometimes supposed to have inhibited all pre-industrial nations. A long period of rising real wages, by changing the structure of demand, will tend to give a disproportionately strong boost to demand for commodities other than the basic necessities of life, and so to sectors of the economy whose growth is especially important if an industrial revolution is to occur. (Wrigley & Schofield 1981, 439; see also Hajnal 1965; MacFarlane 1986)

There is thus some reason to suppose that monogamy, by resulting in a low pressure demographic profile, was a necessary condition for industrialization. This argument suggests that socially imposed monogamy—embedded in the religious and cultural framework of Western societies—may indeed be a central aspect of the architecture of Western modernization.

Another important effect of Western institutions of sex and marriage was to facilitate high-investment parenting. As already indicated, perhaps the most basic mistake Freud made was the systematic conflation of sex and love. This was also his most subversive mistake, and one cannot overemphasize the absolutely disastrous consequences of accepting the Freudian view that sexual liberation would have salutary effects on society.

Contrary to the psychoanalytic perspective, evolutionary theory is compatible with a discrete systems perspective in which there are at least two independent systems influencing reproductive behavior (MacDonald 1988a, 1992, 1995a): One system is a pair bonding system that facilitates stable pair bonds and high-investment parenting. This system essentially brings the father into the family as a provider of resources for children by providing a basis for close affectional ties (romantic love) between men and women. There is good evidence for such a system both in attachment research and personality psychology.

The second system may be characterized as a sexual attraction-mating system that facilitates mating and short-term sexual relationships. This system is psychometrically associated with extraversion, sensation seeking, aggression, and other appetitive systems. Psychological research supports the hypothesis that individuals who are high on these systems tend to have more sexual partners and relatively disinhibited sexual behavior. Highest in young-adult males, this system underlies a low-investment style of mating behavior in which the male's role is simply to inseminate females rather than provide continuing investment in the children. Many human societies have been characterized by intense sexual competition among males to control large numbers of females (e.g., Betzig 1986; Dickemann 1979; MacDonald 1983). This male pursuit of large numbers of mates and sexual relationships has nothing to do with love. It is the defining characteristic of Western culture to have significantly inhibited this male tendency while at the same time providing cultural supports for pair bonding and companionate marriage. The result has been a relatively egalitarian, high-investment mating system.

The psychoanalytic emphasis on legitimizing sexuality and premarital sex is therefore fundamentally a program that promotes low-investment parenting styles. Low-investment parenting is associated with precocious sexuality, early reproduction, lack of impulse control, and unstable pair bonds (Belsky, Steinberg & Draper 1991). Ecologically, high-investment parenting is associated with the need to produce competitive offspring, and we have seen that one aspect of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy has been a strong emphasis on high-investment parenting (*PTSDA*, Ch. 7). Applied to gentile culture, the subversive program of psychoanalysis would have the expected effect of resulting in less-competitive children; in the long term, gentile culture would be increasingly characterized by low-investment parenting, and, as indicated below, there is evidence that the sexual revolution inaugurated, or at least greatly facilitated, by psychoanalysis has indeed had this effect.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that an important aspect of the social imposition of monogamy in Western Europe has been the development of companionate marriage. One of the peculiar features of Western marriage is that there has been a trend toward companionate marriage based on affection and consent between partners (e.g., Brundage 1987; Hanawalt 1986; MacFarlane 1986; Stone 1977, 1990; Westermarck 1922). Although dating this affective revolution in the various social strata remains controversial (Phillips

1988), several historians have noted the prevalence and psychological importance of affectionate parent-child and husband-wife relations in Western Europe since the Middle Ages (Hanawalt 1986; MacFarlane 1986; Pollack 1983), or at least since the seventeenth century (e.g., Phillips 1988; Stone 1977, 1990). Stone (1990) notes that by the end of the eighteenth century “even in great aristocratic households mutual affection was regarded as the essential prerequisite for matrimony” (p. 60).

In view of Freud’s animosity toward Western culture and the Catholic Church in particular, it is interesting that the Church’s policy on marriage included a largely successful attempt to emphasize consent and affection between partners as normative features of marriage (Brundage 1975, 1987; Duby 1983; Hanawalt 1986; Herlihy 1985; MacFarlane 1986; Noonan 1967, 1973; Quaipe 1979; Rouche 1987; Sheehan 1978). Anti-hedonism and the idealization of romantic love as the basis of monogamous marriage have also periodically characterized Western secular intellectual movements (Brundage 1987), such as the Stoics of late antiquity (e.g., P. Brown 1987; Veyne 1987) and nineteenth-century Romanticism (e.g., Corbin 1990; Porter 1982).

From an evolutionary perspective, consent frees individuals to pursue their own interests in marriage, among which may be compatibility and conjugal affection. Although affection can certainly occur in the context of arranged marriages (and this has been emphasized by some historians of Republican Rome [e.g., Dixon 1985]), all things being equal, free consent to marriage is more likely to result in affection being one criterion of importance.

Indeed, one sees in these findings a fundamental difference between Judaism as a collectivist group strategy, in which individual decisions are submerged to the interests of the group, versus Western institutions based on individualism. Recall the material reviewed in *PTSDA* (Ch. 7) indicating that until after World War I arranged marriages were the rule among Jews because the economic basis of marriage was too important to leave to the vagaries of romantic love (Hyman 1989). Although high-investment parenting was an important aspect of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, conjugal affection was not viewed as central to marriage with the result that, as Cuddihy (1974) notes, a long line of Jewish intellectuals regarded it as a highly suspect product of an alien culture. Jews also continued to practice consanguineous marriages—a practice that highlights the fundamentally biological agenda of Judaism (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 8)—well into the twentieth century whereas, as we have seen, the Church successfully countered consanguinity as a basis of marriage beginning in the Middle Ages. Judaism thus continued to emphasize the collectivist mechanism of the social control of individual behavior in conformity to family and group interests centuries after the control of marriage in the West passed from family and clan to individuals. In contrast to Jewish emphasis on group mechanisms, Western culture has thus uniquely emphasized individualist mechanisms of personal attraction and free consent (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 8).

