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RESOURCE AND REPRODUCTIVE COMPETITION BETWEEN JEWS AND GENTILES

One type of Moroccan Muslim folktale depicts the Jews as evildoers who seek to inflict harm upon the Muslims and Islam, but whose nefarious machinations are thwarted. Another type consists of humorous stories in which the Jew tries to get the better of a Muslim, but is outwitted by the latter

The Moroccan Jewish folktales present a reverse image of the Jewish-Muslim contest of wits: in them it is not the Muslim, but the Jew who wins. They tell of rivalry between a righteous Jewish and a wicked Muslim courtier, of clashes between a Jew and a Muslim in which the clever Jew triumphs over the foolish Muslim, of kings of Marrakesh favorably disposed to the Jews (Patai 1986, 126-127).

The preceding chapters indicate that throughout its history Judaism may be conceptualized as a group that has maintained genetic and cultural separatism from gentile societies, while living as a diaspora among them. As indicated in Chapter 1, this state of affairs may be conceptualized as a pseudo-speciation, and the evolutionist must then attempt to characterize the ecological relationship between the pseudo-species.

We have seen that an important aspect of traditional Jewish religious ideology has been that Judaism has an altruistic role to play *vis-à-vis* the gentile world (e.g., Kohler [1918] 1968, 339-340, 375; Moore 1927-30, I:229). An evolutionary perspective suggests rather that all humans possess adaptations that motivate them to attempt to control resources and achieve reproductive success. The present chapter indicates that not uncommonly Jews and gentiles have had conflicts of interest over control of resources and that these conflicts have had implications for differential reproductive success between Jews and gentiles. Further, although resource competition is clearly not the only factor involved in

anti-Semitism, data reviewed here support the proposition that resource competition has often exacerbated anti-Semitism.¹

JEWES AS INTERMEDIARIES IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES

It must be noted at the outset that there has been a recurring situation related to Jewish economic and reproductive competition: In traditional societies, Jews have commonly been utilized as an intermediary group between a ruling elite (and especially alien elites) and the native population. In these situations, the elite gentile group has often actively encouraged Jewish economic interests to the detriment of other sectors of the native population.

Thus, Baer (1961, I:33) notes that Jews tended to become prominent in autocratic societies, rather than in those in which there was a powerful aristocracy: "In a republic headed by aristocratic families there was no room for Jewish statesmen. On the other hand, a monarch or other autocrat, the absolute ruler over an unfriendly native population, would attract to his service Jews—the perpetual 'aliens'—on whose loyal support he could count in securing his regime. This phenomenon, in varying forms, manifested itself time and again also in the history of Christian Europe." Thus, for example, in medieval England, the Jewish population was utilized as a source of revenue for the king, while very hostile attitudes toward Jews developed among the aristocracy and the peasants (Roth 1978). Ultimately the increasing power of the aristocracy was an important factor in the eventual expulsion of the Jews, and the expulsion was also highly popular among the peasants and the clergy.²

Using foreigners as intermediaries is an example of a general phenomenon noticed by Balch (1986), who finds that despotic rulers have often attempted to develop a bureaucracy made up of individuals with no family or kinship ties (and thus no loyalty) to the people who were being ruled. The evolutionary aspects of this situation are obvious. Jews were the ideal intermediary for any exploitative elite precisely because their interests, as a genetically segregated group, were maximally divergent from those of the exploited population. Such individuals are expected to have maximal loyalty to the rulers and minimal concerns about behaving in a purely instrumental manner, including exploitation, toward the rest of the population.

Katz (1961a, 55) expresses it well when he notes in his comments on the economic position of the Ashkenazi Jews in 16th-18th century Europe that "[s]ince Jewish society was segregated religiously and socially from the other classes, its attitude toward them was likely to be almost purely instrumental. . . . The non-Jew had no fear that the Jew would take a partisan stand in the struggle between the rulers and the ruled, who bore the economic yoke of the political privileges enjoyed by the rulers." The corollary of this is that anti-Semitism has tended to have strong popular roots in traditional societies and that autocratic

rulers and aristocratic elements who were least in competition with Jews have often been forces against anti-Semitism. Writing of the period after the Thirty Years War, Israel (1985) notes that in central Europe the trend was for princes to develop Jewish policies that were completely contrary to the interests of the populace and the clergy. Repeated instances are given in which the nobility extended invitations to Jewish merchants and traders despite the vehement objections of native commercial interests.

These findings are congruent with cross-cultural research indicating that elites around the world tend to be far more individualistic and have less loyalty to the group than lower-status individuals (Triandis 1990, 1991). Elites are unlikely to identify with the interests of the society as a whole, and they are relatively eager to agree to arrangements that are personally beneficial, even if they negatively impact other groups of the society.

This phenomenon is therefore not restricted to Jews, but Jews as “perpetual aliens” have often been utilized in this role. Shubituni and Kwan (1965, 191-192) note many such examples, including East Indians in Burma, the Chinese in several areas of Asia, Middle Easterners (Greeks, Syrians, Lebanese) serving as middlemen between colonial Europeans and Africans, Indians in East Africa, and Arabs in Indonesia. In all of these cases, the middlemen were highly vulnerable, since their power came from a dominant elite, and especially so in times of stress. “In effect, the price the minority pays for protection in times of minimal stress is to be placed on the front lines of battle in any showdown between the elite and the peasant groups (Blalock 1967, 82).

In the present chapter, evidence will be provided for this phenomenon both in Sephardic Spain under Christian and Moslem rulers and among the Ashkenazi Jews in Europe dating from the early modern period in Poland and echoed in alliances between Jewish financiers and the ruling aristocracy in 19th-century Western Europe. However, this type of relationship between Jewish and gentile populations has been found even in antiquity at the very dawn of diaspora Judaism. Baron (1952a, 117) notes that the Jews had special status as imperial clients of the Persian government in the fifth century B.C. in the Elephantine province in Egypt. However, “this governmental favoritism brought about a natural resentment in the native majority” (p. 116; see also Sevenster 1975, 49, 182). Later, during the Hellenistic period, Seleucid and Ptolemaic rulers settled Jews in Osroene, Cyrenaica, Egypt, Syria, Parthia, and throughout Western Anatolia (Bickerman 1988, 91; A. Y. Collins 1985, 193-194). These colonists typically were allowed to live according to their own laws (i.e., in a culturally separatist manner). The Jews had a status midway between citizens and resident aliens, and they acted as a counterforce to the local Greco-Asiatic populations. When the power of the Hellenistic kings declined, tensions between Jews, living in their separated communities, and the citizens increased, and there were attempts to abolish Jewish privileges. Baron (1952b, 103) also suggests that the diaspora Jews were useful to the authorities in the Roman Empire because of their lack of interest in the nationalistic strivings of local populations.

Similarly, Stillman (1979) notes several such instances in the Muslim world in which foreign rulers used Jews as intermediaries over subject populations. For example, Jews prospered during the Fatimid occupation of Tunisia (10th century); during and following the Arab conquest of Spain (8th-11th centuries; see also Castro 1954); during the early period following Mongol rule in Iraq (13th century; see also Fischel 1937); during the Merinid occupation of Morocco (13th-15th centuries); during the early Ottoman period (16th century); in 20th-century Morocco, where after 1912 they formed a layer between the French colonial government and the Muslim population as part of the French government's "*diviser pour régner*" colonial policy in which minorities, including Jews, were actively encouraged in a role over subject populations; and in the regime of the "outsider" King Faysal in 20th century Iraq. Finally, in the post-World War II era Jews were useful to the Soviets in establishing anti-popular satellite governments in Eastern Europe (Ginsberg 1993, 33).

In Iraq (1291), Spain (1066), Tunisia (1012), Morocco (1276, 1465), and Jewish settlements in Ottoman areas (end of the 16th century and during the 19th century following the civil emancipation of the Jews), these interludes of prosperity were punctuated by violent popular anti-Jewish uprisings occurring concomitantly with the decline of control by the central government.

