

SECOND REPLY TO NATHAN COFNAS

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INTRODUCTION

Nathan Cofnas has [responded](#) to [my reply](#) to his review of *The Culture of Critique*. Prior to getting into the details of his rejoinder, there are several general points that should be kept in mind.

1. *CofC* stands or falls depending on whether I have adequately described certain *specific* intellectual and political movements as Jewish. In doing so, I focused on movements that were or are influential and provide evidence of their influence. In describing these movements, I focus on the main figures, discuss their Jewish identities and their concern with specific Jewish issues, such as combatting anti-Semitism. I discuss the dynamics of these movements—the authoritarian atmosphere, the guru phenomenon, ethnic networking, and non-Jews who participate in the movement. I am *not* attempting to discuss all well-known Jewish intellectuals if they are not part of these movements. Thus, I never claim that Marx was part of a specifically Jewish intellectual/political movement, since he died long before the rise of the Jewish left in the twentieth century which is the focus of *CofC*. Noam Chomsky is a well-known Jewish intellectual, but he doesn't fit into any of the movements I discuss, and I have never investigated the nature of his Jewish identity (or lack of it) or how he sees Jewish interests. The same could be said for someone like Paul Gottfried who is linked to paleoconservatism. Paleoconservatism is not a Jewish intellectual movement, and indeed neoconservatism, which I argue *is* a Jewish movement, played a decisive role in the eclipse of paleoconservatism (see "[Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement](#)"). Or one could point to a Jewish supporter of the populist positions of President Trump, but the existence of such a person does not make populism a Jewish movement or erase the effective opposition of the New York Intellectuals to American populism in prior decades as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of *CofC*.

2. Individual influential Jews or a separate influential Jewish intellectual movement may be critical of a specific Jewish intellectual movement that I discuss. The split beginning in the 1930s between the Stalinist left, which is the topic of Chapter 3, and the Trotskyist left which is a topic of Chapter 6 and "Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement," comes to mind. It is possible that opposition to the Israel Lobby may also be reasonably analyzed as a Jewish movement. I have not attempted this, although I have noted in several places that criticism of Israel is increasing among Jews and non-Jews. But in order to establish that critics of Israel constitute a Jewish movement, one would have to pursue the program presented in *CofC*: discuss whether participants have a Jewish identity and whether they see their activities as furthering Jewish interests as well as explore the dynamics of these movements—whether there is any evidence for an authoritarian atmosphere, the guru phenomenon, ethnic networking, and the status of non-Jews who participate in the movement.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

This project would thus go well beyond the “default hypothesis” of Jewish IQ as explaining Jewish involvement in intellectual movements. Such situations may be analogized to arguments between different factions in the Knesset—both dominated by Jews but with different perceptions of Jewish interests.

3. I am therefore not attempting to develop a general theory of Jewish viewpoint diversity. I am studying certain specific intellectual and political movements that I attempt to establish as influential. I am not trying to develop a theory of why each Jew or most Jews believe what they do—a much more ambitious project. Thus, for example, I have no interest in describing or explaining the diversity of Jewish attitudes on affirmative action—an interesting question, but not relevant to the thesis of *CofC* which is that certain specific Jewish movements have the features I describe and that they have been influential. Nevertheless, as discussed below, at particular times and places, there is often substantial consensus within the Jewish community on particular issues, e.g., immigration and refugee policy and church-state relations.

4. My writing in *CofC* is restricted to the movements discussed therein—movements that I have argued have been influential in the twentieth century and whose influence often extends into the present. In addition to these movements, it may well be the case that I have left out individual influential Jews, such as Steven Pinker, whose Jewish identity and sense of pursuing Jewish interests would bear investigation and may result in a broader perspective on Jewish influence. Pinker’s recent book, *Enlightenment Now*,¹ is reminiscent of the hostility toward American populism that characterized the New York Intellectuals whose Jewish identities and sense of Jewish interests were discussed in *CofC*. However, whatever the results of such an investigation, they would be subsumed into the general topic of Jewish viewpoint diversity.

DETAILED COMMENTS ON COFNAS’S REJOINER

Cofnas, commenting on the issue that immigration causes ethnic displacement, writes that **“Later in this reply MacDonald argues that some Jews (e.g., Alan Dershowitz) support multiracial immigration to Israel in order to advance Jewish interests as they understand them. But here he acknowledges the obvious point that multiracial immigration to a country (which he equates with “Ethnic displacement”) opposes the ethnic interests of the majority inhabitants of the country.”**

Not everyone subscribes to the idea of ethnic interests as being negatively affected by immigration as formalized by Frank Salter (unfortunately). But the question here is not whether immigration affects ethnic interests but how Dershowitz perceives the issue. As noted in my original reply, Dershowitz may well perceive immigration of Ethiopians as advancing Jewish/Israeli interests. He advocated the immigration of Ethiopian Jews who would only constitute 2.2% of the Israeli population—a long way from ethnic displacement and carrying some benefits in terms of public relations for Israel whose support is declining in the West. On the other hand, in the low-fertility West, if present trends continue, immigrants and their descendants are expected to be majorities within a few decades and already non-White children outnumber White children in the U.S. Other Jews may well disagree with Dershowitz’s attitude

¹ See Ricardo Duchesne, “Steve Pinker’s Anti-Enlightenment Attack on White Identitarians,” *Occidental Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 49–68; in press.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

because they have different perceptions of Jewish interests, but in any case, there is legitimate concern about the Jewish role in ethnic displacement in the U.S.

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Re my statement that Cofnas's review illustrated "motivated cognition": I was not intending to bring up his ethnicity. There are a variety of motives that may be involved in motivated cognition, including financial reward and fame and fortune in the academic world—not necessarily ethnicity. As with the figures discussed in *CofC*, evidence would be needed for an attribution of ethnic motivation. As the context makes clear, I was struck at Cofnas's lack of engagement with the basic ideas and seeming inability to grasp my argument or even bother to read my other relevant writing. Moreover, as this commentary will make clear, Cofnas has several times misrepresented what I have written. Nevertheless, he appears to believe that he had refuted everything I ever said about Judaism (including the first two books—which he acknowledges he did not read closely).

When otherwise intelligent people do such things and call it scholarship, it immediately raises red flags that motivated cognition is involved. And, because I had just written about the complete irrationality and lack of the scientific spirit involved in the Frankfurt School's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, it occurred to me that the same thing was going on in Cofnas's reply. But I did not want to imply that Cofnas is ethnically motivated.

I admit, however, that I was also upset at being labeled "incompetent" and as having engaged in cherry picking and misrepresenting my sources. Cofnas also implies intellectual dishonesty on my part. For example, Cofnas states that I twist the data every possible way to salvage my theory. Thus, in commenting on my referring to the benefits of intermarriage for Jews, he writes, "There can be no doubt that, if liberal, secular Jews had *low* intermarriage rates and high fertility, MacDonald would claim that this was strong evidence in favor of his theory."

But the degree of intermarriage is not relevant to *CofC*, and in making the statement, I was simply citing an appropriate source. What is relevant is Jewish identity and sense of pursuing Jewish interests. And since the degree of intermarriage is obviously irrelevant to *CofC*, who's being dishonest? I will mention quite a few other examples of Cofnas's intellectual dishonesty and scholarly malfeasance in this rejoinder.

There is clearly an edge to Cofnas's writing. His hostility leaps from the page—a sure sign of motivated cognition. I used at least as much care in writing *CofC* as I did in my other academic work which has been published in prestigious, peer-reviewed journals. Indeed, my attitude in writing *CofC* was that, since I knew it would be controversial, I had to make it as bullet-proof as possible.

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Cofnas: Any reasonable interpretation of MacDonald's theory would clearly put *limits* on the diversity of viewpoint that we would expect to find among Jewish ethnic activists. When Jews are overrepresented among the leadership of violently opposing movements (e.g., the pro-Israel lobby vs. Boycott, Divest, Sanction movement; opponents vs. advocates of free speech), this does not fit in any obvious way with MacDonald's theory. Shouldn't we expect Jews to cluster around those movements that actually advance their group interests? MacDonald claims that Jews disagree about how to advance their common ethnic interests, and this is why they are often the leaders both of movements and the movements' opposition. This implies that a large percentage of Jews not only fail to determine what is in

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

their best interests, but are actively working against those interests by opposing the movement that would actually advance them. Isn't Jewish over-representation in conflicting movements evidence in favor of the default hypothesis?

Cofnas wants me to put limits on Jewish viewpoint diversity, but in doing so, he is asking me to produce a theory that I never intended to produce and don't care to attempt. As noted in the Introduction, I am trying to understand *specific* influential Jewish intellectual and political movements, not trying to produce a theory of Jewish viewpoint diversity. As noted there, at times, Jewish movements may be in opposition (e.g., the Stalinist vs., Trotskyist Jewish left), and in such cases one would have to investigate how these Jews see Jewish interests. Moreover, only influential movements are worth studying. As I kept repeating in my original reply, the point is to see where the power and influence lie. I don't know anything about the fine-grained details of who is running BDS, their Jewish identifications, etc., and whether it would qualify as a Jewish movement. I rather doubt it given my personal experience noting the very large numbers of Palestinians and Muslims involved. On the other hand, we have excellent data on who is running AIPAC and the ADL, and this is where most of the power and influence lie now. Of course, things may change.

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Cofnas claims that if he is able to refute *CofC*, he will have discredited all my research on Jews. This is perhaps true, given how irrational humans often are. But such a judgment would not be rational. And, of course, there are obvious benefits to be gained by public figures if they sign on to the idea that my work on Judaism has been discredited.

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Cofnas complains about my use of the phrase "some Jews," claiming I am implying only a few Jews are involved in opposing the Jewish movements I deal with. Not true. "Some Jews" means "some Jews." My use of the phrase was meant to be a general statement, capable of referring to many or a few depending on which movement is being discussed. A good example is neoconservatism, an influential Jewish movement that has attracted quite a few Jews beginning in the 1960s while most American Jews were and are liberal/left. I did not have a chapter on neoconservatism in *CofC* because, when I wrote it, I was unaware how powerful neoconservatives were during the Reagan administration in removing traditional conservatives (paleoconservatives) from positions of power. I only really became interested because of what was happening in the Bush II administration with the Iraq war. When it became obvious that neocons wielded a great deal of power in the Bush II years, I wrote about it and have now included it in the Kindle Edition because it should be considered a chapter of *CofC*.

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I stated in my original reply: "Although the theory is falsifiable (e.g., by showing that these movements were not in any interesting sense Jewish or that they didn't really have any power or influence), it cannot be falsified by providing individual counterexamples.

Cofnas responds: "My paper focuses not on showing that counterexamples to MacDonald's thesis exist, but that the Jews cited by MacDonald himself as examples to support his theory are actually counterexamples."

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Since Cofnas doesn't provide any examples of the latter, I cannot respond. Is he saying that Freud, Boas, Horkheimer, Hook et al. are actually counterexamples to my theory? If so, it's a bizarre claim.

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Cofnas: On page 6 of my paper I acknowledge that MacDonald thinks that there are multiple reasons why non-Jews may join intellectual movements. I write: "Another explanation he [MacDonald] gives for gentile involvement in radical politics is that 'once Jews have attained intellectual predominance, it is not surprising that gentiles would be attracted to Jewish intellectuals as members of a socially dominant and prestigious group and as dispensers of valued resources'" (Cofnas 2018, p. 6, quoting *CofC* p. 3)

This is outrageous. I can agree that Cofnas is aware that I said non-Jews may join Jewish intellectual or political movements because of material rewards and a dominant position. But then why does he ignore that in discussing Margaret Mead, preferring instead to state that I think she was a "puppet" of Boas? This is an egregious misrepresentation based on absolutely zero evidence from my writing—nothing more than an attempt to portray my statement about Mead as an outlandish conspiracy theory.

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Cofnas: "The examples of Jewish disagreement that I give are not comparing Jews in different historical periods, but comparing Jews *in the same periods*. We cannot explain these disagreements by appealing to the fact that historical circumstances change and call for different strategies."

But Cofnas thought it was relevant to bring up Freud as someone who was not really all that ethnically motivated (i.e., contrary to what Cofnas claims is my portrayal of Freud as "a monomaniacal activist dedicated to excusing Jewish behavior and pathologizing anti-Semitism"). Cofnas claims this because Freud would not sign a letter supporting Jewish rioters in Jerusalem in 1929. This was at a time when Zionism was not a majority view among Diaspora Jews and could be labeled a "risky strategy" in the West because of the loyalty issue. So Cofnas seems to think that by not supporting the rioters, Freud was not really all that ethnically committed. Ridiculous. Why else bring it up unless he is identifying Jewish ethnic interests with extreme forms Zionism, even in 1929?

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Cofnas: "There is evidence that Jews played a leading role in promoting the populist Trump, though MacDonald says that these Jews were motivated by their desire to control Trump to advance their ethnic interests."

I have never said that Jews supporting Trump were motivated to advance their ethnic interests. It would hardly be surprising if they were, but I have never seen any evidence to that effect. I was referring to the historical opposition of Jewish intellectuals to populism that I

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

discuss in Chapters 5 and 6 of *CofC* and in my review of Eric Kaufmann's *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*.

The relevant section from Chapter 5 of *CoC* begins: "In the post-World War II era *The Authoritarian Personality* became an ideological weapon against historical American populist movements, especially McCarthyism (Gottfried 1998; Lasch 1991, 455ff). "[T]he people as a whole had little understanding of liberal democracy and . . . important questions of public policy would be decided by educated elites, not submitted to popular vote" (Lasch 1991, 455)."