I conclude that Western religious and secular institutions have resulted in a highly egalitarian mating system that is associated with high-investment parenting. These institutions provided a central role for pair bonding, conjugality, and companionship as the basis of marriage. However, when these institutions were subjected to the radical critique presented by psychoanalysis, they came to be seen as engendering neurosis, and Western society itself was viewed as pathogenic. Freud's writings on this issue (see Kurzweil 1989, 85 and *passim*) are replete with assertions on the need for greater sexual freedom to overcome debilitating neurosis. As we shall see, later psychoanalytic critiques of gentile culture pointed to the repression of sexuality as leading to anti-Semitism and a host of other modern ills.

### **Psychoanalysis and the Criticism of Western Culture**

Psychoanalysis has proved to be a veritable treasure trove of ideas for those intent on developing radical critiques of Western culture. Psychoanalysis influenced thought in a wide range of areas, including sociology, child rearing, criminology, anthropology, literary criticism, art, literature, and the popular media. Kurzweil (1989, 102) notes that "something like a culture of psychoanalysis was being established." Torrey (1992) describes in some detail the spread of the movement in the United States, originally through the actions of a small group of predominantly Jewish activists with access to the popular media, the academic world, and the arts, to a pervasive influence in the 1950s: "It is a long road from a beachhead among New York intellectuals to a widespread influence in almost every phase of American life" (p. 37)—what Torrey terms an "assault on American culture" (p. 127).

And as Shapiro (1989, 292) points out, the vast majority of the New York Intellectuals not only had Jewish backgrounds but also strongly identified as Jews: "The surprising thing about the Jewish intellectuals is not that their expressions of Jewish identity were so pale but that they rejected the easy path of assimilation. That supposedly 'cosmopolitan' intellectuals should concern themselves with such a parochial matter as Jewish identity reveals the hold which Jewishness has had on even the most acculturated." As indicated in Chapter 6, the New York Intellectuals were politically radical and deeply alienated from American political and cultural institutions.

Psychoanalysis was a major component of the *Weltanschauung* of these intellectuals. Torrey's (1992) study indicates a strong overlap among psychoanalysis, liberal-radical politics, and Jewish identification among the American intellectual elite since the 1930s. Torrey (1992, 95) describes Dwight Macdonald as "one of the few *goyim* among the New York intelligentsia" involved in this movement which was centered around the journal *Partisan Review* (see Ch. 6). Given this association of psychoanalysis and the left, it is not surprising that Frederick Crews's (1993; Crews et al. 1995) critique of psychoanalysis has been analyzed as an attack on the left: Writing in *Tikhun*, a publication that combines liberal-radical politics with Jewish activism and is regarded as a journal of the New York Intellectuals (see Ch. 6), Eli Zaretsky (1994, 67) noted that attacks like that of Crews "are continuous with the attack

on the Left that began with the election of Richard Nixon in 1968. . . . They continue the repudiation of the revolutionary and utopian possibilities glimpsed in the 1960s.” Psychoanalysis was an integral component of the countercultural movement of the 1960s; attacks on it are tantamount to attacking a cornerstone of liberal-radical political culture.

Moreover, the material reviewed by Torrey indicates that the preponderance of psychoanalytically inclined Jews among the intellectual elite continued in the post–World War II era. Torrey studied 21 elite American intellectuals identified originally by Kadushin (1974) on the basis of peer ratings as being the most influential. Of the 21, 15 were Jewish, and questionnaires and analysis of the writings of these 15 indicated that 11 had been “significantly influenced by Freudian theory at some point in their careers” (p. 185). (This includes three cases in which the writings of Wilhelm Reich, the leader of the Freudian left, were more influential than those of Freud: Saul Bellow, Paul Goodman, and Norman Mailer.) In addition, 10 of these 11 (Saul Bellow excepted) were identified as having liberal or radical political beliefs at some period of their career.<sup>15</sup>

The link between psychoanalysis and the political left, as well as the critical role of Jewish-controlled media in the propagation of psychoanalysis, can be seen in the recent uproar of Frederick Crews’s critiques of the culture of psychoanalysis. The original articles were published in the *New York Review of Books*—a journal that, along with *Partisan Review* and *Commentary*, is associated with the New York Intellectuals (see Ch. 6). Publication in the *NYRB*, as Crews notes, is “almost like pet owners who had negligently or maliciously consigned their parakeet to the mercies of an ever-lurking cat” (Crews et al. 1995, 288). The implication is that publications like the *NYRB* and the other journals associated with the New York Intellectuals have been instrumental in propagating psychoanalytic and similar doctrines as scientifically and intellectually reputable for decades, and it also suggests that had Crews published his articles in a less visible and less-politicized medium, they could have been safely ignored, as has commonly been the practice over the long history of psychoanalysis.

Several prominent Freudian critiques of culture remained fairly true to Freud’s original premises.<sup>16</sup> Herbert Marcuse, a countercultural guru of the 1960s, was a member of the first generation of the Frankfurt School whose activities are discussed extensively in Chapter 5. In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse accepts Freud’s theory that Western culture is pathogenic as a result of the repression of sexual urges, paying homage to Freud, who “recognized the work of repression in the highest values of Western civilization—which presuppose and perpetuate unfreedom and suffering” (p. 240). Marcuse cites Wilhelm Reich’s early work approvingly as an exemplar of the “leftist” wing of Freud’s legacy. Reich “emphasized the extent to which sexual repression is enforced by the interests of domination and exploitation, and the extent to which these interests are in turn reinforced and reproduced by sexual repression” (p. 239). Like Freud, Marcuse points the way to a nonexploitative

utopian civilization that would result from the complete end of sexual repression, but Marcuse goes beyond Freud's ideas in *Civilization and Its Discontents* only in his even greater optimism regarding the beneficial effects of ending sexual repression.

