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## Jews and the Radical Critique of Gentile Culture: Introduction and Theory

For 1,500 years Jewish society had been designed to produce intellectuals. . . . Jewish society was geared to support them. . . . Rich merchants married sages' daughters; . . . Quite suddenly, around the year 1800, this ancient and highly efficient social machine for the production of intellectuals began to shift its output. Instead of pouring all its products into the closed circuit of rabbinical studies, . . . it unleashed a significant and ever-growing proportion of them into secular life. This was an event of shattering importance in world history. (*A History of the Jews*, Paul Johnson 1988, 340–341)

An important theme of *Separation and Its Discontents* (hereafter *SAID*) was the manipulation of ideology in the service of rationalizing specific forms of Judaism, interpreting history, and combating anti-Semitism. The present volume is in many ways an extension of these phenomena. However, the intellectual movements and political activity discussed in this volume have typically occurred in the wider intellectual and political world and have not been designed to rationalize specific forms of Judaism. Rather, they may be characterized in the broadest sense as efforts at cultural criticism and at times as attempts to influence the wider culture of the society in a manner that conforms to specific Jewish interests.

There is no implication here of a unified Jewish “conspiracy” to undermine gentile culture, as portrayed in the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Since the Enlightenment, Judaism has never been a unified, monolithic movement, and there has clearly been a great deal of disagreement among Jews as to how to protect themselves and attain their interests during this period. The movements discussed in this volume (Boasian anthropology, political radicalism, psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and the New York Intellectuals) were advanced by relatively few individuals

whose views may not have been known or understood by the majority of the Jewish community. The argument is that Jews dominated these intellectual movements, that a strong sense of Jewish identity was characteristic of the great majority of these individuals, and that these individuals were pursuing a Jewish agenda in establishing and participating in these movements.

Thus there is no implication that Judaism constitutes a unified movement or that all segments of the Jewish community participated in these movements. Jews may constitute a predominant or necessary element in radical political movements or movements in the social sciences, and Jewish identification may be highly compatible with or even facilitate these movements without most Jews being involved in these movements. As a result, the question of the overall effects of Jewish influences on gentile culture is independent of the question of whether most or all Jews supported the movements to alter gentile culture.

This distinction is important because on the one hand anti-Semites have often implicitly or explicitly assumed that Jewish involvement in radical political movements was part of an overarching Jewish strategy that also included wealthy Jewish capitalists, as well as Jewish involvement in the media, the academy, and other areas of public life. On the other hand, Jews attempting to defuse the anti-Semitism resulting from the fact that Jews have played a predominant role in many radical political movements have often pointed to the fact that only a minority of Jews are involved and that gentiles are also involved in the movements. Thus, for example, the standard response of the American Jewish Committee (hereafter AJCommittee) during the 1930s and 1940s to the predominance of Jews in radical political movements was to emphasize that most Jews were not radicals. Nevertheless, during this same period the AJCommittee undertook efforts to combat radicalism in the Jewish community (e.g., Cohen 1972).<sup>1</sup> The AJCommittee was implicitly recognizing that statements that only a minority of Jews are radicals may indeed have been true but were irrelevant to whether (1) Jewish identification is compatible with or facilitates involvement in radical political movements, (2) Jews constitute a predominant or necessary element in radical political movements, or (3) influences on gentile society resulting from Jewish predominance in radical movements (or the other Jewish intellectual movements reviewed in this volume) may be conceptualized as a consequence of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy.

Similarly, the fact that most Jews prior to the 1930s were not Zionists, at least overtly, surely does not imply that Jewish identification was irrelevant to Zionism, or that Jews did not in fact constitute a predominant influence on Zionism, or that Zionism did not have effects on gentile societies, or that some gentiles did not become ardent Zionists. Political radicalism has been one choice among many available to Jews in the post-Enlightenment world, and there is no implication here that Judaism constitutes a monolithic unified group in the post-Enlightenment world. That Jews have been more likely than

gentiles to choose radical political alternatives and that Jews have been a predominant influence in some radical political movements are therefore facts highly relevant to the present project.

That some gentiles were involved in these movements is not surprising either. At a theoretical level, my thinking is based once again on an evolutionary interpretation of social identity theory (see *SAID*, Ch. 1). Gentiles may be attracted to the political and intellectual movements that attract Jews and for many of the same reasons, that is, reasons related to social identification and ingroup-outgroup competition. For example, African American intellectuals have often been attracted to leftist intellectual movements and environmentalist explanations of racial group differences in IQ at least partly as a reaction to their perceptions of white animosity and the consequent implications of genetic inferiority. In the same way, I argue that anti-Semitism has been a motivating force for many Jewish intellectuals. Recall the motivating role of self-esteem as a theoretical primitive in social identity theory. A great many people who, for whatever reason, feel victimized by a particular sociopolitical system are attracted to movements that criticize the system, blame others for their problems, and generally vindicate their own positive perceptions of themselves and their ingroup as well as their negative perceptions of outgroups. In each of the intellectual and political movements I review, Jewish identification and a concern to combat anti-Semitism were clearly involved.

Moreover, once Jews have attained intellectual predominance, it is not surprising that gentiles would be attracted to Jewish intellectuals as members of a socially dominant and prestigious group and as dispensers of valued resources. Such a perspective fits well with an evolutionary perspective on group dynamics: Gentiles negotiating the intellectual status hierarchy would be attracted to the characteristics of the most dominant members of the hierarchy, especially if they viewed the hierarchy as permeable. Writer William Barrett, a gentile editor of *Partisan Review*, describes his “awe and admiration” of the New York Intellectuals (a group of predominantly Jewish intellectuals discussed in Chapter 6) early in his career. “They were beings invested in my eyes with a strange and mysterious glamour” (in Cooney 1986, 227). *Partisan Review* was a flagship journal of this very influential intellectual movement and had a decisive influence on success or failure in the literary world. Leslie Fiedler (1948, 872, 873), himself a New York Intellectual, described a whole generation of American Jewish writers (including Delmore Schwartz, Alfred Kazin, Karl Shapiro, Isaac Rosenfeld, Paul Goodman, Saul Bellow, and H. J. Kaplan) as “typically urban, second-generation Jews.” The works of these writers appeared regularly in *Partisan Review*, and Fiedler goes on to say that “the writer drawn to New York from the provinces feels . . . the Rube, attempts to conform; and the almost parody of Jewishness achieved by the gentile writer in New York is a strange and crucial testimony of our time.”