In the Kaufmann review, in a discussion of the New York Intellectuals (who were influenced by the Frankfurt School), I write, citing Terry Cooney:

Clearly the New York Intellectuals were attacking populism in favor of themselves as an intellectual elite. The New York Intellectuals associated rural America with nativism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, and fascism as well as with anti-intellectualism and provincialism; the urban was associated antithetically with ethnic and cultural tolerance, with international-ism, and with advanced ideas. . . . The New York Intellectuals simply *began* with the assumption that the rural—with which they associated much of American tradition and most of the territory beyond New York—had little to contribute to a cosmopolitan culture. . . . By interpreting cultural and political issues through the urban-rural lens, writers could even mask assertions of superiority and expressions of anti-democratic sentiments as the judgments of an objective expertise. (Cooney 1986, 267–268; italics in text)

In any case, as discussed above—and this is the main point—there is no sense in which populism is a Jewish intellectual movement, although it is quite possible that individual Jews with Jewish motivation have joined the movement at certain times and places, particularly if they thought that by doing so they could latch onto someone who would obtain real power, like President Trump. These Jewish figures may well constitute more than 2–3% of the leading figures of a particular camp, such as populism or paleoconservatism, but that by itself is a long way from establishing the latter as Jewish movements. Indeed, I don't know of any Jews who could be properly labeled populists until perhaps some of President Trump's supporters (but certainly not globalist Gary Cohn who resigned because of Trump's tariff proposals).

Incidentally, it's interesting that the urban/rural divide looms larger than ever in American politics, with much of Trump's support coming from predominantly White rural areas; it's not so much red state/blue state, but urban/rural, with rural areas in blue states favoring Trump and Republicans generally. And there can be little doubt that the American Jewish community as a whole has not been aligned with the interests and attitudes of rural America.

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Cofnas: I don't know how to objectively test whether Jews are overrepresented among paleoconservatives. But as of March 20, 2018, according to the "Prominent people" section of the Wikipedia entry for "Paleoconservatism," 1/6 prominent paleoconservative politicians, 1/9 philosophers and scholars, and 1/5 journalists is Jewish. This makes Jews significantly overrepresented among prominent paleoconservatives despite the fact that many self-identifying paleoconservatives are (at least implicitly) unfriendly toward Jews.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Even granting overrepresentation of Jews among Paleocons, it doesn't detract in the least from what I am trying to do. By any standard, paleoconservatism is certainly not a Jewish movement, as discussed above. However, I have proposed that neoconservatism is a Jewish movement based on its origins, evidence for ethnic attachments (especially to Israel), ethnic networking among Jewish neocons, and its structure into the present. As recounted in that article, neocons were successful in removing paleocons from influence during the Reagan administration.

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Cofnas: It is of course true that the "influence of an intellectual or political movement dominated by Jews is independent of the percentage of the Jewish community that is involved in the movement or supports the movement." But this is not the issue. The question is whether Jews tend to create and lead movements designed to advance Jewish interests. If the leaders of the opposition to allegedly Jewish-interest-promoting movements are *also* Jewish, this counts as evidence against the theory in *CofC* and supports the default hypothesis.

I address this here in the Introduction. I am not trying to address all Jewish intellectuals or even all Jewish movements as I define the concept—just those that I think are the most influential—and determine if perceived Jewish interests are important among the key personnel. If one finds that the leadership of a movement opposed to one of these movements is also Jewish, one could explore whether they are doing so because of their perceived Jewish ethnic interests. Maybe so, maybe not. Maybe those leading the opposing movement have very weak Jewish identification and look down on Jewish group interests. Maybe they really are “self-hating Jews.” Maybe they think the movement they are opposing is bad for Jews in the long run. Apart from the Stalinist-Trotskyist split on the Jewish left, I haven't explored any such movements, but I don't need to do so to make my point.

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In my original reply, I wrote: “Cofnas claims that I haven't provided evidence that Jews involved in particular intellectual movements have often gone out of their way to recruit non-Jews as visible leaders of the movement.”

Cofnas responds: Notice that MacDonald does not quote me here since I do not make this claim. The fact that Carl Jung was a gentile was clearly one of the reasons that Freud wanted him to be associated with psychoanalysis. But Jung developed crackpot theories independently of Freud, and eventually Jung broke away and founded his own extremely influential school of pseudoscience.

Okay, let's see the entire quote. This is the entire passage from Cofnas's original review:

A common pattern throughout *The Culture of Critique* is that the same behavior is given a different interpretation depending on whether it is performed by Jews or gentiles. For example, when gentiles assume leadership positions in radical movements (e.g., John Dewey, Carl Jung), it is because “gentiles have . . . been actively recruited to the movements . . . and given highly visible roles . . . in order to lessen the appearance

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

that the movements are indeed Jewish-dominated or aimed only at narrow Jewish sectarian interests” (1988a:4). MacDonald calls this phenomenon “a major theme” of his book. Another explanation he gives for gentile involvement in radical politics is that “once Jews have attained intellectual predominance, it is not surprising that gentiles would be attracted to Jewish intellectuals as members of a socially dominant and prestigious group and as dispensers of valued resources” (1988a:3).

Of course, it is *possible* that in all these cases where Jews and gentiles were both involved in radical politics, the Jews were acting as ethnic activists while the gentiles were being manipulated. But this theory requires strong positive evidence to be credible. As shall be argued, MacDonald never provides such evidence.

In my original reply I provided multiple examples in different historical eras where Jews have used non-Jews to promote their interests and be the public face of groups created and funded by Jews to advance perceived Jewish interests. I also cited scholarly material related to Freud, Boas, the Jewish left (i.e., Chapter 3), and the New York Intellectuals (promoting Dewey). So I provided lots of evidence.

In his most recent reply Cofnas somehow thinks it’s relevant that Jung developed crackpot theories independent of Freud. I really don’t see the relevance of bringing up Jung’s pseudoscience. Yes, Jung ended up being expelled from the movement because he dissented from psychoanalytic dogma. So what? His defection didn’t make psychoanalysis any less a Jewish movement—indeed it affirmed the authoritarian nature of the movement which was fundamental to its structure. And after Jung’s departure, people like the submissive and sycophantic Ernest Jones were waiting in the wings. But alas, despite being publicly identified as the face of the movement, poor Jones wasn’t accepted because of his racial background: “during the 1920s Jones was viewed as a gentile outsider even by the other members of the secret Committee of Freud’s loyalists and even though he had married a Jewish woman. ‘In the eyes of all of [the Jewish members of the committee], Jones was a Gentile. . . . [T]he others always seized every opportunity to make him aware that he could never belong. His fantasy of penetrating the inner circle by creating the Committee was an illusion, because he would forever be an unattractive little man with his ferret face pressed imploringly against the glass” (Grosskurth 1991, 137).

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Referring to a passage from *Separation and Its Discontents* briefly describing the psychology behind the Jewish strategy of recruiting non-Jews to promote their interests, **Cofnas writes: MacDonald is dressing up the trivial observation that Jews oppose anti-Semitism as if it is an interesting scientific proposition. Yes, Jews oppose anti-Semitism. But this is what we would expect if the default hypothesis were true. All people who face attack will try to recruit members of the group that threatens them to their side.**

Recruiting non-Jews to be the public face of Jewish interests goes far beyond finding non-Jews who will take the Jewish side against anti-Semitism—e.g., funding committees favoring immigration prior to the passage of the 1965 law, removing Christianity from the public square, support for socialist and communist organizations, and support for Israel (e.g., organizing and funding Labour and Conservative Friends of Israel, and [Christian Zionist organizations](#)). One

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

would think that a brief paragraph explaining the psychology of such activism (Jewish interests masquerading as universal interests ultimately depending for their effectiveness on social learning theory in psychology and J. P. Rushton's Genetic Similarity Theory) would escape Cofnas's condemnation.

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Maybe Jews don't all have to fit into a "particular mold," but if MacDonald's theory has any interesting content, then a large number of Jews have to fit into *some* sort of mold. If large numbers of influential Jews are fanatically opposed to Jewish interests, this simply does not fit his theory—it is more consistent with the default hypothesis”

Again, Cofnas is trying to make my theory into something it is not, nor is there any reason why I should come up with a theory of Jewish viewpoint diversity. I do not need such a theory to say something meaningful and important about *specific* influential Jewish intellectual and political movements. And again, I don't see “large numbers of Jews fanatically opposed to Jewish interests.” If it's true at all that there are large numbers of Jews who take positions contrary to mainstream perceptions of Jewish interests or the perceptions of Jewish interest typical of a certain movement, it may simply be because they have a different interpretation of what Jewish interests are. Is Stephen Steinlight right to oppose the mainstream Jewish community's open-border philosophy because Muslim immigration is bad for the Jews? Tough question.

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Cofnas: If the Israel Lobby is so effective at maintaining a pro-Israel consensus in the American Jewish community, how come so many of the leading anti-Israel activists are Jews who have gone unpunished (e.g., Chomsky, Judith Butler)?

I suppose it's mainly because of the First Amendment. Such people certainly limit their job prospects—no job openings at AIPAC for them any time soon. However, as discussed in Mearsheimer and Walt's *The Israel Lobby* and in my “Zionism and the Internal Dynamics of Judaism,” in fact the Jewish community has put pressure on Jews critical of Israel. Such controls may be declining in their effectiveness. It's difficult to keep people like Philip Weiss off the internet.

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Cofnas: MacDonald doesn't explain how opposing Israel (e.g., by supporting the BDS movement) or promoting multiracial immigration to Israel (as liberal US Jews have done) could be perceived as advancing the ethnic interests of Jews.

False. In my first reply I gave a number of reasons (e.g., seeing Israeli policies as ultimately self-destructive and unable to garner support from the West); see also comments on Dershowitz's views on immigration to Israel in my original reply. And again, some of these Jews may have weak Jewish identification and disparage Jewish ethnic interests. It's an interesting phenomenon to explore and it could be done with in-depth interviews to determine their perceptions and whether they think these policies are in Jewish ethnic interests. It's not my cup

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

of tea, but I would be interested in seeing the results. My focus is on influential movements that *are* demonstrably tied to Jewish identity and perceived interests.

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Cofnas: It seems that MacDonald is now saying that it doesn't matter that many prominent Jews are anti-Israel because the pro-Israel side has largely prevailed in the US. This is irrelevant to the question at issue. The question is whether it makes sense to say that Jews can be the sorts of Jewish ethnic activists described in *CofC* while at the same time opposing Israel's interests.

But as I keep repeating (which again makes me think motivated cognition is in play here), I am not arguing that all Jews even have the same sense of Jewish ethnic interests or even any sense of Jewish ethnic interests. Some are only weakly involved, some may be strongly identified but rationally disagree on strategy and tactics with the dominant movement. I do want to study *specific* movements that are influential, and I want to determine the extent to which Jewish identities and perceptions of Jewish interests are important for the main figures. There is nothing wrong with leaving it at that. Jewish viewpoint diversity and its relation to the extent of Jewish identity and sense of Jewish interests are certainly important topics to study, but not germane to *CofC*.

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Cofnas: The evidence MacDonald provides that Jewish donors are influencing the Democratic party to support Israel is the fact that 13/14 of the top donors to the Democratic party are Jewish. But this is not actually evidence. We have to look at the donors to see *whether or not they actually support Israel*. It is not enough to just point out that they are Jewish. Indeed, when we look at the list we find that it does not support MacDonald's claim. The top donor to the Democratic party, Thomas Steyer, has a Jewish father and is involved in Episcopalianism. His Wikipedia page mentions numerous philanthropic projects that he is involved with, none of them having anything to do with Jews or Israel. The Wikipedia page of the next biggest Jewish donor, Donald S. Sussman, also mentions multiple philanthropic projects, none related to Jews or Israel. (Sussman specifically claims to "not have an agenda" behind his political donations.) The third largest Jewish donor is Deborah Simon. A Google search for "Deborah Simon" and "Israel" or "Jewish" turns up no evidence that any of her philanthropy is related to Jews or Israel. This reveals a common type of scholarly malpractice in MacDonald's work: He notices that a large number of Jews are involved in some activity, and he assumes without evidence that they are advancing Jewish interests. Those who wish to continue the investigation of top Jewish Democratic donors can follow this link: <https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D>

I mentioned Sheldon Adelson and Haim Saban, and I linked to evidence that they are deeply concerned about Israel. Saban has a long history of very generous support for Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party. I will grant that these others may not be primarily motivated by Israel, but there can be little doubt that Democrats and Republicans do not ignore the likes of Saban and Adelson. Nor is there any doubt that US support for Israel is maintained by Jewish financial clout—which is the point of that section: “at this writing there is no indication for a diminishing

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

influence of the Israel Lobby and major Jewish donors on American political elites” AIPAC is still very powerful and much of its power derives from financial contributions to pro-Israel candidates and against candidates critical of Israel. Beginning with Paul Findley and Charles Percy, there is a long history of American politicians whose careers have ended as a result of the Israel lobby via financial donations to opponents. Mearsheimer and Walt would not have written their book if the power of the Israel Lobby was a thing of the past.