Indeed, Marcuse ends the book with a ringing defense of the fundamental importance of sexual repression in opposition to several "neo-Freudian revisionist" theorists such as Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Henry Stack Sullivan. Interestingly, Marcuse proposes that neo-Freudianism arose because of the belief that orthodox Freudian sexual repression theory would suggest that socialism was unattainable (pp. 238–239). These neo-Freudian revisionists must thus be seen as continuing the psychoanalytic critique of culture, but in a manner that deemphasizes the exclusive concern with sexual repression. These theorists—and particularly Erich Fromm, who had a very strong Jewish identity (Marcus & Tar 1986, 348–350; Wiggershaus 1994, 52ff) and very self-consciously attempted to use psychoanalysis to further a radical political agenda—can be viewed as optimistic-utopian.

Like Marcuse, Fromm was a member of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. A cornerstone of this approach is to view contemporary society as pathogenic and the development of socialism as ushering in a new era of loving human relationships. These writers were highly influential: For example, "A whole generation of college-educated Americans was deeply influenced by Erich Fromm's argument, in *Escape From Freedom*, that National Socialism was the natural outcome of the interplay between a Protestant sensibility and the contradictions inherent in capitalism" (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 87). Fromm (1941) essentially viewed authoritarianism as resulting from an unconscious fear of freedom and a consequent need to seek certainty by joining fascist movements—an example of the tendency among Jewish intellectuals to develop theories in which anti-Semitism is fundamentally the result of the individual or social pathology of gentiles. Fromm, like the other Frankfurt School theorists reviewed in Chapter 5, developed a view in which psychological health was epitomized by individualists who achieved their potentials without relying on membership in collectivist groups: "Progress for democracy lies in enhancing the actual freedom, initiative, and spontaneity of the individual, not only in certain private and spiritual matters, but above all in the activity fundamental to every man's existence, his work" (Fromm 1941, 272). As indicated in Chapter 5, radical individualism among gentiles is an excellent prescription for the continuation of Judaism as a cohesive group. The irony (hypocrisy?) is that Fromm and the other members of the Frankfurt School, as individuals who strongly identified with a highly collectivist group (Judaism), advocated radical individualism for the society as a whole.

John Murray Cuddihy emphasizes that a common theme of psychoanalytic critiques of Western culture is to suppose that surface Western civility is a thin veneer overlying anti-Semitism and other forms of psychopathology. Wilhelm Reich is an exemplar of this trend—"the violent encounter of the 'tribal' society of the *shtetl* with the 'civil' society of the West" (Cuddihy 1974, 111).

In his book *The Function of the Orgasm: Sex-Economic Problems of Biological Energy*, Reich (1961, 206–207; italics in text) wrote, “the forces which had been kept in check for so long by the superficial veneer of good breeding and artificial self-control now borne by the very multitudes that were striving for freedom, broke through into action: In concentration camps, in the persecution of the Jews. . . . In Fascism, the psychic mass disease revealed itself in an *undisguised* form.”

For Reich, the character armor that results ultimately from repressing sexual orgasms begins in civil discourse and ends at Auschwitz. Cuddihy notes Reich’s very wide influence from the 1940s into the 1970s, ranging from anarchist Paul Goodman, the poet Karl Shapiro, novelists Stanley Elkin, Isaac Rosenfeld, and Saul Bellow, and psychotherapists “Fritz” Perls of the Esalen Institute and Arthur Janov (author of *Primal Scream*). Goodman (1960), who along with Rosenfeld and Bellow are grouped among the New York Intellectuals discussed Chapter 6, wrote *Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized Society*, a highly influential indictment of society as thwarting instinctual urges by its insistence on conformity and repression. Here the utopian society was to be ushered in by the revolutionary vanguard of students, and indeed a 1965 survey of the leaders of the radical Students for a Democratic Society found that over half had read Goodman and Marcuse, a much higher percentage than had read Marx, Lenin, or Trotsky (Sale 1973, 205). In an article published in *Commentary*—itself an indication of the extent to which psychoanalytic social criticism had penetrated Jewish intellectual circles, Goodman (1961, 203) asks “*What if the censorship itself, part of a general repressive anti-sexuality, causes the evil, creates the need for sadistic pornography sold at a criminal profit?*” (italics in text). Without adducing any evidence whatever that sadistic urges result from repressing sexuality, Goodman manages to suggest in typical psychoanalytic style that if only society would cease attempting to control sexuality, all would be well.

The disastrous conflation of sex and love in the writings of Freud and his disciples is also apparent in the literary world. Using the example of Leslie Fiedler, Cuddihy (1974, 71) emphasizes the fascination of Jewish intellectuals with cultural criticism emanating from Freud and Marx—whichever one seemed to work best for a particular author at a particular time. Courtly love was unmasked as sublimation—a ritualized attempt to avoid the coarseness of sexual intercourse with a female. And Dickstein (1977, 52) notes regarding Norman Mailer, “Gradually, like the rest of America, he shifted from a Marxian to a Freudian terrain. Like other fifties radicals he was most effective, and most prophetic in the psychosexual sphere rather than in the old political one. . . . Where repression was, let liberation be: this was the message not only of Mailer but of a whole new line of Freudian (or Reichian) radicalism, which did so much to undermine the intellectual consensus of the cold war period.”

Although the works of Marcuse, Goodman, Fiedler, and Mailer are illustrative of the deeply subversive cultural critiques emanating from psychoanalysis, these works are only one aspect of an incredibly broad program. Kurzweil

(1989) has provided a comprehensive overview of the influence of psychoanalysis on cultural criticism in all Western societies.<sup>17</sup> A consistent thread in this literature is a concern for developing theories that entail radical critiques of society. The followers of Jaques Lacan, the French literary critic, for example, rejected a biological interpretation of drive theory but were nevertheless “as eager as their German colleagues to restore the radical stance of psychoanalysis” (Kurzweil 1989, 78). As expected in a nonscience, psychoanalytic influence has resulted in a veritable tower of Babel of theories in the area of literary studies: “In America, not even the contributors could agree on what their activities ultimately were proving or what they amounted to; they all had their own prejudices” (Kurzweil 1989, 195). Lacan’s movement splintered into numerous groups after his death, each group claiming legitimate descent from the master. Lacanian psychoanalysis continued to be a tool in the radical cultural critiques of the Marxist Louis Althusser, as well as the highly influential Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes. All of these intellectuals, including Lacan, were disciples of Claude Lévi-Strauss (see p. 22), who in turn was influenced by Freud (and Marx) (Dosse 1997 I, 14, 112–113).