Almost one-half of Kadushin's (1974, 23) sample of elite post-World War II American intellectuals was Jewish. The sample was based on the most frequent contributors to leading intellectual journals, followed by interviews in which the intellectuals "voted" for another intellectual they considered most influential in their thinking. Over 40 percent of the Jews in the sample received six or more votes as being most influential, compared to only 15 percent of non-Jews (p. 32). It is therefore not surprising that Joseph Epstein (1997) finds that during the 1950s and early 1960s being Jewish was "honorific" among intellectuals generally. Gentile intellectuals "scoured their genealog[ies] for Jewish ancestors" (Epstein 1997, 7). By 1968 Walter Kerr could write, "what has happened since World War II is that the American sensibility has become part Jewish, perhaps as much Jewish as it is anything else. . . . The literate American mind has come in some measure to think Jewishly. It has been taught to, and it was ready to. After the entertainers and novelists came the Jewish critics, politicians, theologians. Critics and politicians and theologians are by profession molders; they form ways of seeing." In my personal experience, this honorific status of Jewish intellectuals remains common among my colleagues and is apparent, for example, in Hollinger's (1996, 4) recent work on the "transformation of the ethnoreligious demography of American academic life by Jews" in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, a major theme is that gentiles have often been actively recruited to the movements discussed here and given highly visible roles within these movements in order to lessen the appearance that the movements are indeed Jewish-dominated or aimed only at narrow Jewish sectarian interests. From the standpoint of social identity theory, such a strategy aims at making gentiles perceive the intellectual or political movement as permeable to non-Jews and as satisfying gentile interests. As indicated in *SAID* (Chs. 5, 6), the rhetoric of universalism and the recruitment of gentiles as advocates of Jewish interests have been recurrent themes in combating anti-Semitism in both the ancient and modern world.

It is also important to keep in mind that the effectiveness and historical importance of Jewish involvement in the movements discussed in this volume were undoubtedly far out of proportion to the actual number of Jews involved. For example, even though in particular historical eras Jews may have been only a numerical minority within radical political or intellectual movements, they may well have been a necessary condition for the effectiveness and historical importance of these movements. Jews who became radicals retained their high IQ, their ambitiousness, their persistence, their work ethic, and their ability to organize and participate in cohesive, highly committed groups (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 7). As Lindemann (1997, 429) notes about Jewish Bolsheviks, "citing the absolute numbers of Jews, or their percentage of the whole, fails to recognize certain key if intangible factors: the assertiveness and often dazzling verbal skills of Jewish Bolsheviks, their energy, and their strength of

conviction.” Jews tend to be far above average on these traits, and these traits have been central to Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy throughout history.

Writing of American Jewish radicals, Sorin (1985, 121–122) notes particularly their hard work and dedication, their desire to make a mark on the world, and their desire to rise in the world, engage in personal promotion, and achieve public acclaim—all traits that lead to upward mobility in any walk of life. These activists therefore became a more powerful, effective force than similarly proletarianized groups of gentiles. “A Jewish proletariat, conscious of its class interest and its cultural identity, grew, and with it grew activism and organization” (Sorin 1985, 35). Sorin (1985, 28) accepts the claim that half the revolutionaries in Russia in 1903 were Jews and notes that Jewish labor militancy as calculated by number of strikes and lost work time was three times that of any other working class in Europe between 1895 and 1904 (p. 35). Within leftist circles, Jews were viewed as the vanguard of the movement. Once this critical mass of Jews had become radicalized, it is not surprising that there would be important repercussions throughout Europe and North America. In addition to being radicals, these Jews were a very talented, intelligent and committed group of people. Similarly, Hollinger (1996, 19) notes that Jews were more influential in the decline of a homogeneous Protestant Christian culture in the United States than Catholics because of their greater wealth, social standing, and technical skill in the intellectual arena.

A major theme, therefore, is that the Jews who originated and dominated the movements considered in this volume were characterized by intelligence, persistence, and the ability to be part of cohesive, cooperative, and highly focused groups. These groups may therefore be conceptualized as secular versions of historical Jewish groups not only because of the high levels of Jewish identity characteristic of group members, but also because these groups retained the essential characteristics of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. Because of these characteristics, these groups were extraordinarily effective in achieving their aims. Collectively, the case studies discussed here provide yet another indication that highly disciplined, cooperative groups are able to outcompete individualist strategies. Indeed, an important thread in the following chapters is that Jewish intellectuals have formed highly cohesive groups whose influence to a great extent derives from the solidarity and cohesiveness of the group. Intellectual activity is like any other human endeavor: Cohesive groups outcompete individualist strategies. The fundamental truth of this axiom has been central to the success of Judaism throughout its history whether in business alliances and trading monopolies or in the intellectual and political movements discussed here (see especially *PTSDA*, Ch. 5).

Another major theme of this volume is that Jewish intellectuals have developed intellectual movements that have subjected the institutions of gentile

society to radical forms of criticism. The converse of this is that gentile-dominated societies have often developed hegemonic ideologies intended to explain and rationalize the current institutions of society. This presumably has been the case for the major religions of the world, and more recently, ideologies such as communism, fascism, and liberal democracy appear to perform a similar function. Judaism, because of its position as a minority group strategy committed to its own worldview, has tended to adopt ideologies in which the institutions and ideologies of the surrounding society are viewed negatively.