This avoidance of the body of evidence presented is typical of Cofnas’s argumentative style: Latching onto a minor issue or an irrelevancy that doesn’t defeat the main point of what I am saying. The acid test would be to see what happens if a political party begins to oppose Israel. We already know what is happening in the U.K. as a result of the Labour Party’s criticism of Israel under Jeremy Corbyn. Jews, who had been important funders of Labour (Jews as 0.5% of the population donated fully one-third of Labour’s budget as recently as 2015), have substantially withdrawn their financial support (this was well before the recent uproar over a mural). Of course, Labour may receive some donations from pro-BDS-type Jews, but that’s a drop in the bucket compared to the donations that appear to be contingent on support for Israel. (Incidentally, this is an excellent reason to prioritize the study of the Israel Lobby over pro-BDS Jews.) I suspect that if the Democrats in the U.S. become as critical of Israel as Labour is now, Jewish financial contributions will dry up—even from Jews who appear to have other priorities at this time.

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Cofnas: It is not clear how this [i.e., Cuddihy’s claim that Marx fits into the general profile of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals] is consistent with Marx’s claim that the “worldly religion of the Jew [is] *Huckstering*,” “his worldly God [is] *Money*,” and an “organization of society which would abolish the preconditions for huckstering, and therefore the possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible” and lead to the dissolution of the Jewish community (see p. 16 of Cofnas 2018).

Cuddihy’s point is that ultimately Marx attributed qualities to non-Jews that he originally attributed to Jews—that what Marx was really up to was to present a radical critique of gentile society as corrupted by qualities that were characteristic of Jews but, in the case the non-Jewish bourgeoisie exhibiting the same traits, overlaid with hypocrisy and fake civility—“*Ecclesia supra cloacam*.” I don’t want to put a great deal of emphasis on that, but it certainly is an intriguing proposal that fits with the other intellectuals Cuddihy and I discuss. From the first chapter of *CofC*, Freud most of all:

From Solomon Maimon to Normon Podhoretz, from Rachel Varnhagen to Cynthia Ozick, from Marx and Lassalle to Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, from Herzl and Freud to Harold Laski and Lionel Trilling, from Moses Mendelssohn to J. Robert Oppenheimer and Ayn Rand, Gertrude Stein, and Reich I and II (Wilhelm and Charles), one dominating structure of an identical predicament and a shared fate imposes itself upon the consciousness and behavior of the Jewish intellectual in *Galut* [exile]: with the advent of Jewish Emancipation, when ghetto walls crumble and the *shtetlach* [small Jewish towns] begin to dissolve, Jewry—like some wide-eyed anthropologist—enters upon a strange world, to explore a strange people observing a strange *halakah* (law code). They examine this world in dismay, with wonder, anger, and punitive objectivity. This wonder, this

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

anger, and the vindictive objectivity of the marginal nonmember are recidivist; they continue unabated into our own time because Jewish Emancipation continues into our own time. (Cuddihy 1974, 68)

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Re Soros: Cofnas: Again, it is not clear how being critical of Israel plays a role in advancing Jewish group interests. If Jews support immigration and multiculturalism throughout the diaspora and are generally critical of Israel, doesn't this make them similar to high-IQ, urban white gentiles? That would seem to support the default hypothesis.

I have no idea how Soros interprets Jewish ethnic interests or whether he cares about his ethnic interests at all. Certainly, urban White gentiles tend to support immigration as well, but so what? The burden of my work re immigration in *CofC* (Chapter 7) is to show that influence from the organized Jewish community and individual Jews was decisive for the watershed 1965 immigration law. A consistent pattern of Cofnas's scholarly malpractice is to think I need to have theories for things I didn't write about in *CofC*. In fact, I have given a lot of thought to why urban Whites tend to oppose their ethnic genetic interests by favoring immigration and other liberal causes, and I linked to a number of articles on the topic in my original reply. And at this point, public opposition to immigration carries large costs for people living amidst the urban consensus on immigration.

* * *

Cofnas: "MacDonald provides no positive evidence that Jews have reason to believe that anti-Israel activism will advance Jewish interests in the "long run."

I am merely giving these as hypothetical reasons for why some Jews and non-Jews may *perceive* anti-Israel activism as ultimately in Israel's best interests. Again, I am not attempting to figure out the motivations of contemporary liberal/left Jews re Israel and there is no need for me to do so. Rather, I am asking questions like whether neoconservatism can sensibly be described as a Jewish movement. A good interview-survey of left/liberal Jews would be a nice start. However, it is noteworthy that, as discussed in Chapter 3 of *CofC*, there is a historical pattern where Jewish support for the left waxed and waned depending on attitudes of the left re Israel (e.g., the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, USSR policy in the Middle East). And, as noted in my original reply, Jewish financial, media, and voting support for the U.K. Labour Party has plummeted because of its attitude on Israel; the same may happen in the Democratic Party eventually. Again, a consistent pattern of Cofnas's scholarly malpractice is to think I need to have theories for things I didn't write about in *CofC*.

* * *

Cofnas's next point has to do with crypsis. I will start with Cofnas's statement from his original article, purportedly describing my take on assimilated Jews: **"Many twentieth-century Jews ostensibly abandoned their Jewish identity and sought to assimilate. MacDonald points out that these Jews often did not support gentile nationalist movements—which he acknowledges were anti-Semitic—and he argues that this is evidence that these Jews were**

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

insincere in their desire to assimilate and were actually engaging in ‘Jewish crypsis’ (his term).”

I then replied: “Cofnas gives no examples of this, either from *CofC* or my other writing, although in a later passage he claims that I attribute crypsis to the Frankfurt School luminaries (discussed below). As a result, I can’t rebut it.”

Cofnas in his rejoinder: “I don't follow this. Is MacDonald saying that he doesn't ‘attribute crypsis to the Frankfurt School luminaries’? The word “crypsis” appears 13 times in *CofC*, but I only discuss the specific example of the Frankfurt School (see Cofnas 2018, p. 15).”

This is obtuse. Obviously, I am not claiming that I don’t attribute crypsis to the Frankfurt School. I said in my original reply that the Frankfurt School engaged in crypsis *of a sort* (“in the sense that the Jewish political agenda [is] not an aspect of the theory and the theories themselves [have] no overt Jewish content”). So how could one reasonably interpret me as saying the opposite in my original reply? Moreover, turning attention to Cofnas’s original comments, I don’t recall claiming anywhere what Cofnas attributes to me there (“Many twentieth-century Jews ostensibly abandoned their Jewish identity and sought to assimilate. MacDonald points out that these Jews often did not support gentile nationalist movements—which he acknowledges were anti-Semitic—and he argues that this is evidence that these Jews were insincere in their desire to assimilate and were actually engaging in ‘Jewish crypsis’ (his term).”) This is absurd and not based on anything I wrote. Again, I am only claiming that the Frankfurt School was engaging in crypsis in the very limited sense mentioned above (no overt Jewish agenda or content in the theory). Cofnas’s comments are an egregious misrepresentation.

* * *

Cofnas comments on my claim that my theory is falsifiable. Cofnas: I certainly did not make this claim. In my March 15, 2018 *Quillette* article with Jonathan Anomaly, we specifically noted that “Any theory can be salvaged in the face of any evidence, though this may require some fanciful theorizing. In practice, we just have to use our judgement to decide which of the competing theories we are considering explains our observations in the most sensible way.” This applies to MacDonald's theory, too. He can always come up with a story to explain away every apparent disconfirmation. Jews support or oppose affirmative action, or they are militantly pro- or anti-Israel. MacDonald can always come up with a way to explain this in terms of a group evolutionary strategy...

This is mind-bogglingly, head-bangingly wrong. Once again, I am forced to explain something that should have been obvious in reading my work (and again suggesting motivated cognition on Cofnas’s part to the point that he is blocking out the obvious). I am interested in looking at *specific* movements that, in my view, can be shown to be Jewishly motivated and influential. I am not interested in providing a general theory of Jewish viewpoint diversity or accounting for the attitudes of each and every Jew. Jews outside the movement don’t count for purposes of showing it is a Jewish movement. My theory can be disconfirmed by showing that Jewish identity and interests are not important for what I am calling a Jewish intellectual movement. Like any good scientist and scholar, I have produced a theory that can be confirmed

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

or disconfirmed by looking at the evidence. Indeed, it seems that Cofnas discounts the importance of empirical confirmation, given that he systematically passes over the mass of evidence presented in *CofC* and the previous volumes and opts instead for some marginal legalistic word play revolving around redefining and misrepresenting what I am trying to do.

Cofnas again brings up affirmative action, but I never proposed that Jews on either side of the issue constituted a Jewish movement, so the question doesn't interest me in the same way that, say, neoconservatism does. There is no "fanciful theorizing" going on—just straightforward, testable proposals on *specific* movements. Given my limited aims, it is utterly irrelevant to explore the motives of Jews who haven't signed on to the movement at issue, and as a result I never even try to explain such people. Why should I? Such people are not "counterexamples" and there is no need for me to explain their motives because they are not relevant to what I am trying to do.

Again, Cofnas completely fails to grasp what I am trying to do. For the umpteenth time, I am not trying to explain the attitudes of all Jews or all prominent Jews on all issues (such as affirmative action) or all Jews who explicitly don't sign on to the theory or Jews who oppose the movement. First and foremost, I am interested in the people at the center of the movement—the ones who ultimately are having the influence.

* * *

Cofnas: "In *CofC* MacDonald makes the bald statement that affirmative action would "necessarily discriminate against Jews" (*CofC*, p. 315). If we accept that claim, then it means that affirmative action is clearly against Jewish interests. But when they had a chance to vote on it, Jews in California voted in *favor* of affirmative action. MacDonald claims that Jews voted for affirmative action in order to "dilute the power of the European-derived group as a whole on the assumption that they would not suffer any appreciable effect" (*CofC*, p. 311). Why can't MacDonald acknowledge this blatant inconsistency?"

Again, as in my original reply, I am not bringing up attitudes on affirmative action as implying anything about Jewish intellectual movements—my overriding concern in *CofC*. So whatever one thinks of this passage, it does not affect the thesis of the book. However, Cofnas conveniently truncates the quote to misrepresent the context. Here is the entire passage:

Because of their high intelligence and resource-acquisition ability, Jews do not benefit from affirmative action policies and other group-based entitlements commonly advocated by minority groups with low social status. Jews thus come into conflict with other ethnically identified minority groups who use multiculturalism for their own purposes. (Nevertheless, because of their competitive advantage within the white, European-derived group with which they are currently classified, Jews may perceive themselves as benefiting from policies designed to dilute the power of the European-derived group as a whole on the assumption that they would not suffer any appreciable effect....)

In other words, I expressed this very tentatively, as a conjecture ("*may perceive*") on which absolutely nothing of importance hinges. I repeat: absolutely nothing of importance hinges on this. Why Jews may support or oppose affirmative action is an interesting question but utterly irrelevant to evaluating whether I have adequately analyzed the Jewish movements discussed in

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

CofC. There is no need whatever for me to develop a theory of Jewish attitudes in this area. It should be obvious to all but the most obtuse that I am not trying to provide a general theory Jewish attitudes or of viewpoint diversity in the Jewish community. I am solely interested in the *specific* movements discussed in *CofC*.

* * *

Cofnas: To refer to this proposition [i.e., my “specific claim” that “there is no interesting sense in which psychoanalysis was a Jewish movement”] **as a "specific claim" is misleading. It's not clear how to definitively test whether something is a "Jewish movement." Is it sufficient for the leadership to be Jewish? For the leaders to be Jewish and identify as Jewish? To be and identify as Jewish and care about Jewish interests? What does would it mean to care about Jewish interests? It is misleading for MacDonald to act like these sorts of claims are testable in a straightforward way.**

Given the guru phenomenon, the leaders are critical. If one can show that Boas, Freud, the leaders of the Frankfurt School and the principal New York Intellectuals such as Sidney Hook did not really identify as Jews and didn't care about Jewish issues (e.g., anti-Semitism) in formulating their theories, I would be perfectly happy to acknowledge that my approach has been refuted, but Cofnas never even attempts this. Ultimately, however, it's also interesting and important to describe the dynamics of these movements to determine if there are general patterns (e.g., the guru phenomenon, access to prestigious media and academic institutions, dealing with dissenters, etc.). I summarize my ideas on these general patterns in Chapter 6.

* * *

Cofnas: There is no consensus among Jewish activists about any nontrivial issue at any particular time. This is the point I made in my paper.

More head-banging. For the umpteenth time, consensus is not important. What is important are the identities and perceived interests of those within the *specific* movement at issue. Moreover, Cofnas misrepresents my sentence to imply that I think there is consensus in the Jewish community. This is the sentence he is commenting on: “But even assuming a well-reasoned consensus among the activists as to what is in the interests of Jews, this consensus could change if conditions change.” In other words, my statement on consensus is a hypothetical that Cofnas misrepresents as an assertion. I briefly discuss possible legitimate uses of consensus as it applies to the Jewish community below.

* * *

Cofnas: On Twitter (but not in my paper) I criticized MacDonald's theory for not having predictive value. By this I did not mean that it should allow us to predict the future in great detail. Rather, I meant that it should predict ex post facto (i.e., it should explain). MacDonald's theory clearly predicts that Jews should have a low intermarriage rate and that they should be underrepresented among the leading critics of Israel. Neither of these predictions has come true.

In science and philosophy, the term ‘prediction’ is not used to mean ‘explanation’. These are distinct concepts. Perhaps Cofnas could just admit error here.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

But in any case, my prediction on Jewish intermarriage was based on the literature at the time (1998) and, as I noted in my original reply: “my projections of the Jewish demographic future in America, made 20 years ago on the basis of my reading, are not holding up.” However, predicting future intermarriage was not important for the main themes of *CofC*. I certainly made no such predictions with respect to the intellectual/political movements I discuss in *CofC*. Moreover, I was not foolhardy enough to try to predict the relative proportions of Jews among critics of Israel as these proportions change in response to what is happening. Relevant to Israel, I have attempted to show that neoconservatism is a Jewish movement like the others discussed in *CofC*—a much less ambitious goal—but not trying to predict what will happen to the movement in the future. As I have noted previously, as a general tactic, Cofnas makes unfounded claims about what I am up to, and then joyously shows that the claim is wrong. Dishonest.