Co-incident with this role as intermediary between ruling elites and the rest of the population has been a strong tradition in which Jews who were prominently placed among the gentile power structure furthered the aims of their co-religionists—a phenomenon that is intimately related to the Jewish emphasis on elitism in education and marriage (see Chapter 7), as well as the importance of altruism and cooperation within the Jewish community (see Chapter 6). The archetype of the well-placed courtier who helps other Jews, while oppressing the local population, is Joseph in the Biblical account of the sojourn in Egypt. Joseph intercedes with the pharaoh on behalf of his family: "Then Joseph settled his father and his brothers, and gave them a possession in the land of Egypt, in the best of the land . . ." (Gen. 47:11). However, the account also emphasizes Joseph's role in oppressing the Egyptians on behalf of the king. Joseph sells grain to the Egyptians during a famine until he has all of their money. He then requires the Egyptians to give their livestock for food and finally their land. "The land became the Pharaoh's; and as for the people, he made slaves of them from one end of Egypt to the other" (Gen. 47:20-21). However, regarding the Israelites, the section continues: "Thus Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt, in the land of Goshen; and they gained possessions in it, and were fruitful and multiplied exceedingly" (Gen. 47:27).

The prototypical Jewish role as an instrument of governmental oppression has been that of the tax farmer.³ This phenomenon appears to have begun in ancient times: Although the details of the account are disputed by some historians (see Sevenster 1975, 67), Josephus describes Joseph, a Jew in the court of the Ptolemies, who was an extremely effective tax farmer whose bid was twice as high as the bids of the local principle men and rulers of the areas where the taxes were collected. "The king was pleased to hear that offer; and, because it

augmented his revenues, said he would confirm the sale of the taxes to him” (XII:177). Joseph obtained compliance by killing prominent citizens and confiscating their property in areas that refused to pay their taxes, thereby stripping Syria “to the bone” (Bickerman 1988, 120). However, Joseph became very wealthy and was instrumental in aiding his co-religionists. Josephus concludes that Joseph “was a good man, and of great magnanimity; and brought the Jews out of a state of poverty and meanness, to one that was more splendid” (*Antiquities of the Jews* 12:224).

However, while it has generally been true that Jewish populations in traditional societies existed at the sufferance of gentile elites who benefited from them in some way, the economic role of Jews often extended far beyond that of being merely agents of princely oppression. It will be seen that, with the exception of primary (agricultural) production and in the absence of powerful controls on Jewish economic behavior, Jewish-gentile resource competition extended throughout the economy to include trade, merchandizing, moneylending, manufacturing, and artisanry. This generalized resource competition between foreign ethnic groups and native populations is also not unique to the relationships between Jews and gentiles. Zenner (1991, 75) describes a wide range of restrictions enacted against diaspora Chinese as a result of resource competition with native populations. For example, the Chinese were prohibited from owning land in Java and California and were expelled from Sonora in the 1920s. Pogroms against Chinese residents occurred in Indonesia in the 1950s, and in Sumatra, the nationalist government attempted to replace Chinese traders with natives.⁴

THE SEPHARDIC JEWS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

Baer (1961) notes repeatedly that the kings of Spain throughout the period of Reconquest viewed the Jews as performing indispensable functions, especially the collection of taxes via tax farming (see also Castro 1954; Lea 1906-07, I:98; Neuman 1969, II:221).⁵ “Barring temporary fluctuations caused by war, anarchy or civil strife, it was the fixed policy of Spanish rulers for over five hundred years to conserve and increase the number of Jews in their provinces, and to protect their interests against the encroachments of the other elements of the Spanish population” (Neuman 1969, I:6).

Moreover, Baer (1961; see also Castro 1954) describes repeated attempts by kings to prevent anti-Semitic laws and behavior in Spain prior to the Inquisition. Or he shows that kings agreed to anti-Semitic measures only as a result of pressure from other classes in society, including the nobility, the clergy, and the popular masses. Even on the eve of the Inquisition and only 10 years prior to the expulsion, King Ferdinand in 1481 wrote letters condemning anti-Semitic actions to the prelates of Saragossa, but did not send them on the advice of his

counselors, who told him of the popular hatred and violence against Jews in that city. Castro (1954, 504) suggests that Ferdinand's reluctant actions against the Jews stemmed from the fact that the kingdom had become ungovernable in view of the hatred of the lower clergy and the masses, "especially if it was necessary to use the people to wage wars in distant lands."

Supporting the thesis of a general alliance between the king and the Jews, Baer notes a tendency such that "every interregnum was likely to bring disaster down upon [the Jews]," including the disaster of 1391 in which there were widespread persecutions and forced conversions of Jews (Baer 1961, II:17). "The lower classes, not the upper, were behind the expulsion of the Jews, who were protected by the upper classes for centuries against all manner of attack and abuse" (Castro 1954, 618).⁶

Resource competition (and anti-Semitism) therefore came from the non-royal estates of Spain. Thus, for example, in 1283, the clergy, nobility, and burghers attempted to end the Jewish influence in government, each estate having its own interests in competition with the Jews (Baer 1961, I:115). Hillgarth (1976) notes that the resulting limitations on Jewish competition resulted in an expansion of opportunities for the non-Jewish bourgeoisie. Early in the 14th century, the king reappointed Jewish tax farmers with the result that "The old rivalries between the Christian and Jewish courtiers thereupon flared up anew" (Baer 1961, I:308; see also I:326). "Every important post held by a Jew was deeply resented by the many disgruntled noblemen who coveted the office" (Neuman 1969, I:226).

Besides rivalries among Jewish and non-Jewish courtiers, there was a gradually increasing tide of popular anti-Semitism dating from at least the 11th century, which culminated in the anti-Jewish riots of 1391, the anti-*Converso*⁷ riots of the 15th century, and eventually the Inquisition itself (Beinart 1971a; Haliczzer 1987; Lea 1906-07; Roth 1974). Even in the latter part of the 13th century, Baer (1961) writes of "deep and widespread unrest" resulting in anti-Semitic actions (I:167). Neuman (1969 I:13) describes the "ever-present danger from the surrounding population" and the bitter economic rivalry between the Jews and the burghers who "sought to impose legal restrictions on them in order to cripple them in the competitive struggle," including restrictions on engaging in handicrafts and trade and even barring Jews from entering into contracts of any kind with Christians (Neuman 1969, I:185).⁸

In the 1370s, anti-Semitism was strongest among the urban lower classes: "the artisans who aspired to wrest control of the municipalities and the mendicant friars who mingled with the poor" (Baer 1961, II:86). Indeed, regarding the riots of 1391, the king made active efforts to defend the Jews, prosecute the offenders, and rehabilitate the Jewish communities after the riots. The rioters, on the other hand, were mainly "little people," although "in every locality noble families and even priests had been involved in the crimes" (Baer 1961, II:99). Castro (1971 339-340) writes of the conflicting interests of the opposed castes (i.e., Spaniards, Muslims, and Jews)—a conflict that "was translated into the enmity of the lower classes toward the bourgeoisie of the cities, who were qualified for leadership by their culture, their economic power,

their administrative and technical efficiency, and who were, irremediably, Hispano-Judaic.”

Besides direct competition among artisans and over jobs in public administration, several authors have noted that popular anti-Semitism derived from Jewish moneylending, and especially tax farming. Neuman (1969, II:226) notes that, “as the Jews were conspicuously identified with the collection of the royal revenue, and the people groaned under the burden of taxes, the Jewish officials were hated by the populace as tools of oppression” (see also Lea 1906-07, I:100; H. Kamen 1985). In the event, the anti-Jewish activities of the Inquisition had “near unanimous” popular support throughout the Iberian peninsula (Baron 1973, 261).

The popular uprisings against the Jews in the 14th and 15th centuries were often fomented by the Church, which was also in competition with the Jews. For example, Jewish domination of the Castilian king Pedro the Cruel was used as a political weapon by his victorious enemies in a fratricidal civil war ending in 1369, with the result that the power of the Church increased and the power of the Jews decreased at the royal court (Baer 1961, I:190). Castro (1954, 511) notes that from the Church’s point of view the alliance between the government and the Jews in the area of fiscal affairs and tax farming deprived the Church of revenue. “A permanent abyss was carved between the people and the government, and also between the state and the Church, because in the Jew the kings had a convenient source of income and in the Church a rival that was taking it away from them.” Castro (1954, 512) also notes that “[c]hurchmen of lesser rank never ceased complaining of the favor shown the Jews by the Spanish monarchs.” In the long run, the government was unable to oppose this ecclesiastical-popular alliance. Ultimately, it was the clergyman Ferdinand Martinez who fomented the popular discontent that resulted in the massacres of 1391 (and ultimately led to the Inquisition).