Such a result follows directly from social identity theory. Particularly striking are the negative views of gentiles apparent in Jewish religious writings. The Law of Cleanness regards gentiles and their land as intrinsically unclean. Gentiles are typically likened to beasts capable of the worst debaucheries, as in the writings of Maimonides where heathen women are suspected of whoredom and heathen men of bestiality (*The Code of Maimonides, Book V: The Book of Holiness*, XXII, 142). Jews conceptualize themselves as descendants of Jacob, represented in Genesis as smooth-skinned, delicate, and contemplative. Gentiles are represented by Esau, Jacob's twin brother, the opposite of Jacob—hirsute, coarse, and brutal. Whereas Esau lives as a hunter and warrior, Jacob lives by intelligence and guile and is the proper master of Esau who has been commanded by God to serve Jacob. Lindemann (1997, 5) shows that these stereotypes remain salient to Jews in contemporary times.

Judaism may come to be viewed as subversive when Jews attempt to inculcate negative perceptions of gentile culture among gentiles. The association of Judaism with subversive ideologies has a long history. Noting the association between Jews and subversive ideas in Muslim countries, Lewis (1984, 104) states that the theme of Jewish subversion is also familiar in "other times and places." Johnson (1988, 214–215) finds that beginning in the Middle Ages converted Jews, especially those forced to convert, were "a critical, questing, disturbing element within the intelligentsia. . . . [Thus] the claim that they were intellectually subversive had an element of truth." The title of a recent book on Jewish art in the Middle Ages expresses this theme well: *Dreams of Subversion in Medieval Jewish Art and Literature* (M. M. Epstein 1997). Epstein comments that "One can sense the anger Jews of the late Middle Ages must have felt when they called for the destruction of Christendom" (p. 115).

In the ancient world through the Middle Ages negative views of gentile institutions were relatively confined to internal consumption within the Jewish community. However, beginning with the Converso turmoil in fifteenth-century Spain these negative views often appeared in the most prestigious intellectual circles and in the mass media. These views generally subjected the institutions of gentile society to radical criticism or they led to the development of intellectual structures that rationalized Jewish identification in a postreligious intellectual environment.

Faur (1992, 31ff) shows that Conversos in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain were vastly overrepresented among the humanist thinkers who opposed the corporate nature of Spanish society centered around Christianity. In describing the general thrust of these writers, Faur (1992, 31) notes that “Although the strategy varied—from the creation of highly sophisticated literary works to the writing of scholarly and philosophical compositions—the goal was one: to present ideas and methodologies that would displace the values and institutions of the ‘old Christian.’ . . . The urgency of reviewing the values and institutions of Christian Spain became more evident with the first massacre of *conversos* perpetrated by the old Christians in Toledo, in 1449.” Similarly, Castro (1954, 557–558) notes that works of “violent social criticism” and “antisocial rancor,” including especially social satire, were originated during the fifteenth century by Converso writers.

A prime example is *The Celestina* (first edition dating from 1499) by Fernando de Rojas, who wrote “with all the anguish, pessimism, and nihilism of a *converso* who has lost the religion of his fathers but has been unable to integrate himself within the compass of Christian belief. Rojas subjected the Castilian society of his time to “a corrosive analysis, destroying with a spirit that has been called ‘destructive’ all the traditional values and mental schemes of the new intolerant system. Beginning with literature and proceeding to religion, passing through all the ‘values’ of institutionalized casteism—honor, valor, love—everything is perversely pulverized” (Rodríguez-Puértolas 1976, 127).

This association of Jews with subversive ideologies continued during and after the Enlightenment as Jews were able to participate in public intellectual debate in Western Europe. Paul Johnson (1988, 291–292), writing of Baruch Spinoza, terms him “the first major example of the sheer destructive power of Jewish rationalism once it escaped the restraints of the traditional community.” Similarly, Heinrich Heine is “both the prototype and the archetype of a new figure in European literature: the Jewish radical man of letters, using his skill, reputation and popularity to undermine the intellectual confidence of the established order” (Johnson 1988, 345).

This “sheer destructive power” of the Jewish intellect was an important aspect of the pre-National Socialist era in Germany. As indicated in *SAID* (Chs. 2, 5), a prominent feature of anti-Semitism among the Social Conservatives and racial anti-Semites in Germany from 1870 to 1933 was their belief that Jews were instrumental in developing ideas that subverted traditional German attitudes and beliefs. Jews were vastly overrepresented as editors and writers during the 1920s in Germany, and “a more general cause of increased anti-Semitism was the very strong and unfortunate propensity of dissident Jews to attack national institutions and customs in both socialist and non-socialist publications” (Gordon 1984, 51).<sup>3</sup> This “media violence” directed at German culture by Jewish writers such as Kurt Tucholsky—who “wore his

subversive heart on his sleeve” (Pulzer 1979, 97)—was publicized widely by the anti-Semitic press (Johnson 1988, 476–477).

Jews were not simply overrepresented among radical journalists, intellectuals, and “producers of culture” in Weimar Germany, they essentially created these movements. “They violently attacked everything about German society. They despised the military, the judiciary, and the middle class in general” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 85). Massing (1949, 84) notes the perception of the anti-Semite Adolf Stoecker of Jewish “lack of reverence for the Christian-conservative world.”

Anti-Semitism among university professors during the Weimar period was partially fueled by the perception that “the Jew represented the critical or ‘negative’ aspects of modern thought, the acids of analysis and skepticism that helped to dissolve the moral certainties, patriotic commitment, and social cohesion of modern states” (Ringer 1983, 7). Reflecting this perception, National Socialist propaganda during the period claimed that Jews attempted to undermine the social cohesion of gentile society while remaining committed to a highly cohesive group themselves—an intellectual double standard in which the basis of social cohesion among gentiles was subjected to intense criticism while the Jews “would retain their international cohesiveness, blood ties, and spiritual unity” (Aschheim 1985, 239). Viewed from this perspective, an important goal of Jewish intellectual effort may be understood as attempting to undermine cohesive gentile group strategies while continuing to engage in their own highly cohesive group strategy. This issue reemerges in the discussion of Jewish involvement in radical political movements and the Frankfurt School of Social Research in Chapters 3 and 5.