* * *

Cofnas: MacDonald acknowledges (here but not in *CofC*) that there is a long history of radicalism among white gentiles. But he does not recognize the challenge that this raises for his thesis. The default hypothesis says that Jews act similarly to high IQ urban white gentiles. High IQ urban white gentiles have historically been attracted to all sorts of radical movements. One of those radical movements was an anti-Darwinian approach in social science that attracted both Jews and white gentiles. The default hypothesis seems to offer a more parsimonious explanation of these facts than MacDonald's.

The fact that some White gentiles have been attracted to Jewish-dominated movements does not raise a challenge to my thesis. By all accounts, based on the sources I cite, the success of the anti-Darwinian movement in the social sciences was because of the activism of Boas and his disciples, not these non-Jews. If Cofnas wants to dispute this, he must dispute my sources (e.g., Degler).

* * *

CHAPTER 2: THE BOASIAN SCHOOL OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE DECLINE OF DARWINISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Cofnas: I did not discuss this in the paper, but there is evidence that Boas thought of Judaism as a religion rather than a race, and identified as a German and with Germany. Risking his career, he wrote a letter to the *New York Times* in 1916 objecting to American hostility toward Germany, explaining that he was motivated "to express concisely what I, and I believe with me many other German-Americans, feel and think." Later in his life he opposed all "in-group" identity. (See L. B. Glick, "Types distinct from our own: Franz Boas on Jewish identity and assimilation," *American Anthropologist* 84(3), pp. 545-565 at pp. 554-555.)

It is irrelevant whether Boas thought of Judaism as a religion or a race. What's important is that he had a strong Jewish identity and thought of his work as eradicating anti-Semitism. And whatever Boas thought about Jewish identity or group identity in general later in life, his work at the time that he had a strong Jewish identity is what carried the day. His later writing couldn't undo the effects of his earlier writing and the general point that, as Gelya Frank observed and as

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

noted in my original reply: “Jewish identifications and the pursuit of perceived Jewish interests, particularly in advocating an ideology of cultural pluralism as a model for Western societies, has been the “invisible subject” of American anthropology.”

The fact that Boas supported Germany in 1916 (despite his well-documented hostility to the Prussian aristocracy) is not in the least surprising because at the time Germany was fighting against Czarist Russia (seen as anti-Jewish), and the vast majority of Jews and the organized Jewish community therefore favored Germany. This changed dramatically after Russia capitulated, the Bolsheviks seized power, and Britain issued the Balfour Declaration. Boas may also have been offended by the anti-German hysteria sweeping America during the World War I and may have come under suspicion because of his name and accent.

* * *

Cofnas then claims that just because there were many Jews in American sociology that I **“seem to think” that fact alone supports my theory**” without exploring whether Jewish identities were important or comparing these Jews to “high-IQ urban gentiles.”

This is the quote from *CofC* he is focused on:

The advent of Jewish intellectuals in the pre–World War II period resulted in “a level of politicization unknown to sociology’s founding fathers. It is not only that the names of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim replaced those of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, but also that the sense of America as a consensual experience gave way to a sense of America as a series of conflicting definitions” (Horowitz 1993, 75). In the post–World War II period, sociology “became populated by Jews to such a degree that jokes abounded: one did not need the synagogue, the *minyan* [i.e., the minimum number of Jews required for a communal religious service] was to be found in sociology departments; or, one did not need a sociology of Jewish life, since the two had become synonymous” (Horowitz 1993, 77).

I didn’t examine whether sociology was a Jewish movement in the period under consideration, so obviously I can’t claim that it was. But I didn’t make such a claim. Notice, however, that Horowitz is claiming that the advent of Jews into sociology transformed the field, and indeed that the high-IQ gentiles who previously dominated the field had a quite different viewpoint (“America as a consensual experience”). So, the passage certainly compared high-IQ gentiles with Jews: these gentiles were replaced by Jews with a quite different perspective, many of them influenced by Marx. I suppose it’s possible these Jews did not identify as Jews or see what they were doing as furthering Jewish interests, but again, I didn’t propose that they constituted a Jewish intellectual movement, although it would certainly be an interesting topic to explore. Maybe they had no Jewish identification but were sincere Marxist universalists with a Marxist, conflict view of society rather than a view of society as consensual. The point was, simply, that along with the Boasians, whom I did analyze in detail as a Jewish intellectual movement, they transformed the field away from Darwinism.

* * *

Cofnas: *CofC* clearly portrays "romantic primitivism" as a weapon of Jewish intellectuals to undermine gentile culture. But *CofC* doesn't even mention the fact that

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

romantic primitivism was invented by European gentiles and has long been a major strand in European thinking.

I could have mentioned previous primitivisms, but it wouldn't have made the slightest difference to my argument. The point I made in my original reply was that by the early twentieth century, the Darwinians were in charge, and as a result, previous versions of romantic primitivism had become irrelevant. The demise of Darwinism was the critical issue, not whether there were previously influential movements of romantic primitivism.

* * *

Re Cofnas's claim that Jared Diamond is a Darwinian: I would label Diamond a Darwinian-in-name-only because ultimately he eschews natural selection as an important factor resulting in differences between populations, thus ignoring a great deal of research. According to Diamond, evolution created a uniform human nature that then responded differently to different environmental opportunities and constraints without changing the genome. My favorite review of *Guns, Germs, and Steel* is that of J. Philippe Rushton (*Population and Environment* 21, no. 1 (1999): 99–107) who labels Diamond's views as "behavioral creationism." True Darwinians are not behavioral creationists.

* * *

Cofnas: Ultimately Darwinism was rejected in the social sciences because of Nazism. Yes, some social scientists opposed Darwinism before WWII, but it was the reaction against Nazism gave their point of view a definitive victory.

Certainly, the reaction against National Socialism may have furthered the anti-Darwinian zeitgeist (but see Michael Woodley et al., *The Rhythm of the West* (2017): "Data do not comport with the popular narrative that eugenics died suddenly after WWII as a result of its problematic association with National Socialism" (p. 12). Rather, Woodley et al. claim that after peaking circa 1925 interest in eugenics gradually, but steadily declined until it was completely discredited by the New Left in the 1960s).

In any case, the fact that Boas and his students had already dominated all the major departments of anthropology well before World War II was decisive for the defeat of academic Darwinism. From Chapter 2 of *CofC*:

By 1915 the Boasians controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its Executive Board (Stocking 1968, 285). In 1919 Boas could state that "most of the anthropological work done at the present time in the United States" was done by his students at Columbia (in Stocking 1968, 296). By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas's students, the majority of whom were Jewish. His protégé Melville Herskovits (1953, 23) noted that

the four decades of the tenure of [Boas's] professorship at Columbia gave a continuity to his teaching that permitted him to develop students who eventually made up the greater part of the significant professional core of American anthropologists, and who came to man and direct most of the major departments of

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

anthropology in the United States. In their turn, they trained the students who . . . have continued the tradition in which their teachers were trained.

* * *

Cofnas then comments on my point: “Regarding Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, the first point to make is that whatever their motivations, they do not cast doubt on the basic thesis of the chapter—that the shift away from Darwinism was fundamentally a project of Boas and his disciples.”

Cofnas: This is not enough to support the Judaism-as-a-group-evolutionary-strategy theory. If the gentiles Mead and Benedict felt hostility to Darwinism and joined with Boas, this would challenge the claim that anti-Darwinism was a movement that wouldn't have succeeded without Jews.

If Cofnas wishes to argue that Mead and Benedict would have succeeded in eradicating Darwin from the social sciences by themselves with no help from Boas or his many Jewish disciples, he is welcome to make the argument. (Good luck!) I am satisfied with the sources I use that find a central role for Boas and his many disciples, most of whom were Jews.

* * *

Cofnas, regarding my section on Jews among hereditarians and non-Jews among environmentalists: **“I specifically criticized MacDonald for ignoring gentiles among environmentalists regarding *race differences in intelligence*, and Jewish over-representation among prominent hereditarians regarding *race differences in intelligence*.”**

I agree there are people in both these categories. But again, my purpose was to study where the power is—the influential movements in the area—and here it’s quite clear that the anti-hereditarians on race differences ended up winning the day in the popular and academic milieus.

* * *

Regarding my point that “Herrnstein’s case would require much more evidence to be included as an example suitable for *CofC*,” Cofnas makes the outrageous claim that **“MacDonald *did* include Herrnstein as an example in *CofC*, the qualification “if true” notwithstanding.”**

This is amazing. I make a hypothetical statement in order to clarify the boundaries of a Jewish intellectual movement and Cofnas claims that I am making an assertion even though I clearly say it is a hypothetical (“*if true*”).

Moreover, in any case, even if Herrnstein was motivated by his Jewish identity and a perspective on Jewish interests, by himself he would not constitute an influential Jewish intellectual movement in the absence of Jewish networking in advancing the cause, Jewish disciples, etc., à la figures like Boas and Freud. Herrnstein’s co-author on *The Bell Curve* was Charles Murray (not Jewish) who has been left with the task of defending *The Bell Curve* because of Herrnstein’s death. And alas, the *Bell Curve* has had very little influence in the long run—certainly no influence on public policy in education.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

* * *

Cofnas comments on the following statement in my reply:

“The question is whether the actions of those who opposed hereditarian perspectives were the result of specifically Jewish identification and motivation and how effective they were in combatting hereditarianism.

Cofnas: “MacDonald seems to be saying that if we find Jews overrepresented on both sides of a scientific debate, we can speculate about the motivations of one side (namely, the liberal side) and conclude that they were motivated by ethnic self-interest. Why is the default hypothesis not more reasonable, i.e., members of a high IQ urban population are overrepresented in scientific debates on all sides?”

Yet again, Cofnas fails to grasp the argument. I am analyzing movements that carried the day (in this case, anti-hereditarianism) and the role played by Jewish identities and perceptions of Jewish interests in these movements. Although it is possible that the opposition would also be a Jewish intellectual movement (as noted above in the case of the Stalinist and Trotskyist left in the 1930s), I don’t find evidence for that, although I am certainly open to finding it. Cofnas’s “default hypothesis” is not reasonable because of the evidence for specific Jewish identities and motivations on the anti-hereditarian side which was victorious (see also previous comments on Richard Herrnstein.)

And in yet another comment indicating a complete failure to grasp the argument, Cofnas says that my comments on Gould’s Jewish identification and influence are irrelevant. But that is exactly the sort of case that must be made if Gould is to be considered participating in a Jewish intellectual movement.

* * *

CHAPTER 4 ON PSYCHOANALYSIS

Cofnas begins by commenting on this passage from my reply: “Note that [Cofnas] does not challenge the basic thesis of the chapter that psychoanalysis was a Jewish movement (a common view among scholars), nor does he quarrel with the assertion that Freud had a strong Jewish identity and sense of pursuing Jewish interests by subverting gentile culture.

Cofnas: I wrote: "Freud certainly did have a Jewish identity—if only because he was continually reminded of it by anti-Semites." I didn't have the space in the Human Nature paper to evaluate this claim in detail.

Okay, so we are still left with no complaints about the basic thesis of the chapter. And we agree that Freud had a strong Jewish identity. So why even bring it up?

* * *

Regarding my comments on the lists of prominent intellectuals compiled by Kadushin and Torrey, Cofnas simply repeats the conclusion of his original critique. But the point of my section in *CofC* is simply to show that psychoanalysis was influential at some point in their careers (implying that psychoanalysis was in fact influential which is what I was trying to show), not that these intellectuals were radicals or that they remained psychoanalysts for the entire career or

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

were necessarily using psychoanalysis to subvert gentile culture. Some of these people became neoconservatives (a common migration for the New York Intellectuals) which certainly doesn't mean that they really abandoned basic leftism. I stand by my comments in my original reply:

Again, [re Chomsky] support for Israel is not synonymous with how individual Jews perceive Jewish interests or whether or not Jewish interests are even relevant to their writing (see above), and this was certainly not the case prior to the establishment of Israel (see above).

Cofnas seems to think that I suppose that all Jews influenced by psychoanalysis are political radicals (“virtually none of them [the Jews on the list of prominent intellectuals] comes close to conforming to MacDonald’s paradigm of a Jewish radical.” However, when I speak of psychoanalysis as generally linked to the left, I am not referring necessarily to the radical left. Even neoconservatism, with its roots on the Trotskyist left, has fundamentally acted to combat paleoconservatism and to move the American conservative movement to the left on key issues like immigration (see “[Neoconservatism as Jewish Movement](#)”). For example, I cite Samuel Francis: “There are countless stories of how neoconservatives have succeeded in entering conservative institutions, forcing out or demoting traditional conservatives, and changing the positions and philosophy of such institutions in neoconservative directions.”

Moreover, some neocons have been influenced by psychoanalysis. Cofnas emphasizes Saul Bellow and Alan Bloom, whom I discuss in the previously referenced article (see especially the quote from Samuel Francis and material on neocon attitudes toward immigration).