Castro (1954, 539) notes that “[i]n the thirteenth and fourteenth century the Jew had dreamed of the possibility of dominating Castile, the new promised land. He had in his hands the promotion and administration of wealth of the kingdom as well as the technical and scientific knowledge possible at that time.” Resource competition and the belief that the Jews were intent on dominating Spain intensified in the period following the forced conversions of 1391, since there were no longer any restrictions on the upward mobility of the Conversos as there had been on the Jews.⁹

In the period following the riots of 1391, Jews who had been forcibly converted “continued to maintain the hold of their class and race on trading and capital” (Kamen 1965, 7). Johnson (1987), Roth (1974), and Salomon (1974) write of the conflict between the Spanish masses and the Conversos that developed when the latter had entered Spanish society in the 15th century, “quickly penetrating the ranks of the Castilian middle and upper classes and occupying the most prominent positions in the royal administration and the Church hierarchy” (Salomon 1974, IX). The economic progress of the Conversos and their descendants was “phenomenally rapid. . . . The law, the

administration, the army, the universities, the Church itself, were all overrun by recent converts of more or less questionable sincerity, or by their immediate descendents. They thronged the financial administration, for which they had a natural aptitude, protest being now impossible. They pushed their way into the municipal councils,¹⁰ into the legislatures, into the judiciary. They all but dominated Spanish life. The wealthier amongst them intermarried with the highest nobility of the land" (Roth 1974, 21).¹¹

Indeed, Walsh (1940, 144) describes a common belief during the period that the New Christians "were planning to rule Spain, enslave the Christians, and establish a New Jerusalem in the West."¹² These beliefs were abetted by two tracts written by the Converso Selemoh ha-Levi, formerly a highly respected rabbi, but later the Bishop of Burgos, in which he declared that the Jews were attempting to rule Spain. Another common belief was that the Conversos had infiltrated both the aristocracy and the Church and were attempting to destroy Spanish society from within (H. Kamen 1985).

Resource competition appears to be an important factor in the anti-Converso activities of the 15th century. Thus, the anti-Converso riots of 1449 in Ciudad Real, like those in Toledo and elsewhere, were the result of the increasing political and economic influence of the Conversos at the municipal level, with the result that "it was the notaries, *alludes*, and other office-holders and notables who were the first to be hit" (Beinart 1981, 58; see also Kamen 1965, 22). The riots of 1474 were "concerted actions by local inhabitants" (Beinart 1981, 63). Guilds were organized along ethnic lines during the Converso period prior to the Inquisition (H. Kamen 1985), so that economic competition between Jews and gentiles continued even after surface religious-group membership ceased to differentiate the two groups. Moreover, the legal exclusion of Conversos from some craft guilds and city offices prior to the Inquisition (Beinart 1971a; Haliczzer 1987) suggests Jewish competition with the gentile non-aristocracy was an issue.

Since the Church was an important avenue of upward mobility, another source of competition between the New and Old Christians was access to the ecclesiastical administration. Many authors have noted the penetration of the Conversos into high positions in the Church, and Kamen (1965, 23) notes the struggle between the Conversos and the Old Christians over access to the ecclesiastical administration. The Old Christians "resented sharing power with men of mixed race and doubtful orthodoxy." The clergyman Fray Alonso, a major instigator of the Inquisition, is depicted as angered by seeing the large number of Conversos filling important posts in the court of Queen Isabella. When Archbishop Siliceo, a man of humble origin, advocated *limpieza* (i.e., purity of blood) statutes to deny Conversos access to the Church, he was in effect making a brief for privileged access to resources for his social class.¹³

Similarly, the Portuguese New Christians in the 16th century moved up socially even more rapidly than did the Spanish New Christians in the previous century. "Their wealth was enormous. . . . They almost monopolized commerce" (Roth 1974, 76), and they became well established in politics, literature,

medicine, the military, and even the clergy. “They grew rich and prosperous, they intermarried with the noblest houses, and they largely entered the Church . . . much of the active capital of the kingdom was in their hands” (Lea 1906-1907, III:238-239).

There is also evidence of a contemporary concern with Jewish reproductive success. Andrés Bernáldez, a defender of the Inquisition and self-conscious spokesman for the viewpoint of the masses, noted that the Conversos had risen “to the rank of scholars, doctors, bishops, canons, priests and priors of monasteries, auditors and secretaries, farmers of Crown revenues and grandees. They had one aim: to increase and multiply” (quoted in Beinart 1981, 21-22; see also Longhurst 1964). Indeed, the Bull of Pope Sixtus IV of 1478 establishing the authority for the Inquisition noted not only that there were crypto-Jews, but also that “their numbers increase not a little” (quoted in Walsh 1940, 149). Concerns about the reproductive success of Jews and their descendants extended well beyond the beginning of the Inquisition: Baron (1973, 186, 241) refers to widespread concern about the reproductive success of the New Christians in early-17th-century Spain and Portugal. For example, Baron notes that a conference of theologians concluded in 1629 that the descendants of Jews proliferated like “the sands of the sea.”¹⁴

Resource competition between New Christians and Old Christians also continued long after the establishment of the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions. Boyajian (1983) recounts the opposition of Spanish merchants to the increasing influence of Portuguese New Christians at the Madrid court, beginning in the 1620s as a result of the New Christian involvement in financing the Spanish monarchy. In order to obtain the cooperation of the New Christians, the monarchy supported granting the demands of the New Christians, including relaxing the Inquisition, giving them the right to participate in Spanish trading ventures, and allowing them to enter military orders of the aristocracy, which had been closed off by *limpieza* laws. However, these interests conflicted with the interests of the Old Christian merchants in Seville and elsewhere in the Spanish Empire, and the latter found powerful allies in the Churches and the Inquisitions of Spain, Portugal, and the New World. Although the monarchy advanced these causes and protected the New Christians for a considerable period, the Old Christian courtiers, urban patricians and merchants, and churchmen eventually prevailed, and the Inquisition and its concern with *limpieza* were reinvigorated, especially in the period following the independence of Portugal in 1640.¹⁵

A very interesting case involving Sephardic Jews after their emigration from the Iberian peninsula is represented by Venice in the 16th century. In Venice, Jews competed successfully against the local merchants and “aroused great jealousy” (Roth 1974, 210), leading to a temporary expulsion. Davidson (1987, 24) finds that anti-Semitic sentiments in 16th-century Venice “were often inspired by economic rivalry” and notes the development of Christian sources of credit by wealthy families attempting to avoid Jewish moneylenders. In the

words of two contemporary Venetian patricians, Jewish moneylending is the means by which they “consume and devour the people of this our city” (p. 24).

It is of interest, however, that the Venetian authorities eventually developed very precise and minutely detailed regulations on Jewish economic activity, which appear to have minimized anti-Semitism because the Jewish economic role was intended to “complement, rather than compete with, the activities of long-established Venetian nobility and citizenry” (Pullan 1983, 146). Jews were forbidden to own land, could not become artisans or engage in manufacturing, and could only charge 5 percent interest on loans.¹⁶ The result was that “Venetians in general could not be relied upon to despise or detest them, save perhaps at certain seasons of the year such as carnival or Passiontide” (p. 159). The role of this intensive regulation of Jewish economic activity in minimizing anti-Semitism was recognized by a contemporary rabbi who, describing the causes of anti-Semitism elsewhere, noted that

Usury makes them unpopular with all the orders of the city; engaging in crafts with the lesser people; the possession of property with nobles and great men. These are the reasons why the Jews do not dwell in many places. But these circumstances do not arise in Venice, where the rate of interest is only 5 percent, and the banks are established for the benefit of the poor and not for the profit of the bankers. The Jews cannot engage in crafts or manufacture, nor can they own real property. Hence they do not seem burdensome or threatening to any estate or order within the city. (Quoted in Pullan 1983, 159)

However, these restrictions did not prevent continuing hostility centering around Jewish competition in trade, and there was concern that Jews would emigrate to the Levant with the great wealth obtained by trading in Venice and that this wealth would eventually benefit the Turks in their wars with Venice.¹⁷ Eventually, the government allowed Jews to dominate trade at the expense of gentile traders and was content to profit from the taxes generated by this economic activity. However, despite the decline of Venetian gentile traders, the gentile community as a whole may have continued to benefit from the international Jewish trading network, since, besides taxes, the exported goods and the goods and services consumed by the Jewish community were manufactured by gentiles.