This phenomenon was not restricted to Germany. Gilson (1962, 31–32), in discussing his Jewish professors at the turn of the century in France, states:

The doctrines of these university professors were really quite different from one another. Even the personal philosophy of Levy-Bruhl did not coincide exactly with that of Durkheim, while Frederic Rauh was going his own way. . . . The only element common to their doctrines is a negative one, but nonetheless real and very active in its own order. One might describe it as a radical defiance of all that which is social conceived as a constraint from which to be liberated. Spinoza and Brunschvieg achieved this liberation through metaphysics. Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl through science and sociology, Bergson through intuition.

Jews have also been at the forefront of the adversarial culture in the United States, England, and France since the mid-1960s, especially as defenders of the adversary culture in the media and the academic world (Ginsberg 1993, 125ff; Rothman & Isenberg 1974a, 66–67).<sup>4</sup> Stein (1979, 28; see also Lichter et al. 1994; Powers et al. 1996) shows that his sample of predominantly Jewish writers and producers of television shows in the 1970s had very negative attitudes toward what they viewed as a gentile-dominated cultural establishment, although their most negative comments were elicited in



informal conversation rather than during formal interviews. Television portrayals of gentile establishment figures in business and the military tended to be very negative. For example, “the writers clearly thought of military men as clean-shaven, blond, and of completely WASP background. In the minds of a few of the people I interviewed, these blond officers were always a hair’s breadth away from becoming National Socialists. They were thought of as part of an Aryan ruling class that actually or potentially repressed those of different ethnic backgrounds” (pp. 55–56).

Indeed, Glazer and Moynihan (1963/1970) credit the emergence of the adversary culture in the United States as a triumph of the New York Jewish cultural-political perspective. Jewish writers and visual artists (including E. L. Doctorow, Norman Mailer, Joseph Heller,<sup>5</sup> Frederick Wiseman, and Norman Lear) were disproportionately involved in attempts to portray American society as “sick” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 120). A common technique of cultural subversion “involves an attack upon genuine inequities or irrationalities. Since all societies abound in both, there is never an absence of targets. However, the attack is generally not directed at the particular inequity or irrationality per se. Rather, such inequities or irrationalities are used as a means for achieving a larger purpose: the general weakening of the social order itself” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 120).

In this volume I will concentrate on Jewish involvement in movements opposed to evolutionary, biological, and genetic findings in the social sciences, radical political ideology, psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and the New York Intellectuals. These movements are not specifically Jewish in the sense that they are not intended to rationalize specific aspects of Judaism such as cultural and genetic separatism. A major point will be that Jews were vastly overrepresented in these movements, that a strong sense of Jewish identity characterized the great majority of these individuals, and that all involved alienation from and rejection of gentile culture.

The discussion therefore reflects Sorkin’s (1985, 102) description of nineteenth-century German-Jewish intellectuals as constituting an “invisible community of acculturating German Jews who perpetuated distinct cultural forms within the majority culture.” The Jewish cultural contribution to the wider gentile culture was therefore accomplished from a highly particularistic perspective in which Jewish group identity continued to be of paramount importance despite its “invisibility.” Even Berthold Auerbach (b. 1812), the exemplar of the assimilated Jewish intellectual, “manipulate[d] elements of the majority culture in a way peculiar to the German-Jewish minority” (Sorkin 1985, 107). Auerbach became a model, for secular Jewish intellectuals, of the assimilated Jew who did not renounce his Judaism. For the most part, these secular Jewish intellectuals socialized exclusively with other secular Jews and viewed their contribution to German culture as a secular form of Judaism—thus the “invisible community” of strongly identified Jewish

intellectuals. This cultural manipulation in the service of group interests was a common theme of anti-Semitic writings. Thus, Heinrich Heine's critique of German culture was viewed as directed at the pursuit of power for his group at the expense of the cohesiveness of gentile society (see Mosse 1970, 52).

In several of the movements discussed in the following chapters it is of considerable importance that their propagators have attempted to clothe their rhetoric in the garb of science—the modern arbiter of truth and intellectual respectability. As White (1966, 2) notes with respect to the Boasian school of anthropology, the aura of science is deceptive: “They would make it appear and would have everyone believe that their choice of premises and goals has been determined by scientific considerations. This is definitely not the case. . . . They are obviously sincere. Their sincerity and group loyalty tend, however, to persuade and consequently to deceive.”

The comment is an excellent illustration of Robert Trivers's (1985) evolutionary theory of self-deception: The best deceivers are those who are self-deceived. At times the deception becomes conscious. Charles Liebman (1973, 213) describes his unselfconscious acceptance of universalist ideologies (behaviorism and liberalism) in his work as a social scientist and suggests that he was engaged in self-deception regarding the role of Jewish identification in his beliefs: “As a behaviorist (and a liberal) I can testify to having been quite unselfconscious about my academic methodology, but I suspect that this would have to be the case. Otherwise I would be defeating the very universalism I espouse.”

### **CONCEPTUALIZING THE JEWISH RADICAL CRITICISM OF GENTILE SOCIETY**

The foregoing has documented a general tendency for Jewish intellectuals in a variety of periods to be involved with social criticism, and I have hinted at an analysis in terms of social identity theory. More formally, two quite different types of reasons explain why Jews might be expected to advocate ideologies and political movements aimed at undermining the existing gentile social order.

First, such ideologies and movements may be directed at benefiting Jews economically or socially. Clearly one of the themes of post-Enlightenment Judaism has been the rapid upward mobility of Jews and attempts by gentile power structures to limit Jewish access to power and social status. Given this rather conspicuous reality, practical reasons of economic and political self-interest would result in Jews being attracted to movements that criticized the gentile power structure or even advocated overthrowing it entirely.

Thus the czarist government of Russia enforced restrictions on Jews mainly out of fear that Jews would overwhelm gentile Russians in free economic competition (Lindemann 1991; *SAID*, Ch. 2). These czarist restrictions on Jews were a prominent rallying point for Jews around the world, and it is not

at all unreasonable to suppose that Jewish participation in radical movements in Russia was motivated by perceived Jewish interest in overthrowing the czarist regime. Indeed, Arthur Liebman (1979, 29ff) notes that Jewish political radicalism in czarist Russia must be understood as resulting from economic restrictions on Jews that were enforced by the government in the context of considerable Jewish poverty and a very rapid Jewish demographic increase. Similarly, well into the 1930s the Jewish socialist labor movement in the United States aimed at bettering the working conditions of its predominantly Jewish membership (Liebman 1979, 267).