* * *

Re Alan Bloom and Saul Bellow: Neither of these people have headings in the section on “Neoconservative Portraits” which is where I discuss the Jewish identity and motivation of the main neocons. They appear in the section on Paul Wolfowitz and are meant to add detail to Wolfowitz’s Jewish milieu. However, Bloom’s fealty to Leo Strauss speaks volumes. And again, being a neoconservative who mouths allegiance to “Western values” means nothing in the context of a movement that is entirely on board with the ethnic displacement of European-Americans. As I noted in [my review](#) of Jacob Heilbrunn, “the general impression one gets is that the neocons adopted positions on domestic policies [although remaining well to the left of the GOP rank and file, if not the plutocrats, on immigration] in order to win influence within the Republican Party and then used their influence to further their foreign policy agenda.”

* * *

I commented in my original reply that “neocons may have a psychoanalytic background (like Bellow and Bloom) and also be strongly identified Jews who are motivated by anti-WASP animus (for further examples of the latter, see [my review](#) of Jacob Heilbrunn’s *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons*).”

Cofnas: “There is no evidence that Bellow or Bloom was "motivated by anti-WASP animus" in either the link highlighted here or in the article that MacDonald links to above.”

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

My comment was based on Bellow's depiction of Bloom in *Ravelstein*: "Ravelstein thought of Jews as displacing WASPs: He 'liked to think of living in one of the tony flat buildings formerly occupied by the exclusively WASP faculty.'" But there's more. Here's Heilbrunn's comment on neocon attitudes toward WASP America from my review:

Like their radical cousins, the early neocons sought:

to overturn the old order in America. . . . After all, no matter how hard they worked, there were still quotas at the Ivy League universities. Then there were the fancy clubs, the legal and financial firms that saw Jews as interlopers who would soil their proud escutcheons and were to be kept at bay. Smarting with unsurpassed social resentment, the young Jews viewed themselves as liberators, proclaiming a new faith." (p. 28)

Further, Bellow's depiction of Bloom in *Ravelstein* bears a remarkable resemblance to the real-life Bloom as depicted by Jacob Heilbrunn: "Then there was Alan Bloom, himself an adoring disciple of Leo Strauss. An acolyte of Bloom, Kenneth Weinstein, notes that being a student of Bloom was like "orbiting the sun" (quoted on p. 97). Bloom's students "tried to model themselves on him, to the point of wearing Turnbull and Asser shirts and squeaky black leather shoes" (p. 97) So I think I am on solid ground when I wrote that Bloom had an animus against WASP America—that he was a member of an ascendant Jewish elite bent on displacing WASP America.

* * *

Cofnas in his original article: "It is ironic that MacDonald casts Robert Silvers as a part of a nefarious Jewish Freudian movement" given that *NYRB* published Frederick Crews' takedown of Freud and the psychoanalytic movement."

I had commented in my original reply: "I'm not sure what got into Silvers to publish Crews."

Cofnas: It seems the main evidence that MacDonald gives for Silvers's nefarious motivations is the fact that he is Jewish. It should not be surprising if Silvers turns out not to have these motivations.

No. I am simply saying that I don't know what Silvers' motives were, and it hardly matters in any case. As I note in the rest of the sentence from my original reply, whatever Silvers' motives, "it does not detract from the general influence of the *NYRB* in promoting psychoanalysis." Once again, Cofnas dishonestly fastens on an irrelevant point to make it seem like he is making a major objection to what I am saying.

* * *

Cofnas: A key claim in the chapter is that Freud promoted psychoanalysis to "pathologize" anti-Semitism. The incident where he blamed the Jews in Israel for provoking Arab violence does not fit in any obvious way with the theory that one of his principal goals was to pathologize anti-Semitism."

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Good grief! Words fail me. (Okay, maybe not.) Just because Freud criticized Jewish behavior in a particular situation does not detract in any way from my claims that psychoanalysis was an effective tool for creating fanciful theories that pathologized anti-Semitism and that Freud himself engaged in such fantasies.

* * *

Cofnas: MacDonald neglects to mention a significant error in CofC that I pointed out in my paper. In CofC he writes that Freud's book *Moses and Monotheism* "contains several assertions that anti-Semitism is fundamentally a pathological gentile reaction to Jewish a pathological gentile reaction to Jewish ethical superiority," citing Freud (1967, pp. 114-117). However, as I note in my paper, pages 114-117 of this edition of *Moses and Monotheism* do discuss anti-Semitism, but say nothing about ethics/morality at all, let alone the ethical superiority of Jews or Judaism.

My citation is to Freud (1939, pp. 114–117) so it was very confusing to see this reference to a 1967 version which turns out to be a reprint of the version I used: Freud, S. (1939). *Moses and Monotheism*, trans. by K. Jones. New York: Vintage. (Reprinted in 1955.)

Relevant to Cofnas's comment, on p. 117 Freud describes Christians as having been forced to convert from pagan attitudes that never really disappeared: "One might say that they have remained 'Badly Christened'; under the thin veneer of Christianity they have remained what their ancestors were, barbarically polytheistic." This is a claim to Jewish ethical superiority given that Freud attributes Jewish ethical superiority ultimately to their belief in monotheism: "In a new transport of moral asceticism the Jews imposed on themselves constantly increasing instinctual renunciation and thereby reached—at least in doctrine and precepts—ethical heights that had remained inaccessible to the other peoples of antiquity. ... Our investigation is intended to show how it [i.e., ethical heights] is connected ... with the conception of the one and only God" (173). Thus, their hatred toward Judaism stems from the fact that at heart they are still barbarians who resent the ethical superiority Judaism achieved long ago by accepting monotheism. Even the phrase "barbarically polytheistic" has the connotation that these barbarians are inferior to refined Jewish monotheism. Indeed, the word 'barbarian' has very negative connotations, as in the first two meanings [here](#): "a person in a savage, primitive state; uncivilized person; 2. a person without culture, refinement, or education; philistine."

Moreover, one would think that Cofnas would be aware of what I had written earlier in the chapter:

In the following passage from *Moses and Monotheism*, the Jews are proposed to have fashioned themselves to become a morally and intellectually superior people:

The preference which through two thousand years the Jews have given to spiritual endeavour has, of course, had its effect; it has helped to build a dike against brutality and the inclination to violence which are usually found where athletic development becomes the ideal of the people. The harmonious development of spiritual and bodily activity, as achieved by the Greeks, was denied to the Jews. In this conflict their decision was at least made in favour of what is culturally the more important. (Freud 1939, 147)

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

So yes, Freud did believe in the ethical superiority of Judaism compared to the Christians whose “polytheistic barbarism” lurks beneath a thin veneer of monotheistic Christianity, making them unable to scale the ethical heights of Judaism and that this deficiency was a cause of anti-Semitism.

* * *

Cofnas: In his letter explaining his refusal to sign the letter condemning the Arabs for rioting, Freud wrote: "I certainly sympathise with [Zionism's] goals, am proud of our University in Jerusalem and am delighted with our settlements' prosperity. But on the other hand, I do not think that Palestine could ever become a Jewish State, or that the Christian and Islamic worlds would ever be prepared to have their holy places under Jewish control. It would have seemed more sensible to me to establish a Jewish homeland on less historically burdened land. But I know that such a rational standpoint would never have gained the enthusiasm of the masses." At that time he wrote this letter his support for Zionism was somewhat tepid.

Freud's Zionism was indeed rather tepid in 1929 compared to later mainstream Jewish attitudes but likely quite a bit more intense than most Jews at the time. In any case, this factoid does nothing to challenge the thesis of the chapter that psychoanalysis was a Jewish movement and that Freud had an intense Jewish identity and feelings of racial estrangement from and superiority toward non-Jews; nor does it detract from the evidence I present that Freud hated Western society (identifying as Hannibal arrayed against Rome) and wished to subvert its sexual mores.

* * *

Cofnas: When Jews claim that they criticize Israel because they care about Jewish interests, why should we take them at their word? Does MacDonald believe the sincerity of Jews who advocate immigration to the US because they say that it will be "good for America"? He offers no explanation for why we should sometimes take the self-expressed motives of Jews at face value and sometimes not.

Again, I am attempting to show that certain *specific* movements can reasonably be labeled Jewish and in doing so I use a variety of sources, including personal statements as well as comments by biographers, historians, etc., to establish how these figures perceived themselves and what they were doing. In general, however, I accept statements about motivation at face value, the only exceptions are when I think deception or self-deception is occurring, but that requires additional evidence (see comments on self-deception in my original reply). But yes, I do doubt the sincerity of people who advocate that masses of poor, racially alien, uneducated people should be invited to become citizens of Western countries given well-established links to welfare dependency, criminality, and costs in social cohesion to the receiving countries—not to mention costs in terms of the genetic fitness of the natives. In any case, in Chapter 7 I have a number of statements by Jewish activists to the effect that they see immigration mainly from the point of view of their perception of Jewish interests, not from the interests of the society as a whole. This issue continues to arise in the contemporary world regarding refugee policy where the [statements](#) of Jewish organizations emphasize how restrictive immigration policy affected Jews in the 1930s, not whether it's good for society now:

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

European Jewish organizations are advocating generous policies toward refugees (*JTA*: “[European Jews, mindful of risks, urge aid to refugees](#)”). Their perceptions are framed by their experiences in the 1930s. As always, the policies advocated for European countries are couched in terms of Jewish attitudes and interests, not the legitimate interests of Europeans to retain their cultures and demographic status:

When he looks into the tired eyes of the Syrian refugees now flooding Europe’s borders, Guy Sorman is reminded of his father, Nathan, who fled Germany for France just months before Adolf Hitler came to power.

“He wanted to go to the United States. Visa declined. He tried Spain, same result. He ended up in France, neither welcome nor deported,” Sorman wrote last week in an Op-Ed in *Le Monde* in which he argued that Europe should learn from its abandonment of the Jews during the Holocaust and accommodate the stream of migrants pouring through its borders from the war-torn Middle East.

Sorman’s view is not uncommon among European Jews, many of them living in societies still grappling with a sense of collective guilt for their indifference to the Nazi genocide — or complicity in it. At a Holocaust memorial event in Paris on Sunday, French Chief Rabbi Haim Korsia urged Europe’s leaders to match the actions of non-Jews who saved Jews from the Nazis by welcoming Syrian refugees.

So once again, the experience of Jews prior to and during World War II is being used as a touchstone for how Europeans should act now. The actions of Europeans should be motivated by guilt over what happened ~80 years ago, and that guilt should trump any concern with the effects of immigration on social cohesion, unemployment, crime, and welfare costs — not to mention the **ethnic genetic interests** of Europeans.

In general, I do accept at face value what Jews and Jewish organizations say about their motives, and in general there is good evidence that predominantly they see the situation in terms of Jewish interests and through lens of Jewish memories, not the interests of their fellow citizens.

* * *

CHAPTER 5: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

Cofnas: The fact that members of the Frankfurt School had a strong reaction to the holocaust (which is hardly surprising) does not mean that they strongly identified as Jews, or supported Jewish ethnocentrism.

Such statements are part of the evidence I use to establish Jewish identification and their support for Jewish ethnocentrism. One has to remember that the culture of the holocaust had not been generally established as the general mainstream culture of the West—a much later development dating from after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 (see Peter Novick’, *The Holocaust in American Life*; Adorno died in 1969). Consider this from Zoltan Tar in his *The Frankfurt School*: “The experience of Auschwitz was turned into an absolute historical and sociological category,” with the point being that “no study of sociology could be possible without reflecting on

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Auschwitz and without concerning oneself with preventing new Auschwitzes” (Tar 1977, 165; quoted in Chapter 5). This seems to me to indicate a strong Jewish identification, as does. And how else can one interpret the intellectual shenanigans of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* except as an attempt to support Jewish ethnocentrism and group continuity and preclude any discussion of Jewish behavior as relevant to anti-Semitism?

Even more to the point, Cofnas never comments on this passage from Chapter 5 regarding Horkheimer who was the person with ultimate administrative power in the Frankfurt School:

Horkheimer had a strong Jewish identity that became increasingly apparent in his later writings (Tar 1977, 6; Jay 1980). However, Horkheimer’s commitment to Judaism, as evidenced by the presence of specifically Jewish religious themes, was apparent even in his writings as an adolescent and as a young adult (Maier 1984, 51). At the end of his life Horkheimer completely accepted his Jewish identification and achieved a grand synthesis between Judaism and Critical Theory (Carlebach 1978, 254–257). (Critical Theory is the name applied to the theoretical perspective of the Frankfurt School.) As an indication of his profound sense of Jewish identity, Horkheimer (1947, 161) stated that the goal of philosophy must be to vindicate Jewish history: “The anonymous martyrs of the concentration camps are the symbols of humanity that is striving to be born. The task of philosophy is to translate what they have done into language that will be heard, even though their finite voices have been silenced by tyranny.”

Tar (1977, 60) describes Horkheimer’s inspiration as deriving from his attempt to leave behind Judaism while nevertheless remaining tied to the faith of his fathers.

Moreover, if indeed Adorno and the Frankfurt School were genuine leftists with weak ethnic identities, they would have been equally concerned about Stalin’s genocides, e.g., of Christian Ukrainians. There is no evidence that they were.

Horkheimer’s strong Jewish identification lends further support to Adorno’s Jewish identification because they seem to have been intellectual clones of each other. Adorno ‘had a very close professional relationship with Horkheimer to the point that Horkheimer wrote of their work, “It would be difficult to say which of the ideas originated in his mind and which in my own; our philosophy is one’ (Horkheimer 1947, vii).” A true radical leftist with no ethnic identity would have been repulsed by Horkheimer’s ethnic commitment. Adorno never said, “no poetry after the Holodomor.” And what was a self-proclaimed radical doing associating with ethnocentric colleagues funded by an ethnocentric Jewish benefactor and associating mainly with Jewish scholars in New York and Los Angeles? Why did none of the Frankfurt School moral luminaries publicly criticize the vertical ethnic integration of the School?

