The Jewish Criticism of Gentile Culture: A Reprise

Do you remember, he asked me, what Lueger, the anti-Semitic mayor of Vienna, once said to the municipality of Vienna when a subsidy for the natural sciences was asked for? “Science? That is what one Jew cribs from another.” That is what I say about Ideengeschichte, history of ideas. (Isaiah Berlin, reflecting on a conversation with Lewis Namier; in Efron 1994, 13)

The material in the previous four chapters indicates that individuals who strongly identified as Jews have been the main motivating force behind several highly influential intellectual movements that have simultaneously subjected gentile culture to radical criticism and allowed for the continuity of Jewish identification. Together these movements comprise the intellectual and political left in this century, and they are the direct intellectual ancestors of current leftist intellectual and political movements, particularly postmodernism and multiculturalism.

Collectively, these movements have called into question the fundamental moral, political, and economic foundations of Western society. A critical feature of these movements is that they have been, at least in the United States, top-down movements in the sense that they were originated and dominated by members of a highly intelligent and highly educated group. These movements have been advocated with great intellectual passion and moral fervor and with a very high level of theoretical sophistication. Each movement promised its own often overlapping and complementary version of utopia: a society composed of people with the same biological potential for accomplishment and able to be easily molded by culture into ideal citizens as imagined by a morally and intellectually superior elite; a classless society in which there would be no conflicts of interest and people would altruistically work for the good of the group; a society in which people would be free of neuroses and aggression toward outgroups and in tune with their biological urges; a multicultural paradise in which different racial and ethnic groups would live in harmony
and cooperation—a utopian dream that also occupies center stage in the discussion of Jewish involvement in shaping U.S. immigration policy in Chapter 7. Each of these utopias is profoundly problematic from an evolutionary perspective, a theme that will be returned to in Chapter 8.

The originators of these movements were all vitally concerned with anti-Semitism, and all of the utopias envisioned by these intellectual and political movements would end anti-Semitism while allowing for Jewish group continuity. A generation of Jewish radicals looked to the Soviet Union as an idyllic place where Jews could rise to positions of preeminence and where anti-Semitism was officially outlawed while Jewish national life flourished. The psychoanalytic movement and the Frankfurt School looked forward to the day when gentiles would be inoculated against anti-Semitism by a clinical priesthood that could heal the personal inadequacies and the frustrations at loss of status that gentiles murderously projected onto the Jews. And the Boasians and the Frankfurt School and their descendants would prevent the development of anti-Semitic ideologies of majoritarian ethnocentrism.

A palpable sense of intellectual and moral superiority of those participating in these movements is another characteristic feature. This sense of intellectual superiority and hostility to gentiles and their culture was a recurrent theme of the leftist movements discussed in Chapter 3. I have also documented a profound sense of intellectual superiority and estrangement from gentile culture that characterized not only Freud but also the entire psychoanalytic movement. The sense of superiority on the part of a “self-constituted cultural vanguard” (Lasch 1991, 453–455) of Jewish intellectuals toward lower-middle-class mores and attitudes was a theme of Chapter 5.

Regarding moral superiority, the central pose of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals is a sense that Judaism represents a moral beacon to the rest of humanity (SAID, Ch. 7). These movements thus constitute concrete examples of the ancient and recurrent Jewish self-conceptualization as a “light of the nations,” reviewed extensively in SAID (Ch. 7). Moral indictments of their opponents are a prominent theme in the writings of political radicals and those opposing biological perspectives on individual and group differences in IQ. A sense of moral superiority was also prevalent in the psychoanalytic movement, and we have seen that the Frankfurt School developed a moral perspective in which the existence of Judaism was viewed as an a priori moral absolute and in which social science was to be judged by moral criteria.

As noted in Chapter 1, current psychological theory and data are highly compatible with supposing that viewpoints advocated by minorities are able to influence attitudes held by the majority, especially when possessing a high degree of internal consistency and especially when they are disseminated from the most prestigious academic and media institutions in the society. Although the influence on gentile societies of Jewish involvement in these intellectual and political movements cannot be assessed with any degree of certainty, the material presented here suggests that Jewish involvement was a critical factor.
Several features of these intellectual movements can be viewed as serving Jewish interests. The greatest danger for a minority group strategy is the development of a highly cohesive, sectarian majority group that views the minority group as a negatively evaluated outgroup. In combating this potential threat, one type of strategy has been to actively promote universalist ideologies within the larger society in which the Jewish-gentile social categorization is of minimal importance. Judaism as a cohesive, ethnically based group strategy continues to exist, but in a cryptic or semi-cryptic state. The exemplar of this strategy is leftist political ideology; however psychoanalysis and even forms of Judaism that minimize phenotypic differentiation between Jews and gentiles, such as Reform Judaism (see *SAID*, Ch. 6), adopt a similar strategy.

Jewish interests are also served by facilitating radical individualism (social atomization) among gentiles while retaining a powerful sense of group cohesion among Jews—the agenda of the Frankfurt School. Gentile group identifications are regarded as an indication of psychopathology. An important component of this strategy is the deconstruction of majoritarian intellectual movements that are incompatible with the continuation of Judaism. These majoritarian intellectual movements may range from radical assimilationism (e.g., the forced conversions to Christianity) to exclusivist majority group strategies based on majority group ethnocentrism (e.g., National Socialism).

Jewish interests are also served by the Frankfurt School ideology that gentile concerns about losing social status and being eclipsed economically, socially, and demographically by other groups are an indication of psychopathology. As an exceptionally upwardly mobile group, this ideology serves Jewish interests by defusing gentile concerns about their downward mobility, and we shall see in Chapter 7 that Jewish organizations and Jewish intellectuals have been at the forefront of the movement to eclipse the demographic and cultural dominance of European-derived peoples in Western societies.

Several themes common to these Jewish intellectual movements bear mentioning. An important thread apparent in the discussions of psychoanalysis, Boasian anthropology, the Frankfurt School, and radical intellectual and political circles has been that Jewish intellectuals have formed highly cohesive groups whose influence derives to great extent from the solidarity and cohesiveness of the group. The influence of minority ideologies is augmented to the extent that there is a high degree of consensus and internal intellectual consistency among those adopting the minority position (see Ch. 1). Intellectual activity is like any other human endeavor: Cohesive groups outcompete individualist strategies. Indeed, the fundamental truth of this axiom has been central to the success of Judaism throughout its history (*PTSDA*, Ch. 5).

Indeed, Jewish associational patterns in science go well beyond the cohesive intellectual movements discussed here. Recently Greenwald and Schuh (1994) demonstrated a pattern of ethnic discrimination in scientific citations whereby Jewish authors were 40 percent more likely to cite Jewish authors
than were non-Jewish authors. Jewish first authors of scientific papers were also approximately three times more likely to have Jewish coauthors than were non-Jewish first authors. Although the methods used in the study did not allow determination of the direction of discrimination, the findings reported throughout this volume strongly suggest that a large proportion of the discrimination originates with Jewish scientists. This is also suggested by the disproportionate representation of Jewish coauthors, presumably the result of Jewish in-group associational patterns both as mentors and colleagues. Moreover, where there are proportionate differences in group size, individuals in minority groups are generally more prone to ingroup bias than are majority group members (Mullen 1991), suggesting that Jews would be more strongly inclined toward ethnic discrimination than gentiles.

Citation by other scientists is an important indication of scholarly accomplishment and is often a key measure used in tenure decisions by universities. As a result, ethnocentric biases in citation patterns are not merely an index of ingroup bias among Jewish scientists; these patterns also have the effect of promoting the work and reputation of other Jewish scientists. Providing further evidence in this regard, the studies by Kadushin (1974), Shapiro (1989, 1992), and Torrey (1992) of twentieth-century American intellectuals indicate not only a strong overlap among Jewish background, Jewish ethnic identification, Jewish associational patterns, radical political beliefs, and psychoanalytic influence but also a pattern of mutual citation and admiration. In Kadushin’s study, almost half of the complete sample of elite American intellectuals were Jewish (Kadushin 1974, 23). The sample was based on the most frequent contributors to leading intellectual journals, followed by interviews in which the intellectuals “voted” for another intellectual whom he or she considered most influential in their thinking. Over 40 percent of the Jews in the sample received six or more votes as being most influential, compared to only 15 percent of non-Jews (p. 32).

Jews have also been greatly overrepresented as editors, publishers and contributors to a variety of radical and liberal periodicals, including The Nation, The New Republic, and The Progressive (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 105). In 1974 The New Republic (TNR) was purchased by Martin Peretz, son of a “devoted Labor Zionist and right-wing Jabotinskyist” (Alterman 1992, 185) and himself a leftist student activist before moving in the direction of neoconservatism. The only consistent theme in Peretz’s career is a devotion to Jewish causes, particularly Israel. He reflects a major theme of Chapter 3 in that he abandoned the New Left when some in the movement condemned Israel as racist and imperialist. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, he told Henry Kissinger that his “dovishness stopped at the delicatessen door” (p. 185), and many among his staff feared that all issues would be decided on the basis of what was “good for the Jews” (p. 186). Indeed, one editor was instructed to obtain material from the Israeli embassy for use in TNR editorials. “It is not enough to say that TNR’s owner is merely obsessed with Israel; he says so himself. But more importantly, Peretz is obsessed with Israel’s critics, Israel’s would-
be critics, and people who never heard of Israel, but might one day know someone who might someday become a critic” (p. 195).