Another practical goal of Jewish political and intellectual movements has been to combat anti-Semitism. For example, Jewish attraction to socialism in many countries in the 1930s was motivated partly by communist opposition to fascism and anti-Semitism (Lipset 1988, 383; Marcus 1983). The general association between anti-Semitism and conservative political views has often been advanced as an explanation for Jewish involvement with the left, including the leftist tendencies of many wealthy Jews (e.g., Lipset 1988, 375ff). Combating anti-Semitism also became a prime goal of Jewish radicals in the United States after Jews had predominantly moved into the middle class (Levin 1977, 211). Rising anti-Semitism and consequent restrictions on Jewish upward mobility during the 1930s also resulted in an attraction of Jews to the left (Liebman 1979, 420ff, 507).

It will be apparent in Chapter 2 that the cultural determinism of the Boasian school of anthropology functioned to combat anti-Semitism by combating racialist thinking and eugenic programs advocated mainly by gentiles. Psychoanalysis (Ch. 4) and the Frankfurt School (Ch. 5) have also been instrumental in developing and propagating theories of anti-Semitism which attribute anti-Semitism to irrational projections of gentiles. In the case of the Frankfurt School, the theory also functioned to pathologize gentile group allegiances as a symptom of a psychiatric disorder while ignoring Jewish group cohesion.

Second, Jewish involvement in social criticism may be influenced by social identity processes independent of any practical goal such as ending anti-Semitism. Research in social identity processes finds a tendency for displacement of ingroup views away from outgroup norms (Hogg & Abrams 1988). In the case of Jewish-gentile contact, these outgroup norms would paradigmatically represent the consensus views of the gentile society. Moreover, individuals who identify themselves as Jews would be expected to develop negative attributions regarding the outgroup, and for Jews the most salient outgroup is the gentile power structure and indeed the gentile-dominated social structure generally.

Jewish ingroup status vis-à-vis the gentile world as an outgroup would be expected to lead to a generalized negative conceptualization of the gentile outgroup and a tendency to overemphasize the negative aspects of gentile society and social structure. From the social identity perspective, the Jewish

tendency to subvert the social order is thus expected to extend beyond developing ideologies and social programs that satisfy specific Jewish economic and social interests and extend to a general devaluation and critique of gentile culture—“the sheer destructive power of Jewish rationalism once it escaped the restraints of the traditional community” (Johnson 1988, 291–292).

The social identity perspective also predicts that such negative attributions are especially likely if the gentile power structure is anti-Semitic or perceived to be anti-Semitic. A basic finding of social identity research is that groups attempt to subvert negative social categorizations imposed by another group (Hogg & Abrams 1988). Social identity processes would therefore be intensified by Jewish perceptions that gentile culture was hostile to Jews and that Jews had often been persecuted by gentiles. Thus Feldman (1993, 43) finds very robust tendencies toward heightened Jewish identification and rejection of gentile culture consequent to anti-Semitism at the very beginnings of Judaism in the ancient world and throughout Jewish history. In *Lord George Bentinck: A Political Biography* (1852, 489), the nineteenth-century racial theorist Benjamin Disraeli, who had a very strong Jewish identity despite being a baptized Christian, stated that “persecution . . . although unjust may have reduced the modern Jews to a state almost justifying malignant vengeance. They may have become so odious and so hostile to mankind as to merit for their present conduct, no matter how occasioned, the obloquy and ill-treatment of the communities in which they dwell and with which they are scarcely permitted to mingle.” The result, according to Disraeli, is that Jews would perceive gentile society in extremely negative terms and may attempt to overthrow the existing social order:

But existing society has chosen to persecute this race which should furnish its choice allies, and what have been the consequences?

They may be traced in the last outbreak of the destructive principle in Europe. An insurrection takes place against tradition and aristocracy, against religion and property. . . .<sup>6</sup> The people of God co-operate with atheists; the most skillful accumulators of property ally themselves with communists; the peculiar and chosen race touch the hand of all the scum and low castes of Europe! And all this because they wish to destroy that ungrateful Christendom which owes to them even its name, and whose tyranny they can no longer endure. (Disraeli 1852, 498–499)<sup>7</sup>

Indeed, Theodore Herzl espoused socialism in the 1890s as a Jewish response to continuing anti-Semitism, not because of its political goal of economic leveling, but because it would destroy the anti-Semitic gentile power structure: “From outcasts of society they [Jews] will become enemies of society. Ah, they are not protected in their civic honor, they are permitted to be insulted, scorned and on occasion also a bit plundered and maimed—what prevents them from going over to the side of anarchy?” Jews “no longer have a stake in the state. They will join the revolutionary parties, supplying or sharpening their weapons. They want to turn the Jews over to the mob—good,

they themselves will go over to the people. Beware, they are at their limit; do not go too far” (in Kornberg 1993, 122).

Similarly, Sammons (1979, 263) describes the basis of the mutual attraction between Heinrich Heine and Karl Marx by noting that “they were not reformers, but haters, and this was very likely their most fundamental bond with one another.” The suggestion, consistent with social identity theory, is that a fundamental motivation of Jewish intellectuals involved in social criticism has simply been hatred of the gentile-dominated power structure perceived as anti-Semitic. This deep antipathy toward the non-Jewish world can also be seen in sociologist and New York Intellectual Michael Walzer’s (1994, 6–7) comment on the “pathologies of Jewish life,” particularly “the sense that ‘all the world is against us,’ the resulting fear, resentment, and hatred of the *goy*, the secret dreams of reversal and triumph.” Such “secret dreams of reversal and triumph” are a theme of the treatment of Jewish radicals in Chapter 3 and Freud and the psychoanalytic movement discussed in Chapter 4.