* * *

I made the following statement in my original reply:

Cofnas seems to think that I can’t make my argument without explicit statements by Frankfurt School authors to the effect that Jewish ethnocentrism is perfectly fine but the ethnocentrism of non-Jews is a pathology. But why would they do that? There are really two possibilities here: they realized it was a double standard but didn’t want to publicize that for the obvious reason that they would be seen as hypocrites. Or they were deceiving

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

themselves by simply focusing on White ethnocentrism as pathological while blocking out any thought about how this presents an intellectual inconsistency—i.e., self-deception.

Cofnas: There is actually a third possibility: Members of the Frankfurt School opposed ethnocentrism for both Jews and gentiles alike. This third possibility seems especially plausible given that MacDonald has no positive evidence for the first two possibilities (besides the fact that the holocaust loomed large for them, which is actually irrelevant).

Certainly, the first possibility—an explicit statement—can be ruled out for obvious reasons. The existence of an implicit double standard can be seen in the fact that Jewish ethnocentrism and Jewish traits were not studied in *The Authoritarian Personality*, nor were they mentioned in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. And note the following comment on *Dialectic of Enlightenment* from *CofC*:

The end of anti-Semitism is thus viewed as a precondition for the development of a utopian society and the liberation of humanity—perhaps the closest that the Frankfurt School ever came to defining utopia. [The footnote here reads: As an indication of the self-conscious Jewish identifications of the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer attributed the refusal of Frankfurt theorists to “name the other” to their following the traditional Jewish taboo on naming God or describing paradise (see Jay 1980, 139).] The envisioned utopian society is one in which Judaism can continue as a cohesive group but in which cohesive, nationalistic, corporate gentile groups based on conformity to group norms have been abolished as manifestations of psychopathology.

Horkheimer and Adorno developed the view that the unique role of Judaism in world history was to vindicate the concept of difference against the homogenizing forces thought to represent the essence of Western civilization: “The Jews became the metaphoric equivalent of that remnant of society preserving negation and the non-identical” (Jay 1980, 148). Judaism thus represents the antithesis of Western universalism. The continuation and acceptance of Jewish particularism becomes a precondition for the development of a utopian society of the future.

This seems to me decisive. Judaism would continue the way it always had—ethnocentric and refusing to lose its sense of difference from the surrounding society— but the rest of society would be changed to inoculate it against anti-Semitism.²

* * *

Cofnas: “This quote is MacDonald's from CofC—it is not Horkheimer's.”

This refers to my statement “in Horkheimer’s essay on German Jews (see Horkheimer 1974), the true enemy of the Jews is gentile collectivities of any kind, and especially nationalism.” This statement is indeed my summary of Horkheimer from *CofC*. The question

² This also answers Cofnas’s comment: “MacDonald does not give evidence that this [i.e., that Judaism would continue as it always had] was Horkheimer and Adorno's hope.” And it answers a later comment by Cofnas: “MacDonald may “stand by [his] conclusion,” but, as I point out in the paper, he does not give any actual evidence that the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* promoted different behavior in Jews and gentiles.”

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

is whether I am making a reasonable interpretation of Horkheimer; Cofnas doesn't dispute that it is in fact an accurate interpretation.

* * *

In my original reply, I commented:

[Cofnas] complains about my claim that Jewish intellectual movements “typically [occur] in an atmosphere of Jewish crypsis or semi-crypsis in the sense that the Jewish political agenda [is] not an aspect of the theory and the theories themselves [have] no overt Jewish content” He then brings up Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse as counter-examples because both were critical of Israel.

Cofnas: This is a misleading account of what I said, especially with regard to Marcuse. Marcuse explicitly called for the return of Arab refugees to Israel, which he acknowledged would end Jewish control of the country (and thus end Israel). Earlier MacDonald described the mass immigration of a different race to a country as "Ethnic displacement" that leads to a "drastic loss of fitness" for the population that receives the immigrants. How can Marcuse be thought of as a Jewish ethnic activist if he wanted to impose a "drastic loss of fitness" on a huge, flourishing segment of the Jewish community? Regarding Fromm, Fromm thought the idea of Israel itself was ridiculous. He said: "The claim of the Jews to the land of Israel cannot be a realistic political claim. If all nations would suddenly claim territories in which their forefathers lived two thousand years ago, this world would be a madhouse." This certainly doesn't make it sound like Fromm wanted special treatment for Jews.

Again, I am not trying to account for Jewish viewpoint diversity on issues like Israel. Whatever Marcuse and Fromm thought about Israel is not relevant to whether the Frankfurt School was a Jewish movement (a “Jewish sect” as Gershom Scholem had it) or whether people like Fromm and Marcuse identified as Jews or had a sense of Jewish interests; nor is it relevant to whether the Israel Lobby and neoconservatism are Jewish movements.

* * *

In my original reply I wrote: “I don't see how anything Cofnas writes rebuts my claim that explicit Jewish identities and political interests are not an aspect of the theories I discuss—that the theories have no overt Jewish content.”

Cofnas: Again, my argument is that this claim requires positive evidence to be accepted. It is not enough to just point out that people are ethnically Jewish, or that they had a strong reaction to the holocaust.

I believe I have provided positive evidence (see above).

* * *

I accept Cofnas's comment on Neturei Karta. Nothing hinges on it.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

* * *

I wrote in my original reply: “The important thing, as always, is to see where the power and influence lie at any particular time. Obviously, the views of Fromm, Marcuse (and Neturei Karta) have little influence at this time” (on attitudes toward Israel).

Cofnas: It is not true that "The important thing, as always, is to see where the power and influence lie at any particular time." Who gains the upper hand—the power and influence—is often a matter of luck. The theory in CofC is that Jews promote certain types of ideas and ideologies to advance their interests (as any reasonable person would understand them) this [*sic*] does not fit with the hypothesis of CofC even if those Jews are not ultimately successful in promoting their position.

Again, Cofnas fails to understand the entire rationale behind *CofC*. I am trying to describe certain movements that are influential (powerful) and provide evidence that they reflect Jewish identities and are guided by participants’ perceptions of Jewish interests. None of these have achieved influence by luck. They have been very well-organized and well-funded, and they have had access to prestigious media and academic institutions. They have drawn support from the wider Jewish community (e.g., Jewish use of the services of psychoanalysts, the American Jewish Committee funding *The Authoritarian Personality*, Jewish funding of neoconservative think tanks). Try to find similar resources backing movements reflecting the views of Fromm and Marcuse on Israel. Again, good luck.

* * *

CHAPTER 3: JEWS AND THE LEFT

Cofnas begins by belaboring my misquoting of Katz. I really don’t know what happened there, but I will plead *mea culpa* (not bad to have one misquote in a book of hundreds of quotes). But as I note in my reply and in *CofC*, absolutely nothing hinges on it. Chapter 3 and my later writing are about the twentieth-century Jewish left. Whatever Marx’s attitude toward Judaism and even whether or not Cuddihy is correct in attributing Marx’s theory to the typical stance of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals, Marx himself was not part of any intellectual movement studied in *CofC*.

* * *

Cofnas, commenting on my claim that nationalists’ distrust of Jews may have been based on accurate perceptions of who their enemies were: **“Even if we accept that anti-Semitism is sometimes a response to Jewish behavior, it seems unreasonable to claim that anti-Semites do not tend to caricature Jews in inaccurate ways.”**

In the first chapter of my book on anti-Semitism (*Separation and Its Discontents*), I use social identity theory as the psychological basis of anti-Jewish attitudes and note that quite often such views may be exaggerated or inaccurate, as repeatedly found in social psychology experiments. Nevertheless, perceptions of anti-Semites are often also firmly based in reality—even if perhaps somewhat exaggerated, and in this regard, Cofnas does not dispute the citations I provide to back up my claim that nationalists had good reason to distrust Jews. Again:

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Given the vast overrepresentation of Jews among their enemies, it would have been natural not to trust someone with a Jewish background who offered to participate in a nationalist movement. In fact, Jews generally opposed national cultures throughout Eastern Europe during the period ([here](#), pp. 73–76)—anti-Jewish or not, and often in leadership positions: “their love of cultural icons transcended national and ethnic boundaries in an age of popular nationalism.” Indeed, Jewish lack of attachment to national cultures has been a theme of anti-Semitism throughout the centuries, beginning with the Book of Exodus ([here](#), 60–70), and extending to perceptions of European Jews in the early twentieth century ([here](#), p. 142) and to concern that Jewish [neoconservatives](#) are more loyal to Israel than the United States.

* * *

First, I provide an extended quote from Chapter 3 of *CofC* to better provide a context for Cofnas’s next claim (added material in italics):

Interestingly, the Jews who remained within the party during the period of the nonaggression pact faced a difficult conflict between divided loyalties, indicating that Jewish identity was still important to these individuals. The nonaggression pact provoked a great deal of rationalization on the part of Jewish CPUSA members, often involving an attempt to interpret the Soviet Union’s actions as actually benefiting Jewish interests—clearly an indication that these individuals had not given up their Jewish identities.³ Others continued to be members but silently opposed the party’s line because of their Jewish loyalties. Of great concern for all of these individuals was that the nonaggression pact was destroying their relationship with the wider Jewish community.

In my original reply, I commented, “It seems to me that, if the issue is being evaluated in terms of whether or not it benefits Jewish interests rather than the interests of the country as a whole, this evident rationalization makes my point.”

Cofnas: According to the passage quoted above (from *CofC* and cited in Cofnas 2018) Jewish CPUSA members either rationalized or "silently opposed" the Soviet Union's alliance with the Nazis. But if Jews were evaluating the Soviet Union's actions "in terms of whether or not it benefits Jewish interests," they obviously would have openly opposed Soviet policy. Jewish identity must have been of secondary importance to them if they were willing to accept or acquiesce to an alliance with the Nazis.

First, silent opposition is opposition; secondly, the fact that all were concerned because the pact damaged their relations with the wider Jewish community indicates continuing Jewish

The footnote is from *CofC*: ³. A good example is Joe Rapoport, an American Jewish radical, whose autobiography (Kann 1981) shows the tendency for American Jewish radicals to perceive the Soviet Union almost exclusively in terms of whether it was good for Jews. Rapoport had a very strong Jewish identity and supported the Soviet Union because on balance he believed it was good for Jews. On his trip to the Ukraine in the early 1930s he emphasizes the Jewish enthusiasm for the regime but not the forced starvation of the Ukrainian peasants. Later he had a great deal of ambivalence and regret about supporting Soviet actions that were not in the Jewish interest. Similarly, Jews in the Hollywood Communist Party of screenwriters had strong Jewish identifications and were, privately at least, far more concerned about anti-Semitism than class warfare issues (Gabler 1988, 338).

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

identification; third, the rationalizations of some included the idea that the pact actually served Jewish interest. And immediately after the passage in question, I have this passage, which seems decisive:

In 1946 the CPUSA even adopted a resolution advocating the continuation of the Jewish people as an ethnic entity within socialist societies. Arthur Liebman describes CPUSA members during the period as being elated because of the congruity of their Jewish interests and membership in the party. Feelings of commonality with the wider Jewish community were expressed, and there was an enhanced feeling of Jewishness resulting from interactions with other Jews within the CPUSA: During the postwar period “Communist Jews were expected and encouraged to be Jews, to relate to Jews, and to think of the Jewish people and the Jewish culture in a positive light. At the same time, non-Communist Jews, with some notable exceptions [in the non-communist Jewish left] . . . accepted their Jewish credentials and agreed to work with them in an all-Jewish context” (Liebman 1979, 514). As has happened so often in Jewish history, this upsurge in Jewish self-identity was facilitated by the persecution of Jews, in this case the Holocaust.

* * *

Cofnas makes a big deal about my failing to note Schatz’s point that 40% of those investigated by the Polish secret police were Jews. However, he did not see my revision which I posted the next day and [advertised on Twitter](#) (including mentioning his Twitter name). So he should have been aware that I did access the Rozenbaum article cited by Schatz and substantially revised the section. My conclusion is the same:

Thus Jews were increasingly victimized by the government and security forces from 1949–1968 because of their prominent positions in the government—an account in agreement with the material I cite from Schatz. If there is one thing Jews have learned, it’s that no system of government is guaranteed to be resistant to anti-Jewish attitudes. The main story line is the gradual triumph of Polish nationalism at the expense of Jewish power. Similarly, after being a dominant elite in the Soviet Union beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution and extending at least well into the 1930s (and really until after World War II), [Jewish power declined, Jews were purged from positions of power, and Jews ultimately became leaders of the refusenik movement](#) aimed at being able to emigrate from the USSR.

* * *

In my original reply I wrote: “Gomulka was obviously concerned about the anti-Soviet overtones permeating pro-Israeli sympathies in Poland. But he also must have seen other very important political advantages, namely an opportunity to deal openly and decisively with the Jewish problem which could bring him even greater control over the party leadership.”

Cofnas: It's certainly not clear from this passage to what extent the charge of Zionist sympathy was a pretext for attacking Jews.

I’m just going by Rozenbaum’s article. Given that there had already been purges of Jews beginning after 1949, Jews likely didn’t have all that much power by 1967–1968 (there were

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

only 25,000 Jews remaining) so the purges may have had deeper reasons than simply expanding Gomulka's power. Nevertheless, Rozenbaum's position seems reasonable and is broadly consistent with Schatz's, although he does not go into detail about what positions Jews held at the latter time, and as a result it's not clear to what extent Jewish power was really an issue at this time.