The central role of psychoanalysis as cultural criticism can also be seen in its role in Germany after World War II. T. W. Adorno, an author of *The Authoritarian Personality*, is an excellent example of a social scientist who utilized the language of social science in the service of combating anti-Semitism, pathologizing gentile culture, and rationalizing Jewish separatism (see Ch. 5). Returning to Germany after World War II, Adorno expressed his fears that psychoanalysis would become “a beauty no longer able to disturb the sleep of humanity” (in Kurzweil 1989, 253). Eventually psychoanalysis became state supported in Germany, with every German citizen eligible for up to 300 hours of psychoanalysis (more in severe cases). In 1983 the government of Hesse sought empirical data on the success of psychoanalysis in return for funding a psychoanalytic institute. The response of the offended analysts is a revealing reminder of two central aspects of the psychoanalytic agenda, the pathologization of enemies and the centrality of social criticism: “They rose to the defense of psychoanalysis as a social critique. . . . [They attacked the] unconscious lies of (unnamed but recognizable) psychoanalysts, their unhappy relationship to power, and their frequent neglect of the counter-transference.” The result was a reinvigoration of psychoanalysis as a social critique and the production of a book that “enlarged their critiques to every political topic” (Kurzweil 1989, 315). Psychoanalysis can be justified solely by its usefulness in cultural criticism independent of data on its effectiveness in therapy.<sup>18</sup>

The most influential psychoanalyst in post-World War II Germany was the leftist Alexander Mitscherlich, who viewed psychoanalysis as necessary to humanize Germans and “defend against the inhumanities of civilization” (in Kurzweil 1989, 234). Regarding the necessity to transform Germans in the wake of the Nazi era, Mitscherlich believed that only psychoanalysis held out the hope of redemption for the German people: “Each German had to face this

past individually via a more or less ‘pragmatic’ Freudian analysis” (p. 275). His journal *Psyche* adopted a generally adversarial stance toward German culture, combining Marxist and psychoanalytic perspectives in an attempt to further “antifascist thinking” (p. 236). The “Bernfeld Circle” of leftist psychoanalysts emphasizing the “social-critical elements of psychoanalysis” was also active in Germany during this period (p. 234).

As is typical of the field generally, these psychoanalysts also produced a plethora of theories of anti-Semitism with no way to decide among them. In 1962 Mitscherlich organized a conference entitled “The Psychological and Social Assumptions of Anti-Semitism: Analysis of the Psychodynamics of a Prejudice,” which offered several highly imaginative psychoanalytic theories in which anti-Semitism was analyzed as essentially a social and individual pathology of gentiles. For example, in his contribution Mitscherlich proposed that children developed hostility when required to obey teachers, and that this then led to identification with the aggressor and ultimately to a glorification of war. Mitscherlich believed that German anti-Semitism was “just one more manifestation of German infantile authoritarianism” (p. 296). Béla Grunberger concluded that “oedipal ambivalence toward the father and anal-sadistic relations in early childhood are the anti-Semite’s irrevocable inheritance” (p. 296). Martin Wagh, analyzed Nazi anti-Semitism as resulting from enhanced Oedipal complexes resulting from father absence during World War I: “Longing for the father . . . had strengthened childish homosexual wishes which later projected onto the Jews” (p. 297).

## CONCLUSION

We begin to grasp that the deviser of psychoanalysis was at bottom a visionary but endlessly calculating artist, engaged in casting himself as the hero of a multivolume fictional opus that is part epic, part detective story, and part satire on human self-interestedness and animality. This scientifically deflating realization . . . is what the Freudian community needs to challenge if it can. (Crews et al. 1995, 12–13)

I conclude that psychoanalysis has fundamentally been a political movement that has been dominated throughout its history by individuals who strongly identified as Jews. A consistent theme has been that psychoanalysis has been characterized by intense personal involvement. The intense level of emotional commitment to psychoanalytic doctrines and the intense personal identification with Freud himself as well as with others in the direct line of descent from Freud suggest that for many of its practitioners, participation in the psychoanalytic movement satisfied deep psychological needs related to being a member of a highly cohesive, authoritarian movement.

It is also not surprising, given the clear sense of Jewish intellectual, moral, and, indeed, racial superiority to gentiles that pervaded the early phases of the movement, that outsiders have proposed that psychoanalysis not only had powerful religious overtones but also was directed at achieving specific

Jewish interests (Klein 1981, 146). The view that psychoanalysis is a “special interest” movement has continued into the contemporary era (Klein 1981, 150).

I have noted that Jewish intellectual activity involving the radical criticism of gentile culture need not be conceptualized as directed at attaining specific economic or social goals of Judaism. From this perspective, the psychoanalytic subversion of the moral and intellectual basis of Western culture may simply result from social identity processes in which the culture of the out-group is negatively valued. This does not appear to be the whole story, however.

One way in which psychoanalysis has served specific Jewish interests is the development of theories of anti-Semitism that bear the mantle of science but deemphasize the importance of conflicts of interest between Jews and gentiles. Although these theories vary greatly in detail—and, as typical of psychoanalytic theories generally, there is no way to empirically decide among them—within this body of theory anti-Semitism is viewed as a form of gentile psychopathology resulting from projections, repressions, and reaction formations stemming ultimately from a pathology-inducing society. The psychoanalysts who emigrated from Europe to the United States during the Nazi era expected to make psychoanalysis “into the ultimate weapon against fascism, anti-Semitism, and every other antiliberal bias” (Kurzweil 1989, 294). The most influential such attempts, deriving from the *Studies in Prejudice* series, will be discussed in the following chapter, but such theories continue to appear (e.g., Bergmann 1995; Ostow 1995; Young-Bruehl 1996). Katz (1983, 40), in discussing two examples of this genre, notes that “this sort of theory is as irrefutable as it is undemonstrable”—a description that has, as we have seen, always been a hallmark of psychoanalytic theorizing whatever the subject matter. In both cases there is no link whatever between the historical narrative of anti-Semitism and psychoanalytic theory, and Katz concludes that “the fact that such analogies [between anti-Semitism and certain clinical case histories of obsessive behavior] are far-fetched does not seem to disturb those who interpret all human affairs in psychoanalytic terms” (p. 41).