Indeed, intense hatred of perceived enemies appears to be an important psychological characteristic of Jews. It is remarkable that Schatz (1991, 113) finds that while all Polish communists in the interwar period hated their enemies, Jewish communists had more perceived enemies and hated them more intensely. As described more fully in Chapter 3, these communist groups were actually highly cohesive ingroups entirely analogous to traditional Jewish groups in their structure and psychological orientation. The proposal that Jewish communists had more intensely negative feelings toward their enemies is highly compatible with the material in *PTSDA* (Ch. 8) and *SAID* (Ch. 1) indicating that Jews may be viewed as having hypertrophied social identity systems and an exaggerated proneness toward collectivist social structures. The greater intensity of Jewish hatred toward outgroups and perceived enemies may be simply an affective manifestation of these tendencies. Indeed, in *PTSDA* (Ch. 7) I reviewed evidence indicating that Jews were highly compartmentalized in their emotional lives—prone to alterations between positive social interactions (paradigmatically directed toward members of a perceived ingroup) and intense interpersonal hostility (paradigmatically directed toward members of a perceived outgroup).

Social identity theory also predicts that Jewish intellectual activity will be directed at developing ideologies that affirm their own social identity in the face of the social categories developed by anti-Semites. Historically this has been a common theme in Jewish religious apologetics (see *SAID*, Ch. 7), but it also occurs among Jewish secular writers. Castro (1954, 558) describes attempts by New Christian intellectuals to “defend the Hebrew lineage” from anti-Semitic slurs during the period of the Inquisition. The Converso bishop of Burgos stated, “Do not think you can insult me by calling my forefathers Jews. They are, to be sure, and I am glad that it is so; for if great age is nobility, who can go back so far?” The Jew, descended from the Maccabees

and the Levites, is “noble by birth.” Castro (1954, 559) also notes that a theme of the New Christian literature of the period was that of “esteem for socially inferior man marginally situated in society.” The category in which Jews see themselves is regarded in a positive light.

Interestingly, the Converso humanist ideology stressed individual merit in opposition to the corporate nature of gentile Christian society (Faur 1992, 35).<sup>8</sup> Reflecting the salience of Jewish-gentile group conflict during the period, Old Christians viewed individual merit as deriving from religious affiliation (i.e., group identity) rather than from individual effort: “In the sixteenth century the scale of values became ever more unbalanced, resulting in the concept that it was more important to establish *who* the person was rather than evaluate his capacity for work or thought” (Castro 1971, 581; italics in text). The ideology of individual merit as the basis of value promoted by the Converso intellectuals may thus be seen as an instance of combating categories of social identity in which one is devalued.<sup>9</sup>

The other side of the coin is that Jews have often reacted quite negatively to Jewish writers who portray Jewish characters as having negative or disapproved traits. For example, Philip Roth has been extensively criticized by Jews and Jewish organizations for portraying such characters, or at least for portraying such characters in America, where his work could be read by anti-Semites (see Roth 1963). While the ostensible reason for this concern was the possibility that such portrayals might lead to anti-Semitism, Roth (1963, 452) suggests also that “what is really objected to, what is immediately painful . . . is its direct effect upon certain Jews. ‘You have hurt a lot of people’s feelings because you have revealed something they are ashamed of.’” The implication of Roth’s critics is that the ingroup should be portrayed in positive terms; and indeed, the most common type of Jewish literary activity has portrayed Jews as having positive traits (Alter 1965, 72). The quote also reflects the discussion of Jewish self-deception in *SAID* (Ch. 8): The shame resulting from awareness of actual Jewish behavior is only half-conscious, and any challenge to this self-deception results in a great deal of psychological conflict.

The importance of social identity processes in Jewish intellectual activity was recognized some time ago by Thorstein Veblen (1934). Veblen described the preeminence of Jewish scholars and scientists in Europe and noted their tendency to be iconoclasts. He noted that the Enlightenment had destroyed the ability of Jewish intellectuals to find comfort in the identity provided by religion, but they do not therefore simply accept uncritically the intellectual structures of gentile society. By engaging in iconoclasm, Veblen suggests, Jews are in fact subjecting to criticism the basic social categorization system of the gentile world—a categorization system with which the gentile, but not the Jew, is comfortable. The Jew “is not . . . invested with the gentile’s peculiar heritage of conventional preconceptions which have stood over, by inertia of habit, out of the gentile past, which go, on the one hand, to make the safe and sane gentile conservative and complacent, and which conduce

also, on the other hand, to blur the safe and sane gentile's intellectual vision, and to leave him intellectually sessile" (Veblen 1934, 229).<sup>10</sup>

Indeed, Jewish social scientists have at least sometimes been aware of these linkages: Peter Gay (1987, 137) quotes the following from a 1926 letter written by Sigmund Freud, whose antipathy to Western culture is described in Chapter 4: "Because I was a Jew, I found myself free from many prejudices which limited others in the employment of their intellects, and as a Jew I was prepared to go into opposition and to do without the agreement of the 'compact majority.'" In a later letter, Freud stated that to accept psychoanalysis "called for a certain measure of readiness to accept a situation of solitary opposition—a situation with which nobody is more familiar than a Jew" (in Gay 1987, 146).<sup>11</sup>

There is a sense of alienation vis-à-vis the surrounding society. The Jewish intellectual, in the words of New York Intellectual and political radical Irving Howe, tends "to feel at some distance from society; to assume, almost as a birthright, a critical stance toward received dogmas, to recognize oneself as not quite at home in the world" (1978, 106).