Similarly, in the literary world, the highly influential left-wing journal *Partisan Review* (PR) was a principle showcase of “the New York Intellectuals,” a group dominated by editors and contributors with a Jewish ethnic identity and a deep alienation from American political and cultural institutions (Cooney 1986, 225ff; Shapiro 1989; Wisse 1987). Clement Greenberg, the highly influential art critic whose work helped establish the Abstract Expressionist movement in the 1940s, is a prototypical member of this group. He made his reputation entirely within what one might term a Jewish intellectual milieu. Greenberg was a writer for PR, managing editor of *Contemporary Jewish Record* (the forerunner of *Commentary*), long-time editor of *Commentary* under Elliot Cohen, as well as art critic for *The Nation*.

There was thus an overlap between official Jewish publications and the secular intellectual journals associated with the New York Intellectuals. Indeed, *Commentary*, published by the American Jewish Committee, became the most widely known journal of the New York Intellectuals, serving to introduce a wider audience to their ideas while also dealing with Jewish issues. Several New York Intellectuals had editorial positions at *Commentary*, including, besides Greenberg, Robert Warshow, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, Sidney Hook, and Norman Podhoretz; PR editor Philip Rahv also served as managing editor for *Contemporary Jewish Record*. Because of the overlap among the contributors and editors, the following are considered the magazines associated with the New York Intellectuals (Jumonville 1991, 8, 234): *PR, Commentary, Menorah Journal, Dissent, The Nation, Politics, Encounter, The New Leader, The New York Review of Books, The Public Interest, The New Criterion, The National Interest*, and *Tikkun*.

*PR* originated as an offshoot of the Communist Party, its central figures all Marxists and admirers of Trotsky. There was, however, an increasingly heavy dose of psychoanalysis beginning in the 1940s. (Lional Trilling, for example, wrote of his much greater allegiance to Freud compared to Marx [Jumonville 1991, 126].) There was also a great deal of influence and cross-fertilization between the New York Intellectuals and the Frankfurt School (Jumonville 1991, 66; Ch. 5). The New York Intellectuals gradually evolved away from advocacy of socialist revolution toward a shared commitment to anti-nationalism and cosmopolitanism, “a broad and inclusive culture” in which cultural differences were esteemed (Cooney 1986, 233). (As we shall see in Ch. 7, *Commentary* published articles during the 1950s favoring multiculturalism and high levels of immigration of all racial and national groups into the United States.) They conceived themselves as alienated, marginalized figures—a modern version of traditional Jewish separateness and alienation from gentile culture. “They did not feel that they belonged to America or that America belonged to them” (Podhoretz 1967, 117; emphasis in text). Indeed, Podhoretz (1979, 283) was asked by a *New Yorker* editor in the 1950s “whether there was a special typewriter key at *Partisan Review* with the word
‘alienation’ on a single key.” They also advocated a secular humanist perspective and opposed religious values at least partly because of the past association between anti-Semitism and Christian religious ideology. The result was “a continuity of perspective in the work of the New York Intellectuals running through the 1930s and 1940s. . . . [T]he New York Intellectuals embraced cosmopolitan values. . . . [T]heir loyalty to those values was intensified by their consciousness of being Jewish, and [that] consciousness helped to make the Partisan Review variant of cosmopolitanism a discrete intellectual position” (Cooney 1986, 245).

It would be difficult to overestimate the New York Intellectuals’ influence on American high culture in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in the areas of literary criticism, art criticism, sociology, and “intellectual high journalism” (Jumonville 1991, 9). Irving Kristol (1983, 10) writes of PR’s “intimidating presence” among his college friends. In the words of art critic Hilton Kramer:

For certain writers and intellectuals of my generation . . . drawn to PR in the late forties and early fifties . . . it was more than a magazine, it was an essential part of our education, as much a part of that education as the books we read, the visits we made to the museums, the concerts we attended, and the records we bought. It gave us an entrée to modern cultural life—to its gravity and complexity and combative character—that few of our teachers could match. . . . It conferred upon every subject it encompassed—art, literature, politics, history, and current affairs—an air of intellectual urgency that made us, as readers, feel implicated and called upon to respond. (Kramer 1996, 43)

Greenberg grew up in the Yiddish-speaking radical sub-culture of New York (“Everyone his family knew was a socialist. As a small boy he thought socialist meant Jewish” [Rubenfeld 1997, 60].) Like the other New York Intellectuals, Greenberg had a strong Jewish identity that ultimately influenced his work. “I believe that a quality of Jewishness is present in every word I write, as it is in almost every word of every other contemporary American Jewish writer” (in Rubenfeld 1997, 89). As editor of Contemporary Jewish Record, Greenberg published an article that openly referred to Henry Adams’s anti-Semitism, a taboo at the time. He was also a major promoter of the work of Franz Kafka whom he regarded as a quintessentially Jewish voice in literature: “The revolutionary and hypnotic effect of the works of Franz Kafka . . . upon the literary avant-garde of the world has been without parallel. . . . Kafka seems to initiate a new [age of fiction] single-handed, pointing a way beyond most of the cardinal assumptions upon which Western fiction has rested until now. Kafka’s writings represent, moreover, perhaps the first time that an essentially and uniquely Jewish notion of reality, expressed hitherto nowhere but in religious forms, has found a secular voice” (in Rubenfeld 1997, 92–93). In a review in PR of a militantly Zionist book by Arthur Koestler denigrating European Jews and praising the Zionists who were colonizing Palestine, Greenberg (1946, 582) exhibited a sense of Jewish superiority, noting “It is possible I want to suggest, to adopt standards of evaluation other than those of Western Europe. It is possible that by ‘world-
historical’ standards the European Jew represents a higher type than any yet achieved in history.” In 1949 a conflict between this nascent Jewish intellectual establishment broke out with the older, predominantly gentile literary establishment over the issue of an award to Ezra Pound, whose poetry reflected his fascist sympathies and his anti-Semitism. Greenberg emphasized the priority of the moral over the aesthetic, writing that “life includes and is more important than art and it judges things by their consequences. . . . As a Jew, I myself cannot help being offended by the matter of Pound’s latest poetry; and since 1943 things like that make me feel physically afraid too” (Greenberg 1949, 515; italics in text).

Philosopher Sidney Hook also had a strong Jewish identification; he was a Zionist, a strong supporter of Israel, and an advocate of Jewish education for Jewish children (see Hook 1989). Hook played a decisive leadership role in the group (Jumonville 1991, 28), and, as indicated above, he had an editorial position at Commentary. In his “Reflections on the Jewish Question” he wrote, “the causes of antisemitism are not to be found in the behavior of Jews” (Hook 1949, 465). Rather, the sources of anti-Semitism are to be found “in the beliefs and habits and culture of the non-Jews” (p. 468), particularly Christianity. Anti-Semitism “is endemic to every Christian culture whose religions made Jews the eternal villain in the Christian drama of salvation” (pp. 471–472).

Hook developed an elaborate apologia for Judaism in the modern world. Being a Jew is simply a social category with no ethnic implications: “A Jew is anyone who for any reason calls himself such or is called such in any community whose practices take note of the distinction” (p. 475; italics in text). According to Hook, there are no Jewish intellectual movements except those, like Zionism and Hassidism, that are explainable “by the social and cultural pressures of Western Christendom.” Jewish intellectuals are said to be influenced much more by gentile intellectuals than by their status as Jews. Indeed, Hook asserts an extreme philosophical nominalism entirely at odds with the entire history of Judaism: Jews do not exist as a group at all. Judaism is a completely atomistic voluntary concatenation of individuals whose only biological ties are within the nuclear family: “Only individuals exist” (p. 481).

Moreover, Hook felt that one had a moral obligation to remain a Jew:

[For most Jews] escape [from being Jewish] was practically impossible, that where it was possible the psychological costs were usually too burdensome, and that morally it was intrinsically degrading to capitulate to irrational prejudice and deny kinship with their own fathers and mothers who, often against heroic odds, had courageously kept their integrity and faith whatever it was. (p. 479)

Like many leftists, Hook approved of the dream of human universalism, but the dream “overlooks the fact that human beings live as Jews and non-Jews here and now and will continue to do so for a long time to come; that the dream itself is based upon the acceptance of differences among men and not on the hope of an undifferentiated unity; and that the microbes of antisemitism
infect even movements which do not officially allow for its existence” (p. 481). (Hook was highly sensitive to anti-Semitism on the left, beginning with the Trotsky-Stalin conflict during the 1920s; see Ch. 3.) Jews would thus continue to exist as Jews long after Hook’s utopia of democratic socialism had been created. For Hook, leftist universalism properly understood implies an acceptance of cultural diversity as not only central to a philosophy of Judaism but central to the idea of democracy itself:

No philosophy of Jewish life is required except one—identical with the democratic way of life—which enables Jews who for any reason at all accept their existence as Jews to lead a dignified and significant life, a life in which together with their fellow-men they strive collectively to improve the quality of democratic, secular cultures and thus encourage a maximum of cultural diversity, both Jewish and non-Jewish. . . . If it is pruned of its Utopianism and its failure to understand that the ethics of democracy presupposes not an equality of sameness or identity but an equality of differences, much of the universalist view still has a large measure of validity. (pp. 480–481)

For Hook (1948, 201–202), “diversity of experience [including ethnic and cultural diversity], direct or indirect, is immediately enjoyable. . . . It safeguards us against provincialism and the tyranny of the familiar, whose hold may sometimes be so strong as to incapacitate us from making new responses necessary for survival. . . . Growth in maturity consists largely in learning to appreciate differences.” Hook thus expresses the fundamental Jewish interest in cultural and ethnic diversity that is a central theme of Chapter 7 on Jewish involvement in U.S. immigration policy.