However, beyond this overt agenda in pathologizing anti-Semitism, it is noteworthy that within psychoanalytic theory, Jewish identity is irrelevant to understanding human behavior. As in the case of radical political ideology, psychoanalysis is a messianic universalist ideology that attempts to subvert traditional gentile social categories as well as the Jewish-gentile distinction itself, yet it allows for the possibility of a continuation of Jewish group cohesion, though in a cryptic or semi-cryptic state. As with radical political ideology, the Jew-gentile social categorization is of diminished salience and of no theoretical significance. As in the case of psychoanalytic theories of anti-Semitism, to the extent that psychoanalysis becomes part of the worldview of gentiles, social identity theory predicts that anti-Semitism would be minimized.

Gilman (1993, 115, 122, 124) suggests that Freud, as well as several other Jewish scientists of the period, developed theories of hysteria as a reaction to the view that Jews as a “race” were biologically predisposed to hysteria. In contrast to this racially based argument, Freud proposed a universal human nature—“the common basis of human life” (Klein 1981, 71) and then theorized that all individual differences resulted from environmental influences emanating ultimately from a repressive, inhumane society. Thus although Freud himself believed that Jewish intellectual and moral superiority resulted from Lamarckian inheritance and were thus genetically based, psychoanalysis officially denied the importance of biologically based ethnic differences or indeed the theoretical primacy of ethnic differences or ethnic conflict of any kind. Ethnic conflict came to be viewed within psychoanalytic theory as a secondary phenomenon resulting from irrational repressions, projections, and reaction formations and as an indication of gentile pathology rather than as a reflection of actual Jewish behavior.

I have noted that there was often an overlap between psychoanalysis and radical political beliefs among Jews. This is not at all surprising. Both phenomena are essentially Jewish responses to the Enlightenment and its denigrating effect on religious ideology as the basis for developing an intellectually legitimate sense of group or individual identity. Both movements are compatible with a strong personal sense of Jewish identity and with some form of group continuity of Judaism; indeed, Yerushalmi (1991, 81ff) argues persuasively that Freud saw himself as a leader of the Jewish people and that his “science” provided a secular interpretation of fundamental Jewish religious themes.

The similarities between these movements is far deeper, however. Both psychoanalysis and radical political ideology present critiques in which the traditional institutions and socio-religious categorizations of gentile society are negatively evaluated. Both movements, and especially psychoanalysis, present their intellectual critiques in the language of science and rationality, the *lingua franca* of post-Enlightenment intellectual discourse. However, both movements have a pronounced political atmosphere despite the scientific veneer. Such a result is perhaps scarcely surprising in the case of Marxist political ideology, although even Marxism has often been touted by its proponents as “scientific” socialism. Psychoanalysis has from the beginning been burdened in its quest for scientific respectability by the clear overtones of its being a sectarian political movement masquerading as science.

Both psychoanalysis and radical political ideology often resulted in a sense of a personal messianic mission to gentile society promising a utopian world free of class struggle, ethnic conflict, and debilitating neuroses. Both movements characteristically developed conceptions of Jewish group identity as leading gentiles to a utopian society of the future, the familiar “light of the nations” concept represented here in completely secular and “scientific” terms. The social categorizations advocated by these movements completely obliterated the social categorization of Jew-gentile, and both movements developed

ideologies in which anti-Semitism was fundamentally the result of factors entirely extraneous to Jewish identity, Jewish group continuity, and Jewish-gentile resource competition. In the promised utopian societies of the future, the category of Jew-gentile would be of no theoretical importance, but Jews could continue to identify as Jews and there could be continuation of Jewish group identity while at the same time a principle source of gentile identity—religion and its concomitant supports for high-investment parenting—would be conceptualized as an infantile aberration. The universalist ideologies of Marxism and psychoanalysis thus were highly compatible with the continuation of Jewish particularism.

Besides these functions, the cultural influence of psychoanalysis may actually have benefited Judaism by increasing Jewish-gentile differences in resource competition ability, although there is no reason to suppose that this was consciously intended by the leaders of the movement. Given the very large mean differences between Jews and gentiles in intelligence and tendencies toward high-investment parenting, there is every reason to suppose that Jews and gentiles have very different interests in the construction of culture. Jews suffer to a lesser extent than gentiles from the erosion of cultural supports for high-investment parenting, and Jews benefit by the decline in religious belief among gentiles. As Podhoretz (1995, 30) notes, it is in fact the case that Jewish intellectuals, Jewish organizations like the AJCongress, and Jewish-dominated organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (see note 2) have ridiculed Christian religious beliefs, attempted to undermine the public strength of Christianity, and have led the fight for unrestricted pornography. The evidence of this chapter indicates that psychoanalysis as a Jewish-dominated intellectual movement is a central component of this war on gentile cultural supports for high-investment parenting.

It is interesting in this regard that Freud held the view that Judaism as a religion was no longer necessary because it had already performed its function of creating the intellectually, spiritually, and morally superior Jewish character: “Having forged the character of the Jews, Judaism as a religion had performed its vital task and could now be dispensed with” (Yerushalmi 1991, 52). The data summarized in this chapter indicate that Freud viewed Jewish ethical, spiritual, and intellectual superiority as genetically determined and that gentiles were genetically prone to being slaves of their senses and prone to brutality. The superior Jewish character was genetically determined via Lamarckian inheritance acting for generations as a result of the unique Jewish experience. The data reviewed in *PTSDA* (Ch. 7) indicate that there is indeed very good evidence for the view that there is a genetic basis for Jewish-gentile differences in IQ and high-investment parenting brought about ultimately by Jewish religious practices over historical time (but via eugenic practices, not via Lamarckian inheritance).