From Solomon Maimon to Normon Podhoretz, from Rachel Varnhagen to Cynthia Ozick, from Marx and Lassalle to Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, from Herzl and Freud to Harold Laski and Lionel Trilling, from Moses Mendelssohn to J. Robert Oppenheimer and Ayn Rand, Gertrude Stein, and Reich I and II (Wilhelm and Charles), one dominating structure of an identical predicament and a shared fate imposes itself upon the consciousness and behavior of the Jewish intellectual in *Galut* [exile]: with the advent of Jewish Emancipation, when ghetto walls crumble and the *shtetlach* [small Jewish towns] begin to dissolve, Jewry—like some wide-eyed anthropologist—enters upon a strange world, to explore a strange people observing a strange *halakah* (code). They examine this world in dismay, with wonder, anger, and punitive objectivity. This wonder, this anger, and the vindictive objectivity of the marginal nonmember are recidivist; they continue unabated into our own time because Jewish Emancipation continues into our own time. (Cuddihy 1974, 68)

Although intellectual criticism resulting from social identity processes need not be functional in attaining any concrete goal of Judaism, this body of theory is highly compatible with supposing that Jewish intellectual activity may be directed at influencing social categorization processes in a manner that benefits Jews. Evidence will be provided in later chapters that Jewish intellectual movements have advocated universalist ideologies for the entire society in which the Jew-gentile social category is reduced in salience and is of no theoretical importance. Thus, for example, within a Marxist analysis social conflict is theorized to result solely from economically based conflict between social classes in which resource competition between ethnic groups is irrelevant. Social identity research predicts that the acceptance of such a theory would lessen anti-Semitism because within the universalist ideology the Jew-gentile social categorization is not salient.

Finally, there is good reason to suppose that minority perspectives are able to have a strong influence on the attitudes of the majority (e.g., Pérez & Mugny 1990). Social identity research indicates that a minority viewpoint, especially when possessing a high degree of internal consistency, is able to have an impact

because it introduces the possibility of an alternative to the taken-for-granted, unquestioned, consensual majority perspective. Suddenly people can discern cracks in the façade of majority consensus. New issues, problems, and questions arise which demand attention. The status quo is no longer passively accepted as an immutable and stable entity which is the sole legitimate arbiter of the nature of things. People are free to change their beliefs, views, customs, and so forth. And where do they turn? One direction is to the active minority. It (by definition and design) furnishes a conceptually coherent and elegantly simple resolution of the very issues which, due to its activities, now plague the public consciousness. In the language of 'ideology' . . . , active minorities seek to replace the dominant ideology with a new one. (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 181)

A critical component of minority group influence is intellectual consistency (Moscovici 1976), and an important theme in the following will be that Jewish-dominated intellectual movements have had a high degree of internal group cohesion and have often been typified by high levels of ingroup-outgroup thinking—a traditional aspect of Judaism. However, because these movements were intended to appeal to gentiles, they were forced to minimize any overt indication that Jewish group identity or Jewish group interests were important to the participants.

Such a result is also highly compatible with social identity theory: The extent to which individuals are willing to be influenced depends on their willingness to accept the social category from which the divergent opinion derives. For Jews intent on influencing the wider society, overt Jewish group identity and overtly stated Jewish interests could only detract from the ability of these movements to influence their intended targets. As a result, Jewish involvement in these movements was often actively concealed, and the intellectual structures themselves were phrased in universalist terms to minimize the importance of the social category of Jew-gentile.

Moreover, since one's willingness to accept influence depends on one's willingness to identify with the stereotypical qualities of an ingroup, the movements not only were conceptualized in universalist terms, rather than Jewish particularist terms; they were also depicted as motivated only by the highest moral and ethical standards. As Cuddihy (1974, 66n) notes, Jewish intellectuals developed a sense that Judaism had a "mission to the West" in which corrupt Western civilization would be confronted by a specifically Jewish sense of morality. To a considerable extent these movements constitute concrete examples of the ancient and recurrent Jewish self-conceptualization as a "light of the nations," reviewed extensively in *SAID* (Ch. 7). This rhetor-



ic of moral condemnation of the outgroup thus represents a secular version of the central pose of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals that Judaism represents a moral beacon to the rest of humanity. But to exert their influence, they were forced to deny the importance of specifically Jewish identity and interests at the heart of the movement.

The high degree of internal group cohesion characteristic of the movements considered in this volume was accompanied by the development of theories that not only possessed a great deal of internal intellectual consistency but also, as in the case of psychoanalysis and radical political theory, could take the form of hermeneutic systems able to accommodate any and all events into their interpretive schemas. And although these movements sought the veneration of science, they inevitably controverted the fundamental principles of science as an individualistic inquiry into the nature of reality (see Ch. 6). Although the extent to which these intellectual and political movements influenced gentile society cannot be assessed with certainty, the material presented in the following chapters is highly compatible with supposing that Jewish-dominated intellectual movements were a critical factor (necessary condition) for the triumph of the intellectual left in late twentieth-century Western societies.

No evolutionist should be surprised at the implicit theory in all this, namely, that intellectual activities of all types may at bottom involve ethnic warfare, any more than one should be surprised at the fact that political and religious ideologies typically reflect the interests of those holding them. The truly doubtful proposition for an evolutionist is whether real social science as a disinterested attempt to understand human behavior is at all possible.

This does not imply that all strongly identified Jewish social scientists participated in the movements discussed in the following chapters. It implies only that Jewish identification and perceived Jewish interests were a powerful motivating force among those who led these movements and among many of their followers. These scientist-activists had very strong Jewish identities. They were very concerned with anti-Semitism and self-consciously developed theories aimed at showing that Jewish behavior was irrelevant to anti-Semitism while at same time (in the case of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School) showing that gentile ethnocentrism and participation in cohesive anti-Semitic movements were indications of psychopathology.

Collectively, these movements have called into question the fundamental moral, political, cultural, and economic foundations of Western society. It will be apparent that these movements have also served various Jewish interests quite well. It will also become apparent, however, that these movements have often conflicted with the cultural and ultimately genetic interests of important sectors of the non-Jewish, European-derived peoples of late-twentieth-century European and North American societies.

## NOTES

1. As indicated in *SAID* (p. 261), the AJCommittee's endeavor to portray Jews as not overrepresented in radical movements involved deception and perhaps self-deception. The AJCommittee engaged in intensive efforts to change opinion within the Jewish community to attempt to show that Jewish interests were more compatible with advocating American democracy than Soviet communism (e.g., emphasizing Soviet anti-Semitism and Soviet support of nations opposed to Israel in the period after World War II) (Cohen 1972, 347ff).

2. A similar phenomenon is apparent in the American movie industry, where anecdotal evidence indicates that gentiles sometimes attempt to present themselves as Jews in order to advance their careers in a Jewish-dominated environment (see Cash 1994).