The example is instructive because it indicates that in traditional societies a sort of “win-win” economic situation could exist in which Jewish economic activity benefited the society as a whole. However, the example also shows that this type of situation occurred only when there were very powerful, rigidly enforced controls on Jewish economic activity. In the absence of such controls, the evidence from this chapter indicates that there is a general tendency for resource competition with most sectors of the gentile economy in traditional societies.

ASHKENAZI JEWS IN EARLY MODERN POLAND

There is excellent evidence for resource competition between Jews and non-Jews throughout Polish history, as well as for the hypothesis of a significant alliance between the Jews and the aristocracy. In the post-medieval period in Poland most Jews lived in privately owned towns, and the owners often encouraged Jewish settlement. The Polish nobility welcomed Jews as estate managers and toll farmers, bankers, and moneylenders. They also encouraged Jewish trade and commerce because, as a consuming class, they benefited from the lower prices brought on by competition (Weinryb 1972; see also Hundert 1986a; Katz 1961a; Tollet 1986).

The preponderance of Jewish economic activity was ultimately the result of franchises derived from the nobility, but eventually, due to increasing numbers, Jews began engaging in non-franchised economic activity such as artisanry—activity that brought them into direct competition with other sectors of the Polish population. There was competition between gentile and Jewish craftsmen, such as butchers, tailors, blacksmiths, and shoemakers, in which non-Jewish guilds attempted to eliminate Jewish craftsmen (Katz 1961a; Weinryb 1972, 64-67). Moreover, non-Jewish merchants often viewed Jews as competitors, and there were periodic attempts to restrict Jewish trade and business, especially in areas where Jews lived on lands owned by the king. For example, in 1485, there was an agreement between the Jewish community and the city council of Cracow in which the Jews agreed to give up trade and most selling, and in 1764, Jews were barred from trade in cattle, grain, and horses. In the 16th century, Jewish rights of commerce were limited in several cities, and other cities were granted the privilege of excluding Jews altogether. In the late 19th century, the Galician government organized an economic boycott of Jewish businesses with a slogan of “buy from your own kind” (Litman 1984, 7), with the result that the Jewish population suffered an economic decline and many emigrated.

Nevertheless, despite recurrent restrictions and exclusions, Jews had essentially won this competition in the areas of trade and artisanry by the time of the 1764 census (Klier 1986, 10). Hundert (1986a) notes that Jews increasingly dominated small-scale domestic commerce and, by the 18th century, they dominated trade with the West as well. The Jewish share of commerce “increased dramatically” (p. 57) from the 16th to the 18th century. Beauvois (1986) notes that there were 12,285 Jewish merchants compared to 1,790 Christian merchants in previously Polish provinces of the Russian Empire in 1840. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that some Jewish families obtained great wealth. “Jews in Poland . . . were building tax farming, estate leasing, and commercial empires; erecting large houses to live in; and trying to amass (to some extent successfully) large fortunes to leave to their children” (Weinryb 1972, 168).

These trends are well captured in the case study of the town of Opatow from the 17th through the 18th century (Hundert 1992). Jews began settling there in the 16th century, and even in 1569, there is an indication of concern by Christian merchants about Jewish competition. In the 17th century, there was a gradual rise in the percentage of trade controlled by Jews in the region, and Jews began to lease the estates of the nobleman who owned the town. Already in the 17th-century, Jews were reluctant to join Christian guilds, and there were anti-Semitic incidents. By the end of the 18th century, Jews dominated almost all areas of trading, manufacturing, and estate managing, and they had become dominant among the artisans as well. Competition was most intense between Jewish and Christian artisans, and there were constant complaints that Jews refused to join Christian guilds, that they controlled the trade in raw materials, that they imported finished products into the town, and that they encouraged Jews not to buy from Christians—complaints that were common throughout Poland at the time. By the end of the 18th century, there were Jewish guilds for butchers, furriers, and hatmakers, and Christians had been almost completely displaced as butchers, bakers, tailors, furriers, and goldsmiths. Corresponding with these developments, Christians increasingly abandoned artisanry in order to work in agriculture.

Similarly, in the area of commerce, Jews were accused of not participating in Christian guilds, and “there were complaints . . . that Jews had pushed Christians entirely out of commerce” (Hundert 1992, 54), with the result that Christian merchants were forced to move elsewhere. Reflecting the separate worlds of Jew and gentile in the town, Jewish merchants complained when a Greek merchant hired a Jewish agent to promote business, with the result that the Greek was forced to hire someone of his own religion. Following this, “Jewish domination of the town’s commerce . . . was almost complete” (p. 57). Finally, Jews came to dominate all phases of the alcoholic beverage business, including manufacture, distribution, and retail.¹⁸

The Jewish community generally prospered not only economically, but also reproductively during this period. The Jewish expansion into almost all phases of the economy supported a Jewish population of Opatow that increased

dramatically from the late 17th century until about 1770. Although the Jewish population then stagnated or declined somewhat, there was increasing emigration to surrounding towns and to Warsaw by Jews who could not be supported in the local economy. Clearly, the economic success of the Jews had translated into a high level of reproductive success as well.

This increasing Jewish economic domination resulted in clashes with the gentile population most affected by this competition. Weinryb (1972, 140) notes that “[i]n all these attempts to limit or exclude Jews and other minorities from trade and crafts, as in the staged violence, it was the lower strata of the city, the small trader, the artisan, and the mob, who were in the forefront of the struggle. The urban elite, the wealthy merchants, were generally less apt to fear Jewish (or any other) competition.” Writing of the 19th century, Kieniewicz (1986, 75) notes that mistrust and hatred were common between Jewish and Christian shopkeepers, pedlars, and middlemen.

Finally, despite the general alliance between the Jews and the nobility, there was significant competition at least some of the time between Jews and all except the very highest levels of Polish society. Weinryb (1972, 60; see also Tollet 1986) notes that in the 15th century, the lower nobility competed with the Jews in the areas of agricultural export and toll farming. Laws were made to prevent Jews from lending money, to restrict the interest rates charged by Jews, and to prevent Jews from farming tolls. Weinryb (1972, 121) also describes a concern among the nobility for the “huge increase” in the Jewish population (and their “fabulous wealth”), which resulted in various restrictions on Jews.

RESOURCE COMPETITION BETWEEN JEWS AND GENTILES IN EUROPE FOLLOWING JEWISH EMANCIPATION

The post-Enlightenment period generally ended the formal alliances between Jews and gentile elites so characteristic of traditional societies. Nevertheless, as indicated in Chapter 4, this did not end *de facto* Jewish separatism, and the evidence provided below indicates that Jewish-gentile resource competition continued and perhaps actually increased during this period.

Jews had a very powerful advantage in this competition. As indicated by the data presented in Chapter 7, Jews, because of their long history of eugenic practices and emphasis on education, were uniquely suited to upward mobility in the newly developing industrial economies of the period. Sorkin (1987, 108) makes the interesting point that the German advocates of Jewish emancipation envisioned Jews as fitting into an agrarian society by entering “productive” occupations such as farming and artisanry (see also Katz 1986, 68ff). The hope among the pro-emancipation forces of the period was that the Jewish economic, educational, and occupational profile would be similar to that of the gentiles.

However, Jewish emancipation resulted in marked differences in the economic, educational, and occupational profiles of Jews and Germans.