Given that the differences between Jews and gentiles are genetically mediated, Jews would not be as dependent on the preservation of cultural supports for high-investment parenting as would be the case among gentiles. Freud’s

war on gentile culture through facilitation of the pursuit of sexual gratification, low-investment parenting, and elimination of social controls on sexual behavior may therefore be expected to affect Jews and gentiles differently, with the result that the competitive difference between Jews and gentiles, already significant on the basis of the material reviewed in *PTSDA* (Chs. 5, 7), would be exacerbated. There is evidence, for example, that more intelligent, affluent, and educated adolescents mature sexually at a relatively slow rate (Belsky et al. 1991; Rushton 1995). Such adolescents are more likely to abstain from sexual intercourse, so that sexual freedom and the legitimization of nonmarital sex are less likely to result in early marriage, single-parenting, and other types of low-investment parenting in this group. Greater intelligence is also associated with later age of marriage, lower levels of illegitimacy, and lower levels of divorce (Herrnstein & Murray 1994). Hyman (1989) notes that Jewish families in contemporary America have a lower divorce rate (see also Cohen 1986; Waxman 1989), later age of first marriage, and greater investment in education than non-Jewish families. Recent findings indicate that the age of first sexual intercourse for Jewish adolescents is higher and the rate of unwed teenage pregnancy lower than for any other ethnic or religious group in the United States. Moreover, since Jews are disproportionately economically affluent, the negative effects of divorce and single-parenting on children are undoubtedly much attenuated among Jews because of the economic stresses typically accompanying divorce and single-parenting are much lessened (McLanahan & Booth 1989; Wallerstein & Kelly 1980).

These data indicate that Jews have been relatively insulated from the trends toward low-investment parenting characteristic of American society generally since the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s. This finding is compatible with data reviewed by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) indicating overwhelming evidence that the negative effects of the shifts that have taken place in Western practices related to sex and marriage in the last 30 years have been disproportionately felt at the bottom of the IQ and socioeconomic class distributions and have therefore included relatively few Jews. For example, only 2 percent of the white women in Herrnstein and Murray's top category of cognitive ability (IQ minimum of 125) and 4 percent of the white women in the second category of cognitive ability (IQ between 110 and 125) gave birth to illegitimate children, compared to 23 percent in the 4th class of cognitive ability (IQ between 75 and 90) and 42 percent in the fifth class of cognitive ability (IQ less than 75). Even controlling for poverty fails to remove the influence of IQ: High-IQ women living in poverty are seven times less likely to give birth to an illegitimate child than are low-IQ women living in poverty. Moreover, in the period from 1960 to 1991, illegitimacy among blacks rose from 24 percent to 68 percent, while illegitimacy among whites rose from 2 percent to 18 percent. Since the mean Jewish IQ in the United States is approximately 117 and verbal IQ even higher (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 7), this finding is compatible with supposing that only a very small percentage of Jewish women are giving birth to illegitimate babies, and those who do are undoubtedly much more likely to

be wealthy, intelligent, and nurturing than the typical single mother from the lower cognitive classes.

The sexual revolution has thus had little effect on parental investment among people in the highest categories of cognitive ability. These results are highly compatible with the findings of Dunne et al. (1997) that the heritability of age of first sexual intercourse has increased since the 1960s. In their younger cohort (born between 1952 and 1965) genetic factors accounted for 49 percent of the variance among females and 72 percent of the variance among males, and there were no shared environmental influences. In the older cohort (born between 1922 and 1952) genetic influences accounted for 32 percent of the variance for females and none of the variance among males, and there was a significant shared environmental component for both sexes. These data indicate that the erosion of traditional Western controls on sexuality have had far more effect on those who are genetically inclined toward precocious sexuality and, in conjunction with the data presented above, indicate gentiles have been far more affected by these changes than have Jews.

Although other factors are undoubtedly involved, it is remarkable that the increasing trend toward low-investment parenting in the United States largely coincides with the triumph of the psychoanalytic and radical critiques of American culture represented by the political and cultural success of the counter-cultural movement of the 1960s. Since 1970 the rate of single-parenting has increased from one in ten families to one in three families (Norton & Miller 1992), and there have been dramatic increases in teenage sexual activity and teenage childbearing without marriage (Furstenberg 1991). There is excellent evidence for an association among teenage single-parenting, poverty, lack of education, and poor developmental outcomes for children (e.g., Dornbusch & Gray 1988; Furstenberg & Brooks-Gunn 1989; McLanahan & Booth 1989; J. Q. Wilson 1993b).

Indeed, all the negative trends related to the family show very large increases that developed in the mid-1960s (Herrnstein & Murray 1994, 168ff; see also Bennett 1994; Kaus 1995; Magnet 1993), including increases in trends toward lower levels of marriage, "cataclysmic" increases in divorce rates (p. 172), and rates of illegitimacy. In the case of divorce and illegitimacy rates, the data indicate a major shift upward during the 1960s from previously existing trend lines, with the upward trend lines established during that period continuing into the present. The 1960s was thus a watershed period in American cultural history, a view that is compatible with Rothman and Lichter's (1996, xviiiiff) interpretation of the shift during the 1960s in the direction of "expressive individualism" among cultural elites and the decline of external controls on behavior that had been the cornerstone of the formerly dominant Protestant culture. They note the influence of the New Left in producing these changes, and I have emphasized here the close connections between psychoanalysis and the New Left. Both movements were led and dominated by Jews.