3. As anti-Semitism increased during the Weimar period, Jewish-owned liberal newspapers began to suffer economic hardship because of public hostility to the ethnic composition of the editorial boards and staffs (Mosse 1987, 371). The response of Hans Lachman-Mosse was to "depoliticize" his newspapers by firing large numbers of Jewish editors and correspondents. Eksteins (1975, 229) suggests that the response was an attempt to deflect right-wing categorizations of his newspapers as part of the *Judenpresse*.

4. A recent, perhaps trivial, example of this type of intellectual ethnic warfare is the popular movie *Addams Family Values* (released in November 1993), produced by Scott Rudin, directed by Barry Sonnenfeld, and written by Paul Rudnick. The bad guys in the movie are virtually anyone with blond hair (the exception being an overweight child), and the good guys include two Jewish children wearing yarmulkes. (Indeed, having blond hair is viewed as a pathology, so that when the dark-haired Addams baby temporarily becomes blond, there is a family crisis.) The featured Jewish child has dark hair, wears glasses, and is physically frail and nonathletic. He often makes precociously intelligent comments, and he is severely punished by the blond-haired counselors for reading a highly intellectual book. The evil gentile children are the opposite: blond, athletic, and unintellectual. Together with other assorted dark-haired children from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and white gentile children rejected by their peers (for being overweight, etc.), the Jewish boy and the Addams family children lead a very violent movement that succeeds in destroying the blond enemy. The movie is a parable illustrating the general thrust of Jewish intellectual and political activity relating to immigration and multi-culturalism in Western societies (see Ch. 7). It is also consistent with the general thrust of Hollywood movies. *SAID* (Ch. 2) reviews data indicating Jewish domination of the entertainment industry in the United States. Powers, Rothman and Rothman (1996, 207) characterize television as promoting liberal, cosmopolitan values, and Lichter, Lichter and Rothman (1994, 251) find that television portrays cultural pluralism in positive terms and as easily achieved apart from the activities of a few ignorant or bigoted miscreants.

5. Heller combines social criticism with a strong Jewish identity. In a talk described in *The Economist* (March 18, 1995, p. 92), Heller is quoted as saying that "being Jewish informs everything I do. My books are getting more and more Jewish."

6. The ellipsis is as follows: "Destruction of the Semitic principle, extirpation of the Jewish religion, whether in the Mosaic or in the Christian form, the natural

equality of man and the abrogation of property, are proclaimed by the secret societies who form provisional governments, and men of Jewish race are found at the head of every one of them.” Rather (1986) notes that anti-Semites who believed in Jewish conspiracies often cited this passage as well as the *Protocols* in support of their theories. He also points out, citing Roberts (1972), that Disraeli’s view that events were controlled by vast international conspiracies was commonplace in the nineteenth century. Rather links these beliefs with the secret society at the center of the psychoanalytic movement (see Ch. 4) as well as with a secret society named “the sons of Moshe” organized by the Zionist Ahad Ha’am (Asher Ginsberg) whose work is discussed in *SAID* (Ch. 5).

7. This passage was invoked by Lucien Wolf, secretary of the Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association, to rationalize Jewish support for Russian revolutionary movements (see Szajkowski 1967, 9).

8. The New Christian ideology implies that members of a highly cohesive, economically successful group are seeking to be judged as individuals rather than as members of a group by the surrounding society. It is of interest that the moral imperative of judging on the basis of individual merit was also a theme in the work of nineteenth-century Jewish writer Michael Beer (see Kahn 1985, 122) and is a major theme of the contemporary neoconservative movement of Jewish intellectuals. Beer was forced to disguise the identity of his protagonist (as a lower-caste Hindu) because his audience was unlikely to view an explicitly Jewish protagonist positively.

9. Castro’s thesis is that economic and intellectual backwardness was the heavy price Spain paid for its successful resistance to the ideology of individual merit. As noted in *SAID* (Ch. 1), maladaptive ideologies can develop in the context of group conflict because they provide a positive social identity in opposition to an outgroup. Thus Spain was unlikely to move toward an individualist, post-Enlightenment society when the advocates of individualism were viewed as covertly having allegiance to a highly cohesive group.

10. Paul Johnson (1988, 408) takes the view that Jewish iconoclasm simply speeded up “changes that were coming anyway. The Jews were natural iconoclasts. Like the prophets, they set about smiting and overturning all the idols of the conventional modes with skill and ferocious glee.” Because it essentially trivializes the ultimate effects of Jewish intellectual efforts, such a view is inconsistent with Johnson’s claim that the emergence of Jews into the mainstream of Western intellectual discourse was “an event of shattering importance to world history” (pp. 340–341). Johnson offers no evidence for his view that the changes advocated by Jewish intellectuals were inevitable. Surely traditional Judaism did not encourage iconoclasm within the Jewish community (witness Spinoza’s fate and the generally authoritarian nature of community controls in traditional Jewish society [*PTSDA*, Ch. 8]). Nor did traditional Jewish scholarship encourage iconoclasm. Although Talmudic studies definitely encouraged argumentation (*pilpul*; see *PTSDA*, Ch. 7), these discussions were performed within a very narrowly prescribed range in which the basic assumptions were not questioned. In the post-Enlightenment world, Jewish iconoclasm has clearly been much more directed at gentile culture than at Judaism, and evidence provided here and in the following chapters indicates that the iconoclasm was often motivated by hostility toward gentile culture. By Johnson’s own account, both Marxism and psychoanalysis are unlikely to have arisen from gentiles, since they both contain

strong overtones of Jewish religious thinking, and I would argue that psychoanalysis especially is unlikely to have arisen except as a tool in the war on gentile culture. The results are much more plausibly due to the generally higher verbal IQ among Jews and their ability to form cohesive groups now directed at critiquing gentile culture rather than at comprehending the Torah and thereby achieving status within the Jewish community.

11. The comment referring to “solitary opposition” is disingenuous, since psychoanalysis from its origins was characterized by a strong group consciousness emanating from a committed core of members. Psychoanalysis itself energetically cultivated the image of Freud as a solitary hero-scientist battling for truth against a biased intellectual establishment. See Chapter 4.