Lindemann (1991, 10) notes that “[i]n the long history of the Jews, the rise of the Jews in the nineteenth century has few parallels in terms of the rapid transformation of the condition of the Jews—in absolute and relative numbers, wealth, in fame, in power, and in influence.” The extraordinary rise of Jews in Germany in the period from 1870 to 1933 following emancipation was a general phenomenon. Jews were concentrated in urban areas and in particular occupations. In general, they were vastly overrepresented in areas requiring a high level of education (business, professions, public service) and underrepresented in agriculture and domestic service—a pattern that Gordon (1984) finds had existed since the Middle Ages. In 1871, when the Jews became fully emancipated in Germany, 60 percent were already in the middle- and upper-income brackets (Sorkin 1987, 110).

Mosse (1987, 204) estimates that despite representing less than 1 percent of the population, Jews controlled 20 percent of the commercial activity in Germany in the period from 1819 to 1935, as indicated by percentages of Jews among the economic elite. Moreover, Jewish involvement in the largest companies was even more substantial than this figure might indicate. For example, Mosse (1987, 273-274) finds that in 1907 Jews had a dominant position in 33 of the 100 largest companies and in 9 of the 13 companies with share capital over 100 million marks. Jews occupied a similar position through the Weimar period (pp. 357-358). In some areas where Jews were concentrated, the overrepresentation of Jews was far higher. Thus, in the capital of Berlin, Jews accounted for nearly 45 percent of the official government *Kommerzienrat* awards given to outstanding businessmen, and in Prussia in 1911 44 percent of the 25 richest millionaires were Jews, as were 27.5 percent of the 200 richest millionaires and 23.7 percent of the 800 richest. In Berlin, as in the Hesse-Nassau area, 12 of the 20 wealthiest taxpayers were Jews.

In the period from 1928 to 1932, Jews controlled 25 percent of retail sales and had a dominant position in certain areas, such as metal businesses, textiles and clothing, grain trade, and department stores (Gordon 1984). Jews also had a prominent position in private banking, so that, for example, in Berlin in 1923, there were 150 Jewish banks and 11 non-Jewish banks. And Jews were also prominently involved in the stock market, the insurance industry, and economic consulting firms. In 1923 Jews occupied 24 percent of the supervisory positions in joint-stock companies. Gordon (1984) also shows that Jews were vastly overrepresented in the legal and judicial system, among university faculty, and as physicians.

At times, the competitive benefit of Jewish group membership was decisive. Thus, in attempting to account for the almost complete absence of gentile banking enterprises in Prussia in the late 19th century, Mosse (1987, 117) emphasizes the competitive advantage enjoyed by Jewish banking firms resulting from the patronage of the Rothschilds, who provided them with capital and higher credit ratings. Jewish banks also had a competitive advantage

because, as emphasized in Chapter 6, they were able to take advantage of international Jewish contacts, which were not available to their gentile competitors.¹⁹ In the era after 1900, all of the large joint-stock banks had a prominent representation of Jews on their boards of directors (Mosse 1987, 158). The result was the development of a separate “Jewish sector” of the German economy in which there were “virtually two separate economies” (Mosse 1987, 275).²⁰

However, the largest overrepresentation of Jews in Germany during this period was in the media: the theater, arts, film, and journalism. In Berlin in 1930, fully 80 percent of the theater directors were Jewish, and Jews wrote 75 percent of the plays produced. Jews edited leading newspapers and were vastly overrepresented among journalists (Gordon 1984; see also Laqueur 1974). Not surprisingly, average Jewish income was considerably higher than average gentile income, with tax return data suggesting that the Jewish/gentile income ratio was at least 2 to 1, and more probably in the range of 4 to 1.²¹

This prosperity was associated with higher aggregate reproductive success than the gentile population: In the period from 1820-1871 in Germany the Jewish population increased faster than the Christian population (74 percent to 63 percent), despite the fact that Jews entered the demographic transition a full generation earlier than the rest of Germany. Jews had a lower fertility than Christians, and the men married later, but marriage restrictions on Jews had been lifted, and the infant mortality rate among Jews was lower.²²

Jewish economic success was associated with anti-Semitism throughout Europe. Lindemann (1991, 10) describes the “rise of the Jews” during the 19th century in Europe as a necessary condition for the modern forms of anti-Semitism that began to appear in the latter part of the century. Lindemann shows that Jews were encroaching on traditional economic and social areas that were formerly exclusively Christian; that Jews were vastly overrepresented in professional occupations, which represented a common means of upward mobility for Jews and gentiles; and that they had attained considerable political influence, thereby diminishing the power and control emanating from traditional sources.

There is evidence that anti-Semitism in Germany in the period after 1870 was strongest among those most in competition with Jews.²³ Bracher (1970, 38) makes the general statement that in the period following 1870, “Anti-Semitism as a separate movement or as part of an increasingly popular race theory generally flared up in times of economic and political crisis.” Gordon (1984, 44) notes that “it is difficult to reject these [economic] differences out of hand as non-existent or unimportant, and they probably continued to contribute to anti-Semitism because they fostered group tensions”

Massing (1949) shows that a concern with disproportionate Jewish representation in education²⁴ and the occupational profile of Jews was a common ingredient of the wave of racial anti-Semitism that occurred among urban Germans during the period from 1870 to 1895. The anti-Semitic press and anti-Semitic politicians routinely called attention to Jewish overrepresentation in

higher education, business, and the professions and to their underrepresentation among artisans and farmers (see also Ragins 1980, 69). Their agitation struck a responsive chord among the upwardly mobile members of the German lower middle classes:

Insecurity and instability were the dominant notes of their existence. Taking advantage of easier access to higher education, members of the lower middle classes vigorously pushed their way up into new occupations which had only a limited absorptive capacity. Competition was bitterly intense and the competitors were frequently Jewish. That aspirants from the lower middle classes, unsure of their prospects, were particularly sensitive to this fact is testified to by numerous, recurring complaints about the disproportionately high ratio of Jewish high school pupils and university students, lawyers, and physicians. (Massing 1949, 76)

Calls for restrictions on the economic and political roles of Jews were characteristic of the many unsuccessful anti-Semitic political movements dating from the 19th century in Germany (Bracher 1970, 44; see Massing 1949, *passim*). Gordon (1984, 199) notes that during the Nazi era, “the majority of Germans appeared to approve the nonviolent exclusion of Jews from German life, as indicated by their general acceptance of quotas, the elimination of Jews from the civil service and the professions, and the Nuremberg laws [which penalized sexual contact between Jews and gentiles].” This general approval of non-violent exclusion is highly compatible with a widespread concern among Germans about Jewish competition.²⁵

Anti-Semitism was typically more characteristic of the lower middle class and urban petty bourgeoisie in Western and Central Europe, while in Eastern Europe, anti-Semitism also occurred among the gentry threatened by the rise of the Jews. In the former areas, anti-Semitism was most common among artisans, clerks, shopkeepers threatened by Jewish-owned department stores, and those who felt deprived of the opportunity of upward mobility because of Jewish overrepresentation in professional schools.²⁶ On the other hand, Lindemann (1991, 46) notes that anti-Semitism was relatively muted in Hungary where the native middle and lower classes were small, so the arrival of Jews did not displace an already existing group. However, as Jews began to dominate economic life in Hungary, and increasingly bought up land previously owned by the aristocracy and gentry, anti-Semitism became more common among these classes as well, and there were efforts to halt Jewish immigration from Russia.

In Russia, restrictions on Jews were justified by the authorities because they feared that the Slavic peasants could not compete with the Jews in the newly industrializing economy—fears made more intense because of the tremendous growth in Jewish population in the 19th century (Lindemann 1991, 135-137). Jews were viewed as more intelligent, more educated, and more able to compete economically than the mass of Russians by a broad range of political opinion,²⁷ with the result that the authorities viewed completely free economic competition with considerable trepidation. “There was, in short, a rather widespread

consensus in Russia that Jews were a separate, somehow superior race, stubbornly resisting assimilation, and steadily working to dominate those among whom they lived” (Lindemann 1991, 138-139).

The Russian pogroms of 1881 were associated with Jewish population growth and increased Jewish immigration into towns, and some of the rioting was instigated by businessmen attempting to compete with Jews (Lindemann 1991, 140). Later, there was competition between middle-class Jews and gentiles in Russia (e.g., the physicians of Kishinev [p. 158], so that by the turn of the century, “[a]s in western Europe, modern racist anti-Semitism linked to nationalism seems to have been most pronounced in those urban areas where elements of the Jewish and Gentile middle classes found themselves in harsh competition” (Lindemann 1991, 144).