The sexual revolution is “the most obvious culprit” underlying the decline in the importance of marriage (Herrnstein & Murray 1994, 544) and its concomitant increase in low-investment parenting:

What is striking about the 1960s “sexual revolution,” as it has properly been called, is how revolutionary it was, in sensibility as well as reality. In 1965, 69 percent of American women and 65 percent of men under the age of thirty said that premarital sex was always or almost always wrong; by 1972, these figures had plummeted to 24 percent and 21 percent. . . . In 1990, only 6 percent of British men and women under the age of thirty-four believed that it was always or almost always wrong. (Himmelfarb 1995, 236)

Although there is little reason to suppose that the battle for sexual freedom so central to psychoanalysis had the intention of benefiting the average resource competition ability of Jews vis-à-vis gentiles, the psychoanalytic intellectual war on gentile culture may indeed have resulted in an increased competitive advantage for Jews beyond merely lessening the theoretical importance of the Jew-gentile distinction and providing a “scientific” rationale for pathologizing anti-Semitism. It is also a war that has resulted in a society increasingly split between a disproportionately Jewish “cognitive elite” and a growing mass of individuals who are intellectually incompetent, irresponsible as parents, prone to requiring public assistance, and prone to criminal behavior, psychiatric disorders, and substance abuse.

Although psychoanalysis is in decline now, especially in the United States, the historical record suggests that other ideological structures will attempt to accomplish some of the same goals psychoanalysis attempted to achieve. As it has done throughout its history, Judaism continues to show extraordinary ideological flexibility in achieving the goal of legitimizing the continuation of Jewish group identity and genetic separatism. As indicated in Chapter 2, many Jewish social scientists continue to fashion a social science that serves the interests of Judaism and to develop powerful critiques of theories perceived as antithetical to those interests. The incipient demise of psychoanalysis as a weapon in these battles will be of little long-term importance in this effort.

## NOTES

1. The ethnic composition of the editorial board of the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* is overwhelmingly Jewish, indicating that psychoanalysis remains fundamentally an ethnic movement. The editor, six of seven associate editors, and 20 of 27 editorial board members of the 1997 volume have Jewish surnames.

2. The continuing role of psychoanalysis in the movement toward sexual liberation can be seen in a recent debate over teenage sexuality. An article in the *Los Angeles Times* (Feb. 15, 1994, A1, A16) noted the opposition of the American Civil Liberties Union and Planned Parenthood to a school program that advocated teenage celibacy. Sheldon Zablow, a psychiatrist and spokesperson for this perspective, stated “Repeated studies show that if you try to repress sexual feelings, they may come out later in far more dangerous ways—sexual abuse, rape” (p. A16). This psychoanalytic fantasy was

compounded by Zablow's claim that sexual abstinence has never worked in all of human history—a claim that indicates his unawareness of historical data on sexual behavior in the West (including Jewish sexual behavior), at least from the Middle Ages until the twentieth century (e.g., Ladurie 1986). I am not aware of any stratified traditional human society (and certainly not Muslim societies) that has taken the view that it is impossible and undesirable to prevent teenage sexual activity, especially by girls. As Goldberg (1996, 46) notes, “within the world of liberal organizations like the ACLU, . . . Jewish influence is so profound that non-Jews sometimes blur the distinction between them and the formal Jewish community.”

3. Also suggesting deception is that two of the Jewish members of Freud's secret committee (Otto Rank and Sandor Ferenczi) had altered their names to appear non-Jewish (Grosskurth 1991, 17).

4. Rank had a very strong Jewish identity, viewing the pressures of assimilation emanating from German society during this period in very negative terms—as “morally and spiritually destructive” (Klein 1981, 130). Rank also had a positive attitude toward anti-Semitism and pressures to assimilate because they promoted the development of Jewish redemptive movements such as psychoanalysis: “Rank believed that the reaction of Jews to the threats of external and internal repression prompted them to preserve their relationship with nature and, in the process, to gain consciousness of this special relationship” (Klein 1981, 131). Rank, whose original name was Rosenfeld, appears to have been a crypto-Jew during part of his life. He adopted a non-Jewish name and converted to Catholicism in 1908 when entering the University of Vienna. In 1918, he reconverted to Judaism in order to enter into a Jewish marriage.

5. Adler “openly questioned Freud's fundamental thesis that early sexual development is decisive for the making of character” (Gay 1988, 216–217) and neglected the Oedipal complex, infantile sexuality, the unconscious, and the sexual etiology of neuroses. Instead, Adler developed his ideas on “organ inferiority” and the hereditary etiology of “anal” character traits. Adler was an avid Marxist and actively attempted to create a theoretical synthesis in which psychological theory served utopian social goals (Kurzweil 1989, 84). Nevertheless, Freud termed Adler's views “reactionary and retrograde” (Gay 1988, 222), presumably because from Freud's view, the social revolution envisioned by psychoanalysis depended on these constructs. Freud's actions regarding Adler are entirely comprehensible on the supposition that his acceptance of Adler's “watered down” version of psychoanalysis would destroy Freud's version of psychoanalysis as a radical critique of Western culture.

Similarly, Jung was expelled from the movement when he developed ideas that denigrated the centrality of sexual repression in Freud's theory. “Jung's most besetting disagreement with Freud, which runs through the whole sequence of his letters like an ominous subtext, involved what he once gently called [Jung's] inability to define libido—which meant, translated, that he was unwilling to accept Freud's term, to make it stand not just for the sexual drives, but for a general mental energy” (Gay 1988, 226; see also Gross 1991, 43). Like Adler, Jung rejected the sexual etiology of neuroses, childhood sexuality, and the Oedipal complex; and like Adler's ideas and unlike these fundamental Freudian doctrines, the idea of libido as restricted to sexual desire is of little use in developing a radical critique of Western culture, because Freud's theory, as indicated here, depends on the conflation of sexual desire and love.

However, in addition, Jung developed a view that religious experience was a vital component of mental health: Freud, in contrast, remained hostile to religious belief (indeed, Gay [1988, 331] writes of Freud's “pugilistic atheism”). As indicated else-

where in this chapter, central to what one might term Freud's pathologization of Christianity is his view that religious belief is nothing more than a reaction formation to avoid guilt feelings consequent to a primeval Oedipal event or, as developed in *The Future of an Illusion*, merely childish feelings of helplessness. Thus a central function of *Totem and Taboo* appears to have been to combat "everything that is Aryan-religious" (in Gay 1988, 331), a comment that at once illustrates Freud's agenda of discrediting not just religion but gentile religion in particular and reveals the extent to which he viewed his work as an aspect of competition between ethnic groups.