* * *

I have revised my statement that "by far the most important target of the security forces in Poland were the nationalists to apply only to the 1945–1949 period, but this anti-nationalist campaign certainly continued well after that.

* * *

I have a comment in my original reply that the acceptance of personnel into the security forces in post-World War II Poland "had to do with Jewish issues."

Cofnas: "This claim is not supported by the quoted text (below). Schatz says that Jews were recruited to the security forces because their experience had made them reliable due to their 'sympathies for the new political system and because of their isolation and exposed position in the wider society.' Schatz doesn't say anything about 'Jewish issues.'"

My assumption here was that their "isolation and exposed position in the wider society" derived from the fact that they were Jews. Seems reasonable. What other reasons could there be? As I noted in Chapter 3 on the immediate post-war period, "the Jewish-dominated government regarded the Jewish population, many of whom had not previously been communists, as 'a reservoir that could be trusted and enlisted in its efforts to rebuild the country. Although not old, 'tested' comrades, they were not rooted in the social networks of the anti-communist society, they were outsiders with regard to its historically shaped traditions, without connections to the Catholic Church, and hated by those who hated the regime.⁴ Thus they could be depended on and used to fill the required position' (Schatz 1991, 212–213). Jewish issues were definitely involved.

* * *

CHAPTER 7: JEWISH INVOLVEMENT IN SHAPING U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY

I claimed in my original reply that Cofnas did not dispute the central role Jews and Jewish organizations in the passage of the immigration law of 1965,

Cofnas: "Due to space constraints, I could not address every issue in my paper in *Human Nature*. The fact that I do not dispute something does not mean that I accept it."

⁴. The "tested" comrades constituted an underground Jewish communist group in prewar Poland. When they came to power following the war, they allied themselves with other Jews who had not been communists prior to the war.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Fair enough, but recall that, as I noted in the Introduction of my original reply, immigration policy is *the most critical issue in the entire book*. I'd be happy enough to have shown that, even if everything else in *CofC* was wrong.

* * *

Re my comments on John Dewey, in my original reply, I quoted Cofnas from his *Human Nature* article as follows:

MacDonald “argues that Dewey was being manipulated by his less famous, albeit Jewish, *student*, Sidney Hook.” However, I did mention that Hook was Dewey’s student and never said that Dewey was being “manipulated,” only that he was being promoted by an intellectual who achieved a great deal of prominence and influence as a New York Intellectual.

Cofnas responds: **“MacDonald does not use the word "manipulated" (I never claimed that he does), but his argument is that Dewey was elevated as a major intellectual in order to serve as an unwitting spokesman for Jewish interests. According to that theory there seems to be a sense in which he was "manipulated.”**

I have no idea exactly how Dewey saw the situation but, whatever his perceptions, they do not affect the main point: Dewey was being promoted by Jewish intellectuals who liked his opinions. I fail to see any necessary sense in which Dewey was manipulated.

Similarly, Cofnas defends his claim that I saw Margaret Mead as a “puppet” by saying **“Being "manipulated" or being a "puppet" does not seem incompatible with holding sincere beliefs.”** I suppose that being manipulated or being a puppet might be compatible with sincere beliefs on the part of the puppet, although the word ‘manipulate’ suggests the person is being controlled. Consider Wikipedia’s [definition](#) of psychological manipulation: “Psychological manipulation is a type of social influence that aims to change the behavior or perception of others through abusive, deceptive, or underhanded tactics.” By advancing the interests of the manipulator, often at another’s expense, such methods could be considered exploitative, abusive, devious, and deceptive. Thus, it seems to me that using these terms is an attempt to make my proposal, based on appropriate sources, as an extreme, outrageous proposal—Dewey and Mead as babes in the woods manipulated by nefarious Jews. This is just another example of Cofnas’s misrepresentation of *CofCs*.

* * *

Regarding my quote from David Hollinger: **Cofnas: It's not clear why MacDonald believes that this quote by Hollinger so strongly supports his claims about Dewey. Hollinger says that "Congregationalists like Dewey did not need" Jews to promote radical ideas, but they were "resoundingly encouraged" to do so by Jews "in urban academic and literary communities." This seems to be clearly consistent with the default hypothesis that these ideas were promoted by high IQ urban people (both Jews and gentile whites).**

Hollinger is clearly not attributing the sea change in academic life to high-IQ gentiles. He is saying Jews were the main force—they “transformed the ethnoreligious demography of

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

American academic life.” A good example is the establishment of anthropology as dedicated to Jewish interests in cultural pluralism, as noted above and in Chapter 2. When the ascendant Jewish elite encountered prominent non-Jews who shared their views, they promoted them so that Dewey’s ideas gained greater attention. Without this promotion by Jews, Dewey’s liberal/left ideology would have had less influence. That’s all I am saying.

And remember that at the time when this was going on, there were plenty of high-IQ non-Jews who were prominent in opposing immigration and promoting Darwinism in the social sciences which, after all had been the received wisdom until Boas. After the Jewish ascendancy gained power, it’s not surprising that high IQ non-Jews who dissented from the views promulgated by the Jewish left were forced to enter other fields, and the left/liberal views of the academic establishment, propagated also by the elite media, had a great deal of influence on college-educated Americans (see my paper “[Why Are Professors Liberals](#)” and my [review](#) of Eric Kaufmann’s *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*).

* * *

Cofnas disputes Andrew Joyce’s analysis of the rise of Spinoza to world-historical importance as the result of Jewish academic activism by providing a laudatory quote from Nietzsche. This is not close to an adequate rebuttal of Joyce’s research on this. Mention should also be made of an [article](#) Joyce wrote on Nietzsche’s complicated relationships with Jews, concluding: “Reviewing some of Nietzsche’s writings from this point on [1878], I am tempted to concur with Ernst Jünemann that his philosophical trajectory was one of steady descent into insanity and Judeophilia.”

Notice also that Cofnas does not dispute the point in my original reply that Jewish intellectuals have worked to destroy the reputations of intellectuals with ideas they disliked (T.S. Eliot, et al.). If Jewish intellectuals can work to destroy reputations, they can also work to promote reputations, as in the case of Dewey and Spinoza—and the other intellectuals reviewed in *CofC*. Nothing surprising about that.

* * *

Cofnas: Madison Grant viciously ridiculed non-Nordic Europeans and argued that immigration from non-Nordic European countries like Italy and Spain should be restricted (see Cofnas 2018, p. 18). I commented that, in opposing Grant's ideas, Jews were effectively promoting white unity. Whether Jews were undermining white unity by promoting different ideas is a separate issue.

Cofnas is trying to put a positive spin on Jewish activism in opposing the 1924 immigration law. Jews did make alliances with Italians on this issue, but it’s quite clear that this was an alliance of convenience. As I note later in the chapter, Jewish pro-immigration activists in the period prior to the 1965 law were disappointed in the lack of enthusiasm on this issue by Italian-Americans. And, as the chapter makes clear, Jewish activists, beginning in the nineteenth century with opposition to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, promoted a multiracial image of America definitely not in the interests of Italian-Americans.

* * *

In my original reply, I noted that Jewish activism was aimed at making White Americans a small minority. **Cofnas: The quote above (taken from *CofC*) provides no justification for the**

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

claim that "Jewish activists were promoting making Whites a small minority in [the] country." The idea that removing the immigration quotas would cause non-white people to come in large numbers was not something that people obviously would have anticipated at the time, given that virtually all immigration was coming from different European countries.

On the contrary, it was already well-known that non-Whites would come in large numbers—hence the Chinese Exclusion Act and the concern of many restrictionists at the time who were worried that immigration would dramatically change the country (Rep. William N. Vaile: “It is a good country. It suits us. And what we assert is that we are not going to surrender it to somebody else or allow other people, no matter what their merits, to make it something different. If there is any changing to be done, we will do it ourselves. (*Cong. Rec.*, April 8, 1924, 5922)).

And during the 1950s, immigration restrictionists emphasized that the U.S. was already under siege from people wanting to immigrate. Senator Pat McCarran in 1953: “Today, as never before, untold millions are storming our gates for admission and those gates are cracking under the strain. The solution of the problems of Europe and Asia will not come through a transplanting of those problems en masse to the United States. . . . I do not intend to become prophetic, but if the enemies of this legislation succeed in riddling it to pieces, or in amending it beyond recognition, they will have contributed more to promote this nation’s downfall than any other group since we achieved our independence as a nation.” (Senator Pat McCarran, *Cong. Rec.*, March 2, 1953, 1518)

And where would the 900 million immigrants that Louis Marshall (the key Jewish activist in the 1920s) envisioned come from after the national origins provisions had been gutted? Jewish activism during the entire period from the 1880s to 1965 was aimed at promoting multiracial immigration to the U.S. Recall this statement from the American Jewish Committee quoted from Chapter 7: “Americanism is not to be measured by conformity to law, or zeal for education, or literacy, or any of these qualities in which immigrants may excel the native-born. Americanism is the spirit behind the welcome that America has traditionally extended to people of all races, all religions, all nationalities” (in Cohen 1972, 369). American Jewish Congress had the same perspective:

During this period [1950s] the *Congress Weekly*, the journal of the AJCongress, regularly denounced the national origins provisions as based on the “myth of the existence of superior and inferior racial stocks” (Oct. 17, 1955, p. 3) and advocated immigration on the basis of “need and other criteria unrelated to race or national origin” (May 4, 1953, p. 3). Particularly objectionable from the perspective of the AJCongress was the implication that there should be no change in the ethnic status quo prescribed by the 1924 legislation (e.g., Goldstein 1952a, 6). The national origins formula “is outrageous now . . . when our national experience has confirmed beyond a doubt that our very strength lies in the diversity of our peoples” (Goldstein 1952b, 5).

Jewish activists opposed the idea that the United States had any ethnic connotations—that the U.S. should be seen as a proposition nation dedicated only to certain ideals. Thus the comment from Joseph L. Blau (1958, 15) writing in a publication of the American Jewish Congress: “[Horace] Kallen’s view is needed to serve the cause of minority groups and minority cultures in this nation without a permanent majority”—the implication being that Kallen’s ideology of

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

multiculturalism opposes the interests of any ethnic group in dominating the United States.” Note particularly the phrase “no permanent majority. These Jewish activists were maintaining that the U.S ought to be up for grabs ethnically and culturally at a time when an ethnic status quo had been legislated by the 1924 immigration law—a status quo designed to make Northwest Europeans a permanent majority. This type of thinking was already on the table in the 1920s, as exemplified by Maurice Samuel’s opposition to an ethnic conception of the United States:

The well-known author and prominent Zionist Maurice Samuel (1924, 215), writing partly as a negative reaction to the immigration law of 1924, wrote, “If, then, the struggle between us [i.e., Jews and gentiles] is ever to be lifted beyond the physical, your democracies will have to alter their demands for racial, spiritual and cultural homogeneity with the State. But it would be foolish to regard this as a possibility, for the tendency of this civilization is in the opposite direction. There is a steady approach toward the identification of government with race, instead of with the political State.”

Samuel deplored the 1924 legislation as violating his conceptualization of the United States as a purely political entity with no ethnic implications.

We have just witnessed, in America, the repetition, in the peculiar form adapted to this country, of the evil farce to which the experience of many centuries has not yet accustomed us. If America had any meaning at all, it lay in the peculiar attempt to rise above the trend of our present civilization—the identification of race with State. . . . America was therefore the New World in this vital respect—that the State was purely an ideal, and nationality was identical only with acceptance of the ideal. But it seems now that the entire point of view was a mistaken one, that America was incapable of rising above her origins, and the semblance of an ideal-nationalism was only a stage in the proper development of the universal gentile spirit. . . . (pp. 218–219)

* * *

CHAPTER 8: WHITHER JEWS AND THE WEST?

Cofnas agrees that he shouldn’t have implied that I claimed that Jews exhibited “hypocrisy” in their attitudes on immigration in the diaspora versus Israel. However, he writes: **“When MacDonald says “Whereas” Jews in America advocate multiculturalism in American, Israeli Jews do not advocate multiculturalism, it seems clear that he is trying to portray this as somehow an inconsistency, i.e., Jews are advocating one thing in one [comment ends].”**

My point is that such attitudes are not based on a general principle (e.g., that multiracial immigration is a universal good that all societies should pursue). I am simply illustrating the general point that Jewish interests diverge in different contexts. There is a disparity, not hypocrisy. In a lot of my writing since establishing *The Occidental Observer*, I am trying to get White Westerners to be more concerned about interests and less addicted to principles that conflict with their interests.

* * *

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Cofnas, commenting on my description of Israeli laws on immigration, writes that my description **“does not make MacDonald's false claim true. Immigration to Israel is not “officially restricted to Jews,” as MacDonald claims.”**

I acknowledge that my claim in Chapter 8 that “immigration to Israel is officially restricted to Jews” is inaccurate because of the possibility that spouses can immigrate. However, my general point on the restrictiveness of Israeli immigration policy stands, and the summary of Israeli immigration law in my original reply is accurate. Immigration to Israel for non-Jews is very limited. (As I am writing this, Israel [announced](#) a UN program that will distribute African refugees to Western countries and thus, in the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, relieve the suffering of Israelis in a Tel Aviv neighborhood [but inflict suffering on a Western country?].) As a [website](#) describing the Law of Return notes, “Israel, despite being a liberal democratic country, is not an immigration country. Therefore, Israel does not have laws and regulations enabling foreigners who wish to come and settle Israel the opportunity to do so.” As I wrote in my original reply, “I may be going out on a limb here, but I’m thinking every Jewish organization in America would be up in arms” if the U.S. adopted laws favoring people of European descent analogous to those of Israel favoring Jews.