Anti-Semitism was relatively muted in France, where, despite the rapid rise of a Jewish bourgeoisie and a somewhat more rapid population rise than for the population as a whole, the Jewish population never exceeded 0.2 percent of the total. Nevertheless, Jews were overrepresented in the professions, finance, middle- and top-level government positions, academia and the military, and as students at elite secondary schools. Anti-Semitism occurred among several groups threatened by this rise, including French Catholics concerned about the decline in political power and patronage associated with their religion; nationalists concerned about the financial power of Jews as a foreign element, often with German origins; shopkeepers and small businessmen threatened by larger stores or factories disproportionately owned by Jews; and butchers in direct competition with Jews. The relative success of Jews was psychologically very salient to the French. A successful Jewish student (Julien Benda) recalled that his triumph in the *concours général* “appeared to me one of the essential sources of the anti-Semitism we had to bear fifteen years later. Whether the Jews realized it or not, such success was felt by other French people as an act of violence” (quoted in Johnson 1987, 382).²⁸

Finally, Lindemann (1991) stresses that the rise of the Jews in 19th-century Europe not only was a matter of increased wealth and social prestige, but also involved a population explosion, especially in Eastern Europe. As indicated below, the rate of population increase among Jews during this period in Eastern Europe was much higher than that of non-Jewish populations (i.e., as a community, they had greater reproductive success). The result was that there was increasing social differentiation within the Jewish population (including considerable poverty), as well as emigration to Western Europe and America, especially in the late 1870s and 1880s. Lindemann (1991) emphasizes the contribution of the population explosion of Jews in Eastern Europe (e.g., Russia [pp. 133-135]) to anti-Semitism in a Western Europe that was inundated by Jewish immigrants (pp. 28-29).

There were also large population movements within countries from rural to urban areas. After emancipation in Austria, a great many Jews from rural areas settled in Vienna, leading to gentile perceptions of an “invasion” by an alien group (Lindemann 1991, 25), especially because gentiles were being driven out

of their occupations by this large group of immigrants. Gay (1988, 20) notes that “[f]eeling beleaguered by this ever-growing Jewish presence, Austrian gentiles worried over it in humor magazines, social clubs, and political meetings. They made anxious jokes, pleaded for the assimilation of the ‘alien’ invaders, or, some of them, issued strident calls for their expulsion.”

Before concluding this section, it is worth making a brief comment on Jewish-gentile competition in the United States in the early 20th century. As noted above in the case of France, there was concern that Jews would “overrun” prestigious private universities if intellectual merit were the only criterion (Sachar 1992, 328). As a result, quota systems were developed to restrict Jewish competition not only in private universities, but also in professional schools, although in most cases the percentage of Jewish students was still well above their representation in the population.²⁹ As expected, the diminished resources available during the Great Depression exacerbated these attempts to limit Jewish access to elite schools and high-status professions, or indeed other jobs. Numerical quotas in the professions became more restrictive, and employment advertisements carried an unprecedented number of restrictions on Jews. These quotas were lifted following World War II, and by 1952, Jews constituted 24 percent of the students at Harvard, 23 percent at Cornell, 20 percent at Princeton, and 13 percent at Yale despite constituting only 3 percent of the population (Sachar 1992, 755).

There are a number of other indications that Jews very rapidly achieved a highly disproportionate representation in several key areas of American society in the post-World War II era, and especially after 1960. Rothman and Lichter (1982) summarize data on the extraordinary representation of Jews in the American academy in the 1960s and 1970s. A 1968 survey found that 20 percent of the faculty at prestigious schools were Jewish, and there was a strong concentration in the social sciences, with fully 30 percent of the most productive faculty in social science departments at elite universities being Jewish. Similarly, Jews constituted 20 percent of the legal profession during this period and represented fully 38 percent of the faculty at elite law schools. Sachar (1992, 755) notes that in 1957, Jews constituted 32 of the 70 most eminent intellectuals in a list compiled by *Public Interest*, and in 1973, Jews were overrepresented by 70 percent in the *Directory of American Scholars*.

More informally, Patai and Patai (1989) found that in 1972, 6.5 percent of a sample from *Who's Who in America* were Jewish although, they represented only 2.7 percent of the population. Similarly, Weyl (1989, 21), using the Jewish last name method, found Jews overrepresented on several indices of achievement, including *Who's Who in America*, *American Men and Women of Science*, *Frontier Science and Technology*, *Poor's Directory of Directors*, *Who's Who in Finance and Industry*, *Directory of Medical Specialists*, and *Who's Who in American Law*.

Rothman and Lichter (1982) note that academic social science departments are an important source of social influence, and this disproportionate Jewish influence on society extended also to the media during this period. A quarter of

the Washington press corps were found to be Jewish in a 1976 study, and 58 percent of the television news producers and editors at the ABC television network in a 1973 study were Jewish. A 1979 study found that Jewish background was characteristic of 27 percent of the staff at the most influential news media. During this period, half of prime-time television writers were Jewish, and 32 percent of influential media critics were Jewish.

Jewish representation in academia and the media may well have increased in recent times. Ginsberg (1993, 1) notes that as of 1993 the percentages of Jewish representation at elite academic institutions were undoubtedly higher than in the late 1960s. Ginsberg also states that despite the fact that Jews comprised only 2 percent of the population, almost half of American billionaires were Jews as were approximately 10 percent of the members of the U. S. Congress. Jewish overrepresentation continues to be apparent in the media. Kotkin (1993, 61) notes that “[t]he role of Jews within Hollywood and the related entertainment field remains pervasive.” Ginsberg (1993, 1) notes that the owners of the largest newspaper chain and the most influential newspaper (*The New York Times*) are Jews, as are the chief executive officers of the three major television networks and the four largest film studios. Rothman and Lichter’s (1982, 98) conclusion would appear to be accurate: “Americans of Jewish background have become an elite group in American society, with a cultural and intellectual influence far beyond their numbers.”³⁰

REPRODUCTIVE COMPETITION BETWEEN JEWS AND GENTILES

As noted above, Beinart (1981, 21) cites the view of historian Andrés Bernaldez, who, writing during the period of the Inquisition, noted that the purpose of the crypto-Jews was to “increase and multiply,” a comment that clearly indicates that the Old Christians were concerned about reproductive competition between themselves and the crypto-Jews of the 15th century. Baer (1961) points to the increasing Jewish population as well as the concomitant social differentiation and class conflict among the Jews from the late 13th to the 15th century. Baer cites a 14th-century observer who noted that, whereas previously the Jews were few in number and wealthy, there was now a great deal of social differentiation within the Jewish community and the Jewish quarter was densely populated. Baer also infers an increasing Jewish population from the development in the 13th century of a growing class struggle and from the growth of executive bodies within Jewish communities. Roth (1937) mentions their “rapidly increasing descendents” (p. 26) in the 15th century prior to the Inquisition, and Lea (1906-07, I:86) notes that the number of Jews increased “until they formed a notable portion of the population.”

Nevertheless, although there is agreement that the Jewish population was increasing rapidly prior to the expulsion, I have been unable to find explicit

comparisons between Jewish and Christian population changes in pre-expulsion Spain. Hillgarth (1978) notes that there are no good population estimates for Castile before 1528, but suggests that the population of Aragon did not grow in the period from 1300 to 1500 and may actually have decreased, a finding that, given the Jewish demographic data discussed above, would indicate that the Jewish population increased at a greater rate than did the gentile population during this period.

There is wide agreement that at least until the demographic transition Jews in Eastern Europe had a much greater rate of natural increase than gentile populations (Deshen 1986, 46; see also Ritterband 1981; A. Goldstein 1981). Johnson (1987, 356) notes that in the period 1880-1914, the Jewish population of Europe grew at a rate of 2 percent per year, "a rate of increase that exceeds all other European peoples for this period" (Katz 1986, 4).