The New York Intellectuals included the following prominent Jewish participants, classified roughly according to main area of involvement, although they tended to be generalists rather than specialists: Elliot Cohen (editor of Menorah Journal and founding editor of Commentary); Sidney Hook, Hannah Arendt (political philosophy, political and intellectual journalism); William Phillips and Philip Rahv (editors of PR; literary criticism, intellectual journalism); Lionel Trilling, Diana Trilling, Leslie Fiedler, Alfred Kazin, and Susan Sontag (literary criticism); Robert Warshow (film criticism and cultural criticism); Isaac Rosenfeld, Delmore Schwartz, Paul Goodman, Saul Bellow, and Norman Mailer (fiction and poetry, literary criticism); Irving Howe (political journalism, literary criticism); Melvin J. Lasky, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol (political journalism); Nathan Glazer, Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, David Riesman, and Michael Walzer (sociology); Lionel Abel, Clement Greenberg, George L. K. Morris, Meyer Schapiro, and Harold Rosenberg (art criticism).

The New York Intellectuals spent their careers entirely within a Jewish social and intellectual milieu. When Rubenfeld (1997, 97) lists people Greenberg invited to social occasions at his apartment in New York, the only gentile mentioned is artist William de Kooning. Revealingly, Michael Wrezin (1994, 33) refers to Dwight Macdonald, another Trotskyist contributor to PR, as “a distinguished goy among the Partisans.” Another non-Jew was writer
James T. Farrell, but his diary records a virtually all-Jewish social milieu in which a large part of his life was spent in virtual non-stop social interaction with other New York Intellectuals (Cooney 1986, 248). Indeed, Podhoretz (1967, 246–248) refers to the New York Intellectuals as a “family” who, when they attended a party, arrived at the same time and socialized among their ingroup.

Cultural critique was central to the work of the New York Intellectuals. To Rahv (1978, 305–306), modernist culture was important because of its potential for cultural critique. Modernism encouraged “the creation of moral and aesthetic values running counter to and often violently critical of the bourgeois spirit.” “What is modern literature if not a vindictive, neurotic, and continually renewed dispute with the modern world?” Such pronouncements on the critical potential of even the most abstract art reflected the views of Frankfurt School theorists Adorno and Horkheimer, the latter of whom noted that “An element of resistance is inherent in the most aloof art” (Horkheimer 1941, 291).

The New York Intellectuals exemplified the tendency to exude a sense of moral and intellectual superiority combined with a very realpolitik ability to promote and consolidate the power of the ingroup that is typical of the movements reviewed in this volume. In their own self-conception, the New York Intellectuals “combined genuine loyalty to values under siege with the cultivation of an image—the image of a detached and alienated intelligentsia holding the line against corruptions of mind and spirit” (Cooney 1986, 200). I have noted that Clement Greenberg emphasized the priority of the moral over the aesthetic. Similarly, Lionel Trilling viewed literary criticism as centrally concerned with “the quality that life does not have but should have” (in Jumonville 1991, 123). In the political arena, issues were portrayed as “a struggle between good and evil. . . . The emphatic, emotion-charged, often moralistic positions that the New York Intellectuals established, and the tendency to identify their own views with fundamental intellectual integrity, worked against the commitment to openness and free thought proclaimed in their public statements and implicit in their attachment to cosmopolitan values” (Cooney 1986, 265).

The elitism in their [the New York Intellectuals’] outlook was not a socioeconomic sort dependent on upper-class privileges, of course, but rather an intellectual elitism—a Jeffersonian aristocracy of talent, ability, intelligence, and critical acuity. They were worried about maintaining the intellectual vocation and its values. Further, they were the elite in the sense of being elect or chosen. But all these types of elitism had some connection: they were ways of conserving power for one group, and they resulted in a patronizing condescension toward the lower orders of society. (Jumonville 1991, 169)

This condescension and failure to respect others’ ideas are particularly obvious in the New York Intellectuals’ attitudes toward traditional American culture, especially the culture of rural America. There is a large overlap between the New York Intellectuals and the anti-populist forces who, as
discussed in Chapter 5, used *The Authoritarian Personality* to pathologize the behavior of gentile Americans and particularly the lower middle class. The New York Intellectuals were cultural elitists who abhorred cultural democracy and feared the masses while nevertheless remaining consistently left-of-center politically. The movement was “a leftist elitism—a leftist conservatism, we might say—that slowly evolved into . . . neoconservatism (Jumonville 1991, 185). The New York Intellectuals associated rural America with “nativism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, and fascism as well as with anti-intellectualism and provincialism; the urban was associated antithetically with ethnic and cultural tolerance, with internationalism, and with advanced ideas. . . . The New York Intellectuals simply began with the assumption that the rural—with which they associated much of American tradition and most of the territory beyond New York—had little to contribute to a cosmopolitan culture. . . . By interpreting cultural and political issues through the urban-rural lens, writers could even mask assertions of superiority and expressions of anti-democratic sentiments as the judgments of an objective expertise” (Cooney 1986, 267–268; italics in text). In Chapter 7 the battle between this urbanized intellectual and political establishment and rural America is joined over the issue of immigration, in this case with the support of all of the mainstream Jewish political organizations.

*PR* also had an ingroup-outgroup mentality that is entirely consistent with the other Jewish-dominated intellectual movements reviewed here. Norman Podhoretz describes the *PR* crowd as a “family” that derived “out of the feeling of beleaguered isolation shared with the masters of the modernist movement themselves, elitism—the conviction that *others* were not worth taking into consideration except to attack, and need not be addressed in one’s writing; out of that feeling as well, a sense of hopelessness as to the fate of American culture at large and the correlative conviction that integrity and standards were only possible among ‘us.’ ” It was an insular world in which the only people who even existed were ingroup members: “[T]he family paid virtually no heed to anyone outside it except kissing cousins. . . . To be adopted into the family was a mark of great distinction: it meant you were good enough, that you existed as a writer and an intellectual” (Podhoretz 1967, 115–116, 151; italics in text).

Like the other intellectual movements reviewed in this volume, *PR* had a sense of community and groupness, “a sense of common purpose and group support around the magazine”; the basic question about a prospective writer was whether he was “‘our’ kind of writer” (Cooney 1986, 225, 249). Among this self-described alienated and marginalized group there was also an atmosphere of social support that undoubtedly functioned as had traditional Jewish ingroup solidarity arrayed against a morally and intellectually inferior outside world. They perceived themselves as “rebel intellectuals defending a minority position and upholding the best traditions of radicalism” (p. 265). *PR* provided “a haven and support” and a sense of social identity; it “served to assure many of its members that they were not alone in the world, that sympathetic intellec-
tuals existed in sufficient number to provide them with social and professional moorings” (Cooney 1986, 249). There was thus a great deal of continuity to this “coherent, distinguishable group” of intellectuals “who mainly began their careers as revolutionary communists in the 1930s [to] become an institutionalized and even hegemonic component of American culture during the conservative 1950s while maintaining a high degree of collective continuity” (Wald 1987, 12, 10).

Consistent with the multiple overlapping alliances generated by this Jewish intellectual milieu, there were charges that a Jewish literary establishment was able to determine success in the literary world and that it advanced the careers of Jewish writers. Jewish group cohesiveness was implied by Truman Capote and Gore Vidal who complained about the ability of Jewish intellectuals to determine success in the literary world and to their tendency to promote Jewish writers (see Podhoretz 1986, 24). Capote described a “Jewish mafia” in the literary world as a “clique of New York-oriented writers who control much of the literary scene through the influence of the quarterlies and intellectual magazines. All of these publications are Jewish-dominated and this particular coterie employs them to make or break writers by advancing or withholding attention” (in Podhoretz 1986, 23).

I suppose that in addition to whatever conscious feelings of Jewishness underlie these associational patterns, there is also an unconscious solidarity that Jews have with other Jews and that facilitates the overlapping alliances and mutual citation patterns discussed here. Greenwald and Schuh (1994) argue that the discrimination effects found in their study of Jewish scientists are unconscious, partly because they find the pattern of Jewish–non-Jewish ethnic discrimination among scientists involved in research on prejudice who, it is plausible to suppose, would not themselves consciously adopt a pattern of ethnic discrimination. In fact, a large body of research indicates unconscious prejudice among people who qualify as non-prejudiced on the basis of apparently honest self-reports (Crosby, Bromley & Saxe 1980; Gaertner & Dovidio 1986). These findings fit well with the importance of self-deception as an aspect of Judaism (SAID, Ch. 8): Jewish scientists who perceive themselves to be entirely nonprejudiced unconsciously favor ingroup members.