* * *

Cofnas: Alan Dershowitz celebrates the fact that Ethiopians bring "racial and cultural diversity" to Israel, and they are "an increasingly important part of the Jewish nation's experiment in multiculturalism." When Jews like Dershowitz say this sort of thing about America, for MacDonald it is transparently anti-gentile white. So why does he think it's so obvious that Dershowitz's pro-African immigration activism in Israel is a secret ploy to help Israel? MacDonald is committed to the idea that whatever Dershowitz does there must be a hidden agenda to advance Jewish interests. But there is no positive evidence to support this claim.

I am not saying Dershowitz is engaging in a “secret ploy”—yet another attempt by Cofnas to misrepresent me as an outlandish conspiracy theorist. And his claim that **“MacDonald is committed to the idea that whatever Dershowitz does there must be a hidden agenda to advance Jewish interests”** is nothing more than a vicious ad hominem. I don’t know what Dershowitz’s motives are, although I did propose some possible motives consistent with his strong Jewish identity and his demonstrated record as a Jewish activist promoting Jewish interests—[“Israel’s lawyer.”](#)). My proposals for the motivation of U.S. Jews in promoting multiracial immigration are not based on Dershowitz but on the entire history of Jewish activism in the area, summarized in Chapter 7. Whatever the activism of some American Jews regarding immigration to Israel, I am confident that the ethnoreligious right is firmly in charge in Israel and will prevent immigration from places like Ethiopia to be able to alter the nature of Israeli society into anything resembling the multicultural utopia envisioned by American Jews for the U.S.

* * *

Re intermarriage, Cofnas claims that the fact that liberal, secular Jews who were depicted in *CofC* to be pursuing their ethnic interests, are disappearing because of intermarriage and low fertility **“does not seem consistent with the hypothesis of *CofC*.”**

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Intermarriage is of course more likely among secular, non-religious Jews, although issues often [remain](#). In any case, this does nothing to argue against the evidence that the Jewish figures I discussed in *CofC* did indeed identify as Jews and pursued what they perceived to be Jewish interests. So far as I know, none of the figures I discussed intermarried.

* * *

Cofnas: There is little sense to the idea that intermarriage rates probably exceeding 70% among reform and unaffiliated Jews (the majority in the US), combined with very low fertility, contributes to a group evolutionary strategy. There can be no doubt that, if liberal, secular Jews had *low* intermarriage rates and high fertility, MacDonald would claim that this was strong evidence in favor of his theory.

I am just going with the data showing that intermarriage has benefits for the community, although of course I would agree that there are costs in terms of ethnic fragmentation. The three points I made in that passage stand (the Zionist solution to intermarriage, benefits to the diaspora community, and the fertile core Jewish population). Moreover, the Jewish population in the United States is [not declining in absolute numbers](#), although it may not be keeping up with the immigration-fueled population growth of the U.S. And again, as in my rejoinder to the previous comment, the hypothesis of *CofC* is that the Jews I discussed did indeed identify as Jews and pursued what they perceived to be Jewish interests, not whether they intermarried or not. The general marriage preferences of liberal, secular Jews are not relevant to the Jewish identities and sense of pursuing Jewish interests of the Jews I discuss in *CofC*. And again, so far as I know, none of the figures I discussed intermarried. So, once again, Cofnas erects a straw man and then attempts to refute it. Yet another misrepresentation.

* * *

Cofnas: “It is not accurate to describe "the Jewish community" as "respond[ing] to problems as they arise" if various Jews respond to the same circumstances in opposite ways.”

While I have repeatedly said that the Jewish community is not monolithic, I do accept the idea that at particular times and on particular issues there is more or less of a Jewish consensus (although of course not unanimous). I agree with J.J. Goldberg as summarized in Chapter 8:

The general message of Goldberg’s (1996) book, *Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment*, is that American Judaism is well organized and lavishly funded. It has achieved a great deal of power, and it has been successful in achieving its interests. There is a great deal of consensus on broad Jewish issues, particularly in the areas of Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, abortion rights, and civil liberties (p. 5). Indeed, the consensus on these issues among Jewish activist organizations and the Jewish intellectual movements reviewed here despite a great deal of disagreement on other issues is striking. Massive changes in public policy on these issues beginning with the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s coincide with the period of increasing Jewish power and influence in the United States.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Some areas of this consensus may indeed be unraveling, particularly with respect to Israel and certainly on civil liberties as Jewish organizations have [spearheaded](#) restrictions on free speech. But there is no question that at this time American Jewish power is mainly deployed to support Israel, and I don't see that changing any time soon.

* * *

Cofnas denies any “name-calling” in his original article. As noted above, I took particular umbrage to his claim that I was incompetent and prone to cherry picking and misrepresentation. Seems like name-calling to me. I have found no examples of cherry picking and none of misrepresentation apart from a botched reference to Jacob Katz that still puzzles me and, in any case, makes absolutely no difference to the argument of *CofC*.

* * *

Cofnas: “Re the alleged misrepresentation discussed in the Appendix, Here MacDonald quotes only part of the passage that I cited, and he leaves out some of his commentary that misrepresents Sanford. The passage in *CofC* continues: "Again, individuals identifying strongly with the ideology of a majority group are viewed as suffering from psychopathology, yet Judaism as a viable religion would necessarily be associated with these same psychological processes."”

This is the passage as quoted by Cofnas in his original article:

R. Nevitt Sanford . . . finds that affiliation with various Christian religious sects is associated with ethnocentrism, and that individuals who have rebelled against their parents and adopted another religion or no religion are lower on ethnocentrism. These relationships are explained as due to the fact that acceptance of a Christian religion is associated with “conformity, conventionalism, authoritarian submission, determination by external pressures, thinking in ingroup-outgroup terms and the like vs. nonconformity, independence, internalization of values, and so forth” (Adorno et al. [1950](#):220). Again, individuals identifying strongly with the ideology of a majority group are viewed as suffering from psychopathology, yet Judaism as a viable religion would necessarily be associated with these same psychological processes (MacDonald [1998a](#):174–75).

Cofnas is claiming that I misrepresented Sanford but then complains that I left out the last part of the passage which refers to Judaism which Sanford never discussed. The last part of the passage clearly does not claim anything about what Sanford wrote but rather about what he didn't write, so I can't very well be misrepresenting him by not including it my reply. It was clearly a comment applying what Sanford wrote about Christians to Judaism: I simply stated that “conformity, conventionalism, authoritarian submission, determination by external pressures, thinking in ingroup-outgroup terms and the like vs. nonconformity, independence, internalization of values, and so forth” would also be characteristic of Judaism for it to be a viable group. How am I misrepresenting Sanford? I am simply providing an accurate characterization of how Sanford sees affiliation with the mainstream Christian sects as being linked to ethnocentrism and am merely asking readers to consider about how it would apply to Judaism.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

* * *

In my original reply, I wrote: “In other words, Sanford is proposing that the real issue is whether the religion is self-chosen as indicated by being different from the mother’s.”

Cofnas: “This is not correct. The issue for Sanford is whether the religion is "'genuine,' in the sense that it was arrived at more or less independently of external pressure and takes the form of internalized values" (as quoted below). Sanford does not say that the "real issue" is whether the religion is different from the mother's.”

But my statement says that the important thing is that the religion is “self-chosen as indicated by being different from the mother’s.” Cofnas is therefore misrepresenting me by claiming Sanford thinks **"real issue" is whether the religion is different from the mother's,** leaving out the rest. He accomplishes his misrepresentation by leaving out part of my sentence and then pretends that I didn’t realize that Sanford was claiming that it was really about whether the religion was self-chosen. I have interpreted Sanford correctly. For Sanford, having a different religion from the mother is simply a marker that the person has adopted the religion as a result of free choice rather than authoritarian conformity.

* * *

In my original reply I wrote that according to Sanford: “affiliation with *various* Christian religious sects is linked with ethnocentrism” (emphasis added). I am not claiming anything about “all Christian religious sects,” and therefore I am not claiming that, according to Sanford, Christian beliefs per se are the problem.

Cofnas: As noted in the first comment to this Appendix, MacDonald does not quote the full passage from *CofC* that I quoted. After the quote from Sanford MacDonald commented that "Again, individuals identifying strongly with the ideology of the majority group are viewed as suffering from psychopathology" (in the immediately preceding sentence he referred to "a Christian religion," so by "ideology of the majority group" he clearly means "Christianity").

How much clearer can I get?? In *CofC* I clearly restrict Sanford’s claims to “various Christian sects,” not all of Christianity. And when I am referring to the “majority group” I am, like Sanford, referring to the mainstream large Christian denominations, not the small Protestant sects, and yes, Sanford portrays the former as by-and-large problematic.

* * *

Regarding my point that Sanford himself made some general statements linking Christianity with ethnocentrism:

Cofnas: This is at best highly misleading. Sanford claimed that negative personality traits lead people to unthinkingly adopt the religion of the majority, but he said that "genuine" Christianity is associated with positive personality traits. So he was most certainly not saying that there is an inherent link between Christianity and ethnocentrism.

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

I completely agree with Cofnas's summary of Sanford here. But that's exactly what I said in summarizing Sanford's detailed theory. However, I also noted that Sanford made some general statements about Christianity that are not reflected in what one might call his more considered view. If anything, Sanford made the lapse, not I. In particular, as I wrote in my original reply, Sanford made the following statements: (1) the statement linking affiliation with large Christian denominations with ethnocentrism ... —their means, after all, are considerably higher than the Unitarians and the minor Protestant sects—combined with Sanford's point that simply being part of a Christian ingroup may be enough to yield negative feelings toward outgroups; and (2) the statement at the beginning of the Discussion section...: "Belonging to or identifying oneself with a religious body in America today certainly does not mean that one thereby takes over the traditional Christian values of tolerance, brotherhood, and equality. On the contrary, it appears that these values are more firmly held by people who do not affiliate with any religious group" (p. 219).

* * *

I wrote in a comment on #2 in the previous paragraph that "This last statement is particularly interesting because it appears in the general summary of the chapter—the take-home message, if you will. One wonders why Sanford would make such statements if he didn't want to convey the idea that Christian religious affiliation per se was problematic."

Cofnas: If Sanford wanted to convey the idea that Christian religious affiliation is "per se" problematic, why would he say that "genuine" Christianity is associated with positive psychological traits?

Clearly Sanford is saying Christianity *as it actually exists in 1940s America* is problematic—exactly what I wrote in my original reply.

* * *

Cofnas flags my statement that "various Christian religious sects," not "all Christian religious sects") were linked to ethnocentrism:

Cofnas: MacDonald wrote "various Christian religious sects" as well as "a Christian religion," which I cannot interpret as referring to anything other than a generic Christianity.

But the context in Chapter 5 makes clear that the relationships between ethnocentrism and Christianity only hold for some Christian groups. Obviously when I am summarizing Sanford's views on when there is a relationship between the "Christian religion" and ethnocentrism, I am *not* referring to the sects in which such relationships do not hold. Therefore, I am not saying that Sanford is claiming a general relationship between Christianity and ethnocentrism.

* * *

Cofnas flags my statement in my original reply: "Given that Judaism is all about having a strong sense of ingroup...."

Second Reply to Nathan Cofnas

Cofnas: This is certainly not true of Judaism as it is practiced by the vast majority of American Jews (today or when *The Authoritarian Personality* was written). Jews who go to synagogue on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur are not "all about having a strong sense of ingroup." Again, there is no evidence that the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* applied a double standard to Judaism and Christianity.

The authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* did not have a double standard because they completely ignored saying anything about the ingroup aspects of Judaism. Jewish intermarriage in the U.S. in the late 1940s was [negligible](#) and although it is much higher today, Jewish organizations staffed by strongly identified Jews as well as individual strongly identified Jews with prominent positions in the media, academia, and political culture continue to be very influential.

* * *

Cofnas: Reform/unaffiliated Jews like Adorno et al. are dying out, precisely because they didn't (and don't) have a "strong sense of being an ingroup."

As indicated above, I believe that Adorno had a strong sense of Jewish identity—despite being only half-Jewish himself. It is worth mentioning that in regard to Reform/unaffiliated Jews “dying out” that Adorno married a woman from a Jewish family. His children would have been Jewish according to Jewish religious law.

DISCUSSION

I am not sure that anyone will actually read this far into what has been a tedious exercise. Nevertheless, the verdict must be that the thesis of *CofC* has emerged unscathed from Cofnas's critique. I look forward to continued debate, although I believe that further discussions based on Cofnas's critique are pointless.

Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from this regarding scholarship and collectivist passions, a frequent cause of motivated cognition. There is clearly an insulting, abusive tone in Cofnas's writing, organized, it would seem, around defense of Jewish honor. The motive is noble. I aspire to be as deeply concerned about my own people.

But if we are to iterate towards full understanding of how group identity has shaped Western history and led to the present dispensation, we must maintain civility. That can be an ordeal when one feels so passionately.

It can take considerable self-discipline, but it can be done. Just as the West eventually separated church and state, the motives of group love and hate must be separated from scholarship if reason is to win the day.

I should also say that I will not respond in the future to [comments on a pdf](#). Cutting and pasting them was tedious and at times impossible because they resulted in destroying the formatting in Word.