For Poland, Abramsky, Jachimczyk, and Polonsky (1986; see also Hundert 1986a; Hundert 1986b; Hundert 1989; Israel 1985, 163) find that the percentage of Jews in Poland increased from 0.6 percent at the end of the 15th century to 5 percent by the mid-17th century and to 10 percent by 1920.³¹ Similarly, in Russia from 1820 to 1880, the Jewish population increased by 150 percent, while the non-Jewish population increased only 87 percent (Lindemann 1991, 133-134). The increase in certain areas was even more remarkable (e.g., increasing by 850 percent from 1844 to 1914 in the southern provinces, compared to 250 percent for non-Jews), and most of the increase was in urban areas. The phenomenon of the "village Jew" occurring in the 16th to the 18th century in Poland (Weinryb 1972) suggests that the Jews had reached the limit of the urban economy during this period, with the result that there was increasing colonization outside the traditional Jewish urban economic sphere.

On the basis of Polish data, Plakans and Halpern (1981) attribute greater Jewish fertility primarily to the young age at which females married, and to the fact that virtually all females married. Both of these attributes of Jewish families contrast strongly with the general European pattern in which significant numbers of females remained unmarried during times of economic hardship. Since the usual interpretation of the European pattern of delayed marriage and female celibacy reflects economic constraints (e.g., Wrigley & Schofield 1981), the results suggest that there were fewer economic constraints on Jews regarding marriage than was the case for gentiles.³² However, there are also indications that the mortality rate among Jews was significantly lower than that for surrounding populations (Gitelman 1981), a finding related to the high-investment parenting typical of most Jewish communities throughout history (see Chapter 7).³³

It is quite possible that anti-Semitism has been a significant factor in Jewish demographic history. Although Jews appear to have had a more rapid rate of increase in Spain prior to the Inquisition and expulsion, the ultimate result of the Spanish Inquisition and the expulsion was probably far different, since the great majority of the Sephardic refugees eventually ended up in the Moslem world,

where there was a long-term demographic and cultural decline of Judaism resulting ultimately from anti-Semitism on the part of the local populations.³⁴

Fraikor (1977) describes the boom-and-bust nature of Ashkenazi population growth, growing quickly due to very high fecundity, but then dropping back as the result of persecution and massacre. As reconstructed by Fraikor, the Ashkenazi population increased rapidly until the period of the Crusades, when anti-Semitic massacres and expulsions occurred throughout Western Europe, with the Jewish population reaching a low point in the 14th century.³⁵ This was followed by a rapid rise during the “Golden Age of Jews” in Poland, followed by a demographic crash as a result of the Cossack massacres and other wars in the 17th century. This pattern has continued into the 20th century, and not only with the Nazi holocaust. Gitelman (1981, 45) notes that in Russia the events from 1914 to 1945, including over 2,000 pogroms between 1918 to 1921 and the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, had a devastating demographic effect on Jews.

A particularly interesting gentile response to reproductive competition with Jews in traditional societies was to place restrictions on the fertility of the Jewish population. This appears to have been particularly common in Germany. Lowenstein (1981, 98) describes regulations in parts of pre-emancipation Germany that prescribed that the number of Jewish families in each town was not to increase and that Jews could not settle in other towns without special permission. Families could only be started if there was emigration or death of a head of household. However, exceptions were made in the case of wealthy merchants or industrialists, craftsmen, and farmers.³⁶ Alice Goldstein (1981, 118), writing on the basis of 18th-century German data, finds communities restricting marriage to only one child per family and restricting the number of marriages per year out of fear “that the Jews would become too populous and then too powerful.”

These laws continued in some parts of Germany in the 19th century and were especially strong in Bavaria, where the population of Jews decreased from 52,908 to 50,648 in the period from 1818 to 1871. There was some indication that these legal restrictions resulted in a later age of marriage in these areas than in areas without the restrictions. In some areas, however, illegal marriages and high rates of illegitimacy occurred as a result of the restrictions.

These data clearly indicate that resource and reproductive competition occurred between Jews and gentiles in traditional societies. In at least some cases, there is very good evidence that Jews won this competition, especially by squeezing out competitors in the urban economy—i.e., the economy that was midway between the primary production of the peasantry and the ruling gentile elite. Moreover, there is evidence that Jewish population growth, undoubtedly in conjunction with Jewish control of economic resources, was viewed negatively by gentile communities and was associated with attempts to control the Jewish population, as well as attempts to limit Jewish control of resources, which made possible the Jewish demographic increases.

Finally, the generalization that the rate of population increase among Jews was higher than that of gentiles in many traditional societies and the

industrializing societies of Eastern and Central Europe does not extend beyond these societies. Data reviewed in Chapter 7 indicate a decline in Jewish fertility in contemporary Western societies to a level below that of gentiles.

NOTES

1. In *SAID* (ch. 1) I develop a theory of anti-Semitism based on social identity theory. From this theoretical perspective, resource competition is expected to exacerbate anti-Semitism, but other factors (e.g., cultural separatism) are expected to be important as well.

2. During the civil war leading to the Magna Carta, Jews were often the first target of the aristocratic forces, and the Magna Carta itself contains two clauses that restrict the lending practices of Jews by ensuring that widows and orphans had first claim on the estate before debts owed to Jews (Roth 1978, 36-37). In the following period, Jews were tolerated only if they could show they were of financial benefit to the king, and when, as a result of royal depredations of Jewish wealth, this ceased to be the case, the Jews were expelled entirely. Jordan (1989, 182) indicates that Christian merchants were also instrumental in the expulsion of the Jews as a means of removing a source of competition.

3. A tax farmer is one who promises to pay the governmental authorities a certain sum for the right to collect taxes in a particular area .

4. Although these data suggest resource competition between overseas Chinese and host populations, Zenner (1991, 78ff) also notes that the Chinese did not maintain rigid cultural or reproductive barriers between themselves and the host society. There are other indications that the overseas Chinese did not really constitute a closed group strategy. Thus, the evidence that Chinese merchants favored friends and relatives (Zenner 1991, 80), is compatible with essentially individual/family strategies where the Chinese businessman conceptualizes his relationships in terms of kinship and reciprocity, rather than in an ingroup/outgroup manner where the ingroup includes all diaspora Chinese. Also compatible with this interpretation is Zenner's (1991, 81; see also Yee 1993) comment that the locus of ethnocentrism and group identification among the Chinese was the extended family unit (as indicated, e.g., by ancestor worship as the primary religious manifestation). Jews, on the other hand, developed a highly elaborated diaspora ideology in which the locus of group identification included all members of the dispersed group, no matter how distantly related. One's family was simply a part of this much larger group. Reflecting this group, rather than a familial sense of identification, Jews typically communicated regularly and often engaged in altruistic behavior toward co-religionists in distant parts of the world (see Chapter 6). This did not occur with the Chinese.

5. The Jews were also viewed as indispensable to the Muslim rulers of Spain, even during periods characterized by considerable anti-Semitism. Fischel (1937) notes that despite many *de jure* restrictions on Jews during the 'Abbasid caliphate, Jews were utilized in the civil services where their services were indispensable, especially in the roles of physician and banker.

6. The Jews were well aware of the protection provided by the king, and grateful for it. Baer (1961) notes that laws on Jewish informers generally prohibited actions that would benefit Christians. The exception, however, was the king. "If anyone would tell the king (whom God save!) or the lords of council a thing to his [the king's] advantage

and for his well-being—even if the information was directed against a Jew—that man shall not be stigmatized as an informer or slanderer, since all Jews are in duty bound to seek the king's welfare" (quoted in Baer 1961, II:266).

7. Many Jews were forced to convert to Christianity as a result of the riots of 1391. Forced converts and their descendants are termed *Conversos* or New Christians (or sometimes the derogatory *Marranos*) in contrast to gentiles or Old Christians.