Several examples of such deep feelings of Jewish solidarity were given in SAID (Ch. 1), and these feelings were found to be characteristic of Freud in Chapter 4. They are exemplified by the following comments of Clinton administration Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich (1997, 79), on his first face-to-face meeting with Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan: “We have never met before, but I instantly know him. One look, one phrase, and I know where he grew up, how he grew up, where he got his drive and his sense of humor. He is New York. He is Jewish. He looks like my uncle Louis, his voice is my uncle Sam. I feel we’ve been together at countless weddings, bar mitzvahs, and funerals. I know his genetic structure. I’m certain that within the last five hundred years—perhaps even more recently—we shared the same ancestor.” As New York Intellectual Daniel Bell notes, “I was born in galut
and I accept—now gladly, though once in pain—the double burden and the
double pleasure of my self-consciousness, the outward life of an American
and the inward secret of the Jew. I walk with this sign as a frontlet between
my eyes, and it is as visible to some secret others as their sign is to me” (Bell
each other out in social situations and feel “far more at home” after they have
discovered who is Jewish. Moreover, “most Jews claim to be equipped with
an interpersonal friend-or-foe sensing device that enables them to detect the
presence of another Jew, despite heavy camouflage.” These deep and typically
unconscious ties of genetic similarity (Rushton 1989) and sense of common
fate as members of the same ingroup lead to the powerful group ties among
Jewish intellectual and political activists studied here.

The theory of individual differences in individualism-collectivism devel-
oped in SAID (Ch. 1) predicts that Jews, because of a greater genetic and
environmental push toward collectivism, would be especially attracted to such
groups. Sulloway (1979b) describes the “cultlike” aura of religion that has
permeated psychoanalysis—a characterization that fits well with the proposal
that Judaism must be understood as involving the psychological mechanisms
underlying participation in religious cults (see SAID, Ch. 1). The parallels
between traditional Judaism and psychoanalysis as an authoritarian, cohesive
ingroup that enforces conformity on group members thus go well beyond the
formal structure of the movement to include a deep sense of personal in-
volvement that satisfies similar psychological needs. From the standpoint of
the theory developed in SAID, it is not in the least surprising that the secular
organizations developed and dominated by Jews, including also radical
political movements and Boasian anthropology, would end up appealing to the
same psychological systems as did traditional Judaism. At a basic level,
Judaism involves a commitment to an exclusionary group that actively main-
tains barriers between the ingroup and the rest of the world.

This group cohesion is particularly striking in situations where Jewish intel-
lectuals have continued to function as cohesive groups even after anti-
Semitism during the Nazi era forced them to emigrate. This occurred with
psychoanalysis and also with the Frankfurt School. A similar pattern was
evident in the highly influential Vienna Circle in philosophy (Horowitz 1987).

In the intellectual world, group cohesiveness has facilitated the advocacy of
particular viewpoints within academic professional associations (e.g., the
Boasian program within the American Anthropological Association; psycho-
analysis within the American Psychiatric Association). Rothman and Lichter
(1982, 104–105) note that Jews formed and dominated cohesive subgroups
with a radical political agenda in several academic societies in the 1960s,
including professional associations in economics, political science, sociology,
history, and the Modern Language Association. They also suggest a broad
political agenda of Jewish social scientists during this period: “We have
already pointed out the weaknesses of some of these studies [on Jewish
involvement in radical political movements]. We suspect that many of the
‘truths’ established in other areas of the social sciences during this period suffer from similar weaknesses. Their widespread acceptance . . . may have had as much to do with the changing ethnic and ideological characteristics of those who dominated the social science community as they did with any real advance in knowledge” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 104). Sachar (1992, 804) notes that the Caucus for a New Politics of the American Political Science Association was “overwhelmingly Jewish” and that the Union of Radical Political Economists was initially disproportionately Jewish. Moreover, as Higham (1984, 154) notes, the incredible success of the Authoritarian Personality studies was facilitated by the “extraordinary ascent” of Jews concerned with anti-Semitism in academic social science departments in the post–World War II era.

Once an organization becomes dominated by a particular intellectual perspective, there is enormous intellectual inertia created by the fact that the informal networks dominating elite universities serve as gatekeepers for the next generation of scholars. Aspiring intellectuals, whether Jewish or gentile, are subjected to a high level of indoctrination at the undergraduate and graduate levels; there is tremendous psychological pressure to adopt the fundamental intellectual assumptions that lie at the center of the power hierarchy of the discipline. As discussed in Chapter 1, once a Jewish-dominated intellectual movement attains intellectual predominance, it is not surprising that gentiles would be attracted to Jewish intellectuals as members of a socially dominant and prestigious group and as dispensers of valued resources.

Group cohesiveness can also be seen in the development of worshipful cults that have lionized the achievements of group leaders (Boasian anthropology and psychoanalysis). Similarly, Whitfield (1988, 32) summarizes the “ludicrous overpraise” of Zionist scholar Gershon Scholem. Daniel Bell, a Harvard sociologist and leading member of the New York Intellectuals, labeled Scholem’s *Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah* the most important book of the post–World War II era. Novelist Cynthia Ozick proclaimed, “There are certain magisterial works of the human mind that alter ordinary comprehension so unpredictably and on so prodigious a scale that culture is set awry and nothing can ever be seen again except in the strange light of that new knowledge[,] . . . an accretion of fundamental insight [that] takes on the power of a natural force. Gershom Scholem’s oeuvre has such a force; and its massive keystone, *Sabbatai Sevi*, presses down on the grasping consciousness with the strength not simply of its invulnerable, almost tidal, scholarship, but of its singular instruction in the nature of man.” Whitfield comments that “by the time Ozick was done, even Aristotle began to look like an underachiever; even Freud was confined to ‘a peephole into a dark chamber,’ while Scholem had become elevated into ‘a radio telescope monitoring the universe.’ ” (Apart from ethnic boosterism, perhaps Scholem was viewed as of universal importance because he deliberately downplayed Jewish particularism in his work [See Preface to the first paperback edition.])
It is interesting to note other examples of cohesive groups of Jewish intellectuals besides those considered in the previous chapters. In sixteenth-century Spain a concentrated group of Converso intellectuals were intimately involved in making the University of Alcalà into a bastion of nominalism—a doctrine widely viewed as subversive of religion (González 1989). George Mosse (1970, 172) describes a group of predominantly Jewish leftist intellectuals in the Weimar period that “attained a certain cohesion through the journals it made its own.” Similarly, Irving Louis Horowitz (1987, 123) describes an “organic group” of Austrian Marxist intellectuals during the pre–World War II period who “shared in common Jewish ancestry if not Zionist persuasions.” Horowitz (1987, 124) notes that the Austrian Marxist group and the Frankfurt School had “shared ethnic and religious backgrounds . . . not to mention overlapping networks and cohorts” resulting ultimately from the unity of prewar European German Jewish life.

Another interesting example is a highly cohesive group of neo-Kantian Jewish intellectuals centered at the University of Marburg under the leadership of Hermann Cohen in late-nineteenth-century Germany (Schwarzchild 1979, 136). Cohen (1842–1918), who ended his career teaching at a rabbinical seminary, rejected the historicism of the Volkisch thinkers and the Hegelians in favor of an idealistic version of Kantian rationalism. A primary intellectual goal was to suppose that the ideal Germany must be defined in universal moral terms that rationalized the continued existence of Jewish particularism: “A Germanism that might demand of me that I surrender my religion and my religious inheritance, I would not acknowledge as an ideal peoplehood in which the power and dignity of the state inhere. . . . [A] Germanism that might demand such a surrender of religious selfhood, or that could even approve of and project it, simply contradicts the world-historical impulsion of Germanism” (in Schwarzchild 1979, 143). As with the Frankfurt School there is an absolute ethical imperative that Judaism exist and that Germany not be defined in ethnic terms that would exclude Jews: In Cohen’s philosophical utopia, different “socio-historical entities will not so much merge into one as live peaceably and creatively with one another” (Schwarzchild 1979, 145), an expression of Horace Kallen’s cultural pluralism model reviewed in Chapter 7. Cohen’s group was viewed by anti-Semites as having an ethnic agenda, and Schwarzchild (1979, 140) notes that “the spirit of Marburg neo-Kantianism was in fact largely determined by the Jewishness of its adherents.” A common criticism was that the Marburg School engaged in highly creative reinterpretations of historical texts, notably including interpretations of Judaism and such notoriously ethnocentric Jewish thinkers as Maimonides as representing a universalistic ethical imperative. Suggesting deception or self-deception, there was a tension between Cohen’s avowed German nationalism with his pronouncements of great concern for the suffering of Jews in other countries and his urging of other Jews to look to German Jews for guidance (Rather 1990, 182–183).
During the 1920s, there was “a distinct coterie” of Jewish intellectuals (Lionel Trilling, Herbert Solow, Henry Rosenthal, Tess Slesinger, Felix Morrow, Clifton Fadiman, Anita Brenner) centered around the *Menorah Journal* under the leadership of Elliot Cohen (later the founding editor of *Commentary*) (Wald 1987, 32). This group, which later overlapped a great deal with the New York Intellectual group described above, was devoted to promoting the ideas of cultural pluralism. (Horace Kallen, the originator of cultural pluralism as a model for the United States [see Ch. 7], was a founder of the Menorah Society.) Reflecting its fundamentally Jewish political agenda, during the 1930s this group gravitated to the Communist Party and its auxiliary organizations, believing that, in the words of one observer, “the socialist revolution and its extension held out the only realistic hope of saving the Jews, among others, from destruction” (in Wald 1987, 43). Further, while adopting an ideology of revolutionary internationalism, the group “shared with cultural pluralism a hostility to assimilation by the dominant culture” (Wald 1987, 43)—another indication of the compatibility of leftist universalism and Jewish non-assimilation that is a theme of Chapter 3.