6. It is noteworthy that an early member of the psychoanalytic movement, Ludwig Braun, believed that Freud was "genuinely Jewish," and that to be Jewish meant, among other things, that one had "a courageous determination to combat or oppose the rest of society, his enemy" (Klein 1981, 85).

7. As a psychoanalyst himself, Gay imagines an erotic message underlying the surface meaning of aggression and hostility toward Western culture.

8. Other psychoanalytic interpretations of anti-Semitism as a pathological gentile reaction to Jewish superiority occurred during the period. In 1938 Jacob Meitlis, a psychoanalyst of the Yiddish Institute of Science (YIVO), stated: "We Jews have always known how to respect spiritual values. We preserved our unity through ideas, and because of them we survived to this day. Once again our people is faced with dark times requiring us to gather all our strength to preserve unharmed all culture and science during the present harsh storms" (in Yerushalmi 1991, 52). Anti-Semitism is here conceptualized as the price to be paid by Jews for bearing the burden of being the originators and defenders of science and culture. (Several other psychoanalytic theories of anti-Semitism are discussed below and in Ch. 5.)

9. Nathan of Gaza provided the intellectual foundation for the ill-fated Shabbetean messianic movement in the seventeenth century.

10. Similarly, in the French psychoanalytic movement of the mid-1960s, "The propositions of 'linguistic' psychoanalysis became assumptions. Soon, no one any longer questioned whether a self-assured disposition really could hide a vulnerable unconscious structure . . . : most French intellectuals accepted that both conscious and unconscious thought were organized in accordance with linguistic structures" (Kurzweil 1989, 245).

11. The imputation of egotistic motives is particularly interesting. As discussed in Chapter 6, all of the Jewish intellectual movements reviewed in this volume are fundamentally collectivist movements that demand authoritarian submission to hierarchical authority. Egotistic motives are therefore incompatible with these movements: such movements thrive on the submergence of self-interest to the goals of the group. In Chapter 6 I argue that science is inherently an individualistic enterprise in which there is minimal loyalty to an ingroup.

12. Fritz Wittels dates the desire for a "strict organization" to discussions among Freud, Ferenczi, and Jung that occurred during the 1909 voyage to the United States. "I think there is good reason to suppose that they discussed the need for a strict organization of the psychoanalytical movement. Henceforward, Freud no longer treated psychoanalysis as a branch of pure science. The politics of psychoanalysis had begun. The three travelers took vows of mutual fidelity, agreeing to join forces in the defense of the doctrine against all danger" (1924, 137).

13. Wittels (1924, 143–144) recounts an interpretation of a recurrent dream of Monroe Meyer, a student of psychoanalysis, in which Meyer feels in danger of choking after eating a large piece of beefsteak. The interpretation favored by Wittels is that of

Stekel, who noted: "It seems to me that the beefsteak represents the indigestible analysis. My unfortunate colleague is compelled six times every week to swallow a wisdom which threatens to stifle him. The dream is the way in which his internal resistance to the analysis secures expression." Whatever one might think of this interpretation, Wittel's comments indicate that even during the 1920s, devoted disciples within the psychoanalytic community realized the danger that psychoanalysis could easily become a form of brainwashing.

14. This failure to comprehend the egalitarian nature of Western sexual customs was also apparent in Heinrich Heine's vigorous opposition to the bourgeois sexual morality of the nineteenth century. As did Freud, Heine viewed sexual emancipation as a matter of liberation from the constraints imposed by an oppressive and overly spiritual Western culture. Sammons (1979, 199) notes, however, that "in the middle class public, sexual license had long been regarded as a characteristic vice of the aristocracy, while sexual discipline and respect for feminine virtue were associated with bourgeois virtue. In driving so roughly across the grain of these tabus, Heine was running his familiar risk of being perceived, not as an emancipator, but as temperamentally an aristocrat, and the resistance he generated was by no means restricted to the conservative public." Indeed, lower- and middle-status males' concern with controlling aristocratic sexual behavior was a prominent feature of nineteenth-century discourse about sex (see MacDonald 1995b,c). Wealthy individuals stand to benefit far more than their inferiors from the relaxation of traditional Western sexual mores.

15. The four elite Jewish intellectuals in this study who were apparently not influenced by Freud were Hannah Arendt, Noam Chomsky, Richard Hofstadter, and Irving Kristol. Of these, only Noam Chomsky could possibly be regarded as someone whose writings were not highly influenced by his Jewish identity and specifically Jewish interests. The findings taken together indicate that the American intellectual scene has been significantly dominated by specifically Jewish interests and that psychoanalysis has been an important tool in advancing these interests.

16. For example, Norman O. Brown's influential *Life against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History* (1985; originally published in 1959) completely accepts Freud's analysis of culture as delineated in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Brown finds the most important Freudian doctrine to be the repression of human nature, particularly the repression of pleasure seeking. This repression-caused neurosis is a universal characteristic of humans, but Brown claims that the intellectual history of repression originated in Western philosophy and Western religion. In terms highly reminiscent of some of Freud's early associates, Brown points to a utopian future in which there is a "resurrection of the body" and a complete freeing of the human spirit.

17. Interestingly, Kurzweil (1989) notes that psychoanalysis was central to cultural criticism in both the United States and France, but the role of Marxism in critical analysis differed in the two countries. In the United States, where Marxism was anathema, the critics combined Marx and Freud, whereas in France, where Marxism was much more entrenched, psychoanalysis was combined with structural linguistics. The result was that "in both countries the radical claims for psychoanalysis were based on the opposition to familiar and accepted theoretical discourses and to existing biases" (p. 244).

18. As another example, Kurzweil describes a project in which a full-time staff of 20 psychoanalysts failed to alter the antisocial tendencies of ten hardened criminals through a permissive rehabilitation program. The failure of the program was attributed

to the difficulty of reversing the effect of early experiences, and there were calls for preventive psychoanalysis for all German children.