8. Brief mention should be made regarding Jewish competition with gentiles in the Muslim world (see also Chapter 7). Stillman (1979) notes the exclusion of Jews from a wide range of economic activities by Muslim guilds in medieval Morocco and from government service in 14th-century Egypt (p. 273). In Morocco, Jews were restricted to certain crafts and moneylending, which were prohibited or viewed negatively by Muslims for religious reasons, and Sephardic Jewish artisans formed their own guilds and professional societies there. A commentary on the Jews of Tunis in the late 19th century notes that Jews were displacing Arabs in trade and industry because they were protected by the authorities. Their newly acquired status enabled the Jews to successfully compete with the native Arab population and resulted in fear and jealousy by the displaced Arabs. "This fear and jealousy is added to the hatred of centuries, and the old 'Dshifa, ben Dshifa' (carrion, sons of carrion), is still the usual designation when they speak of Jews" (see Stillman 1979, 416-419).

9. As discussed in *SAID* (chs. 3 and 4), the Converso community remained highly cohesive and endogamous over a time span of several hundred years. Many of its members became crypto-Jews, often openly returning to Judaism after emigrating from the Iberian peninsula.

10. Even after the establishment of the Inquisition and well into the 16th century, the Conversos retained control of the municipal councils (Castro 1971, 340).

11. As discussed in *SAID* (ch. 3), intermarriage into the nobility tended to occur as a result of Jews providing dowries so that their daughters could marry into the gentile nobility. Such marriages therefore did not affect the racial purity of the Jewish gene pool, since the children were reared as gentiles. Moreover, there was no intermarriage at all in the lower social classes.

12. These beliefs may well have been exaggerated, but they certainly indicate that perceptions of resource competition were important psychologically to the Old Christians. The social identity theory of anti-Semitism developed in *SAID* (ch. 1) is highly compatible with the importance of false, exaggerated beliefs in the development of anti-Semitism.

13. As discussed in *SAID* (ch. 3), racial purity (*limpieza*) became a prime consideration for competition for resources during the period of the Inquisition, resulting in upward mobility of the lower classes because they were much less likely to have any Jewish ancestry.

14. The comment is undoubtedly intentionally reminiscent of God's promise to Abraham at Genesis 22:17: "I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand which is upon the seashore."

15. The persecution, however, occurred within the context of continued New Christian financing of the Spanish monarchy, since there was no effective alternative to New Christian participation in the royal finances. Eventually, however, all except the most powerful New Christians increasingly looked elsewhere for their future and eventually settled in diaspora Portuguese communities and northern mercantile centers such as Amsterdam, where they reverted to their Jewish identity.

16. The very precisely defined economic role of Jews in Venice required policing. The main activity of the Inquisition of Venice was to prevent deception by crypto-Jews posing as Christians in order to circumvent the restrictions on Jewish economic activity. Crypto-Jews who declared their Judaism upon entering Venice did not come under the purview of the Inquisition. But individuals were investigated if they were believed to have remained crypto-Jews in Venice and continued to conduct business as Christians (Pullan 1983, 315).

17. Concern with Jewish ties to the Turks is an example of the loyalty issue—a consistent theme of anti-Semitism. See *SAID* (ch. 3).

18. The only exception was the wine business, which was perhaps due to ritual reasons. However, Jews were active in the wine business in other areas of Poland (see Katz 1961a).

19. Mosse (1987, 131ff) also describes intense competition in the wire-making industry between a Jewish group and a gentile firm, which eventually resulted in amalgamation. However, he points to a continuing ethnic aspect of the episode. The Jewish group, although unrelated, retained its central core of Jewish managers over four generations and retained close commercial ties with other Jewish firms. Similar examples are discussed in Chapter 6.

20. For example, in 1931, of the 100 largest companies, 31 were predominantly Jewish, 58 were predominantly gentile, and only 10 were a mixture (Mosse 1987, 357).

21. Data summarized by Gay (1988, 19-20) indicate a similar pattern in Vienna during this period, where by 1880 Jews made up 10 percent of the population. There are clear associations between resource competition and the rise of anti-Semitism emanating from the gentile society. Regarding the extent of Jewish cultural dominance in *fin de siècle* Vienna, Gay (1988, 21) quotes the German Jewish novelist Jacob Wasserman as writing that "nearly all the people with whom I came into intellectual or cordial contact were Jews. . . . I soon recognized that all public life was dominated by Jews. The banks, the press, the theater, literature, social functions, all was in the hands of the Jews."

22. In Chapter 7, these demographic tendencies among the Jews are viewed as general aspects of Judaism as an evolutionary/ecological strategy.

23. As indicated in note 1, resource competition is not expected to be the only factor involved in anti-Semitism (see *SAID*, ch. 1). Gordon (1984) notes that German anti-Semitism was strongest in areas with the greatest numbers of unassimilated Eastern European Jewish immigrants, suggesting an independent effect of negative attitudes engendered by cultural separatism. The restriction of Jewish immigration was a common theme of anti-Semitism in Germany (e.g., Bracher 1970, 40).

24. Katz (1985, 91) finds that by 1860 the percentage of Jewish children attending secondary school was 3 to 4 times that of the gentile population and that this ratio increased in later years.

25. There is no question that Hitler's perception that Jews and "Aryans" were locked in an intense competition was central to his world view (Bracher 1970; Gordon 1984; see discussion in *SAID* [ch. 3]). These perceptions of economic competition and Jewish economic domination, although clearly having a basis in reality, may well have been exaggerated—a not uncommon aspect of anti-Semitism and one that is highly compatible with an evolutionary perspective (see *SAID*, ch. 1). However, when the Nazis ultimately achieved power, anti-Semitism became a top-down movement in the sense that its direction was determined by the leaders of the party and was quite independent of popular support: "Nazi victory meant that Hitler and the radical anti-Semites in the Nazi

party, not the German electorate in general, would determine Jewish policy" (Gordon 1984, 90).

26. Carlebach (1978, 60) notes that all classes in Germany (nobility, merchants, small shop keepers, and laborers) feared they would be negatively affected by the emancipation of the Jews. Jews established close links with the ruling aristocracy and the aristocracy often became financially dependent on Jews (Lindemann 1991, 13, 37, 43-45). Carlebach (1978, 60) also notes that the nobility in Prussia opposed the emancipation of the Jews because they feared that Jews would purchase all of the land. There was no fear that emancipating the gentile peasants would similarly alter the old social order.

27. These opinions are supported by modern research (see Chapter 7).

28. In addition, Lindemann (1991) shows that Jews were also overrepresented among those responsible for major financial scandals, such as bank failures, large-scale fraud, and stock market panics. These incidents often had disproportionately adverse effects on gentiles, and gentiles attributed them to Jews. Although these incidents do not involve direct competition, they involve an exploitative Jewish-gentile relationship in the sense that individual Jews were overrepresented among those who benefited by these affairs, so that resources are moving from the gentile community to the Jewish community without proportionate reciprocity.

29. For example, while 58 percent of the graduates of City College of New York who applied to medical school were accepted in 1925, only 15 percent were accepted in 1939; the percentage of Jews in medical school at Columbia University declined from 47 percent in 1920 to 8 percent in 1940 (Dinnerstein 1991).

30. Ginsberg (1993) shows that Jewish economic and cultural success since 1960 in the United States has the potential to result in anti-Semitic repercussions. For example, Jews were predominant among those involved in hostile corporate takeovers and insider trading scandals during the 1980s, and gentile reactions to these activities often had anti-Semitic overtones (Ginsberg 1993, 189-199). Moreover, African-Americans with the highest level of anti-Semitism are elite professionals who are in competition with Jews for positions in the public and quasi-public sectors of the economy (p. 181). There are also suggestions that non-Jewish White liberals may sometimes welcome African-American anti-Semitism as a means of decreasing Jewish influence (p. 180).

31. These percentage increases occurred despite the existence of considerable emigration, which began in the 17th century following the Cossack uprisings.

32. Notice that, within this perspective, celibacy does not play an independent role in limiting population growth among gentiles. Rises in celibacy are a result of economic constraints.

33. In at least one instance, greater Jewish fertility occurred despite later marriage. Alice Goldstein (1981) finds that, although Jews were indeed more fertile than gentiles prior to 1880 in a German sample, they actually married later than gentiles.

34. See Chapters 7 and 8 and *SAID* (ch. 2).

35. Fraikor (1977) also notes that the plague contributed to the demographic low point in the 14th century.

36. The latter two categories were encouraged as part of government policy to get the Jews to adopt these occupations, rather than the more typical occupation of petty trade.