Beginning in the early 1950s there was a group centered around Irving Howe, including Stanley Plastrik, Emanuel Geltman and Louis Coser who organized the magazine *Dissent* as the PR coterie moved steadily away from revolutionary socialism (Bulik 1993, 18). In addition to leftist social criticism, Howe wrote extensively about Yiddish literature and Jewish history; his *The World of Our Fathers* records his nostalgic appreciation of the Yiddish-socialist subculture of his youth. *Dissent* was greatly influenced by the Frankfurt School in the area of cultural criticism, particularly the work of Adorno and Horkheimer, and it published work by Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse based on their syntheses of Freud and Marx. In the New Left era, the radical Foundation for Policy Studies was centered around a group of Jewish intellectuals (Sachar 1992, 805).

Among leftists, we have seen that Jewish communists tended to have Jewish mentors and idealized other Jews, especially Trotsky, who were leaders or martyrs to the cause (see Ch. 3). Even the Jewish neoconservative movement has sought intellectual inspiration from Leo Strauss rather than from gentile conservative intellectuals such as Edmund Burke, Russell Kirk, or James Burnham (Gottfried 1993, 88). For Strauss as a highly committed Jew, liberalism is only the best of several alternatives that are even more unacceptable (i.e., the extreme left or right). Strauss complains of the assimilatory tendencies in liberal society and its tendencies to break down the group loyalty so central to Judaism and to replace it with “membership in a nonexistent universal human society” (Tarcov & Pangle 1987, 909). Strauss’s political philosophy of democratic liberalism was fashioned as an instrument of achieving Jewish group survival in the post-Enlightenment political world (see Tarcov & Pangle 1987, 909–910). Prior to their conversion, Goldberg (1996, 160) notes that the future neoconservatives were disciples of Trotskyist theoretician Max
Shachtman, also a Jew and a prominent member of the New York Intellectuals (see also Irving Kristol’s [1983] “Memoirs of a Trotskyist”).

In the cases of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School, and to a lesser extent Boasian anthropology, we have seen that these cohesive groups typically had strong overtones of authoritarianism, and like traditional Judaism itself, they were highly exclusionary and intolerant of dissent. Cuddihy (1974, 106) points out that Wilhelm Reich had the distinction of being expelled from both the German Communist Party (for his “incorrect” view of the causes of fascism) and psychoanalysis (for his political fanaticism): “Reich’s attempt to ‘marry’ two of the Diaspora ideologues, Freud and Marx, ended in his separation from the two movements speaking in their names.” Recall also David Horowitz’s (1997, 42) description of the world of his parents who had joined a “shul” run by the CPUSA. Note the ingroup-outgroup mentality, the sense of moral superiority, the sense of being a minority persecuted by the goyim, and the powerful overtones of authoritarianism and intolerance of dissent:

What my parents had done in joining the Communist Party and moving to Sunnyside was to return to the ghetto. There was the same shared private language, the same hermetically sealed universe, the same dual posturing revealing one face to the outer world and another to the tribe. More importantly, there was the same conviction of being marked for persecution and specially ordained, the sense of moral superiority toward the stronger and more numerous goyim outside. And there was the same fear of expulsion for heretical thoughts, which was the fear that riveted the chosen to the faith.

An ingroup-outgroup orientation, noted above as a characteristic of the PR coterie, was apparent also in leftist political groups which were also predominantly Jewish during this period. In the words of PR editor William Phillips (1983, 41), “The Communists were experts at maintaining a fraternal atmosphere that distinguished sharply between insider and outsider. One couldn’t just leave; one had to be expelled. And expulsion from the tribe brought into motion a machinery calculated to make the expelled one a complete pariah. Party members were forbidden to talk to the ex-Communist, and a campaign of vilification was unleashed whose intensity varied according to the importance of the expelled person.” We have seen that psychoanalysis dealt with its dissenters in a similar manner.

These movements tended to center around a charismatic leader (Boas, Freud, or Horkheimer) with a powerful moral, intellectual, and social vision, and the followers of these leaders had an intense devotion toward them. There was an intense psychological sense of missionary zeal and, as we have seen, moral fervor. This phenomenon occurred in the case of psychoanalysis and the Boasian movement, and (with massive irony) this was also the case with Critical Theory: “The theory which filled Adorno and Marcuse with a sense of mission both before and after the war was a theory of a special sort: in the midst of doubts it was still inspiring, in the midst of pessimism it still spurred them on towards a kind of salvation through knowledge and discovery. The promise was neither fulfilled nor betrayed—it was kept alive” (Wiggershaus
Like Freud, Horkheimer inspired intense loyalty combined with personal insecurity (at least partly because of his control over the Institute’s budget [Wiggershaus 1994, 161–162]), so that his underlings at the Institute, like Adorno, became fixated on him and intensely jealous of their rivals for their master’s favors. Adorno “was prepared to identify himself completely with the great cause of the Institute, measuring everything by that standard” (Wiggershaus 1994, 160). When fellow institute member Leo Lowenthal complained that “Adorno showed a sense of zealousness not far removed from a sense of resentment,” Horkheimer commented that this is what he valued in Adorno: “For [Horkheimer], all that mattered was that [Adorno’s] zealous aggressiveness, which was able to detect concessions to the bourgeois academic system in the work of Lowenthal, Marcuse, Fromm, and even more so in the work of others, should be channeled along the right lines, namely those with significance for social theory” (Wiggershaus 1994, 163).

Rallying around charismatic leaders (Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg) has also been apparent among Jewish radicals (see Ch. 3). The New York Intellectuals may be an exception because they were relatively de-centralized and quite querulous and competitive with each other, with no one rising to the pre-eminent status of a Freud or Boas. However, like many Jewish leftists, they tended to idolize Trotsky, and, as we have seen, Sidney Hook played a decisive leadership role in the group (Jumonville 1991, 28). They also constituted a distinct coterie centered around the “little magazines” whose editors wielded great power and influence over the careers of would-be group members. Elliot Cohen, despite his lack of presence as a writer, had a charismatic influence on those who wrote for him as editor of Menorah Journal and Commentary. Lional Trilling labeled him a “tormented ‘genius’ ” (in Jumonville 1991, 117), a leader who influenced many, including Trilling in their journey from Stalinism to anti-Stalinism and finally toward the beginnings of neoconservatism. Prospective members of the ingroup typically idolized ingroup members as cultural icons. Norman Podhoretz (1967, 147) writes of his “wide-eyed worshipful fascination” with the PR crowd at the beginning of his career. Ingroup members paid “rapt attention” to others in the group (Cooney 1986, 249). Like different branches of psychoanalysis, there were offshoots of these magazines initiated by people with somewhat different aesthetic or political visions, such as the circle around Dissent whose central figure was Irving Howe.

This tendency to rally around a charismatic leader is also a characteristic of traditional Jewish groups. These groups are extremely collectivist in Trianidis’s (1990, 1991) sense. The authoritarian nature of these groups and the central role of a charismatic rabbi are particularly striking: “A haredi . . . will consult his rabbi or hasidic rebbe on every aspect of his life, and will obey the advice he receives as though it were an halachic ruling” (Landau 1993, 47). “The haredim’s blind obeisance to rabbis is one of the most striking characteristics of haredism in the eyes of the outside world, both Jewish and Gentile” (Landau 1993, 45). Famous rebbes are revered in an almost godlike manner.
(tzaddikism, or cult of personality), and indeed there was a recent controversy over whether the Lubavitcher Rebbe Schneerson claimed to be the Messiah. Many of his followers believed that he was; Mintz (1992, 348ff) points out that it is common for Hasidic Jews to view their rebbe as the Messiah.

This intensity of group feeling centered around a charismatic leader is reminiscent of that found among traditional Eastern European Jews who were the immediate ancestors of many of these intellectuals. Zionist leader Arthur Ruppin (1971, 69) recounts his visit to a synagogue in Galicia (Poland) in 1903:

There were no benches, and several thousand Jews were standing closely packed together, swaying in prayer like the corn in the wind. When the rabbi appeared the service began. Everybody tried to get as close to him as possible. The rabbi led the prayers in a thin, weeping voice. It seemed to arouse a sort of ecstasy in the listeners. They closed their eyes, violently swaying. The loud praying sounded like a gale. Anyone seeing these Jews in prayer would have concluded that they were the most religious people on earth.

Later those closest to the rabbi were intensely eager to eat any food touched by the rabbi, and the fish bones were preserved by his followers as relics.

As expected on the basis of social identity theory, all these movements appear to have a strong sense of belonging to an ingroup viewed as intellectually and morally superior and fighting against outgroups seen as morally depraved and as intellectually inferior (e.g., Horkheimer’s constant admonition that they were among the “chosen few” destined to develop Critical Theory). Within the ingroup, disagreement was channeled into a narrowly confined intellectual space, and those who overstepped the boundaries were simply excised from the movement. The comments of Eugen Bleuler to Freud when he left the psychoanalytic movement in 1911 are worth quoting again because they describe a central feature of psychoanalysis and the other movements reviewed in this volume: “[T]his ‘who is not for us is against us,’ this ‘all or nothing,’ is necessary for religious communities and useful for political parties. I can therefore understand the principle as such, but for science I consider it harmful” (in Gay 1987, 144–145). All these features are central to traditional Judaism as well and are compatible with proposing that a basic feature of all manifestations of Judaism is a proneness to developing highly collectivist social structures with a strong sense of ingroup-outgroup barriers (see PTSDA, Ch. 8).

Another important theme is that psychoanalysis and the Authoritarian Personality studies showed strong overtones of indoctrination: Theories were developed in which behavior that did not conform to politically acceptable standards was conceptualized as an indication of psychopathology. This is apparent in the tendency for psychoanalysis to attribute rejection of psychoanalysis itself to various forms of psychopathology, as well as in its general perspective that a pathology-inducing gentile culture was the source of all forms of psychiatric diagnosis and that anti-Semitism was the sign of a dis-
turbed personality. The *Authoritarian Personality* studies built on this tradition with its “discovery” that the failure to develop a “liberal personality” and to deeply and sincerely accept liberal political beliefs was a sign of psychopathology.

Indeed, one might note that a common theme of all these movements of cultural criticism is that gentile-dominated social structures are pathogenic. From the psychoanalytic perspective, including the Frankfurt School, human societies fail to meet human needs that are rooted in human nature, with the result that humans develop a variety of psychiatric disorders as a response to our fall from naturalness and harmony with nature. Or humans are seen as a blank slate on which Western capitalist culture has written greed, gentile ethnocentrism, and other supposed psychiatric disorders (Marxism, Boasian anthropology).

Group cohesion can also be seen in the support these movements have obtained from the wider Jewish community. In Chapter 5 I noted the importance Jewish radicals placed on maintaining ties with the wider Jewish community. The wider Jewish community provided economic support for psychoanalysis as the preferred form of psychotherapy among Jews (Glazer & Moynihan 1963); it also provided philanthropic support for institutes of psychoanalysis. Jews also provided the great majority of the financial support of the University of Frankfurt as a haven for German-Jewish intellectuals beginning in the Wilhelmine period (see W. E. Mosse 1989, 318ff), and the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt was established by a Jewish millionaire, Felix Weil, with a specific intellectual-political mission that eventually developed into Critical Theory (Wiggershaus 1994). In the United States, foundations such as the Stern Family Fund, the Rabinowitz Fund, and the Rubin Foundation provided money for radical underground publications during the 1960s (Sachar 1992, 804). Much earlier, American Jewish capitalists like Jacob Schiff financed Russian radical movements directed at overthrowing the Czar and may well have had considerable impact (Goldstein 1990, 26–27; Szajkowski 1967).

Moreover, Jewish influence in the popular media was an important source of favorable coverage of Jewish intellectual movements, particularly psychoanalysis and 1960s political radicalism (Rothman & Lichter 1982). Favorable media depictions of psychoanalysis were common during the 1950s, peaking in the mid-sixties when psychoanalysis was at the apex of its influence in the United States (Hale 1995, 289). “Popular images of Freud revealed him as a painstaking observer, a tenacious worker, a great healer, a truly original explorer, a paragon of domestic virtue, the discover of personal energy, and a genius” (p. 289). Psychiatrists were portrayed in movies as “humane and effective. The number of Hollywood stars, directors, and producers who were ‘in analysis’ was legion” (p. 289). An important aspect of this process has been the establishment of journals directed not only at a closed community of academic specialists but also at a wide audience of educated readers and other consumers of the counterculture.
The support of the wider Jewish community can also be seen in the association between Jewish-owned publishing houses and these intellectual movements, as in the case of the association between the Frankfurt School and the Hirschfeld Publishing Company (Wiggershaus 1994, 2). Similarly the Straussian neoconservative movement developed access to the mainstream intellectual media. Disciples of Leo Strauss have developed their own publishing and reviewing network, including neconservative publications, Basic Books, and the university presses at Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Chicago (Gottfried 1993, 73).

These ideologies were promulgated by the most prestigious institutions of the society, and especially by elite universities and the mainstream media, as the essence of scientific objectivity. The New York Intellectuals, for example, developed ties with elite universities, particularly Harvard, Columbia, the University of Chicago, and the University of California–Berkeley, while psychoanalysis and Boasian anthropology became well entrenched throughout academia. The moral and intellectual elite established by these movements dominated intellectual discourse during a critical period after World War II and leading into the countercultural revolution of the 1960s. These movements dominated intellectual discourse by the time of the sea change in immigration policy in the 1960s (see Ch. 7). The implication is that individuals receiving a college education during this period were powerfully socialized to adopt liberal-radical cultural and political beliefs. The ideology that ethnocentrism was a form of psychopathology was promulgated by a group that over its long history had arguably been the most ethnocentric group among all the cultures of the world. This ideology was promulgated by strongly identified members of a group whose right to continue to exist as a cohesive, genetically impermeable group ideally suited to maximizing its own political, economic, and cultural power was never a subject of discussion. However, the failure to adopt these beliefs on the part of gentiles was viewed as an admission of personal inadequacy and an acknowledgment that one was suffering from a condition that would benefit from psychiatric counseling.

Scientific and intellectual respectability was thus a critical feature of the movements reviewed here. Nevertheless, these intellectual movements have been fundamentally irrational—an irrationality that is most apparent in the entire conduct of psychoanalysis as an authoritarian, quasi-scientific enterprise and in the explicit depiction of science as an instrument of social domination by the Frankfurt School. It is also apparent in the structure of psychoanalysis and radical political ideology, which are, like traditional Jewish religious ideology, essentially hermeneutic theories in the sense that the theory is derived in an \textit{a priori} manner and is constructed so that any event is interpretable within the theory. The paradigm is shifted from a scientific perspective that emphasizes the selective retention of theoretical variants (Campbell 1987; Hull 1988; Popper 1963) to a hermeneutic exercise in which any and all events can be interpreted within the context of the theory. In the case of Critical Theory, and to a considerable extent, psychoanalysis, the actual
content of the theory continually changed and there was divergence among its practitioners, but the goal of the theory as a tool of leftist social criticism remained intact.

Despite the fundamental irrationality of these movements, they have often masqueraded as the essence of scientific or philosophical objectivity. They have all sought the aura of science. Hollinger (1996, 160), in describing what he terms “a secular, increasingly Jewish, decidedly left-of-center intelligentsia based largely but not exclusively in the disciplinary communities of philosophy and the social sciences,” notes that “science offered itself to [Harvard historian Richard] Hofstadter and to many of his secular contemporaries as a magnificent ideological resource. Or, to put the point more sharply, these men and women selected from the available inventory those images of science most useful to them, those serving to connect the adjective scientific with public rather than private knowledge, with open rather than closed discourses, with universal rather than local standards of warrant, with democratic rather than aristocratic models of authority.” Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer included himself and the other New York Intellectuals in his statement that “Sociology is still for many socialists and sociologists the pursuit of politics through academic means (in Jumonville 1991, 89). Jumonville (1991, 90) comments that “Part of the impact of the New York group on American intellectual life is that they dignified that outlook of political pursuit. They were never embarrassed to admit the political content of their work, and in fact brought into the intellectual mainstream the idea that all strong work had ideological and political overtones.”

Even the Frankfurt School, which developed an ideology in which science, politics, and morality were systematically conflated, presented The Authoritarian Personality as a scientifically based, empirically grounded study of human behavior because of a perceived need to appeal to an American audience of empirically oriented social scientists. Moreover, the rhetoric surrounding the Institute of Social Research never failed to emphasize the scientific nature of its undertaking. Carl Grünberg, the first director of the Institute, very self-consciously attempted to divert suspicion that the Institute was committed to a dogmatic, political form of Marxism. It was committed, he maintained, to a clearly articulated scientific research methodology: “I need not emphasize the fact that when I speak of Marxism here I do not mean it in a party-political sense, but in a purely scientific one, as a term for an economic system complete in itself, for a particular ideology and for a clearly delineated research methodology” (in Wiggershaus 1994, 26). Similarly, the PR group portrayed itself as being on the side of science, as exemplified by PR editor William Phillips, whose list of “scientists” included Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky (Cooney 1986, 155, 194).

Particularly important in this general endeavor has been the use of a rationally argued, philosophical skepticism as a tool in combating scientific universalism. Skepticism in the interest of combating scientific theories one dislikes for deeper reasons has been a prominent aspect of twentieth-century Jewish
intellectual activity, apparent not only as a defining feature of Boasian anthropology but also in much anti-evolutionary theorizing and in the dynamic-contextualist view of behavioral development discussed in Chapter 2. In general this skepticism has been aimed at precluding the development of general theories of human behavior in which genetic variation plays a causative role in producing behavioral or psychological variation or in which adaptationist processes play an important role in the development of the human mind. The apotheosis of radical skepticism can be seen in the “negative dialectics” of the Frankfurt School and in Jacques Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction which are directed at deconstructing universalist, assimilatory theories of society as a homogeneous, harmonious whole on the theory that such a society might be incompatible with the continuity of Judaism. As in the case of Jewish political activity described in Chapter 7, the effort is aimed at preventing the development of mass movements of solidary groups of gentiles and a repetition of the Holocaust.

The fundamental insight of the Frankfurt School and its recent postmodernist offshoots, as well the Boasian School of anthropology and much of the criticism of biological and evolutionary perspectives in the social sciences reviewed in Chapter 2, is that a thoroughgoing skepticism and its consequent fragmentation of intellectual discourse within the society as a whole is an excellent prescription for the continuity of collectivist minority group strategies. Within the intellectual world, the greatest potential danger for a collectivist minority group strategy is that science itself as an individualist enterprise conducted in an atomistic universe of discourse could in fact coalesce around a set of universalist propositions about human behavior, propositions that would call into question the moral basis of collectivist minority group strategies such as Judaism. One way to prevent this is for science itself to be problematized and replaced by a pervasive skepticism about the structure of all reality.

The intended effect of such movements (and to a considerable extent their actual effect) has been to impose a medieval anti-scientific orthodoxy on much of the contemporary intellectual world. Unlike the Christian medieval orthodoxy which was fundamentally anti-Semitic, it is an orthodoxy that simultaneously facilitates the continuation of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, deemphasizes Judaism as an intellectual or social category, and deconstructs the intellectual basis for the development of majoritarian gentile group strategies.

None of this should be surprising to an evolutionist. Intellectual activity in the service of evolutionary goals has been a characteristic of Judaism dating from the ancient world (see *SAID*, Ch. 7). In this regard I suggest that it is no accident that science has developed uniquely in Western individualistic societies. Science is fundamentally an individualistic phenomenon incompatible with high levels of the ingroup-outgroup thinking that has characterized the Jewish intellectual movements discussed in these chapters and indeed has come to characterize much of what currently passes as intellectual discourse in
the West—especially postmodernism and the currently fashionable multicultural movement.

Scientific groups do not have essences in the sense that there are no essential group members and no essential propositions one must ascribe to in order to be a group member (Hull 1988, 512). In the movements reviewed here, however, both of these essentialist propositions appear to be true. For example, whereas, as Hull suggests, even Darwin could have absented himself or been ejected from the group without the evolutionary program losing its identity, I rather doubt that Freud could have been similarly ejected from the psychoanalytic movement without changing entirely the focus of the movement. In a comment that indicates the fundamentally individualist nature of scientific communities, Hull notes that although each individual scientist has his or her own view of the essential nature of the conceptual system, the adoption of such an essentialist perspective by the community as a whole could only prevent the conceptual growth characteristic of real science.

This individualistic conceptualization of science is highly compatible with recent work in the philosophy of science. A fundamental issue in the philosophy of science is to describe the type of discourse community that promotes scientific thinking in any area of endeavor. As phrased by Donald Campbell (1993, 97), the question is “which social systems of belief revision and belief retention would be most likely to improve the competence-of-reference of beliefs to their presumed referents?” I propose that a minimal requirement of a scientific social system is that science not be conducted from an ingroup-outgroup perspective. Scientific progress (Campbell’s “competence-of-reference”) depends on an individualistic, atomistic universe of discourse in which each individual sees himself or herself not as a member of a wider political or cultural entity advancing a particular point of view but as an independent agent endeavoring to evaluate evidence and discover the structure of reality. As Campbell (1986, 121–122) notes, a critical feature of science as it evolved in the seventeenth century was that individuals were independent agents who could each replicate scientific findings for themselves. Scientific opinion certainly coalesces around certain propositions in real science (e.g., the structure of DNA, the mechanisms of reinforcement), but this scientific consensus is highly prone to defection in the event that new data cast doubt on presently held theories. Thus Barker and Gholson (1984) show that the long rivalry between cognitivist and behaviorist positions in psychology essentially hinged on the results of key experiments that resulted in defection or recruitment to these positions within the psychological community. Arthur Jensen (1982, 124) summarizes this view well when he notes that “when many individual scientists . . . are all able to think as they please and do their research unfettered by collectivist or totalitarian constraints, science is a self-correcting process.”

Each individual participant in a real science must view himself or herself as a free agent who is continually evaluating the available evidence in order to arrive at the best possible current understanding of reality. A variety of extra-
scientific influences may affect individual scientists in conducting and evaluating research results, such as the need not to offend one’s superior or give comfort to a rival research group (Campbell 1993). A real scientist, however, must self-consciously attempt to remove at least the influence of personal relationships, group ties, gender, social class, political and moral agendas, and even career advancement possibilities. Real scientists change their beliefs on the basis of evidence and are willing to abandon presently held beliefs if they conflict with the evidence (Hull 1988, 19).

The assumption is that by honestly endeavoring to remove these influences, scientific consensus increasingly coalesces around propositions in which the referents of scientific propositions have an important role in the creation of scientific belief. As Stove (1982, 3) notes, despite resistance to the proposition in a large part of the intellectual world, there has been an enormous growth of knowledge in the past 400 years. Nevertheless, consensual progress in the social sciences has not occurred, and I rather doubt that consensual progress will occur until research ceases to be conducted from an ingroup-outgroup perspective.

In the movements reviewed here, intellectual endeavor had strong overtones of social group solidarity, as individual participants could always count on others to hold similar views and to present a united front against any unwelcome data. One consequence of the group conflict in the Iberian peninsula during the period of the Inquisition was that science became impossible (Castro 1971, 576; Haliczer 1989). The ideology supporting the Inquisition, including theologically derived views of the nature of physical reality, became an aspect of a collectivist worldview in which any deviation from the established ideology was viewed as treason to the group. Science requires the possibility and intellectual respectability of committing treason; or rather, it requires the impossibility of treason because there is an implicit understanding that one’s views of reality are not a function of group allegiance but of one’s independent (individualistic) evaluation of the available evidence.

In a real science the fundamental structure of reality cannot be decided a priori and protected from empirical disconfirmation, as is the case whenever groups develop a political stake in a particular interpretation of reality. Yet this is precisely what occurred during the Inquisition and the period of medieval Christian religious orthodoxy, and it has been the case in all the intellectual movements reviewed here (as well as in much of the Jewish historiography reviewed in *SAID*, Ch. 7). Because the movements reviewed here have had an underlying Jewish political agenda, the essential doctrines and the direction of research were developed a priori to conform to those interests. And because of the fundamental irrationality of the ideologies involved, the only form these movements could take was that of an authoritarian ingroup that would simply excise dissenters from the group. Within these movements the route to a successful career involved, as a necessary condition, authoritarian submission to the fundamental tenets of the intellectual movement.
Nevertheless, at times the situation is more complicated, and even participation in a real scientific culture can also be used to advance Jewish ethnic interests. In Chapter 2 it was noted that the empirical research of Harvard population biologist R. C. Lewontin actually uses methods condemned by the extreme methodological purism with which he has opposed several evolutionary and biological approaches to human behavior. It is interesting in this regard that Lewontin (1994a, 33) appears to be aware that participation in a truly scientific culture creates a “bank account of legitimacy which we can then spend on our political and humanist pursuits.” Lewontin has therefore established a reputation in a real scientific community and then used that reputation to advance his ethnic agenda, part of which is to insist on a methodological rigor that is incompatible with social science. Even real science can be converted into political currency.

At a deeper level, I suppose, a fundamental aspect of Jewish intellectual history has been the realization that there is really no demonstrable difference between truth and consensus. Within traditional Jewish religious discourse, “truth” was the prerogative of a privileged interpretive elite that in traditional societies consisted of the scholarly class within the Jewish community. Within this community, “truth” and “reality” were nothing more (and were undeniably perceived as nothing more) than consensus within a sufficiently large portion of the interpretive community. “Without the community we cannot ascribe any real meaning to notions like the word of God or holiness. Canonization of Holy Scripture takes place only in the context of the understanding of those scriptures by a community. Nor can scripture be holy for an individual alone without a community. The holiness of writ depends upon a meaning that is ‘really there’ in the text. Only the communal reading-understanding of the texts makes their meaning, the meaning that is capable of being called holy, as real as the community itself” (Agus 1997, 34).

As we have seen in SAID (Ch. 7), Jewish religious ideology was an infinitely plastic set of propositions that could rationalize and interpret any event in a manner compatible with serving the interests of the community. Authority within the Jewish intellectual community was always understood to be based entirely on what recognized (i.e., consensual) scholars had said. It never occurred to the members of this discourse community to seek confirmation of their views from outside the community of intellectual discourse itself, either from other (gentile) discourse communities or by trying to understand the nature of reality itself. Reality was whatever the group decided it should be, and any dissent from this socially constructed reality would have to be performed within a narrow intellectual space that would not endanger the overall goals of the group.

Acceptance of the Jewish canon, like membership in the intellectual movements reviewed here, was essentially an act of authoritarian submission. The basic genius of the Jewish intellectual activity reviewed in these chapters is the realization that hermeneutic communities based solely on intellectual consensus within a committed group are possible even within the post-Enlightenment
world of intellectual discourse and may even be successfully disseminated within the wider gentile community to facilitate specific Jewish political interests.

The difference from the pre-Enlightenment world, of course, is that these intellectual discourses were forced to develop a facade of science in order to appeal to gentiles. Or, in the case of the skeptical thrust of Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction and the Frankfurt School (but not involvement in activities such as The Authoritarian Personality), it was necessary to defend the viability of philosophical skepticism. The scientific veneer and philosophical respectability sought by these movements then functioned to portray these intellectual movements as the result of individualistic free choice based on rational appraisals of the evidence. This in turn necessitated that great efforts were required to mask Jewish involvement and domination of the movements, as well as the extent to which the movements sought to attain specific Jewish political interests.

Such efforts at deemphasizing Jewish involvement have been most apparent in radical political movements and psychoanalysis, but they are also apparent in Boasian anthropology. Although the Jewish political agenda of the Frankfurt School was far less camouflaged, even here an important aspect of the program was the development of a body of theory applicable to any universalist conception of society and not in any way dependent on the articulation of a specifically Jewish political agenda. As a result, this ideological perspective and its postmodern descendants have been enthusiastically embraced by non-Jewish minority group intellectuals with their own political agendas.

The phenomenon is a good example of the susceptibility of Western individualist societies to invasion by cohesive collectivist groups of any kind. I have noted a strong historical tendency for Judaism to prosper in Western individualist societies and to decline in Eastern or Western collectivist societies (see SAID, Chs. 3–5; PTSDA, Ch. 8). Jews benefit greatly from open, individualistic societies in which barriers to upward mobility are removed and in which intellectual discourse is not prescribed by gentile-dominated institutions like the Catholic Church. But, as Charles Liebman (1973, 157) points out, Jews “sought the options of the Enlightenment but rejected its consequences” by (in my terms) retaining a strong sense of group identity in a society nominally committed to individualism. Individualist societies develop republican political institutions and institutions of scientific inquiry that assume that groups are maximally permeable and highly subject to defection when individual needs are not being met. Individualists have little loyalty to ingroups and tend not to see the world in terms of ingroups and outgroups. There is a strong tendency to see others as individuals and evaluate them as individuals even when the others are acting as part of a collectivist group (Triandis 1995).

As a result, intellectual movements that are highly collectivist may come to be regarded by outsiders in individualistic societies as the result of individualistic, rational choice of free agents. Evidence suggests that Jews have been
concerned to portray Jewish intellectual movements as the result of enlightened free choice. Thus Jewish social scientists were instrumental in portraying Jewish involvement in radical political causes as “the free choice of a gifted minority” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 118), and I have noted the role of the media in portraying Freud as a tireless seeker of truth. Yet because of their collective, highly focused efforts and energy, these groups can be much more influential than the atomized, fragmented efforts of individuals. The efforts of individualists can easily be ignored, marginalized, or placed under anathema; in contrast, the collectivity continues to dominate intellectual discourse because of its cohesiveness and its control of the means of intellectual production. In the long run, however, there is reason to believe that the Western commitment to individualism depends on the absence of powerful and cohesive collectivist groups acting within society (SAID, Chs. 3–5).

It is of some importance that none of these post-Enlightenment intellectual movements reviewed here developed a specific positive rationale for continued Jewish identification. The material reviewed in this volume indicates that such an ideological rationale will not be forthcoming because, in a very basic sense, Judaism represents the antithesis of the Enlightenment values of individualism and its correlative scientific intellectual discourse. In the economic and social sphere, Judaism represents the possibility of a powerful, cohesive group ethnic strategy that provokes anti-individualist reactions in gentile outgroups and threatens the viability of individualist political and social institutions. In the intellectual sphere, Judaism has resulted in collectivist enterprises that have systematically impeded inquiry in the social sciences in the interests of developing and disseminating theories directed at achieving specific political and social interests.

It is thus not surprising that although these theories were directed at achieving specific Jewish interests in the manipulation of culture, they “could not tell their name”; that is, they were forced to minimize any overt indication that Jewish group identity or Jewish group interests were involved, and they could not develop a specific rationale for Judaism acceptable within a post-Enlightenment intellectual context. In SAID (Ch. 2) I noted that the Jewish contribution to the wider gentile culture in nineteenth-century Germany was accomplished from a highly particularistic perspective in which Jewish group identity continued to be of paramount subjective importance despite its “invisibility.” Similarly, because of the need for invisibility, the theories and movements discussed here were forced to de-emphasize Judaism as a social category—a form of crypsis discussed extensively in SAID (Ch. 6) as a common Jewish technique in combating anti-Semitism. In the case of the Frankfurt School, “What strikes the current observer is the intensity with which many of the Institute’s members denied, and in some cases still deny, any meaning at all to their Jewish identities” (Jay 1973, 32). The originators and practitioners of these theories attempted to conceal their Jewish identities, as in the case of Freud, and to engage in massive self-deception, as appears to have been common among many Jewish political radicals. Recall the Jewish radicals who
believed in their own invisibility as Jews while nevertheless appearing as the quintessential ethnics to outside observers and at the same time taking steps to ensure that gentiles would have highly visible positions in the movement (pp. 91–93). The technique of having gentiles as highly visible exemplars of Jewish-dominated movements has been commonly used by Jewish groups attempting to appeal to gentiles on a wide range of Jewish issues (SAID, Ch. 6) and is apparent in the discussion of Jewish involvement in influencing immigration policy in the following chapter. As an additional example, Irving Louis Horowitz (1993, 91) contrasts the “high-profile,” special-interest pleading of the new ethnic and sexual minorities within sociology with the Jewish tendency toward a low-profile strategy. Although Jews dominated American sociology beginning in the 1930s, specifically Jewish interests and political agendas were never made salient.

Given this history, it is highly ironic that Jewish neoconservative intellectuals have been in the forefront demanding that social science accept a scientific paradigm rather than the subjectivist, anti-science racist ideologies typical of recent multiculturalist ideologues. Thus Irving Louis Horowitz (1993) shows that Jews dominated American sociology beginning in the 1930s and were instrumental in the decline of Darwinian paradigms and the rise of conflict models of society based on radical political theory. Horowitz notes, however, that this Jewish domination of sociology is now threatened by affirmative action hiring policies that place a cap on the number of Jews admitted to the profession as well as by the anti-Semitism and the politically motivated research agendas of these new ethnic minorities that increasingly influence the profession. Faced with this state of affairs, Horowitz (1993, 92) makes a plea for a scientific, individualist sociology: “Jewish growth and survival are best served in a democratic polity and by a scientific community.”

The material reviewed here is highly relevant to developing a theory of how human evolved psychology interfaces with cultural messages. Evolutionists have shown considerable interest in cultural evolution and its relation to organic evolution (Flinn 1997). Dawkins (1976), for example, developed the idea of “memes” as replicating cultural units transmitted within societies. Memes may be adaptive or maladaptive for the individuals or the societies adopting them. In terms of the present undertaking, the Jewish intellectual and cultural movements reviewed here may be viewed as memes designed to facilitate the continued existence of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy; their adaptiveness for gentiles who adopt them is highly questionable, however, and indeed, it is unlikely that a gentile who believes that, for example, anti-Semitism is necessarily a sign of a pathological personality is behaving adaptively.

The question is: What evolved features of the human mind make people likely to adopt memes that are inimical to their own interests? On the basis of the material reviewed here, one critical component appears to be that these memes are promulgated from highly prestigious sources, suggesting that one feature of our evolved psychology is a greater proneness to adopt cultural
messages deriving from people and individuals with high social status. Social learning theory has long been aware of the tendency for models to be more effective if they have prestige and high status, and this tendency fits well with an evolutionary perspective in which seeking high social status is a universal feature of the human mind (MacDonald 1988a). Like other modeling influences, therefore, maladaptive memes are best promulgated by individuals and institutions with high social status, and we have seen that a consistent thread of the Jewish intellectual movements reviewed here has been that they have been promulgated by individuals representing society’s most prestigious intellectual and media institutions and they have attempted to cloak themselves in the veneer of science because of the high status of science. Individuals such as Freud have become cultural icons—true cultural heroes. The cultural memes emanating from his thought, therefore, have a much greater opportunity to take root in the culture as a whole.

Also relevant is that the movements reviewed here typically occurred in an atmosphere of Jewish crypsis or semi-crypsis in the sense that the Jewish political agenda was not an aspect of the theory and the theories themselves had no overt Jewish content. Gentile intellectuals approaching these theories were therefore unlikely to view them as aspects of Jewish-gentile cultural competition or as an aspect of a specifically Jewish political agenda; to the contrary, they were more likely to view the promulgators of these theories as “just like themselves”—as individualists seeking scientifically grounded truth about humans and their societies. Social psychological theory has long known that similarity is highly conducive to liking, and this phenomenon is susceptible to an evolutionary analysis (Rushton 1989). The proposal is that if these theories had been promulgated by traditionally Orthodox Jews, with their different modes of dress and speech patterns, they never would have had the cultural impact that they in fact had. From this perspective, Jewish crypsis and semi-crypsis are essential to the success of Judaism in post-Enlightenment societies—a theme discussed in *SAID* (Ch. 9).

Evolved mechanisms that facilitate the acceptance of maladaptive ideologies among gentiles are not the whole story, however. In *SAID* (Ch. 8) I noted a general tendency for self-deception among Jews as a robust pattern apparent in several historical eras and touching on a wide range of issues, including personal identity, the causes and extent of anti-Semitism, the characteristics of Jews (e.g., economic success), and the role of Jews in the political and cultural process in traditional and contemporary societies. Self-deception may well be important in facilitating Jewish involvement in the movements discussed here. I have noted evidence for this in the case of Jewish political radicals, and Greenwald and Schuh (1994) persuasively argue that the ingroup ethnic bias exhibited by their sample of researchers on prejudice is not conscious. Many of the Jews involved in the movements reviewed here may sincerely believe that these movements are really divorced from specifically Jewish interests or are in the best interests of other groups as well as Jews. They may sincerely believe that they are not biased in their associational patterns or in their
patterns of citation in scientific articles, but, as Trivers notes (1985), the best deceivers are those who are self-deceived.

Finally, theories of social influence deriving from social psychology are also relevant and may yield to an evolutionary analysis. I have suggested that the memes generated by these Jewish intellectual movements achieve their influence, at least at first, because of the processes of minority group influence. The issue of whether this aspect of social psychology may be viewed as part of the evolved design features of the human mind remains to be re-searched.

NOTES

1. I became aware of Borowitz’s (1973) interesting account of Jewish self-deception, *The Mask Jews Wear: Self-Deceptions of American Jewry*, too late for inclusion in Chapter 8 of *SAID*. It is a good treatment of the complexities of Jewish identity in the post-Enlightenment world, albeit with some self-deceptions of its own, such as its equation of Jewish ethnocentrism with applied morality.
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